THE
REMINISCENCES
OF
CARL SCHURZ

VOLUME THREE
1863–1869

WITH A SKETCH OF HIS LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES
FROM 1869 TO 1906

BY
FREDERIC BANCROFT AND WILLIAM A. DUNNING

ILLUSTRATED WITH PORTRAITS AND VIEWS

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In 1904, when Mr. Schurz was nearing the end of the second volume, and was hoping to finish the first draft of the third volume in a year or two, he consented to the serial publication of parts of what he had written. The selection, special alteration and proof-reading of these rapidly appearing parts, and also the preparation of the first volume for the press—these and many incidental matters claimed the right of way and much impeded his progress with the third volume. When his work was abruptly terminated he had reached only the first problems of Grant’s administration and had barely passed the threshold of his important services in the Senate. His manuscript is printed as he left it. Had he lived to complete his third volume, in which he hoped to reach at least the end of Hayes’ administration, it would doubtless have been revised and condensed.

It was a serious question to decide how to fill out the third volume and how to treat the remainder of Mr. Schurz’s career. Various projects were carefully considered. All except the one that has been followed, were found to be impracticable because they either did not suit present requirements or would interfere with probable later publications that ought to be kept distinct from the Reminiscences. Fortunately Mr. Schurz had preserved a practically complete set of his speeches and important public writings during all the later period, which are comprehensive, interesting and valuable, historically. He had also preserved a correspondence of many thousands of letters on matters of public interest. It was accordingly decided that it would be most in harmony with the Reminiscences and most welcome to the readers who have followed Mr. Schurz’s narrative, if this vast material should be carefully examined with a view to making a summary sketch of the leading features of his political career after 1869.
PREFACE

Mr. Frederic Bancroft, for many years a valued friend of Mr. Schurz, seemed peculiarly fitted for this task and could happily be prevailed upon to undertake it. He was so fortunate as to be able to associate with himself Professor William A. Dunning of Columbia University, an authority on that period of history. The results of their collaboration are presented in a later part of this volume.

AGATHE SCHURZ,
MARIANNE SCHURZ,
CARL L. SCHURZ.

NEW YORK, October, 1908
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THE REMINISCENCES OF CARL SCHURZ
CHAPTER I

The story of the Gettysburg campaign has so often and so elaborately been rehearsed, that it is hardly possible to add anything of value to the familiar tale. I shall, therefore, put down only some individual impressions and experiences which may be of interest at least to the circle of my personal friends.

On the 30th of June, on our march through Maryland, I had the good fortune of finding shelter in a nunnery, the St. Joseph's College at Emmitsburg, in Maryland, a young ladies' school, carried on by a religious order. I waited upon the Lady Superior to ask her for permission to use one of her buildings as my headquarters for a night, suggesting, and with perfect sincerity, that her buildings and grounds would be better protected by our presence within than by any guards stationed without. The Lady Superior received me very graciously, and at once put one of the houses within the enclosure at my disposal. She even sent for the chaplain of the institution, Father Borlando, to conduct us through the main edifice, and permitted one of my officers, a good musician, to play on the organ in the chapel, which he did to the edification of all who heard him. The conduct of my troops camped around the institution was exemplary, and we enjoyed there as still and restful a night as if the outside of the nunnery had been as peaceful as daily life was ordinarily within it. I mention this as one of the strange contrasts of our existence, for at daybreak the next morning I was waked up by a marching order, directing me to take the road to Gettysburg.

We did not know that we were marching towards the most
famous battlefield of the war. In fact, we, I mean even the superior officers, had no clear conception as to where the decisive battle of the campaign was to take place. Only a few days before, General Hooker had left the command of the Army of the Potomac—he had been made to resign, as rumor had it—and General Meade had been put into his place. Such a change of commanders at the critical period of a campaign would ordinarily have a disquieting effect upon officers and men. But in this case it had not, for by his boastful proclamation and his subsequent blunders and failures at Chancellorsville, General Hooker had largely forfeited the confidence of the army, while General Meade enjoyed generally the repute, not of a very brilliant, but of a brave, able and reliable officer. Everybody respected him. It was at once felt that he had grasped the reins with a firm hand. As was subsequently understood, neither he nor General Lee desired or expected to fight a battle at Gettysburg. Lee wished to have it at Catstown, Meade on Pipe Creek. Both were drawn into it by the unexpected encounter of the Confederate general Heth, who hoped to find "some shoes" for his men in the town of Gettysburg, and a Federal cavalry general on reconnaissance, both instructed not to bring on a general engagement, but rather cautioned against it. When we left Emmitsburg at 7 a.m. we were advised that the First Army Corps, under General Reynolds, was ahead of us, and there was a rumor that some rebel troops were moving toward Gettysburg, but that was all. At 10:30, when my division had just passed Horner's Mills, I received an order from General Howard to hurry my command forward as quickly as possible, as the First Corps was engaged with the enemy in the neighborhood of Gettysburg. This was a surprise, for we did not hear the slightest indication of artillery firing from that direction. I put the division
to the "double quick," and then rode ahead with my staff. Soon I met on the road fugitives from Gettysburg, men, women and children, who seemed to be in great terror. I remember especially a middle-aged woman, who tugged a small child by the hand and carried a large bundle on her back. She tried to stop me, crying out at the top of her voice: "Hard times at Gettysburg! They are shooting and killing! What will become of us!" Still I did not hear any artillery fire until I had reached the ridge of a rise of ground before me. Until then the waves of sound had passed over my head unperceived.

About 11:30 I found General Howard on an eminence east of the cemetery of Gettysburg, from which we could overlook a wide plain. Immediately before us Gettysburg, a comfortable-looking town of a few thousand inhabitants. Beyond and on both sides of it, stretching far away an open landscape dotted with little villages and farmhouses and orchards and tufts of trees and detached belts of timber; two creeks, Willoughby's Run on the left and Rock Creek on the right; radiating from the town westward and eastward, well-defined roads—counting from right to left the Hanover road, the York Pike, the Gettysburg and Hanover railroad, the Hunterstown road, the Harrisburg road, the Carlisle road, the Mummasburg road, the Cashtown and Chambersburg Pike, the Hagerstown road, and behind us the roads on which our troops were coming—the Emmitsburg road, the Taneytown road, and the Baltimore road. The elevated spot from which we overlooked this landscape was Cemetery Hill, being the northern end of a ridge which terminated due south in two steep, rocky knolls partly wooded, called the Round Tops—half a mile distant on our right a hill called Culp's Hill, covered with timber; and opposite our left, about a mile distant, a ridge running almost parallel with Cemetery Ridge, called [5]
Seminary Ridge, from the Lutheran Seminary buildings on its crest—the whole a smiling landscape inhabited by a peaceable people wont to harvest their crops and to raise their children in quiet and prosperous contentment.

From where we stood we observed the thin lines of troops, and here and there puffy clouds of white smoke on and around Seminary Ridge, and heard the crackle of the musketry and the booming of the cannon, indicating a forward movement of our First Corps, which we knew to be a little over 8000 men strong. Of the troops themselves we could see little. I remember how small the affair appeared to me, as seen from a distance in the large frame of the surrounding open country. But we were soon made painfully aware of the awful significance of it. The dead body of General Reynolds, the commander of the First Corps, was being carried away from the field. He had been too far forward in the firing-line and the bullet of a Southern sharpshooter had laid him low. So the action had begun with a great loss. He was known as an officer of superior merit, and in the opinion of many it was he that ought to have been put at the head of the Army of the Potomac. General Reynolds' death devolved the command of the First Corps upon General Doubleday, the command of all the troops then on the field upon General Howard, and the command of the Eleventh Corps upon me.

The situation before us was doubtful. We received a report from General Wadsworth, one of the division commanders of the First Corps, that he was advancing, that the enemy's forces in his front were apparently not very strong, but that he thought that the enemy was making a movement towards his right. From our point of observation we could perceive but little of the strength of the enemy, and Wadsworth's dispatch did not relieve our uncertainty. If the enemy
before us was only in small force, then we had to push him as far as might seem prudent to General Meade. But if the enemy was bringing on the whole or a large part of his army, which his movement toward General Wadsworth's right might be held to indicate, then we had to look for a strong position in which to establish and maintain ourselves until reinforced or ordered back. Such a position was easily found at the first glance. It was Cemetery Hill on which we then stood and which was to play so important a part in the battle to follow. Accordingly General Howard ordered me to take the First and Third Divisions of the Eleventh Corps through the town and to place them on the right of the First Corps, while he would hold back the Second Division under General Steinwehr and the reserve artillery on Cemetery Hill and the eminence east of it, as a reserve.

About 12:30 the head of the column of the Eleventh Corps arrived. The weather being sultry, the men, who had marched several miles at a rapid pace, were streaming with perspiration and panting for breath. But they hurried through the town as best they could, and were promptly deployed on the right of the First Corps. But the deployment could not be made as originally designed by simply prolonging the First Corps' line, for in the meantime a strong Confederate force had arrived on the battlefield on the right flank of the First Corps, so that to confront it, the Eleventh had to deploy under fire at an angle with the First. General Schimmelfennig, temporarily commanding my, the Third, Division, connected with the First Corps on his left as well as he could under the circumstances, and General Francis Barlow, commanding our First Division, formerly Devens', deployed on his right. General Barlow was still a young man, but with his beardless, smooth face looked even much younger than he was. His
men at first gazed at him wondering how such a boy could be put at the head of regiments of men. But they soon discovered him to be a strict disciplinarian, and one of the coolest and bravest in action. In both respects he was inclined to carry his virtues to excess. At the very time when he moved into the firing line at Gettysburg I had to interfere by positive order in favor of the commander of one of his regiments, whom he had suspended and sent to the rear for a mere unimportant peccadillo. Having been too strict in this instance, within the next two hours he made the mistake of being too brave.

I had hardly deployed my two divisions, about 6000 men, on the north side of Gettysburg, when the action very perceptibly changed its character. Until then the First Corps had been driving before it a comparatively small force of the enemy, taking many prisoners, among them the rebel general Archer with almost his whole brigade. My line, too, advanced, but presently I received an order from General Howard to halt where I was, and to push forward only a strong force of skirmishers. This I did, and my skirmishers, too, captured prisoners in considerable number. But then the enemy began to show greater strength and tenacity. He planted two batteries on a hillside, one above the other, opposite my left, enfilading part of the First Corps. Captain Dilger, whose battery was attached to my Third Division, answered promptly, dismounted four of the enemy's guns, as we observed through our field-glasses, and drove away two rebel regiments supporting them. In the meantime the infantry firing on my left and on the right of the First Corps grew much in volume. It became evident that the enemy's line had been heavily reinforced, and was pressing upon us with constantly increasing vigor. I went up to the roof of a house behind my skirmish line to get a better view of the situation, and observed that
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my right and center were not only confronted by largely superior forces, but also that my right was becoming seriously overlapped. I had ordered General Barlow to refuse his right wing, that is to place his right brigade, Colonel Gilsa's, a little in the right rear of his other brigade, in order to use it against a possible flanking movement by the enemy.

But I now noticed that Barlow, be it that he had misunderstood my order, or that he was carried away by the ardor of the conflict, had advanced his whole line and lost connection with my Third Division on his left, and in addition to this, he had, instead of refusing, pushed forward his right brigade, so that it formed a projecting angle with the rest of the line. At the same time I saw the enemy emerging from the belt of woods on my right with one battery after another and one column of infantry after another, threatening to envelop my right flank and to cut me off from the town and the position on Cemetery Hill behind.

I immediately gave orders to the Third Division to re-establish its connection with the First, although this made still thinner a line already too thin, and hurried one staff officer after another to General Howard with the urgent request for one of his two reserve brigades to protect my right against the impending flank attack by the enemy. Our situation became critical. As far as we could judge from the reports of prisoners and from what we observed in our front, the enemy was rapidly advancing the whole force of at least two of his army-corps—A. P. Hill's, and Ewell's, against us, that is to say, 40,000 men, of whom at least 30,000 were then before us. We had 17,000, counting in the two brigades held in reserve by General Howard and not deducting the losses already suffered by the First Corps. Less than 14,000 men we had at that moment in the open field without the slightest advantage of

[9]
position. We could hardly hope to hold out long against such a superiority of numbers, and there was imminent danger that, if we held out too long, the enemy would succeed in turning our right flank and in getting possession of the town of Gettysburg, through which our retreat to the defensive position on Cemetery Hill would probably have to be effected. For this reason I was so anxious to have one of the reserve brigades posted at the entrance of the town to oppose the flanking movement of the enemy which I saw going on.

But, before that brigade came, the enemy advanced to the attack along the whole line with great impetuosity. Gilsa’s little brigade, in its exposed position “in the air” on Barlow’s extreme right, had to suffer the first violent onset of the Confederates, and was fairly crushed by the enemy rushing on from the front and both flanks. Colonel Gilsa, one of the bravest of men and an uncommonly skillful officer, might well complain of his fate. Here, as at Chancellorsville, he was in a position in which neither he nor his men could do themselves justice, and he felt keenly the adverse whims of the fortunes of war. General Barlow, according to his habit always in the thickest of the fight, was seriously wounded, as happened to him repeatedly, and had to leave the command of the division to the commander of its second brigade, General Adelbert Ames. This brigade bravely endured an enfilading fire from two rebel batteries placed near the Harrisburg road. But it was forced back when its right flank was entirely uncovered and heavy masses of rebel infantry pressed upon it.

About four o’clock, the attack by the enemy along the whole line became general and still more vehement. Regiment stood against regiment in the open fields, near enough almost to see the white in one another’s eyes, firing literally in one another’s faces. The slaughter on both sides was awful. At [10]
that moment it was reported that the right wing of the First Corps, which had fought heroically all day, had been pressed back, and one of General Doubleday's aides-de-camp brought me a request for a few regiments to be sent to his assistance. Alas, I had not a man to spare, but was longing for reinforcements myself, for at the same time I received a report that my Third Division was flanked on its left, on the very spot where it should have connected with the First, General Doubleday's corps. A few minutes later, while this butchery was still going on, an order reached me from General Howard directing me to withdraw to the south side of the town and to occupy a position on and near Cemetery Hill.

While I was doing my utmost, assisted by my staff officers, to rally and re-form what was within my reach of the First Division, for the purpose of checking the enemy's advance around my right, and to hold the edge of the town, the reserve brigade I had so urgently asked for, the First Brigade of the Second Division, Eleventh Corps, under Colonel Coster, at last arrived. It came too late for that offensive push which I had intended to make with it in order to relieve my right, if it had come half, or even quarter of an hour earlier. But I led it out of the town and ordered it to deploy on the right of the junction of the roads near the railway station, which the enemy was fast approaching. There the brigade, assisted by a battery, did good service in detaining the enemy long enough to permit the First Division to enter the town without being seriously molested on its retreat. The Third Division was meanwhile still sustaining the murderous contest. To break off an engagement carried on at long range, is comparatively easy. But the task becomes very difficult and delicate in a fight at very close quarters. Still, the Third Division, when ordered to do so, fell back in good form, executing its retreat to the town,
fighting, step by step, with great firmness. I said in my offi-
cial report: "In this part of the action, which was almost
a hand-to-hand struggle, officers and men showed the highest
courage and determination. Our loss was extremely severe.
The Second Brigade, Third Division, lost all its regimental
commanders; several regiments nearly half their number in
killed and wounded." Among the mortally wounded was Col-
onel Mahler of the Seventy-fifth Pennsylvania, who had been
a revolutionary comrade of mine in the German fortress of
Rastatt, in 1849. Now with death on his face he reached out
his hand to me on the bloody field of Gettysburg, to bid me a
last farewell. I came out unscathed, but my horse had a bullet
hole clean through the fatty ridge of the neck just under the
mane.

It has been represented by some writers, Southerners, that
the Union forces on the first day of the battle of Gettysburg
were utterly routed and fled pell-mell into the town. This is
far from the truth. That there were a good many stragglers
hurrying to the rear in a disorderly fashion, as is always the
case during and after a hot fight, will not be denied. Neither
will it be denied that it was a retreat after a lost battle with
the enemy in hot pursuit. But there was no element of disso-
lution in it. The retreat through the town was of course more
or less disorderly, the streets being crowded with vehicles of
every description, which offered to the passing troops exceed-
ingly troublesome obstructions. It is also true that Eleventh
Corps men complained that when they entered the town, it
was already full of First Corps men, and vice versa, which
really meant that the two corps became more or less mixed
in passing through. It is likewise true that many officers and
men, among others General Schimmelfennig, became en-
tangled in cross streets, and alleys without thoroughfare, and
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were captured by the enemy pressing after them. But, after all, the fact remains that in whatever shape the troops issued from the town, they were promptly reorganized, each was under the colors of his regiment, and in as good a fighting trim as before, save that their ranks were fearfully thinned by the enormous losses suffered during the day.

As we ascended Cemetery Hill from the town of Gettysburg we met General Hancock, whom General Meade had sent forward to take command of the field. The meeting of Generals Hancock and Howard is thus described by Major E. P. Halstead of the staff of the First Corps, who had been sent by General Doubleday to ask General Howard for reinforcements: "I returned to where General Howard sat, just as General Hancock approached at a swinging gallop. When near General Howard, who was then alone, he saluted, and with great animation, as if there was no time for ceremony, said General Meade had sent him forward to take command of the three Corps [the First, Eleventh, and his own, the Second]. General Howard replied that he was the senior. General Hancock said: 'I am aware of that, General, but I have written orders in my pocket from General Meade, which I will show you if you wish to see them.' General Howard said: 'No; I do not doubt your word, General Hancock, but you can give no orders here while I am here.' Hancock replied: 'Very well, General Howard, I will second any order that you have to give, but General Meade has also directed me to select a field on which to fight this battle in rear of Pipe Creek.' Then casting one glance from Culp's Hill to Round Top, he continued: 'But I think this the strongest position by nature upon which to fight a battle that I ever saw, and if it meets your approbation I will select this as the battlefield.' General Howard responded: 'I think this a very strong posi-
tion, General Hancock, a very strong position.' 'Very well, sir, I select this as the battlefield,' said General Hancock, and immediately turned away to rectify our lines.'

This story is told by Major Halstead in the *Century* series of "Battles and Leaders," and he adds this remark: "There was no person present besides myself when the conversation took place between Howard and Hancock. A number of years since I reminded General Hancock of that fact and what I had heard pass between them. He said that what I have repeated here was true, and requested a written statement, which I subsequently furnished him."

That the appearance of Hancock as commander of the field should have sorely touched Howard's pride, is well intelligible, especially as he could hardly fail to understand it as an expression of want of confidence in him on the part of General Meade.

It was about 3:20 of the afternoon when General Buford sent a dispatch to General Meade in which he said: "In my opinion there seems to be no directing person." This was too severe on General Howard, who, in fact, had given several directions which were unquestionably correct. But it, no doubt, expressed the prevailing impression, and under these circumstances the appearance of General Hancock at the front was a most fortunate event. It gave the troops a new inspiration. They all knew him by fame, and his stalwart figure, his proud mien, and his superb soldierly bearing seemed to verify all the things that fame had told about him. His mere presence was a reinforcement, and everybody on the field felt stronger for his being there. This new inspiration of self-reliance might have become of immediate importance, had the enemy made another attack—an eventuality for which we had to prepare. And in this preparation Howard, in spite of his heart-sore, co-
operated so loyally with Hancock that it would have been hard to tell which of the two was the commander, and which the subordinate.

The line was soon formed. The Second Brigade, Colonel Orlando Smith's of Steinwehr's division, was already in position on the Cemetery Hill, fronting the town and occupying the nearest houses. Coster's brigade, and next the First Division, under Ames, were posted on the right, and my division, the Third, on his left on the cemetery itself. The First Corps was placed on my left, except Wadsworth's division, which was sent to the extreme right to occupy Culp's Hill. The batteries were put in proper position, and breastworks promptly constructed wherever necessary. All this was accomplished in a very short time. This done, General Hancock sat down on a stone fence on the brow of the hill from which he could overlook the field, on the north and west of Gettysburg, occupied by the Confederates. I joined him there, and through our field-glasses we eagerly watched the movements of the enemy. We saw their batteries and a large portion of their infantry columns distinctly. Some of those columns moved to and fro in a way the purpose of which we did not clearly understand. I was not ashamed to own that I felt nervous, for while our position was a strong one, the infantry line in it appeared, after the losses of the day, woefully thin. It was soothing to my pride, but by no means reassuring as to our situation, when General Hancock admitted that he felt nervous, too. Still he thought that with our artillery so advantageously posted, we might well hold out until the arrival of the Twelfth Corps, which was only a short distance behind us. So we sat watching the enemy and presently observed to our great relief that the movements of the rebel troops looked less and less like a formation for an immediate attack. Our nerves grew more and more tranquil [15]
as minute after minute lapsed, for each brought night and reinforcements nearer. When the sun went down the Twelfth Corps was on the field and the Third Corps arriving.

There has been much speculation as to whether the Confederates would not have won the battle of Gettysburg had they pressed the attack on the first day after the substantial overthrow of the First and Eleventh Corps. Southern writers are almost unanimous in the opinion that Lee would then without serious trouble have achieved a great victory. It is indeed possible that had they vigorously pushed their attack with their whole available force at the moment when the First and Eleventh Corps were entangled in the streets of the town, they might have completely annihilated those corps, possessed themselves of Cemetery Hill, and taken the heads of the Federal columns advancing toward Gettysburg at a disadvantage. But night would soon have put an end to that part of the action; that night would have given General Meade time to change his dispositions, and the main battle would in all likelihood have been fought on Pipe Creek instead of Gettysburg, in the position which General Meade had originally selected.

Nor is it quite so certain, as Southern writers seem to think, that the Confederates would have had easy work in carrying Cemetery Hill after the First and Eleventh Corps had passed through the town and occupied that position. When they speak of the two corps as having fled from the field in a state of utter demoralization, they grossly exaggerate. Those troops were indeed beaten back, but not demoralized or dispirited. Had they been in a state of rout such as Southern writers describe, they would certainly have left many of their cannon behind them. But they brought off their whole artillery save one single dismounted piece, and that artillery, as now posted, was capable of formidable work. The infantry was in-
deed reduced by well-nigh one-half its effective force, but all that was left, was good. Besides, the Confederates, too, had suffered severely. Their loss in killed and wounded and prisoners was very serious. Several of their brigades had become disordered during the action to such an extent that it required some time to re-form them. It is therefore at least doubtful whether they could have easily captured Cemetery Hill before the arrival of heavy reinforcements on our side. Another disputed point is whether we did not make a great mistake in continuing the bloody fight north of the town too long.

Thirty-eight years after the event I was called upon by Mr. John Codman Ropes, the eminent historian of the Civil War, who unfortunately for the country has died before finishing his work. He had then the history of the battle of Gettysburg in hand and wished to have my recollections as to certain details. In the course of our conversation I asked him what his criticism was of our conduct on the first day. He said that on the whole we fought well and were obliged to yield the field north and east of the town, but that we committed a great mistake in not retreating to our second position south and west of Gettysburg an hour and perhaps two hours earlier. The same opinion was expressed by General Doubleday in his official report. In referring to about that time of the day he says: "Upon taking a retrospect of the field it might seem, in view of the fact that we were finally forced to retreat, that this would have been the proper time to retire; but to fall back without orders from the commanding general might have inflicted lasting disgrace upon the corps—nor would I have retreated without the knowledge and approbation of General Howard, who was my superior officer. Had I done so, it would have uncovered the left flank of his corps. If circumstances required it, it was his place, not mine, to issue the order. Gen-
eral Howard, from his commanding position on Cemetery Hill, could overlook all the enemy's movements as well as our own, and I therefore relied much upon his superior facilities for observation to give me timely warning of any unusual danger."

That General Howard ought to have given the order to retreat at an earlier period of the action will, in the light of subsequent events, seriously be doubted. He may, in the first place, well have hesitated to retreat without orders from General Meade for reasons perhaps not quite as good, but nearly as good, as those given by General Doubleday for not having retreated without orders from General Howard.

But there was another consideration of weightier importance. Would not the enemy, if we had retreated two hours, or even one hour earlier, have been in better condition, and therefore more encouraged to make a determined attack upon the cemetery that afternoon,—and with better chance of success? The following occurrence subsequently reported, indicates that he would. Three or four companies of my regiments, led by Captain F. Irsch, became separated from the main body while retreating through the streets of Gettysburg. Hotly pressed by the pursuing enemy, they threw themselves into a block of buildings near the market place, from which they continued firing. A rebel officer approached them under a flag of truce, and summoned them to surrender. Captain Irsch defiantly refused, saying that he expected every moment to be relieved, as the Army of the Potomac was coming on. The rebel officer replied that the whole town was in the possession of the Confederates, and he offered Captain Irsch "safe conduct" if he would look for himself. The Captain accepted, and saw on the market place General Ewell on horseback, at the moment when an officer approached him (General
Ewell) in hot haste, and said to him within the Captain's hearing that General Lee wished him, General Ewell, forthwith to proceed to attack the Federals on Cemetery Hill, whereupon General Ewell replied in a low voice, but audible to Captain Irsch, that if General Lee knew the condition of his, Ewell's, troops, after their long march and the fight that had just taken place, he would not think of such an order, and that the attack could not be risked. This story, which I have from Captain Irsch himself and which is corroborated by other evidence, would seem to show that by continuing as long as we did, our fight in the afternoon, in spite of the losses we suffered, we rendered the enemy unable, or at least disinclined, to undertake a later attack upon Cemetery Hill, which might have had much more serious results. There is, therefore, very good reason for concluding that General Howard rendered valuable service in not ordering the retreat as early as General Doubleday thought he ought to have ordered it.

I remember a picturesque scene that happened that night in a lower room of the gate house of the Gettysburg Cemetery. In the center of the room a barrel set upright, with a burning tallow candle stuck in the neck of a bottle on top of it; around the walls six or seven generals accidentally gathered together, sitting some on boxes but most on the floor, listening to the accounts of those who had been in the battle of the day, then making critical comments and discussing what might have been and finally all agreeing in the hope that General Meade had decided or would decide to fight the battle of the morrow on the ground on which we then were. There was nothing of extraordinary solemnity in the "good-night" we gave one another when we parted. It was rather a commonplace, business-like "good-night," as that of an ordinary occasion. We of the Eleventh Corps, occupying the cemetery, lay down,
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wrapt in our cloaks, with the troops among the grave-stones. There was profound stillness in the graveyard, broken by no sound but the breathing of men and here and there the tramp of a horse's foot; and sullen rumblings mysteriously floating on the air from a distance all around.

The sun of the 2nd of July rose brightly upon these two armies marshalling for battle. Neither of them was ready. But as we could observe the field from Cemetery Hill, the Confederates were readier than we were. The belts of timber screening their lines presented open spaces enough, in which we could see their bayonets glisten and their artillery in position, to permit us to form a rough estimate of the extent of the positions they occupied and of the strength of their forces present. There was a rumor that Lee's army was fully as strong as ours—which, however, was not the case—and from what we saw before us, we guessed that it was nearly all up and ready for action. We knew, too, that to receive the anticipated attack, our army was, although rapidly coming in, not nearly all up. It was, indeed, a comforting thought that Lee, who, as rumor had it, had wished and planned for a defensive battle, was now obliged to fight an aggressive one against our army established in a strong position. Yet we anxiously hoped that his attack would not come too early for our comfort. Thus we watched with not a little concern the dense columns of our troops as they approached at a brisk pace on the Taneytown road and the Baltimore Pike to wheel into the positions assigned to them. It was, if I remember rightly, about 8 o'clock when General Meade quietly appeared on the cemetery, on horseback, accompanied by a staff officer and an orderly. His long-bearded, haggard face, shaded by a black military felt hat the rim of which was turned down, looked careworn and tired, as if he had not slept that night. The spectacles on his nose
gave him a somewhat magisterial look. There was nothing in his appearance or his bearing—not a smile nor a sympathetic word addressed to those around him—that might have made the hearts of the soldiers warm up to him, or that called forth a cheer. There was nothing of pose, nothing stagey, about him. His mind was evidently absorbed by a hard problem. But this simple, cold, serious soldier with his business-like air did inspire confidence. The officers and men, as much as was permitted, crowded around and looked up to him with curious eyes, and then turned away, not enthusiastic, but clearly satisfied.

With a rapid glance he examined the position of our army, which has often, and quite correctly, been likened to a fishing hook, the long shank of which was formed by Cemetery Ridge, running south from the cemetery to Round Top; the head by the cemetery itself, and the hook, receding toward the southeast, by the woods of Culp's Hill. The General nodded, seemingly with approval. After the usual salutations I asked him how many men he had on the ground. I remember his answer well. "In the course of the day I expect to have about 95,000—enough, I guess, for this business." And then, after another sweeping glance over the field, he added, as if repeating something to himself: "Well, we may fight it out here just as well as anywhere else." Then he quietly rode away.

The Second Corps of our army had arrived about seven; two divisions of the Fifth about the same time; several brigades of the Third Corps came up about nine; the Artillery Reserve and the large ammunition train was parked in the valley between Cemetery Ridge and Culp's Hill by eleven; the Sixth Corps under Sedgwick reached Rock Creek after a march of thirty-four miles, about four of the afternoon. Thus our line was gradually filled. But the forenoon passed without any serious attack from the Confederates. There were
only, as the two armies "felt" one another, occasional sputterings of musketry and abrupt discharges of cannon, like growling barks of chained watch-dogs when you approach them too closely. At last, between three and four, the expected attack came. Our position had its weak points. On our extreme right the Twelfth Corps under General Slocum held Culp's Hill—Wadsworth's division of the First Corps joined the Twelfth Corps to the Eleventh under Howard, which occupied the cemetery, forming the bend of the fishing hook; to the left of the Eleventh on Cemetery Ridge, the "long shank," stood Doubleday's division of the First, then the Second Corps under Hancock, and on its left the Third under Sickles, which, to gain a higher and apparently more advantageous position, was moved forward on the Cemetery Ridge line to a peach orchard, hence become famous, the two divisions of the corps forming a projecting angle, provoking attack. The Round Tops on the left of the Third Corps were unoccupied. These were the weak points which General Lee's keen eyes quickly perceived. Our Fifth Corps stood in reserve, and our Sixth Corps under Sedgwick had not yet arrived. Lee's army formed a large semicircle fronting our lines—Ewell's Corps on its left, facing Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill; A. P. Hill's Corps in the center, occupying Seminary Ridge and facing part of Cemetery Ridge held by the Second and the Third Corps, and Longstreet's facing our left.

It was from Longstreet's Corps, therefore, that the attack upon our weak points came. A brisk cannonade preceded it, which, to judge by the missiles which whirred over our heads, was partly directed upon Cemetery Hill, and to which the batteries near us replied at a lively rate. Then we heard a confused noise on our left, a continuous rattle of musketry, discharges of artillery now thundering with rapid vehemence;
then slackening as if batteries were silenced; then breaking out again with renewed violence; and from time to time something like an echo of a Union cheer or a rebel yell. Owing to a projecting spur of Cemetery Ridge, we on the cemetery itself could not see what was happening on our extreme left—nothing but the rising clouds of white smoke. Neither did the sounds we heard indicate which side had the advantage in the battle. But looking to our rear we observed how regiment after regiment was taken from our right wing to be hurried as quickly as possible toward the left of the army as reinforcement. The fire grew more furious from minute to minute, and about half after six, the roar of the battle actually seemed to indicate that our line was yielding. A moment later Captain Dilger of my artillery, who had gone to the ammunition train to get a new supply, came galloping up Cemetery Hill in great agitation with the report that the enemy had overwhelmed the Third Corps in the peach orchard and pressing after our flying troops had pierced our left center; that his musket balls were already falling into our ammunition train, and that unless the rebels were beaten back at once, they would attack us in the rear and take us prisoners in half an hour. It was a moment of most anxious suspense. But it did not last long. Loud and repeated Union cheers on our left, which could be heard above the din of battle, told us that relief had come in time and had rolled back the hostile wave. General Meade had skillfully used the advantage afforded us by the "interior line" in rapidly shifting forces from one point to another as the necessities of the moment required, and thus succeeded in meeting the assault of the enemy with superior numbers. As evening came the battle on the left sank into a lull and we were assured that, although the enemy had gained some ground, we had won a secure lodgment on the Round Tops, owing to
General Warren’s keen discernment of the situation, and our line from there to Cemetery Hill was substantially restored.

In the meantime the enemy, noticing the withdrawal of some of our troops from Culp’s Hill, had tried to capture that vitally important position. But there, too, although the enemy possessed himself of some of the breastworks left by the brigades that had been called away to assist in beating back the attack on our left, he was checked by our troops left in position, especially General Greene’s brigade—the same General Greene who lived in New York to reach, in honor and health, the age of ninety odd years—which heroically maintained itself alone until succored by reinforcements, among which were several of my regiments. A part of my First Brigade was sent to strengthen General Ames, who was hard pressed, and some of the Second Brigade pushed to the support of General Wadsworth, which they did very efficiently—for which thanks were returned.

But the dangers of the day were not yet ended. It was already dark when we on Cemetery Hill were suddenly startled by a tremendous turmoil at Wiedrich’s and Rickett’s batteries placed on a commanding point on the right of Cemetery Hill. General Howard and I were standing together in conversation when the uproar surprised us. There could be no doubt of its meaning. The enemy was attacking the batteries on our right, and if he gained possession of them he would enfilade a large part of our line toward the south as well as the east, and command the valley between Cemetery Ridge and Culp’s Hill, where the ammunition trains were parked. The fate of the battle might hang on the repulse of this attack. There was no time to wait for superior orders. With the consent of General Howard I took the two regiments
nearest to me, ordered them to fix bayonets, and, headed by Colonel Krzyzanowski, they hurried to the threatened point at a double-quick. I accompanied them with my whole staff. Soon we found ourselves surrounded by a rushing crowd of stragglers from the already broken lines. We did our best, sword in hand, to drive them back as we went. Arrived at the batteries, we found an indescribable scene of mêlée. Some rebel infantry had scaled the breastworks and were taking possession of the guns. But the cannoniers defended themselves desperately. With rammers and fence rails, hand spikes and stones, they knocked down the intruders. In Wiedrich's battery, manned by Germans from Buffalo, a rebel officer, brandishing his sword, cried out: "This battery is ours!" Whereupon a sturdy artilleryman responded: "No, dis battery is unser," and felled him to the ground with a sponge-staff. Our infantry made a vigorous rush upon the invaders, and after a short but very spirited hand-to-hand scuffle tumbled them down the embankment. As General Hunter said in his contribution to the Century series: "The Dutchmen showed that they were in no way inferior to their Yankee comrades, who had been taunting them ever since Chancellorsville." Our line to the right, having been reinforced by Carroll's brigade of the Second Corps, which had hurried on in good time, also succeeded in driving back the assailants with a rapid fire, and the dangerous crisis was happily ended. I could say with pride in my official report that during this perilous hour my officers and men behaved splendidly. During the night the regiments that had been withdrawn from my command to give aid elsewhere, returned to their former positions.

The net result of the second day's battle was, on the whole, not encouraging to either side. The Confederates had gained some ground—the position of the Emmitsburg road on their
right and some Union breastworks on Culp's Hill on their extreme left; but they had also failed in several of their attacks, and become aware how difficult it would be to break the Union lines at any point in a manner to secure a decisive result. On the other hand, our army had lost some ground, but at the same time made its position stronger by the secure occupation of the Round Tops and the rectification of its line between them and Cemetery Hill. But both armies had suffered enormous losses in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and the commander of each, as has appeared from subsequent revelations, profoundly wished he were well out of the mess, while neither could see how he could do else than continue on the line on which he had begun. A council of the corps commanders held by General Meade that night was unanimous in that decision.

At dawn of day on the 3rd of July we were roused from sleep by a fierce rattle of musketry in the woods of Culp's Hill. As already mentioned, the withdrawal of several brigades from our right to assist our left in the fights of the preceding day had enabled the enemy to get possession of several breastworks abandoned by the Twelfth Corps. General Meade decided that for the security of our right flank those positions must be re-taken, and the Twelfth Corps went at the task with great spirit. It was a little battle of its own, of which, owing to the woods on the field of action, we could see nothing except the columns of troops sent from the center and the left wing of our army to the assistance of the right. But the firing was incessant, both of artillery and musketry, now and then swelling into a great roar, stimulating the imagination of the distant listeners into nervous activity as to what might be happening under that cloud of white smoke hovering over Culp's Hill. About half past ten the firing ceased, and it was reported that the Twelfth, after a six hours' stubborn fight, not too bloody
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on our side, had retaken the positions held by the enemy during the night.

And then came that interval of perfect stillness of which most of the descriptions of the battle of Gettysburg have so much to say. That the battle should have come to a short stop would have surprised nobody. But when that stop lengthened from minute to minute, from half hour to half hour, and when it settled down into a tranquillity like the peaceful and languid repose of a warm midsummer morning in which one might expect to hear the ringing of the village church-bells, there was something ominous, something uncanny, in these strange, unexpected hours of profound silence so sharply contrasting with the bloody horrors which had preceded, and which were sure to follow them. Even the light-hearted soldiers, who would ordinarily never lose an opportunity for some outbreak of an hilarious mood, even in a short moment of respite in a fight, seemed to feel the oppression. Some sat silently on the ground munching their hard-tack, while others stretched themselves out seeking sleep, which they probably would have found more readily had the cannon been thundering at a distance. The officers stood together in little groups discussing with evident concern what this long-continued calm might mean. Could it be that Lee, whose artillery in long rows of batteries had been silently frowning at us all the morning, had given up his intention to make another great attack? If not, why had he not begun it at an earlier hour, which unquestionably would have been more advantageous to him?

Suddenly the riddle was solved. About one o’clock the long hush was broken by the booming of two guns fired in rapid succession on the enemy’s right, where Longstreet’s Corps stood. And at once this signal was answered by all the batteries of the Confederate army, about 130 cannon, that could be
brought to bear upon Cemetery Hill and the ridge joining it to the Round Tops. Instantly about 80 pieces of our artillery—as many as could usefully be posted in our line facing west and northwest—took up the challenge, and one of the grandest artillery duels in the history of wars followed. All that I had ever read in battle-stories of the booming of heavy guns out-thundering the thunders of heaven, and making the earth tremble, and almost stopping one's breath by the concussions of the air—was here made real, in terrific effect. The roar was so incessant and at times so deafening that when I wished to give an order to one of my officers I had to put my hands to my mouth as a speaking trumpet and shout my words into his ear. Fortunately the enemy had aimed their artillery a little too high, so that most of its missiles passed over our heads. But enough of them struck the ground on the cemetery and exploded there, to scatter death and destruction among the men immediately around, and to shatter gravestones and blow up ammunition caissons. But as most of them flew over us, rushing, screaming, whirring, and as they burst above, and sent down their deadly fragments, they added to the hellish din a peculiarly malicious noise of their own. How would the men endure this frightful experience? One of the hardest trials of the courage and steadfastness of the soldier is to stand still and be shot at without being able to reply. This ordeal is especially severe when the soldier is under a heavy artillery fire which, although less dangerous than that of musketry, is more impressive on the nerves. It bewilders the mind of the bravest with a painful sense of helplessness as against a tremendous power, and excites to peculiar vivacity the not unnatural desire to get into a safer place out of range. As a matter of course we ordered the troops to lie down flat on the ground, so as to present the smallest possible target. But when I observed the effect
of the dropping of a shell right into the midst of a regiment which caused some uneasy commotion, I thought it my duty to get upon my feet and look after it. I found that it had a very steadying and cheering effect upon the men to see me quietly walking up and down in front smoking a cigar. I could not speak to them, for the incessant roar of the cannonade would not let them hear me. But I noticed that many of them returned my smile in a sort of confidential way when I happened to catch their eyes, as if to say: "It is not jolly, but we two will not be frightened by it." Indeed it was not jolly, for I felt as if the enemy's projectiles rushing over me were so near that I might have touched them with my riding-whip held up at full length of my arm. But observing the good effect of my promenade in front, I invited, by gesture, some of the regimental officers to do likewise. They promptly obeyed, although, I suppose, they liked the stroll no more than I did.

Many years later I found in Tolstoy's great novel, "War and Peace," a description of the conduct of a Russian regiment at the battle of Borodino, which had to remain motionless under a fearful fire of French batteries, the men sitting on the ground and diverting their minds under the deadly hail by braiding the blades of grass within their reach. It reminded me vividly of what I saw on the cemetery of Gettysburg, where, while that tremendous cannonade was going on, some of the men occupied their minds by cleaning their gun-locks, others by polishing the buttons of their uniforms, still others by sewing up rents in their clothes. Evidently Tolstoy wrote from the personal experience of battles.

I had the good fortune of saving in a curious way the life of one of my aides, Captain Fritz Tiedemann, one of whose daughters more than thirty years later was to become the wife of one of my sons. During an interval between two of my
front promenades I stretched myself on the ground, my aide Fritz by my side. Feeling a nagging desire to eat something, I shouted into his ear: "Fritz, go and see whether you cannot borrow a cracker for me from somebody. I am desperately hungry." Fritz had hardly moved two paces away from me when a piece of a burst shell about half as large as my hand fell upon the place on which he had been lying, and buried itself several inches in the soil. Thus the life of my son's father-in-law that was to be, was saved by the craving of my stomach.

The furious bombardment had lasted more than an hour when the excellent Chief of Artillery of the Army of the Potomac, General Hunt, passed along the line the order to "cease firing"; not all the batteries to become silent at once, but one after another. The intention, and the actual effect, was, not only to prevent the further useless expenditure of ammunition, but principally to make the enemy believe that our artillery was in great part seriously crippled and would no longer be able to offer effective resistance to a vigorous attack. In fact the actual effect of the enemy's grand bombardment of our lines had been very trifling. A few pieces had been dismounted, but they were easily replaced from the reserve artillery. A few caissons had been exploded, but there was plenty of ammunition left. Some men and some horses had been killed or wounded, but their number was astonishingly small considering the awfulness of the turmoil, and there was nothing of the terror and demoralization which the enemy, no doubt, had expected to produce. To judge by my own command, which occupied one of the positions most exposed to the enemy's fire, we had suffered very little in killed and wounded, and I did not hear of a single man that had skulked away from the ranks.

But the enemy seemed to think differently. As our bat-
teries grew silent, so did his. And then came forth that famous scene which made the battle of Gettysburg more dramatic than any other event of the Civil War, and which more nearly approached the conception of what a battle is in the imagination of persons who have never seen one. I will describe only what we observed of it from the crest of Cemetery Hill. From a screen of woods opposite our left center emerged a long line of Confederate infantry, mounted officers in front and behind; and then another, and another—about 15,000 men. The alignment was perfect. The battle-flags fluttered gaily over the bayonets glittering in the sunlight. The spectacle has often been truly likened to a grand holiday parade on a festive ground. A mile of open field separated them from our line of defense. They had hardly traversed one-tenth of that distance when they became fully aware that those of them who had counted upon our artillery having been much disabled, had grievously deceived themselves. No sooner had the attacking column appeared on the open than our batteries, which had in the meantime been re-formed and well supplied with ammunition, opened upon them from the front and from the right and left, with a terrific fire. Through our field-glasses we could distinctly see the gaps torn in their ranks, and the ground dotted with dark spots—their dead and wounded. Now and then a cheer went up from our lines when our men observed some of our shells striking right among the advancing enemy and scattering death and destruction around. But the brave rebels promptly filled the gaps from behind or by closing up on their colors, and unshaken and unhesitatingly they continued their onward march. Then the Confederate artillery behind them, firing over their heads, tried to silence our batteries or at least to attract their fire so as to divert it from the infantry masses advancing in the open field. But in vain. Our cannon
did not change their aim, and the number of dark spots dotting the field increased fearfully from minute to minute. So far not a musket had been discharged from behind the stone fences protecting our regiments. Now the assailants steadily marching on seemed to disappear in a depression of the ground, where they stopped for a little while to readjust their alignment. But when they emerged again, evidently with undismayed courage, and quickened their pace to make the final plunge, a roar of cannon and a rattle of musketry, so tremendous, received them that one might have thought any force coming against it would have been swept from the face of the earth. Still the attacking lines, although much thinned and losing their regularity, rushed forward with grim determination. Then we on the cemetery lost sight of them as they were concealed from our eyes by the projecting spur of the ridge I have already spoken of. Meanwhile a rebel force, consisting apparently of two or three brigades, supporting the main attack on its left, advanced against our position on Cemetery Hill. We had about thirty pieces of artillery in our front. They were ordered to load with grape and canister, and to reserve their fire until the enemy should be within four or five hundred yards. Then the word to fire was given, and when, after a few rapid discharges, the guns "ceased" and permitted the smoke to clear away, all we saw of the enemy was the backs of men hastily running away, and the ground covered with dead and wounded. Our skirmishers rushed forward, speeding the pace of fugitives and gathering in a multitude of prisoners.

But on our left the struggle, which from the cemetery we could not see, still continued. We could only hear a furious din which seemed to be stationary. Could it be that the rebels were breaking our lines? With nervous anxiety we turned our
eyes upon the valley behind us. But there we saw, not fugitives or skulkers from our positions, but columns of troops hurrying to the scene of the decisive conflict. This was reassuring. At last, looking again at the field which had been traversed by the splendid host of assailants, we saw, first little driblets, then larger numbers, and finally huge swarms of men in utter disorder hurrying back the way they had come, and then, soon after, in hot pursuit, clouds of blue-coated skirmishers from our front rushing in from both sides, firing and capturing prisoners. This spectacle could have but one meaning. The great attack had failed disastrously. That magnificent column that had so proudly advanced upon us, was not only defeated, but well-nigh annihilated. A deep sigh of relief wrung itself from every breast. Then tremendous cheers arose along the Union lines, and here and there the men began to sing "John Brown's Soul." The song swept weirdly over the bloody field.

The general feeling in our ranks was that we had won a victory, and that we had now to reap its fruits. The instinct of the soldiers demanded a prompt, aggressive movement upon the enemy, and I think the instinct of the soldiers was right. The strongest of our army corps, the Fifth, kept in reserve, was substantially intact. Hardly any of the other corps had suffered so much as to be incapable of vigorous action. Their spirits were elated to genuine enthusiasm by the great event of the day. An order for a general advance seemed to be the natural outcome of the moment, and many men in the ranks fairly cried for it. But it did not come. Our skirmishers followed the retreating enemy for a certain distance, and then returned with their prisoners without having touched the positions from which the attacking force had emerged. Then two or three batteries of rebel artillery galloped forth from the belt
of timber which screened the enemy's scattered forces. They advanced a short distance, unlimbered, fired a few discharges, limbered up again, and galloped back—probably to make us believe that the enemy, although repulsed, was still on the ground in fighting trim. (I do not remember having seen this fact stated in any of the histories of the battle of Gettysburg, but I observed it with my own eyes, and the impression is still vivid in my memory.)

Soon darkness and deep silence fell upon the battlefield. Officers and men, utterly exhausted by the fatigues and excitements of the past three days, just dropped down on the ground. In a moment my people around me were soundly asleep among the shattered gravestones. About two o'clock in the morning I was suddenly aroused by a sharp but short rattle of musketry, the sound coming clearly from the plain on the north side of the town. It lasted only a few seconds—then complete stillness again. What could it mean? Only that the enemy was withdrawing his pickets, and some of our outposts sent a volley after them. This was my own opinion, and that of my officers. The next minute we were fast asleep again, and woke up only when daylight was upon us. Early in the morning I sent a detachment of my second brigade, under my chief of staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Otto, into the town to reconnoiter. They took prisoners over 250 rebel stragglers, who remained behind while the enemy had during the night quietly evacuated Gettysburg. I at once rode in with some staff-officers and orderlies to satisfy myself whether there were any wounded men left in the houses or on the fields beyond, where my troops had been engaged on the first day of the battle. Then I enjoyed a most delightful surprise.

Of all the losses we had suffered in the first day's bloody battle, that of my old friend Schimmelfennig went nearest to
GENERAL SCHIMMELFENNIG
my heart. He had not only been an officer of exceptional ability, but my military instructor in the old German days, and a dear personal friend. We did not know what had become of him—whether he lay dead on the field, or had been wounded, or made a prisoner by the enemy. Some of his officers had last seen him in the thickest of the fight, and how, when the order to retreat was given, he had left the field in the rear of his command. Further, their accounts did not go. Now, when early in the morning after the three-days' struggle I entered the town—what should I see? In the door of one of the houses on the main street, General Schimmelfennig, alive and waving his hat to me. "Halloh!" he shouted. "I knew you would come. I have been preparing for you. You must be hungry. I found some eggs in this house and saved them for you. We shall have them fried in a few minutes. Get off your horse and let us take breakfast together." It was a jolly repast, during which he told us his story. When, during that furious fight of the first day, the order to retreat reached him, he did his best to take his command out of the fire-line in as orderly a shape as possible—a very difficult operation under any circumstances—and, therefore, left the field in the rear of his troops. But when he reached the town he found the streets crowded with a confused mass of artillery and vehicles of all sorts, and disorganized men. Somehow he was crowded into a blind lane, and suddenly ran against a high fence, barring his progress, while some rebel infantrymen, in hot pursuit, were yelling close behind him. To clear the tall fence on horseback was impossible. He therefore dismounted and climbed over it. While he was on the top rail, his pursuers came up to him, and one of them knocked him on the head with the butt of his gun. The blow did not hurt him much, but he let himself drop on the other side of the fence as if he were dead, or at least stunned. Fortunately, he wore
an ordinary cavalry overcoat over his general’s uniform, so that no sign of his rank was visible. The rebel soldiers, thus taking him for a mere private, then passed by him. After a little while he cautiously raised his head and discovered that he was alone in a little kitchen garden, and that within a few yards of him there was a small stable or shed that might serve him as a temporary shelter. He crawled into it, and found a litter of straw on the ground, as well as some bread crumbs and other refuse, which seemed to have been intended for pigs. Soon he heard voices all around him, and from the talk he could catch he concluded that the rebels had taken possession of the town and were making preparations for its defense.

There he lay, then, in his pig-sty, alone and helpless, surrounded on all sides by enemies who might have discovered him at any moment, but fortunately did not, and unknown to the inhabitants of the house to which the kitchen garden belonged. He had nothing to eat except the nauseous scraps he found on the ground, and nothing to drink except the few drops that were left in his field flask. And in this condition he lay from the afternoon of the 1st of July until the early morning of the 4th. But worse than hunger and thirst during those two and a half days and three nights was his feverish anxiety concerning the course of the battle. There was an ill-omened silence during the first night and the early forenoon of the second day. Had our army withdrawn? From the noises he heard he could only conclude that the enemy held the town of Gettysburg in force. But the roar of cannon and the rattle of the musketry during the afternoon assured him that our army was present in force, too. Only he could not tell which side had the advantage, or whether there was any advantage achieved by either side. And so it was on the third day, when the battle seemed to rage furiously, at different times and at
different points, apparently neither advancing nor receding, until late in the afternoon the artillery became silent, and a mighty Union cheer filled the air. Then his hope rose that something favorable to us had happened. Still, he was disquieted again by the continued presence of the rebel infantry around him, until late in the night he heard something like the passing around of an order among them in a low voice, whereupon they seemed quietly to slink away. Then perfect stillness. At break of day he ventured his head out of the pig-sty, and finding the kitchen garden completely deserted, he went into the house, the inhabitants of which greeted him first with some apprehension, but then, upon better knowledge of the situation, with great glee. A happy moment it was to me when I could telegraph to Mrs. Schimmelfennig, who was, with my family, at Bethlehem, Pa., that her husband, who had been reported missing after the first day's battle, had been found, sound and safe!

No contrast could have been gloomier than that between the light-hearted hilarity of our breakfast and my visit to the battlefield immediately following it. The rebels had removed many if not most of their dead, but ours lay still in ghastly array on the ground where they had fallen. There can be no more hideous sight than that of the corpses on a battlefield, after they have been exposed a day or more to the sun in warm weather—the bodies swollen to monstrous size, the faces bloated and black, the eyes bulging out with a dead stare, all their features puffed out almost beyond recognition, some lying singly or in rows, others in heaps, having fallen over one another, some in attitudes of peaceful repose, others with arms raised, others in a sitting posture, others on their knees, others clawing the earth, many horribly distorted by what must have been a frightful death-struggle. Here I stood on the ground
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occupied by my division during that murderous conflict, around me the dead bodies of men who, but three days ago, had cheered me when I rode along their front, and whose greetings I had responded to with sincere affection, the features of some of whom I now succeeded in recognizing after a painful effort; some officers whom I had known well, with whom I had talked often, and who now lay here, struck down in the flower of their young manhood, now horrible to look at like the rest—and over yonder, only a few paces away, some Confederate dead, whom their comrades had left on the field, now looking just like our men, and having in all probability died with the same belief in the justice of their cause. Was it possible that any of them should have been sincerely convinced of the righteousness of the cause they fought for—the cause of slavery? I had to say to myself that it was possible, and in many cases even certain; for did I not know from history that in many religious wars men had cut one another's throats with the fierceness of fanatical conviction concerning differences of opinion on doctrinal points which to-day would call forth from any educated person only a smile of pity? I rode away from this horrible scene in a musing state of mind, finally composing myself with the reaffirmed faith that in our struggle against slavery we could not possibly be wrong; that there was an imperative, indisputable necessity of fighting for our cause; that the belief of the rebels in the righteousness of their cause might be ever so sincere, and that they might individually deserve ever so much credit for that sincerity, but that their error stood offensively in the way of justice, and that their challenge had to be met.

There were more harrowing experiences in store for me that day. To look after the wounded of my command, I visited the places where the surgeons were at work. At Bull Run, I

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THE BATTLEFIELD OF GETTYSBURG
had seen only on a very small scale what I was now to behold. At Gettysburg the wounded—many thousands of them—were carried to the farmsteads behind our lines. The houses, the barns, the sheds, and the open barnyards were crowded with moaning and wailing human beings, and still an unceasing procession of stretchers and ambulances was coming in from all sides to augment the number of the sufferers. A heavy rain set in during the day—the usual rain after a battle—and large numbers had to remain unprotected in the open, there being no room left under roof. I saw long rows of men lying under the eaves of the buildings, the water pouring down upon their bodies in streams. Most of the operating tables were placed in the open where the light was best, some of them partially protected against the rain by tarpaulins or blankets stretched upon poles. There stood the surgeons, their sleeves rolled up to the elbows, their bare arms as well as their linen aprons smeared with blood, their knives not seldom held between their teeth, while they were helping a patient on or off the table, or had their hands otherwise occupied; around them pools of blood and amputated arms or legs in heaps, sometimes more than man-high. Antiseptic methods were still unknown at that time. As a wounded man was lifted on the table, often shrieking with pain as the attendants handled him, the surgeon quickly examined the wound and resolved upon cutting off the injured limb. Some ether was administered and the body put in position in a moment. The surgeon snatched his knife from between his teeth, where it had been while his hands were busy, wiped it rapidly once or twice across his blood-stained apron, and the cutting began. The operation accomplished, the surgeon would look around with a deep sigh, and then—“Next!”

And so it went on, hour after hour, while the number of expectant patients seemed hardly to diminish. Now and then
one of the wounded men would call attention to the fact that his neighbor lying on the ground had given up the ghost while waiting for his turn, and the dead body was then quietly removed. Or a surgeon, having been long at work, would put down his knife, exclaiming that his hand had grown unsteady, and that this was too much for human endurance—not seldom hysterical tears streaming down his face. Many of the wounded men suffered with silent fortitude, fierce determination in the knitting of their brows and the steady gaze of their bloodshot eyes. Some would even force themselves to a grim jest about their situation or about the "skedaddling of the rebels." But there were, too, heart-rending groans and shrill cries of pain piercing the air, and despairing exclamations, "Oh, Lord! Oh, Lord!" or "Let me die!" or softer murmurings in which the words "mother" or "father" or "home" were often heard. I saw many of my command among the sufferers, whose faces I well remembered, and who greeted me with a look or even a painful smile of recognition, and usually with the question what I thought of their chances of life, or whether I could do anything for them, sometimes, also, whether I thought the enemy were well beaten. I was sadly conscious that many of the words of cheer and encouragement I gave them were mere hollow sound, but they might be at least some solace for the moment.

There are people who speak lightly of war as a mere heroic sport. They would hardly find it in their hearts to do so, had they ever witnessed scenes like these, and thought of the untold miseries connected with them that were spread all over the land. He must be an inhuman brute or a slave of wild, unscrupulous ambition, who, having seen the horrors of war, will not admit that war brought on without the most absolute necessity, is the greatest and most unpardonable of crimes.
In the course of the day the great tidings came that General Grant had taken Vicksburg and made the whole garrison of that Confederate stronghold prisoners of war. That was a great victory—a complete victory—and great was the cheering along our lines when we heard of it. But there was also among many of the officers of the Army of the Potomac, deep-down, a depressing consciousness that ours was not, what it might have been, a complete victory. To be sure, we had fought a great battle—and fought it bravely; our losses were enormous, over twenty-five per cent. of the whole force, and the losses of the enemy could hardly be less; we had disastrously repulsed a fierce attack of the Confederates and inflicted upon them a terrible blow. But now, on the day after that great event, there stood the enemy—having, indeed, withdrawn from the field fought over during the preceding three days, but only to concentrate his forces in a strong defensive position on that very Seminary Ridge from which he had been directing his offensive movements—there he stood, within sight of us, within cannon-shot, grimly daring us to attack him, and we did not move. The situation seemed almost humiliating when we remembered that the day before, after the repulse of Pickett's charge, with three hours of daylight to spare, we might, by a resolute and vigorous counter-charge by our whole disposable force, have achieved a real victory over Lee's army, a victory which might have stopped this mainstay of the Confederacy of most of its power of mischief. I have always esteemed General Meade's character so highly that I am loath to join his critics on any point. But I have always understood it to be one of the first of the rules of war—which, in fact, are nothing but the rules of common sense applied to the business of war—that when you have dealt the enemy a blow which destroys his strength at some important point, and which confuses and demoralizes
him so as to make him stagger—or, as the pugilists say, to render him "groggy"—you must follow up your advantage to the best of your ability, so as to reap its fruits. That we had dealt such a blow to Lee's army by the repulse of Pickett's charge we could see with our eyes. The attacking force of the rebels had not only been hurled back, but what was left of it had been turned into a disorderly and demoralized mob—that is, it had been substantially annihilated as a fighting body, much more apt to continue running than to offer effective resistance—for the time being, at least. On the other hand, we had one army corps that had hardly been engaged at all, and several others which, in spite of the losses they had suffered, were in good fighting form and in unusually fine fighting spirits; for at that moment the Army of the Potomac—what had not often happened to it before—felt victory in its bones. In one word, the chances of success would have been decidedly and largely in our favor. It was one of those rare opportunities in war promising great results, but, to win them, demanding instant resolution. There being no instant resolution the great opportunity was lost. Lee was given ample time to rally and re-form his shattered host, and, contracting his lines, to establish himself in his strong defensive position on Seminary Ridge. There he stood—a whole day longer, like a wounded lion—wounded, but still defiant.

He gave the order to retreat across the Potomac on the afternoon of July 4th. There we had another opportunity to win great results by a vigorous pursuit. Lee's retreat was a difficult one, owing to his encumbrances and the heavy rains spoiling the roads. But our pursuit was not vigorous. We started the next day, exerted hardly any pressure at all upon his rear, marched by circuitous routes more or less parallel with Lee's line of retreat, and when, after several days, we caught
up with him in an entrenched position, we put off the attack long enough to give him time to withdraw his whole army across the river without any serious loss. Thus it happened that General Lee saved from the battlefield at Gettysburg an army still capable of giving many anxious hours to the defenders of the Union. Indeed, the political value of the results achieved at Gettysburg can hardly be overestimated. Had Lee defeated us on that battlefield, and marched with his victorious hosts upon Baltimore and Washington, there would have been complications of incalculable consequence. The lines of communication between the seat of our government and the North and West might have been seriously interrupted. A new secession movement might possibly have been started in Maryland. The disloyal partisan elements in the Northern States might have been greatly encouraged to aggressive activity. New attempts might have been made in England and France to bring about the recognition of the Southern Confederacy by those powers, and eventual intervention in its favor. I am far from believing that all this would have resulted in the final breaking down of the Union cause, for the North would no doubt have risen to a supreme effort, but our situation would certainly have been beset with most perplexing troubles for a time, and the war might have been materially prolonged.

On the other hand, Lee's failure at Gettysburg—if we call it only that—had dashed the highest hopes of the Southern people. The invasion of the North and the attempt to transplant the war upon Northern soil had so decidedly miscarried that so ambitious a plan would hardly again be thought of. The hope of supplying the meager and constantly dwindling resources of the South with rich Northern spoil had to be given up forever. Moreover, Lee's army, which so far had thought itself invincible, and looked upon the Northern soldiers with
haughty contempt, had been seriously weakened in the self-reliance which had inspired its daring in many battles. Thenceforth it felt itself on the defensive. And the defensive, although still formidable, was bound gradually to grow weaker as the Confederacy found it more and more difficult to fill the widening gaps in the ranks of its armies, and to furnish its fighting forces with the necessaries of warfare.

It has been a common saying that the capture of Vicksburg, giving us the free command of the Mississippi, and the battle of Gettysburg, forcing the best Southern army back upon Southern soil, broke the backbone of the rebellion. This is substantially true. But it is equally true that, had our success at Gettysburg been so followed up as to destroy Lee's army, or at least to render it unable to keep the field, the war would probably have been a year shorter.

When General Lee had recrossed the Potomac, our army leisurely followed rather than pursued him upon the old, well-trodden field of operations in Virginia. An amusing little adventure happened to me on that occasion. When we were passing through Loudoun County, Virginia, my division had the rear of the marching column, and I observed on a ridge of ground on our left, running nearly parallel with our line of march, at a distance of about two miles, groups of horsemen, who would quickly disappear again after having for a moment shown themselves. Owing to the distance we could not make out through our glasses whether they looked like Union or rebel cavalry, or guerrillas, of whom there were a good many in that part of Virginia, under their famous chief, Colonel Mosby. But it was my own opinion, as well as that of my staff-officers, that they must be detachments of Union cavalry, charged with the duty of guarding the flank of the army on its march. This would have been the correct thing. Not hav-
ing any cavalry to investigate the matter at a distance, I had to content myself with pushing out a little farther my infantry flanking parties and my rear guard. That night we camped at a place called Mountsville, where we were to rest two or three days. The next morning it was reported to me that Mosby's guerrillas were hovering all around us, and had already picked up some army vehicles and sutlers' wagons, as well as a number of stragglers.

At once I ordered out several strong infantry patrols to scour the country in all directions, and one of them I accompanied myself for the special purpose of establishing an outpost at a mill situated on a water-course, near which I had noticed on yesterday's march several loiterers of suspicious appearance. I rode ahead of the patrol, accompanied by an officer of my staff, two orderlies, and my staff bugler. Light-heartedly we enjoyed the freshness of the morning.

To get to the mill we had to pass through a little defile—a narrow, sunken road, slightly descending, and bordered on each side by an abrupt rise of ground covered with trees and underbrush. We had hardly entered this defile, when, at the lower end of it, perhaps two hundred yards ahead of us, we observed a troop of horsemen, ten or twelve of them, who advanced toward us. They looked rather ragged, and I took them for teamsters or similar folk. But one of my orderlies cried out: "There are the rebels!" And true enough, they were a band of Mosby's guerrillas. Now they came up at a gallop, and in a minute they were among us. While we whipped out our revolvers, I shouted to my bugler: "Sound the advance, double-quick!" which he did; and there was an instant "double-quick" signal in response from the infantry patrol, still hidden by the bushes, but close behind us. We had a lively, but, as to my party, harmless conversation with revolvers for a few see-
onds, whereupon the guerrillas, no doubt frightened by the shouts of the patrol coming on at a run, hastily turned tail and galloped down the road, leaving in our hands one prisoner and two horses. We sped after them, but as soon as they had cleared the defile they scattered over the fields, and were soon lost to sight in the ravines and among the timber-belts around. The infantry patrol, of course, could not overtake them, but it found in a sheltered nook, at a distance from the road, several army vehicles, two sutlers' wagons, and a lot of our stragglers that had been captured.

About ten years later, when I was a member of the Senate of the United States, I was one day passing through the great rotunda of the Capitol, and was stopped by an unknown person with the question: "General, do you remember me?" He was a man of middle stature, a lean, close-shaven face, and a somewhat high-pitched voice. I should have judged him to be a genuine Yankee, especially as I thought I detected in his speech something of the nasal twang usually attributed to the New Englander. I had to confess that I did not remember him. "Well," he replied; "but you surely recall a lively meeting you had with some of Mosby's men on a shady road near Mountsville, Loudoun County, Virginia, on a fine July morning in 1863! I am Colonel Mosby, and I was there. You and I were together at arm's length on that occasion." Of course, there was a hearty handshake and a merry laugh. And we good-naturedly confessed to one another how delighted each one of us would have been to bag the other. Shortly after the close of the Civil War, Colonel Mosby, the nimble and daring marauder, who had often given us much annoyance, "accepted the situation," joined the Republican party, and was employed by the Union Government in various capacities.

During the summer weeks which followed, my command
did not again come into contact with the enemy. We were occasionally shifted from one place to another, as the safety of the communications of the army required. We led, therefore, a rather dull life, but that period is especially memorable to me, because it was there that I committed a breach of discipline for which I might have been—and perhaps ought to have been—cashiered.

The case was this: A private in one of my regiments had been tried by court-martial for desertion, and, according to law, sentenced to death. I was directed to see to the execution of that sentence, for which a special day was appointed. It was reported to me that the culprit was a mere boy, who had been seduced to desert by two older men, bad characters, who succeeded in getting away, while he was caught. I was also informed that he had been in the custody of my provost-guard on the battlefield of Gettysburg, and I had an idea that if a soldier sentenced to death was brought under the fire of the enemy again, he was, according to military custom, relieved of that mortal sentence and entitled at least to some commutation of it. I went to see the poor fellow, and found him to be a young Bohemian, a remarkably handsome lad of hardly more than eighteen, who looked at me with the honest eyes of a child. He told me his side of the story of his desertion in a simple way, confirming what I had heard of his being taken with them by two much older comrades, and that he did not know how serious a thing it was, and how he had intended to come back, and how he would try to die bravely if die he must—but his mother—oh, his mother! The poor woman was a widow, and lived in New York. She was not alone, and not destitute, but she loved him much, and would miss him dreadfully.

I at once made up my mind that, in spite of my orders, I
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would not direct that boy to be shot, and that I would save him from being shot by anybody else if I could.

First, I tried the "regular official channels." I appealed to my immediate superior, my corps commander, General Howard, asking him for authority to put off the execution, and laying before him at the same time—to be submitted to the War Department—my reasons for believing that the unfortunate young man should be pardoned. General Howard, with whom I talked the matter over personally, showed himself very sympathetic, but he told me that he had no power to suspend the order I was to execute. He would, however, forward my request to a higher authority, with a warm endorsement, which, no doubt, he did. The time set for the execution approached, but no answer from the War Department came. On the dreaded day I was ordered to take my command from New Baltimore, Virginia, to some point the name of which I have forgotten, and the poor boy was to be shot at noon on the march. I was firmly resolved not to do it. I did not advise General Howard of my resolution, because I did not wish to involve him in my responsibility. We did, indeed, stop at noon, but merely to give the troops a little rest and time to cook and eat their midday meal. My poor culprit remained undisturbed. When we had gone into camp in the evening, I had him brought into my tent. I told him that an effort was being made to save him, but that I did not know whether it would succeed. He expressed his gratitude with touching simplicity. He said that he expected to be shot that day, and that, when the column halted at noon, he was sure that his last moment on earth had come. But when he then heard the bugle signals, indicating that the troops were to be put in motion again, he suddenly wanted something to eat, and he felt a great joy in his heart which he was hardly able to repress; and would I
permit him to write to his mother about it? It was hard for me to repeat to him that I could give him no definite assurance; but when the next morning no answer came from the War Department, I wrote to Mr. Lincoln directly—again in disregard of all the rules and regulations—submitting to him a full statement of the case, and asking him to pardon the boy. Then I had not long to wait for a response. The pardon came promptly, and the boy was sent back to his regiment.

The whole affair was hushed up quietly. My insubordinate conduct passed without official notice, and I never heard of the matter again until nearly forty years later, when at one of the annual banquets held by the "Eleventh Corps Association," composed of survivors of the war, an elderly man, apparently a well-to-do mechanic, was brought to me, who introduced himself as the "deserter" condemned to death, and whose life I had saved in the summer of 1863.

During these comparatively quiet weeks after such arduous campaigns the matter of the reorganization of the Army of the Potomac came naturally to the foreground. In consequence of the casualties of the war, many of the regiments had become reduced to mere skeletons. My division, for instance, which, had all the regiments composing it been up to their original number, would have been 10,000 men strong, counted after the battle of Gettysburg hardly more than 1500 muskets. And many other commands were in a similar condition. The return from the hospitals or from furlough of men who had been wounded or sick, gradually repleted the ranks somewhat, but far from sufficiently, and the few recruits who were furnished us through conscription and the lavish bounty system, were in large part of a character by no means desirable. We became familiarly acquainted with the "bounty-jumper," the fellow who pocketed considerable sums of money in selling him-
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self for service as a soldier, and then would desert on the first favorable occasion, to play the same game again, at a different place and under a different name.

The task of army-reorganization brought to the front the question what would be done with the Eleventh Corps. The conduct of the corps on the battlefield at Gettysburg should have silenced the voice of detraction which had malignantly pursued it ever since it had been made the scapegoat of the Chancellorsville disaster. To be sure, we had again had the misfortune of being opposed, on the first day, to a vastly superior force of the enemy, in an unfavorable position, and we had been beaten, together with the First Corps. But we had held our ground a considerable time in a terrible fight, which inflicted enormous losses upon us; and then, after a short but very difficult retreat through the streets of a town filled with all sorts of obstructions, we instantly re-formed our thinned ranks, ready to fight again. On the next two days our men endured the great cannonade with exemplary firmness, manfully repelled the attacks made upon them, and whenever ordered, rushed with alacrity to the points where aid was required. No troops could have done their duty better. The defamatory persecution of the Eleventh Corps might then have ceased. But it did not. The "foreign legion," as it was dubbed, was to serve as a scapegoat again for the retreat of the First Corps from a battlefield which could no longer be held against overwhelming numbers. How far this campaign of slander would go in its absolutely unscrupulous disregard of the truth, and how tenaciously the original calumny was stuck to, appears from a description of the battle of Gettysburg published by General Charles King, an officer of the regular army, over thirty years after the event. There we are told that while in the first day's battle the First Corps was [50]
MAJOR-GENERAL CARL SCHURZ

From a War-time Photograph
making an heroic stand against the reinforced rebels, the Eleventh Corps was "losing its hold on the northward front"; that "its foreign-born, foreign-bred brigadiers were giving way before the natives sweeping down upon them in those long gray lines"; and that, "just as at Chancellorsville, one sturdy Ohio brigade—McLean's command, now led by Ames—was making stanch but futile stand against the onward rush of Early and Gordon." To characterize the cool effrontery of this tale I have only to remind my reader of the fact that at Chancellorsville McLean's brigade was at once swept away by the first onset of Jackson's attack, that the division on our extreme right at Chancellorsville, the first to be driven in, was commanded by General Devens of Massachusetts, a native, and his strongest brigade by General McLean, also a native, while only his smallest brigade had Colonel Gilsa, a foreign brigadier, at its head; that the only real fighting at Chancellorsville, which for about an hour delayed Jackson's progress, was done by "foreign brigadiers," Schimmelfennig and Krzyzanowski of Schurz's division, and Buschbeck of Steinwehr's division; and that on the first Gettysburg day the "foreign brigadiers" did not leave the "native" Ohio brigade in the lurch, but that, on the contrary, the "foreign brigadiers" withdrew from the field even a little later than the Ohio brigade, after a valiant struggle, had found itself obliged to retreat.

The corps still continued to be used as a convenient scapegoat for all sorts of mishaps with which it had absolutely nothing to do. Officers and men still complained of being exposed to outrageous indignities. This went so far that in some instances the commanders of reinforcements that were to be attached to the corps, loudly protested against being identified with it on account of its "reputation." I had long been in favor of maintaining the identity of the corps, and of
"braving it out." But the situation gradually became unendurable. Something had to be done, in justice to the officers and men—either to dissolve and distribute the corps among other organizations, or to take it in some way out of this noxious atmosphere.

I discussed the matter with Generals Howard and Meade, who both agreed that I should go to Washington to lay before General Halleck, who was then still in command of the Armies of the United States, the scheme proposed by me and recommended by them. The proposition was to attach two of the three divisions of the Eleventh Corps to other corps, and to send me with my division, to be reinforced by other troops available for that purpose, to Shenandoah Valley, to guard that important region, which had repeatedly been, and was again to be, the theater of rebel operations on the right flank and rear of the Army of the Potomac. Introducing me, General Howard wrote to General Halleck: "In case the proposition of General Meade, which was telegraphed to-day, respecting the Eleventh Corps, should be acted upon as desired, General Schurz would be left with an independent division. In furtherance of his own views, which he will present in person, I wish to say that the General has been prompt, energetic, and able during the operations in which I have been associated with him. Should you see fit to occupy the Shenandoah Valley with a small force, so as to co-operate with this army and prevent its occupaney by the rebels, I believe I do not flatter him when I say that General Schurz will not fail to give complete satisfaction." In the same letter, General Howard said: "We feel sensitive under false accusations, but considering the existing prejudices in this army against the Eleventh Corps, and the great difficulty in overcoming them, we regard it better for the service to make the changes. The different corps are now so
small that a consolidation is advisable. Personally, it will be gratifying to me to return to the Second Corps, but I do not feel dissatisfied with the Eleventh during the present campaign, and hope the changes referred to will not be regarded as a reflection upon the officers and soldiers of this command, who have worked so hard and done so much to carry out every order."

All I could obtain from General Halleck was that he would take the matter into consideration. Nothing more was heard of it. The Eleventh Corps was not dissolved. It was, however, reinforced by the assignment to it of several regiments, enough of which were added to my division to enable me to form three brigades. One of these remained under the command of Colonel Krzyzanowski. The second was given to the senior colonel after him, Colonel Hecker, and the third, the old brigade of General Schimmelfennig, who was transferred to the army besieging Charleston, to a new-comer, General Hector Tyndale.

When I first saw General Tyndale, with his proud mien, his keen eye, his severely classic features framed in a brown curly beard, it struck me that so Coriolanus might have looked. A closer acquaintance with him gradually ripened into friendship. He was a few years older than I, and had already a remarkable record behind him. He was the son of a merchant in Philadelphia, and a business man himself. Although without an academic education, his appearance and conversation were those of a man of culture. His was the natural refinement of a mind animated with high ideals, pure principles, perfect honesty of intelligence, a chivalrous sense of honor, and, added to all this, artistic instinct. He had been a warm anti-slavery man, but not an extreme abolitionist. He disapproved of John Brown's attempt at slave-insurrection. But when John Brown's
wife appeared in Philadelphia looking for an escort to accompany her on a last visit to her husband, in jail in Virginia under sentence of death, Hector Tyndale chivalrously offered his services, thus braving not only the fury of the mob surrounding John Brown's prison, but also the violent prejudice of his own neighbors. The news of the breaking out of our Civil War found him on a business journey in Europe, but he instantly, at great sacrifice, hastened home to enter the volunteer army. He was made a major in the Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania Regiment, and won promotion by efficient service on various fields. At Antietam he was severely wounded in the head, and obtained the rank of a brigadier-general for conspicuous bravery in action. Having recovered after long prostration, he was assigned to my division. As a strict disciplinarian, he was, as frequently happens, at first not popular with his soldiers, but they gradually perceived that his apparent sternness sprang from an overruling sense of duty and a conscientious care for their welfare, and then their respect turned into affection. It was this rigid, relentless, uncompromising sense of duty which years later, after he had returned to private life, made his fellow-citizens in Philadelphia more than once look to him when the civic situation demanded the services of men of uncompromising rectitude and indomitable moral courage. He never was a popular man, in the ordinary sense, for he would often appear haughty from his moral sensitiveness, and distant, owing to his very nature. Only his near friends enjoyed the real loveliness of his character. He was an aristocrat by taste, and a true democrat by principle and sympathy. I have known few men who so nearly approached the current conception of antique virtue and the ideal of the republican citizen. He died in 1880, not yet sixty years old.
CHAPTER II

At last, on the 25th day of September, 1863, the Eleventh Corps was cut loose from the Army of the Potomac and dispatched, together with the Twelfth, both under the command of General Hooker, to the western field of operations. General Rosecrans had maneuvered the rebel general, Bragg, out of Chattanooga, but suffered a grievous defeat on September 19th and 20th at Chickamanga, where the Army of the Cumberland was saved from total destruction only by the heroic firmness of General Thomas. It may be remarked here, by the way, that the rout of our right wing in that battle was far more disastrous and discreditable than the defeat of the Eleventh Corps at Chancellorsville had been, but that nobody ever thought of branding that part of the Army of the Cumberland with cowardice on that account. Our defeated hosts found refuge in Chattanooga, where they entrenched themselves. The Confederate General Bragg did not feel himself strong enough to carry their works by assault, but he besieged them closely enough to threaten their lines of communication with the Union forces in the West, as well as their bases of supplies. In fact, the Army of the Cumberland at Chattanooga was reduced to very short rations, and there was such a scarcity of forage that there were not nearly sound horses enough to equip the artillery. Under these circumstances the Eleventh and the Twelfth Corps were detached from the Army of the Potomac and hurried westward to succor the Army of the Cumberland in its precarious situation, and in the first place
to open the "cracker-line," as the soldiers humorously called the line of supplies.

On the 1st and 2nd of October, my command arrived at Bridgeport, Alabama, on the Tennessee River. One of my first duties was to acquaint myself with the country in my front and on my flanks. Many of the scouting parties I led myself, and it was on these occasions that I came first into personal contact with the population of that hill-region of Northern Alabama, Northern Georgia, and Southwestern Tennessee. I had met Southern country people in Virginia and Maryland, and had been astonished at the ignorance of many of them as to what, among the rural population of the North, were matters of common knowledge. But my experiences in my present surroundings were far more astonishing still. Not far from my encampment I struck a farmhouse inhabited by an elderly man, his wife, and a flock of children. He was by no means a poor man, for, as he told me, he owned several hundred acres of land. But he lived in a log-house, the central part of which was open at the front with one enclosed room on the right and one on the left, with mud chimneys, the chinks between the logs being so imperfectly filled that the wind would pass through freely. There was hardly anything inside worthy of the name of furniture. The art of reading and writing was unknown in the family, except, perhaps, from hearsay. The children were dirty, ragged, and, of course, barefooted, sharing the freedom of the house with dogs and other domestic animals.

The farmer seemed to be a good-natured person, but my conversations with him disclosed an almost incredible depth of ignorance. Of the country in which he lived he had only a vague and nebulous conception. He asked me where all these people, meaning the soldiers, came from. When I told him they came from New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, and
Wisconsin, he was very much puzzled. Of New York he had heard as “a monstrous big town,” so far away that it would take several weeks’ travel to get there. He asked me how many people might live there, but when I answered about seven hundred thousand, he understood me to say seven thousand. He threw up his hands in amazement, and exclaimed: “Lord, seven thousand people living in one place! That place must be bigger than Chattanooga!” He had heard somebody say that the earth was traveling around the sun; but he could not believe it. Did he not see the sun rising every morning on one side of him and travel to the other side, where it set in the evening? He cherished some religious notions centering in a somewhat indefinite imagining of heaven and hell and salvation, which he had received from his parents and from itinerant exhorters. He had also heard something about the Atlantic Ocean, beyond which there were large countries with lots of strange people in them, and he was struck dumb with wonder and amazement, looking me over with a sort of puzzled curiosity, when I told him that I and many of the soldiers were born in one of those countries on the other side of the great water.

But I had another experience if possible still more astonishing. On one of my rides I struck a lonely log-cabin, in the door of which I saw a woman, surrounded by a lively flock of flaxen-haired children, some six or seven of them, of various ages. Being thirsty, I rode up to her to ask her for a drink of water, which she brought to me in a gourd from the well-bucket, presenting it with a kindly smile and a few words in the local dialect, which I did not understand. Although poorly clad and barefooted, she looked rather clean and neat; and so did the children, who had evidently been washed that day. She appeared to be about thirty-five years old, and the expression of her face was pleasant, frank, and modest. I asked her
whether these were her children. She answered, "Yes," looking around at them with an expression of obvious pride and pleasure. How many children had she? "Thirteen. Some were in the field, the older ones." Where was her husband? In the army? "Husband?" She had no husband. Was he dead, leaving her alone with so many children? Without the slightest embarrassment she answered that she never had had any husband; and in response to my further question whether she really had never been married, she simply shook her head with an expression, not of vexation, but rather of surprise, as if she did not quite understand what I might mean. I left her, greatly puzzled. When I met my friend, the old farmer, again, I asked him about her; he replied that she was a very decent and industrious woman, who took good care of her children, and that there were several such cases around there.

I do not mean to say that those cases portrayed the general state of civilization in a large tract of country. In some of the valleys, or "coves," I found people, indeed, quite illiterate, but intellectually far more advanced and more conversant with the moralities of civilized society. But even among them, instances such as I have described appeared sporadically, while in some more secluded districts they represented the rule. What surprised me most was that such people were mostly of pure Anglo-Saxon stock, here and there interspersed with Scotch-Irish, very clearly demonstrating that the element of race is by no means the only one determining the progressive capacities or tendencies of a population, but that even the most vigorous races may succumb in their development to the disfavor of surrounding circumstances. These people, in their seclusion, were simply left behind by the progressive movements going on at a distance.

About the 20th of October we learned, first by rumor, and
THE REMINISCENCES OF CARL SCHURZ
then by official announcement, that General Grant had taken
command of the "Military Division of the Mississippi," in-
cluding the field of operations of the Army of the Cumber-
land; that General Rosserans had been removed from the com-
mand of that army, to be superseded by General Thomas; and
that General Sherman was hurrying on from the West with
large reinforcements. On the 27th we broke camp and started
on our march from Bridgeport to Chattanooga. The road was
in a dreadful condition. There were so many carcasses of mules
and horses lying on and alongside of it, that I thought if they
were laid lengthwise they would easily cover the whole dis-
tance. In the afternoon of the 28th we arrived in Lookout
Valley, near Brown's Ferry, about three miles from Chattanooga. The commanding form of Lookout Mountain frowned
down upon us, with a rebel battery on top. We presumed
that there must be a rebel force at its foot, but it was hidden
from us by dense woods. There were with us two divisions of
the Eleventh Corps, General Steinwehr's and mine, except
some detachments, and part of General Geary's division of the
Twelfth Corps, which, however, was left behind with a wagon
train at a small hamlet called Wauhatchie, about three miles
distant. The road from Wauhatchie to Brown's Ferry was
bordered on the enemy's eastern side by steep ridges, inter-
sected by gaps and ravines, through one of which ran a country
road leading to Kelly's Ferry, and through another the track of
the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. On the western side of
the Wauhatchie road there was a valley about one-half mile
wide, covered partly with cornfields, partly with timber and
underbrush, and bordered by the Raccoon Mountains. On
our march we saw nothing of the enemy except little squads of
cavalry, who vanished at our approach, and a small infantry
force in the woods near Wauhatchie, which disappeared after
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having fired a few shots, when it saw some of our regiments deploy for attack. Besides, the rebel battery posted on the top of Lookout Mountain pitched some shells at us, without effect. But from the same height the enemy could easily observe every one of our movements, and it occurred to some of us that the separation by nearly three miles of bad road of Geary's small force from ours was really an invitation to an attack under circumstances very favorable to the enemy. However, such was the disposition made by General Hooker, and all we could do was to surround ourselves by strong picket lines, well thrown out, to guard against a surprise. So we went into bivouac.

All remained quiet until about midnight, when we were disturbed by a few shots fired on our picket line. Then profound stillness again, which, however, lasted only about half an hour. Then very lively firing was heard in the direction of Wauhatchie. This evidently meant something more serious. We could not doubt that the enemy was attacking Geary in order to overwhelm him, and thus to break the line of communication we had established. Prompt action was necessary. The troops abruptly waked from their first and best sleep, tumbled out of their blankets with alacrity, and were under arms in a few minutes, ready to march. Night combats are apt to be somewhat uncomfortable affairs under any circumstances. Napoleon is quoted to have said that "the two-o'clock-in-the-morning courage" is the true test of the soldier's quality. To be called upon to fight when, as he feels, he ought to be permitted to sleep, and to fight, too, with a sensation of peculiar emptiness in his stomach, of dullness in his head, and of shiver in his back and limbs, and with a darkness surrounding him which prevents him from seeing the things he ought to see, and sometimes makes him see things which do not exist, is apt to
make him surly, to confuse him, and to weaken his confidence in himself. However, our men were, on this occasion, in good spirits, indulging themselves in more or less jocose curses on the enemy who had disturbed them. Soon General Hooker rode up—as it seemed to me in a somewhat excited state of mind—and ordered me to hurry my division to the relief of Geary. This was the order I had expected. Instantly I put myself at the head of Tyndale's brigade, which was the nearest at hand, and marched off on the road to Wauhatchie, sending my chief-of-staff to my other two brigades, with the order to follow me. The moon shone brightly, only now and then obscured by passing clouds. We could see ahead on the open ground tolerably well. But the shadows of the dense woods we entered were all the darker. Having thrown out a skirmish line to the front, and flanking parties toward the hills, we pressed on with the utmost possible expedition on the road, which was very bad. The musketry fire ahead of us at Wauhatchie grew more lively and was punctuated with occasional discharges of artillery which, to judge from the sound, came from Geary's battery. Evidently, Geary was hard pressed, and we accelerated our speed. We had advanced only a few hundred yards when we received a heavy volley of musketry from one of the darkly wooded hills on our left. One of my aides, riding by my side, was wounded and had to be carried to the rear. Several men in the marching column were also hit. Without orders some scattering shots were fired in reply from our side, which were promptly stopped, and we pushed on without delay, anxious as I was to reach Geary, and confident that our forces behind would at once take care of the enemy on my left and rear who had tried to molest us. This, indeed, was done by a brigade of the second division which in splendid style stormed and cleared the hill from which the
volley had come. But it seemed probable that the whole row of hills along which the road to Wauhatchie ran, was occupied by rebel troops to guard the flank and rear of those who attacked Geary, and I reinforced my flanking parties. We soon struck a slight turn toward the hills in the road where it was especially muddy and difficult. I directed the column to march straight ahead through what appeared to me an open field, expecting to reach Geary more quickly. But my advance skirmishers soon ran into a miry bog covered with low brush, which appeared to be impassable, and we were obliged to regain the road by a movement to the left. This was done without any loss of time. Until then General Howard had been with me off and on during the march. Now, accompanied by an aide, he rode on to Geary to tell him that help was near.

Then one of those confusing disarrangements occurred which occasionally will happen in campaigns or battles, and which sometimes produce much mischief and cause excited controversies among the interested parties. I had hardly reached the road again, when through staff officers sent after me, I received the information that my second and my third brigades which, according to my orders, were to follow Tyndale's, and which, therefore, I firmly expected to be at my heels, were not following me at all, but were kept back—one by General Hooker's personal direction, and the other by an order delivered by one of General Hooker's staff officers that it should accompany a lot of prisoners to Chattanooga. I was much surprised, but would have hurried on to Geary with Tyndale's brigade alone, had not at that moment one of General Hooker's aides-de-camp, Lieutenant Oliver, come with an order from General Hooker that I should take and occupy with one brigade the hill on my left next to the railroad gap. I replied to Lieutenant Oliver that I was ordered by General
Hooker personally to push through to Geary, that I had just been informed of my other two brigades having been stopped by General Hooker’s direction, and that if I occupied the hill on my left with the only brigade I had on hand, I would have no troops at all to push on to Geary. Lieutenant Oliver answered that General Hooker wanted the hill on my left taken, and he repeated the order. This was puzzling. However, it naturally occurred to me that circumstances might have changed. The firing at Wauhatchie had for a while slackened and then died out altogether. It was evident that Geary, after a fierce fight, had succeeded in repulsing the rebel attack. But there was still more firing going on in my rear near the hill from which the volley had been thrown upon us. The enemy might perhaps have made a new movement, making it most important that the gaps in the row of hills be in our possession. Finally, although General Hooker had personally ordered me to push through to Geary, his last order, brought by his aide-de-camp, was that I should take and occupy with one brigade the hill immediately on my left, and according to all military rules, it was the last order that counted. I asked, therefore, General Tyndale to arrest the march to Geary, and to take and occupy the hill with his brigade.

This was done. Our skirmishers ascended the dark woods, silently. There was a moment of remarkable stillness. Then we heard about half way up a ringing voice calling out: “What regiment do you belong to?” Another voice, a little further away, responded, naming a Georgia regiment. Thereupon promptly followed a shot and then a rattle of musketry. Then three of our regiments rushed up after our skirmishers, the firing became more lively, and soon our men were on the crest and descended the opposite slope, the enemy yielding as our men steadily advanced. The affair occupied not much
more than a quarter of an hour, but it cost us two killed, one of them a captain, and ten wounded. The importance of our occupation of the hill consisted in its commanding one of the passes through that chain of ridges. Our troops had, therefore, to be put in proper position to sustain an attack, the immediate vicinity to be explored by scouts, pickets to be well thrown out on front and flanks, and a reserve to be properly placed—arrangements which require some time, especially in the dark and on densely wooded and uneven ground, not permitting anything to be discerned with certainty, even at a very short distance. While these things were being done, Lieutenant Oliver, who had left me soon after the fight, had ample time to report to his chief all that had happened, and General Hooker had ample time to send me further instructions if my doings were in any respect not in accordance with his wishes, or if he desired me to do anything beyond. But as I received no word from him I naturally believed that I had acted to General Hooker’s entire satisfaction; and as the firing had ceased along the whole line, and everything seemed to be in the best of order, I hastened to report to General Hooker myself, and to look after my other two brigades held back by him.

I found General Hooker in the midst of my brigades, which stood there with grounded arms. Expecting a word of commendation in response to my salute, I was beyond measure astonished when in a harsh voice and in that excited manner which I had observed in him an hour or two before, he asked me why I had not carried out his order to march my division to the relief of Geary. Mastering my feelings, I quietly replied that I had tried to do so; that I had marched off at the head of my advance brigade; that I then had received his positive order while en route to take and occupy a certain hill with one brigade; that I had ordered my other two brigades to fol-
low me, but that they had been held back by superior orders; that therefore I had no troops to take to Geary. There was a moment's silence. He broke it by repeating that he had given me the order to march to Geary two hours before, and that I should do it now. I asked him whether my two brigades held back by his superior orders were now at my disposal again. He answered that they were, and rode away. I doubted, and my officers, too, doubted, whether he was in his senses.

At once we were in motion, Colonel Hecker's brigade leading. On the road Colonel Hecker told me what had happened. He had promptly obeyed the instruction brought to him by my chief-of-staff, to follow my second brigade, Colonel Krzyzanowski's, in marching to Wauhatchie. A little while after the head of our column had been fired upon from the hill on our left, he observed that Krzyzanowski's brigade halted, presumably by order. But he, Colonel Hecker, having received no such order, continued his march, passing by Krzyzanowski's brigade through an open field. He had hardly done so when Major Howard, of General Hooker's staff, brought him, too, a positive order to halt at the cross-roads, one branch of which led to Chattanooga, and to form his brigade front towards the hills. He had not time to do so when General Hooker himself appeared, and Major Howard said: "Here is General Hooker himself." General Hooker asked: "What troops are these?" Hecker answered: "Third Brigade, Third Division, Eleventh Corps." General Hooker asked further: "Where is General Schurz?" Hecker replied: "In the front; one of his aides has just been carried by here wounded." General Hooker then instructed Hecker so to form his brigade that it could easily change front towards the right—the valley—if necessary. He thereupon inquired about the troops standing nearest to Hecker, and was informed that it was the
Second Brigade, Colonel Krzyzanowski's, of my division, and saying to Colonel Hecker: "You stay here!" he rode over to Krzyzanowski's brigade and remained with it a considerable time. Indeed, it was between it and Hecker's brigade, within speaking distance of both, where I found him when I returned from Tyndale's position. This was the report Hecker gave me. It was subsequently proved to be absolutely correct in every detail. It made the words addressed by General Hooker to me more and more inexplicable. I could understand how the sudden appearance of the enemy on the range of hills between us and Chattanooga should have produced upon his mind the impression that the main action that night would have to be fought not at Wauhatchie, but in the immediate vicinity of our camp, and how that impression should have led him to throw into the hills or to keep in his own hand the troops he had ordered to the relief of Geary. But that he should not have appreciated what he had done in changing his dispositions, even after he had been informed of it, and that he should have blamed anybody for the confusion but himself, was not so easy to explain, except upon the supposition that he wanted a scape-goat for the mistake he had made in leaving Geary in so recklessly exposed a situation, which might have resulted in a very serious disaster, had the rebels attacked with a larger force. However, I consoled myself with the hope that when after a good sound sleep he reviewed the events of the night quite soberly, General Hooker would find it to be the best policy to recognize the truth and tell it.

As soon as I had free disposition of my two brigades again, both Hecker and Krzyzanowski were promptly dispatched to Geary, and the gap between him and Tyndale was properly filled. I bivouacked in the woods near Tyndale's position, and before lying down to take a short sleep, I still had
occasion to witness a weird scene characteristic of the time and place. Some of my staff officers had built a little fire under a rock, to take the shiver out of their limbs. One of them reported to me that two women had come and squatted near that fire, and that nobody could understand what they said. Would I not come and examine them myself? There I met a curious spectacle—the two women sitting on their heels like Indians, looking in the flickering light of the camp-fire almost like two bundles of rags; the one old, sharp-featured, and wrinkled, strands of gray hair falling over her face, her mouth holding a corn-cob pipe with a very short stem, the eyes dark, with reddish, apparently inflamed, eyelids. Her shoulders were covered with something like a dirty gray woolen shawl; her dress somewhat dingy and tattered, undefinable as to stuff and color. So one of Macbeth's witches might have looked. I asked her what she wanted. She looked up to me with a meaningless eye, and muttered something which I was unable to understand. Then her gaze dropped to the fire again, and she continued to smoke her short corn-cob pipe, which she seemed much to relish. I thought it best to try my fortune with the other woman by putting my question to her. Her attire was very much like that of her companion, but when she lifted her head, I was surprised to look into a young face which might have been called decidedly handsome, if not beautiful, had it been washed—large lustrous dark eyes shaded by long lashes, fine features of classic cut, a noble chin under exquisitely curved lips. But these lips bore a brownish hue, which was soon explained. She also uttered some—to me, at least—entirely unintelligible words in response to my question, whereupon she quietly dropped her eyes to the fire, as if she had said all that she could say. Then she thrust one of her hands deep into her bosom and brought forth a huge roll of tobacco, bit off
with evidently sharp teeth a good mouth-filling plug which she began composedly to chew, while she restored the roll to its hiding place. Then both sat perfectly silent again, stolidly smoking and chewing, until I repeated my question what they wanted, with increased urgency. In what the old woman—probably the mother—mumbled in reply, we detected something resembling the word “cow,” and then, using this discovery as a clue, we finally succeeded by many artifices of interrogation in the way of word-and-sign-language in eliciting the fact that their cow had been stampeded by our fight, and probably had got across Lookout Creek, the opposite bank of which was held by the rebels, and they wanted us to get their cow back for them. With much difficulty and persistent effort we made them understand that if the cow had crossed the creek, it must be given up for lost; but if it was found within our lines, there might be a chance—although a very uncertain one—of their getting it back. Then, without looking at anybody, they gave a grunt, rose up, and, smoking and chewing, vanished in the darkness. Poor creatures! The loss of their cow, no doubt, meant much to them—perhaps the loss of the only comfort of their lives.

In the course of the next morning I saw General Grant for the first time. Unexpectedly he had come over with General Thomas to inspect our lines. As his coming had not been announced, his appearance among us was a surprise, and there was no demonstration, no cheering, among the soldiers, because they did not know that this modest-looking gentleman was the victorious hero of many battles. There was absolutely nothing of the fuss-and-feathers style, nothing of the stage or picture general about him. His head was covered with the regulation black felt hat. He wore a major-general’s coat, but it was unbuttoned and unbelted. He carried no sword. On his
hands he had a pair of shining white cotton gloves, and on his feet low shoes which permitted a pair of white socks to be seen, all the more as his trousers had perceptibly slipped up. He smoked a large black cigar with great energy, and looked about him in a business-like way with an impassable face. I had no opportunity for coming into personal contact with him at that time, as the cavalcade passed by at a brisk gait.

While General Grant pushed on his preparations for the discomfiture of Bragg’s army, which occupied very strong positions on Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, the Eleventh Corps remained encamped until November 22nd in Lookout Valley, extending and strengthening its entrenchments. We were within range of the rebel battery on Lookout Mountain, which every day dropped a number of shells into our camps, without doing any damage. The noise made by the shells in coming and in exploding at first caused a little nervousness among some of the men, which, however, soon disappeared. Indeed, a shell falling into my mess tent while I was sitting at dinner with the officers of my staff, caused a momentary sensation and a rapid scattering of the diners. But as the shell did not explode, confidence was soon restored. It gradually became a favorite amusement of the troops to watch the puffs of smoke ejected by the rebel guns on Lookout Mountain, to listen to the whirring noise made by the coming missiles, and to make bets as to where they would strike the ground.

Another amusement consisted in the talks with deserters from the rebel army, who came over to us in great numbers. They were mostly from some Alabama regiments which were camped opposite to us on the other side of Lookout Creek. They would during the night crawl over a big tree which had fallen across the creek, and then surrender to our pickets.
There were so many of them that I sometimes, when I rose in the early morning, found the space between my headquarter tents filled with a dense crowd. They were a sorry lot; ragged, dirty, and emaciated. The first thing a great many of them asked for as soon as they had surrendered themselves, was "the oath." They insisted upon "taking the oath" without delay. There had, no doubt, been much current talk about their having to "take the oath of allegiance" if they surrendered. But many of them seemed to think that "taking the oath" meant getting something to eat,—so eager were they in their demand for it, and apparently as disappointed when they were only asked to hold up their hands and swear. That disappointment was relieved by the subsequent distribution of rations among them, and the avidity and relish with which those rations were devoured, spoke volumes of the lean days when they had had nothing to live upon but roasted ears of corn. Among those with whom I talked I found some who were not without a certain kind of rustic mother-wit. But the ignorance of most of them was beyond belief. There we saw the "Southern poor white" in his typical complexion. His knowledge of the world had originally been confined to the interior and the immediate surroundings of his wretched log-cabin. With those whom we met as deserters, the horizon had been widened somewhat by their experience of campaign life, but not very much. They had but a very dim conception, if any conception at all, of what all this fighting and bloodshed was about. They had been induced, or had been forced, to join the army by those whom they had been accustomed to look upon as their superiors. They had only an indistinct feeling that on the part of the South the war had not been undertaken and was not carried on for their benefit. There was a "winged word" current among the poor people of the South, which strikingly portrayed the situation,
as they conceived it to be, in a single sentence: "It is the rich man's war and the poor man's fight." This was so true that the poor whites of the South could hardly be expected to be sentimentally loyal to the "Southern cause." Many of them saw, therefore, nothing dishonorable or criminal in desertion or voluntary surrender, and resorted to it without any qualm of conscience when they got tired of sacrificing themselves for the benefit of interests which they did not understand. But while they did move in the ranks, they proved in many respects excellent soldiers. They suffered hunger and all sorts of privations with heroic endurance. They executed marches of almost incredible length and difficulty, and bore all kinds of fatigue without much complaint. And they were good, steady fighters, too, and many of them good marksmen, having been "handy" with the rifle or shotgun from their childhood up. Those who had surrendered to us and "took the oath" we put to work in improving the roads and similar tasks and found them to be, if not very good, at least tolerably useful laborers.

At last General Grant was ready to strike. Bragg had foolishly detached Longstreet's corps to overwhelm Burnside at Knoxville, and thus had dangerously weakened himself. Sherman had arrived with several divisions of his army, and on November 22nd the Eleventh Corps received orders to leave Lookout Valley and to march to Chattanooga, where we joined the Army of the Cumberland. I shall not attempt a description of the battle of Missionary Ridge, with all its dramatic and picturesque incidents, but confine myself to my own personal experiences, one of which is of some psychological interest. When after a quiet sleep I woke up about daybreak on November 23rd, my first thought was that on that day I would be killed. It was as if a voice within me told
me so with solemn distinctness. I tried to shake off the impression and to laugh at my weakness in listening to that voice a single moment. But while I met my companions and went about the performance of my duties in the accustomed way, the voice would always come back: "This day I shall be killed." Once I actually came very near sitting down to write a "last letter" to my wife and children, but a feeling of shame at my superstitious emotion came over me, and I desisted. Still the voice would not be silent. I busied myself with walking about among my troops to see that they were in proper fighting trim for the battle which we expected to open at any moment, but the voice followed me without cessation. I made a strong effort to appear as cheerful as usual, so that my officers should not notice the state of my mind, and I think I succeeded. But what I could not conceal was a restless impatience that the impending action should begin. Still the whole forenoon passed without any serious engagement—only a cannon shot now and then, and here and there a little crackle of picket firing. The breastworks and batteries of the enemy on the steep crest of Missionary Ridge on our left and opposite our center, and on Lookout Mountain on our right, frowned down upon us, apparently impregnable; and we stood inactive, looking at them.

At last, about noon, two divisions of the Army of the Cumberland in our left center were ordered to advance, and in a short space of time they took the first line of the enemy's rifle pits at the foot of the mountains. Although the voice within still spoke, I felt a little relief when I heard the real thunder of battle immediately in front. But my command stood there two hours more with grounded arms waiting for orders. At last at two o'clock a staff officer galloped up with the instruction that I should take position in the woods on the left of
THE REMINISCENCES OF CARL SCHURZ

those divisions, between Orchard Knob and the Tennessee River, connecting on my right with General Wood, and on my left with the second division of our Corps. "Now is the time," said the voice within. In deploying my command and making the prescribed connection I had no difficulty—only a slight skirmish fire, the enemy readily yielding when I pushed my skirmishers as far ahead as Citico Creek. But there was a rebel battery of artillery placed on the slope of Missionary Ridge opposite Orchard Knob, invisible to us on account of the woods, which threw shells at us, and apparently had a correct range. Shells would come over to us from it in slow order, probably about two a minute. A practiced ear could gauge their course in coming rather accurately by their whirring noise. Having made my alignment with the neighboring divisions on the right and left, I was halting on horseback with my staff, between my skirmishers and my line of battle, in momentary expectation of further orders, when I heard a shell, as I judged, coming straight towards me. "This is the one," I said to myself. The few moments I heard it come seemed very long. It did strike the ground under my horse, causing the animal to give a jump, broke the forelegs of the horse of one of my orderlies immediately behind me, and then struck an embankment about twenty yards in rear of me, and exploded, without hurting anyone. The effect was electric. The voice within me said: "This was the one, but it did not kill me after all." Instantly the premonition of death vanished, and my usual spirits returned. I never had such an experience again; but I have in vain tried to find an explanation for the one I have had.

The share of my division in the actual fighting in the battle of Missionary Ridge was rather slight. It would have been our fortune to take part in the conquest of Lookout...
Mountain, the so-called "battle above the clouds"—had not an unexpected mixing of General Hooker's troops with other commands transferred us from Lookout Mountain to Chattanooga. But as it was, we could only watch it from afar as during the afternoon the little puff's of smoke enlivened the brush on the rugged mountain slope, and after dark the musketry flickered through it like swarms of fireflies. The steady advance of our fire-line in this spectacular fashion greatly cheered the whole army. Late the same afternoon I received an order from General Grant to support the forces on my right and left in case of an attack, but, unless myself attacked, to do nothing that might bring on a general engagement. As there was nothing but slight skirmishing in my front and that of my neighbors, this order was easily executed. The night passed quietly. At sunrise the next day, the 25th of November, I was ordered to drive the enemy out of his rifle pits in my front, which was done with ease.

But it was by no means intended that our corps should remain without serious work in the battle. On the contrary, an important part had been assigned to us in what was to be the decisive movement. But again accident doomed us to comparative inactivity.

It was General Grant's plan that Sherman should assault the extreme right of Bragg's army placed on the northern end of Missionary Ridge at Tunnel Hill, and then drive the enemy from the flank out of his position on the crest. Sherman did succeed in crossing the Tennessee River at the appointed place on the right of the enemy, and in dislodging the rebel forces from the heights immediately before him; but advancing, he discovered to his chagrin that the heights he had carried were separated from the enemy's strong position on Tunnel Hill by a deep and precipitous ravine which was a very serious
obstacle to his progress. In the course of the morning I received orders to join General Sherman, the second division of our Corps having preceded me. About 2 p. m. I took position on Sherman's left. I then met the General personally for the first time. I found him sitting on a stone fence overlooking the great ravine separating him from the enemy's fortifications on Tunnel Hill, which bristled with cannon and bayonets.

General Sherman was anxiously watching the progress of Ewing's division of the Fifteenth Corps, reinforced by two or three regiments of Buschbeck's brigade of the Eleventh, as it struggled up the slope toward the rebel entrenchments above, under very heavy fire of the enemy. They were evidently laboring hard. General Sherman received me very cordially and asked me to sit by him. At once we were engaged in lively conversation as if we had been old acquaintances. The General was in an unhappy frame of mind, his hope of promptly overwhelming the enemy's right flank and thus striking the decisive blow of the battle having been dashed by the discovery of the big ravine in his way. It was a stinging disappointment. He gave vent to his feelings in language of astonishing vivacity,—at least, it astonished me, as I had never seen or heard him before. I expected every moment that he would order me to "go in" with my whole division in support of Ewing's charge. But he preferred that my command should remain in reserve on his left to provide for the emergency of a rebel attack from that quarter. The result as to my command was that it stood there inactive, only now and then attracting a shell from the rebel position across the ravine, as my troops showed themselves. So the afternoon wore on. After a short stay on the stone fence Sherman restlessly walked away, and I did not see him again that day. Ewing's attack advanced more and more slowly, but came near reaching
the rebel entrenchments on the crest, when toward dusk it seemed to be arrested by the increasing intensity of the rebel fire, and dropped back down the hill. From the direction of Chattanooga, the center of the position of our army, we heard a tremendous roar, and saw thick clouds of white smoke rising into the air, but we did not know what it signified. It might have meant an unsuccessful attack on Missionary Ridge, like Ewing's, but on a grander scale and perhaps with more disastrous results. Thus we on the extreme left, were rather in a depressed state of mind when the shadows of evening fell and the battlefield grew more and more silent.

The great victory of Missionary Ridge was announced to us in an almost casual way. There was immediately behind my line of battle a little dilapidated negro cabin, in which our headquarter orderlies had constructed, out of planks found lying around, something like a table, with a bench on each side. There I sat down with my staff officers to "supper"—coffee, hard-tack, and, perhaps, a slice of bacon. We had hardly begun our repast when my division-surgeon dismounted outside, came in and joined the revelers. He was a somewhat monosyllabic gentleman, and gave us only a "good evening." After a while I asked him: "Where do you come from, doctor?"

"Just from Chattanooga, sir."
"Looked for medical stores, I suppose."
"Yes, sir."
"There was a tremendous noise around there. What was it?"
"Fighting, sir."
"Fighting—where?"
"On the hillside, sir. Boys went up nicely."
"What hillside?"
They call it Missionary Ridge, I believe, sir."

"What? Our boys went up Missionary Ridge? Did they get to the top? Now be a little more lively, doctor!"

"Yes, sir, we could see them climb up there, and there was much waving of hats and cheering."

"What? Got to the top? And the rebels ran away?"

"I heard some officers say so at headquarters."

"By Jove, then we have won the battle!"

"I guess so, sir!" said the doctor quietly.

The rest of us jumped up without finishing our supper and hurriedly ran out for more news. Then we heard from afar a swelling wave of cheers rolling along our lines toward us, and in a few minutes we had the whole glorious story. It was an amazing tale. Sherman's attack on the enemy's right having come to a standstill, several divisions of the Army of the Cumberland in our center were ordered to advance. It was at first not intended to attempt the actual storming of Missionary Ridge—a fortified position which seemed well-nigh impregnable by a front attack—but rather to make a threatening demonstration calculated to induce Bragg to withdraw forces from his right to his center, and thus to facilitate Sherman's task. But the brave men of our Army of the Cumberland, once launched, could not be held back. With irresistible impetuosity, without orders,—it may almost be said against orders,—they rushed forward, hurled the enemy's advanced lines out of their defenses on the slope, scaled the steep acclivity like wild-cats, suddenly appeared on the crest of the ridge, where the rebel host, amazed at this wholly unlooked-for audacity, fled in wild confusion, leaving their entrenched artillery and thousands of prisoners behind them. It was a soldier's triumph, one of the most brilliant in history.

The next two days we took part in the pursuit of the dis-
comfited enemy, which resulted in the capture of more guns—bringing up the total to 42 pieces—of more prisoners, amounting to 6000 in all, and of large numbers of vehicles and stores, and in vast destruction of property. And then we set out under General Sherman's command on an expedition to Knoxville, East Tennessee, for the relief of General Burnside, who was hard pressed by General Longstreet's corps.

According to alarming reports, Burnside was in sore need of speedy help. It seemed to be a matter of days how long he would be able to hold out. The distance to be covered in a hurry was 120 miles. We marched in the lightest kind of order—no tents, no wagon trains, the men carrying only their blankets and knapsacks, if they had any, with something to eat in their haversacks, and plenty of ammunition in their cartridge boxes. But they were in fine spirits after the great victory, and bore the fatigue of the forced march with excellent cheer. We usually started about daybreak and went into camp about dark, having in the meantime crossed rivers and creeks with or without bridges, and mountain passes, sometimes over roads hardly worthy of the name. We saw no enemy in our front except some cavalry detachments sent out not to fight, but to observe. Whenever they came within range, a shell or two from our guns made them scamper off.

On this march I witnessed a little scene which was characteristic of the "fun" which we higher officers occasionally indulged in. One frosty morning I noticed a rather decent-looking house by the roadside, from the chimney of which a blue cloud of smoke curled up. In the front yard two orderlies were holding saddled horses. I concluded that there must be general officers inside, and, possibly, something to eat. Seduced by this thought, I dismounted, and found within, toasting their feet by a crackling wood fire, General Sherman
and General Jefferson C. Davis, who commanded a division in the Fourteenth Corps attached to Sherman’s command,—the same General Jeff. C. Davis, who, at the beginning of the war, had attracted much attention by the killing of General Nelson in the Galt House at Louisville. General Sherman kindly invited me to sit with them, and I did so. A few minutes later General Howard entered. I have already mentioned that General Howard enjoyed the reputation of great piety, and went by the name of “the Christian soldier.” General Sherman greeted him in his brusque way, exclaiming: “Glad to see you, Howard! Sit down by the fire! Damned cold this morning!” Howard, who especially abhorred the use of “swear words,” answered demurely: “Yes, General, it is quite cold this morning.” Sherman may have noticed a slight touch of reproof in this answer. At any rate, I observed a wink he gave General Davis with his left eye, while a sarcastic smile flitted across his features. It became at once clear what it meant, for Davis instantly, while talking about some indifferent subject, began to intersperse his speech with such a profusion of “damns” and the like, when there was not the slightest occasion for it, that one might have supposed him to be laboring under the intenseset excitement, while really he was in perfectly cold blood. In fact, as I afterward learned, General Davis was noted for having mastered the vocabulary of the “Army in Flanders” more completely than any other man of his rank. Howard made several feeble attempts to give a different turn to the conversation, but in vain. Encouraged by repeated winks and also a few sympathetic remarks from Sherman, Davis inexorably continued the lurid flow of his infernalisms, until finally Howard, with distress painted all over his face, got up and left; whereupon Sherman and Davis broke out in a peal of laughter. And when I ventured upon a remark about Howard’s suffer-
ings, Sherman said: "Well, that Christian soldier business is all right in its place. But he needn't put on airs when we are among ourselves."

A few weeks later, when the Knoxville campaign was over, Sherman addressed a letter to Howard thanking him, most deservedly, for the excellent services rendered by him on that expedition, and praising him as "one who mingled so gracefully and perfectly the polished Christian gentleman and the prompt, zealous, and gallant soldier." When I read this, I remembered the scene I have just described, and imagined I saw a little twinkle in Sherman's eye.

On December 5th, not many miles from Knoxville, we were informed that Longstreet had not waited for the arrival of our forces of relief, but effected his retreat toward Virginia. Thus our expedition had accomplished its purpose. It was a victory achieved by the soldiers' legs. We were allowed a day's rest, and then started on our way back, the same 120 miles and a little more, to our old camp in Lookout Valley. We could march more leisurely, but the return seemed harder than the advance had been. There was not the same spirit in it. Our regular food supplies were entirely exhausted. We had "to live upon the country." We impressed what live stock we could, which was by no means always sufficient. The surrounding population, Union people, were friendly, but poor. Roasted wheat and corn had to serve for coffee, molasses found on the farms, for sugar. But far worse than this, the clothing of the men was in tatters, the shoes worn and full of holes. Perhaps one-fourth of the men had none at all. They protected their feet by winding rags around them. Their miseries were increased by occurrences like this: One day our march was unusually difficult. We passed through a hilly country. The roads were in many places like dry, washed-out beds of moun-
tain torrents, full of boulders, large and small. The artillery horses could not possibly pull their pieces and caissons over these obstacles. They had to be unhitched, and infantry detachments were called upon to help the artillerymen lift their guns and appurtenances over the rocks. This operation had to be repeated several times during the day. Thus the marching column was stopped time and again without affording the soldiers any real rest. On the contrary, such irregular stoppages for an uncertain length of time are apt to annoy and fatigue the marching men all the more. At last, toward dusk of the evening, I struck on our route a large meadow-ground through which a clear stream of water flowed. There was plenty of wood for fires near by. The spot seemed to be made for camping. My orders as to how far I was to march, were not quite definite. I was to receive further instructions on the way. My troops having been on their feet from early morning and having marched under the difficulties described, were tired beyond measure. They just dragged themselves painfully along. I resolved to rest them on this favored spot if permitted, and dispatched a staff officer to corps-headquarters, two or three miles ahead, to obtain that permission. Meanwhile, waiting for an answer which I did not doubt would be favorable, camping places were assigned to the different brigades.

After the lapse of about an hour, when a large part of my command had come in and were beginning to build fires and to prepare such food as they had, my officer returned from corps-headquarters with the positive order that I must, without loss of time, continue my march and proceed about three miles farther, where a camping place would be assigned to me. I thought there must be some mistake, as, according to reports, there was no enemy within many miles, and I dispatched a
second staff officer to represent to corps-headquarters that to start my men again would be downright cruelty to them, and I begged that they be allowed to stay for the night where they were, unless there were real necessity for their marching on. In due time the answer came that there was such necessity. Now nothing was to be done but to obey instantly. My division bugler sounded the signal. There arose something like a sullen groan from the bivouac, but the men emptied the water, which was just beginning to boil in their kettles, upon the ground, and promptly fell into line. We had hardly been on the way half an hour when a fearful thunderstorm broke upon us. The rain came down in sheets like a cloudburst, driving right into our faces. In a few minutes we were all drenched to the skin. I wore a stout cavalry overcoat with cape, well lined with flannel, over my uniform. In an incredibly short time I felt the cold water trickle down my body. My riding boots were soon full to overflowing. One may imagine the sorry plight of the poor fellows in rags. They had to suffer, too, not only from the water coming down from above, but also from water coming from below. We were again passing through a hilly district. The road ran along the bottom of a deep valley with high ridges on both sides. From these the rain-water rushed down in streams, transforming the road into a swelling torrent, the water reaching up to the knees of the men, and higher. Meanwhile the thunder was rolling, the lightning flashing, and the poor sufferers stumbling over unseen boulders under the water, and venting their choler in wild imprecations.

At last, after having struggled on in this way for about two hours, we emerged from the wooded hills into a more open country—at least I judged so, as the darkness seemed to be a little relieved. The storm had ceased. Riding at the head of my column, I ran against a horseman standing in
the middle of the road. "What troops are these?" he asked. "Third Division, Eleventh Corps." He made himself known as an officer of the corps staff. My advance patrol had somehow missed him and gone astray. He brought me an order to put my command into camp "right here on both sides of the road." I asked him what it was that made my march in this dreadful night necessary, but he did not know. It was so dark that I could not distinguish anything beyond half a dozen feet. I did discover, however, that on "both sides of the road" there were plowed fields. There was water from the rain standing in the furrows and the ridges were softened into a thick mire. And there my men were to camp. My staff officers scattered themselves to find a more convenient, or less dismal, location for the men, but they soon returned, having, in the gloom, run into camps occupied by other troops. Nothing remained but to stay where we were. The regiments were distributed as well as possible in the darkness. The men could not stretch themselves out on the ground because the ground was covered or soaked with water. They had to sit down on their knapsacks, if they had any, or on their heels, and try to catch some sleep in that position. About midnight the wind shifted suddenly and blew bitterly cold from the north, so bitterly, indeed, that after a while our outer garments began to freeze stiff on our bodies. I thought I could hear the men's teeth chatter. I am sure mine did. There we sat, now and then dropping into a troubled doze, waiting for day to dawn. As soon as the first gray of the morning streaked the horizon, there was a general stir. The men rose and tossed and swung their limbs to get their blood into circulation. The feet of not a few were frozen fast in the soil, and when they pulled them up, they left the soles of such shoes as they had, sticking in the hardened mud. The pools of water left by the rain were covered with solid
crusts of ice, and the cold north wind was still blowing. I started my command as soon as possible in order to get the men into motion, intending to have them prepare their breakfast further on in some more congenial spot. The ranks were considerably thinned, a large number of the men having strayed away from the column and trudged on in the darkness of the night. As we proceeded we saw them crawl out from houses or barns or sheds or heaps of cornstraw or whatever protection from the weather they had been able to find. The hard-frozen and stony road was marked with streaks of blood from the feet of the poor fellows who limped painfully along.

And finally it turned out that all this had been for nothing. Headquarters had been disturbed by a rumor that the enemy was attempting a cavalry raid in our direction, which might have made a drawing together of our forces necessary. But the rumor proved quite unfounded. I have told the story of that dismal night so elaborately to show my reader that even in an ordinary campaign, not to be compared with the retreat of Napoleon's army from the Russian snow-fields, soldiers are sometimes exposed to hardships not always necessary, which in their effects are now and then no less destructive than powder and lead.

But on the whole the expedition to Knoxville for the relief of Burnside had been a decided success. The forced marches were well planned, and executed with exemplary precision and spirit. Congratulatory orders and complimentary letters were flying about in great profusion. General Sherman wrote one to General Howard in which he, with justice, commended his conduct very highly, and charged him "to convey to General Schurz and Colonel Buschbeck and to all your officers the assurance of my official and personal respect." General Howard, in his turn, was quite eloquent in praise of the
Eleventh Corps, and lauded its "division and brigade commanders for the energy and constancy they manifested during the campaign." In the course of his report he spoke with especial commendation of Colonel Hecker, who commanded my Third Brigade, and who had performed the most arduous duties with his characteristic spirit and efficiency. On the 17th of December we re-occupied our old encampments in Lookout Valley and looked forward to a comparatively quiet and comfortable winter.

But my repose and that of many of the officers in my command was disturbed in an entirely unexpected and exasperating manner. On the 10th of January, 1864, I found in a New York paper a reprint of General Hooker's official report on the engagement of Wauhatchie, which I have so elaborately described above because a knowledge of the details of the occurrence is needed for a just appreciation of what followed. In that report General Hooker praised the conduct of the troops under his command in the Wauhatchie affair very highly, and then added:

"I regret that my duty constrains me to except any portion of my commendation of their courage and valor. The brigade dispatched to the relief of Geary, by orders delivered in person to the division commander, never reached him until long after the fight had ended. It was alleged that it lost its way, when it had a terrific infantry fire to guide it all over the way; and that it became involved in a swamp, where there was no swamp or other obstacle between it and Geary to delay it a moment in marching to the relief of its imperiled companions."

When I read this I was utterly amazed and indignant. I had often heard a murmur among the generals of the army that "Joe Hooker's character for truth and veracity was not
good.” But how he could have put into an official report statements so palpably false and so malicious was beyond my comprehension. It was cowardly at the same time, for if Hooker’s allegations were true, or believed by him to be true, it was his obvious duty not only to call the division and the brigade commanders by name, but to cause them to be tried by court martial for undutiful conduct in the presence of the enemy. What brigade was meant in the report as guilty of such conduct? Was it Tyndale’s, which really had run into a bog, but which was promptly extricated, and then by General Hooker’s own order, acknowledged by him, took and occupied a gap in the hills? Or was it Hecker’s brigade, which, on its way to Geary’s position, was held back by General Hooker himself and was permitted to proceed only long after Geary’s fight had ceased, and had never been stopped by any swamp? I had hardly finished reading the report when my brave friend Colonel Hecker, pale with anger, rushed into my tent, paper in hand, and with quivering lip swore that he would rather die than submit to so infamous an outrage as this imputation. I suggested to Hecker that he address to me a written protest against this untruthful report, in the calmest language he could command, and a short statement of the facts, together with a demand for a court of inquiry, and I sat down at once to write a letter to General Hooker containing an emphatic remonstrance against his report, in which I declared that, “believing that Colonel Hecker and his command did on that occasion all they were ordered to do, and did it with conscientiousness and alacrity, I begged leave to assume the responsibility for their conduct, if any mistakes or any violation of orders had been committed. If, indeed, anybody must be blamed, I would rather claim the blame entirely for myself, than permit it to fall, even by construction, upon my subordinate commanders and their men,
who bear no responsibility in this matter and have always executed orders with promptness and spirit.” I then asked, “respectfully and earnestly,” that General Hooker properly exonerate Colonel Hecker and his brigade from the accusation cast upon them, or that a court of inquiry be granted to probe the matter to the bottom. Thus I made the cause of my subordinates my own, fully resolved to expose the calumny and calumniator and not to spare him.

The court of inquiry was granted, but with ill grace. In the first place it was ordered to include in its investigation all the operations connected with the fight at Wauhatchie, which would have required the collection of great masses of testimony obscuring the real issue and consuming endless time. I remonstrated, and the order was satisfactorily changed. But in the second place the composition of the court might have been resented as an indignity to me. Among its members there was not a single officer of my rank, and all of them belonged to General Hooker’s command. But this I permitted to pass without any protest, relying upon the justice of my cause. As I expected, the testimony of the many witnesses called demonstrated beyond the possibility of doubt or cavil the absolute truthfulness of the story as I have told it above: That General Hooker had ordered me to march my command to the relief of Geary; that I started at the head of Tyndale’s brigade to execute this order, having directed my other two brigades to follow me; that then, being attacked near his camp, General Hooker disposed by later orders of these two brigades for other purposes; that he ordered me to take and occupy a gap in the hills with the only brigade, Tyndale’s, left me; that Colonel Hecker finally sent off to Geary, had acted strictly according to General Hooker’s and my personal directions; that Hecker could not by any possibility have reached Geary before the end
of his fight, because he was not let go by General Hooker himself until hours after Geary's fight had ended, and so on; in other words, that General Hooker's report was nothing but a muddled jumble of untruths.

General Hooker, when examined as a witness, had substantially nothing to say except that he must stand by his report. But having the privilege of summing up the case in my own behalf, I availed myself of the opportunity to give General Hooker a piece of my mind. I did this to my heart's content in a written statement which I read to the court, and which went on record. I reviewed the testimony with great care, exposing every fact in the case with the utmost clearness, and then paid General Hooker my compliments in this style:

"Before closing, I deem it my duty to call your attention to one feature of this business which has an important bearing, not only upon my interests but upon yours and upon those of every subordinate commander in the army. We are bound by the iron chains of military discipline. The superior has it in his power to do all manner of things which may work serious injury to the honor and reputation of the subordinate, which the latter is but seldom at liberty to disprove and almost never able to resent. The greater, in this respect, the power of the superior, the more is he in honor and conscience bound to use his power with the utmost carefulness and discrimination, for the honor and reputation of every subordinate officer is a sacred trust in the hands of the superior commander. The most formidable weapon in the hands of the latter is his official report of campaigns and actions. It is universally received as documentary history, as the purest fountain from which the future historian can take his most reliable information. Praise and censure conveyed in such a report is generally looked upon as based upon irrefutable evidence. And it ought
to be. Every conscientious commander will therefore consider it a sacred duty, before making an official statement affecting the honor and reputation of a subordinate, to scrutinize with scrupulous care the least incident connected with the case; and when at last, after weighing every circumstance, he has arrived at the conclusion that his duty commands him to pronounce a censure, he will again well weigh every word he says so as to be perfectly sure that he does not say too much. For it must be considered that public opinion is generally swayed by first impressions, and an injury once done can but rarely be repaired by a subsequent modification of language.

"And I now invite you to apply this criterion, which certainly is a just one, to the report of General Hooker. That it is severe in its reflections on a body of troops, nobody will deny. By solemnly excepting them in a general commendation of courage and valor, it stigmatizes them as destitute of the first qualities which a soldier is proud of. That the report is a just one, who will after this investigation assert it? I am far from saying that General Hooker knowingly and willfully reported what was false; his position ought to exempt him from the suspicion of such an act. I have not entertained that suspicion a moment, but what excuse is there for his error?

"There are two things which every conscientious man will be careful to guard against. The first is saying anything to the prejudice of another which he knows to be false, and the other is saying anything to the prejudice of another which he does not positively know to be true. And did General Hooker positively know his report to be true and just? He could not know to be just what is proved to be unjust. But would it have been impossible to ascertain the truth? I lived within five minutes' walk of his headquarters. My brigade commanders were all within call. I saw him almost every day, and a single question
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would have elicited a satisfactory explanation. The question was not asked. Five minutes' conversation with his own aides, Lieutenant Oliver and Captain Hall, would have removed the error. Was the error so dear to him that he shielded it with silence against the truth? But to me it is a mystery how that error could stand against the force of his own recollections. Were they, too, shut out when that paragraph was penned? They would, indeed, have ill-comported with the sensational dash with which the verbiage of the censure is flavored.

"You will admit that this is not the way in which troops should be declared destitute of courage and valor; troops belonging to a division which on three battlefields lost far more killed and wounded than it counted men when I was put in command, and than it counts men to-day; and this is not the way to treat an officer, not one of whose subordinates will say that when he was in a place of danger his general was not with him. This is a levity which would not be admissible in the ordinary walks of life, much less in the military world, where every question of honor is weighed with scrupulous nicety. When looking at this most strange transaction, every impartial observer will ask himself, 'What can have been the motive of this?' If the battle had been lost, we might have found the motive in the desire of the commander to throw the responsibility upon some subordinate whom he might select as the unfortunate victim of his embarrassments. This, indeed, would not be noble nor even excusable; yet we can find the springs of such actions among the ordinary weaknesses of human nature. But we were victorious; the results of the action were uncommonly gratifying, and that General Hooker should then sit down and coolly endeavor to consign a fellow-soldier and part of his command to shame, and affectingly ornament the scene with the fanciful pyrotechnics of a terrific infantry fire flam-
ing around imperiled companions—for that I seek the motive in vain.” * * * *

“Everybody that knows me, will tell you that here, as elsewhere, I have been and am the most forbearing and inoffensive of men. And even in this case, I would have abstained from all sharpness of criticism had I not, by a series of occurrences, been tortured into the conviction that, at last, I owed it to myself and to my companions to array on one occasion the whole truth in its nakedness against official and private obloquy.” * * * *

The verdict of the court of inquiry appeared like an almost ludicrous effort to carry water on both shoulders. It is intelligible that the colonels composing that court should have hesitated to find their commander, General Hooker, guilty of a muddled head during the night of the Wauhatchie engagement in giving orders and then making the execution of those orders utterly impossible by subsequent orders, and of covering this fact by a palpable falsehood and a shameless slander of his subordinates in an official report. On the other hand, they were too honest to join General Hooker in his outrageous misrepresentation of facts and his calumnious assault. Thus they hit upon a finding according to which the facts were exactly as I had stated them; but General Hooker was right in wishing Geary speedily relieved, and in being displeased when this was not done as he had wished; and he held back my brigades, believing I had other troops to send to Geary. Tyndale was right in not marching to the relief of Geary, because he was ordered to occupy a certain hill. Hecker was right in doing what he did, because he was ordered to do so. And, finally, “General Schurz, as soon as he had received his orders from General Hooker, promptly set about carrying them into execution; the troops were quickly under arms; they turned out splendidly. The necessary orders answering the object and fitting the cir-
circumstances were given. The column was put in motion, and General Schurz took his proper place at its head. He had reason to assume, and act upon the assumption, that his entire command was following him; if any of his brigades failed to do so, they acted in disregard of orders, or were stopped by orders which were regarded as superior to those of General Schurz. General Schurz had official information upon which in the opinion of the court, he was authorized to rely and act; that the Second and Third Brigades of his division had been detached from his command, and were under orders direct from General Hooker, which orders were in conflict with the orders issued by him. In the opinion of the court, General Schurz has fully explained his delay in going to the relief of Geary, and his apparent disobedience of orders in this regard, and fully justified his conduct in the premises, and consequently it follows that he has exonerated himself from the strictures contained in General Hooker's official report.” As to my vindication, the verdict could not have been more conclusive and emphatic.

I was told that General Hooker felt the substantial condemnation of his conduct very keenly, and spoke of it with intense bitterness. Although I remained under his command for several months longer, I never saw him again until about fifteen years later at a dinner at the White House. I was then Secretary of the Interior under President Hayes. General Hooker had been married in the meantime, and, visiting Washington with his wife, was invited to dine with the President. The President, knowing nothing of our past difficulties, invited me, too, thinking that it would be a pleasant meeting of old war comrades. I noticed, after dinner, that Hooker sought to have some private words with me, and I could not avoid him. “You know, General,” he said, “that trouble about Wau-
hatchie between you and me was all owing to Howard's riding away from his command." "General," I answered—I fear somewhat coldly—"I do not see what Howard's riding away could have had to do with our quarrel." Some other guest intervening, there our conversation stopped.

General Hooker proved himself a brilliant corps commander on many a battlefield. His "battle above the clouds," although by no means the hardest of his fights, has won a shining place in history. His competency as a commander of a large army was very seriously put in doubt by his amazing failure at Chancellorsville. It was in a large measure the infirmities of his character that stood in his way, impeding, if not altogether preventing, hearty co-operation between him and his comrades. He had, deservedly, the reputation of an envious critic and backbiter, running down other persons' merit to extol his own. He did not spare the best. In a curious letter of December, 1863, addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon P. Chase, in which he gave a somewhat sarcastic account of what he considered an insidious attempt by Grant to deprive him of his due part in the battle of Missionary Ridge, to the advantage of Sherman, he said of that general: "Sherman is an energetic and active officer, but in my judgment is as infirm as Burnside. He will never be successful. Please remember what I tell you." The feeling called forth by such things among the high officers of the army can well be imagined. When in September, 1863, General Slocum, as commander of the Twelfth Corps, being put under the orders of General Hooker, protested against the arrangement on the ground that "he had no confidence in General Hooker as an officer, and no respect for him as a man," he spoke the mind of many of his comrades. Subsequently, on Sherman's "march to the sea," Hooker found himself compelled to ask to be relieved [93]
from his position in that army, on the ground of the indignities he had to suffer in the distribution of commands among the various major generals; and thus he disappeared from the scene at a time when he might still have rendered much good service. But his character made his comrades decidedly disinclined to serve under, or even with him.

My encounter with General Hooker, although very satisfactory to me in some respects, and very much enjoyed by other officers, who keenly relished the moral drubbing Hooker had received, after all had serious consequences to me as to my position in the army. It was quite clear that thenceforth I could not again serve under the orders of General Hooker in any campaign, and that, on the other hand, he would not wish to have me among his subordinate commanders. I did not ask to be relieved or transferred at once, because that would have looked like a moral retreat. Besides, I had some hope that in the reorganization of the army preparatory to the Atlanta campaign, some way might be found to obviate the difficulty. I neglected, or, rather, I deemed it improper to urge or even express my personal wishes, and quietly went about the duties assigned to my command, which, during the winter and early spring, consisted in guarding and keeping in repair the so-called "cracker-line," which supplied the army camped at Chattanooga and vicinity with its necessaries; an office which the very long, one-track railroad, exposed to guerrilla attacks and the like, did not always satisfactorily perform—for I remember weeks during which salt was lacking and we used gunpowder instead, and forage was so scarce that many horses, among them two of my own, died of actual want of food. At last I was advised that in the work of reorganization the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps had been consolidated under the name of the Twentieth Corps, that the Twentieth Corps was to be com-
manded by General Hooker, and that I was assigned to the command of a so-called Corps of Instruction near Nashville, in which a number of newly levied regiments were to be made fit for active duty, and then, presumptively, to form part of the Army of the Cumberland, under General Thomas. Thus I was separated from General Hooker, but in a manner not at all according to my wishes and expectations. I had hoped to march with Sherman southward, but the position to which I was now assigned promised little active service, for nobody could then foresee the battle of Nashville. Still, I obeyed orders without protest or murmur. My camp was speedily established at Edgefield, on the northern side of the river, opposite Nashville, and several newly organized regiments from Western States, especially from Indiana, came in to fill it.

It was then that I made the acquaintance of Andrew Johnson, whom President Lincoln had made "Military Governor" of Tennessee. I called upon him at the State House in Nashville, and he received me not only with polite kindness, but with some evidence of a desire to cultivate intercourse with me. I was not quite clear in my own mind about the impression he made upon me. He had worked himself up from poverty and a low social position to political prominence by the energy of his character and a degree of ability which, if not brilliant, was at least higher than that of his political competitors in East Tennessee. By a bold and vigorous fight against all secession tendencies and against the arrogant pretensions of the slave-holding aristocracy, he became the most conspicuous representative and the leader of the loyal Union element of the South. His appearance was not prepossessing, at least not to me. His countenance was of a distinctly plebeian cast, somewhat like that of the late Senator Douglas, but it had nothing of Douglas' force and vivacity in it. There was no genial sunlight in it; [95]
rather something sullen, something betokening a strong will inspired by bitter feelings. I could well imagine him leading with vindictive energy an uprising of a lower order of society against an aristocracy from whose lordly self-assertion he had suffered, and whose pride he was bent upon humiliating. Nor did he as a “child of the soil,” possess anything of that ingenuous, naïve, and lovable naturalness which never ceased to form one of the greatest charms of Lincoln’s character. Johnson was by no means a man of culture. His education had been of the scantiest. Judging from his conversation, his mind moved in a narrow circle of ideas as well as of phrases. But his contact with the world had taught him certain things as to decent and correct appearance. As often as I saw him I found him clothed in the customary broadcloth of the higher politician in Washington, with immaculate linen; and I noticed also in his deportment, as far as I could observe it, an air, whether assumed or genuine, of quiet dignity. Yet I could not rid myself of the impression that beneath this staid and sober exterior there were still some wild fires burning which occasionally might burst to the surface. This impression was strengthened by a singular experience. It happened twice or three times that, when I called upon him, I was told by the attendant that the Governor was sick and could not see anybody; then, after the lapse of four or five days, he would send for me, and I would find him uncommonly natty in his attire, and generally “groomed” with especial care. He would also wave off any inquiry about his health. When I mentioned this circumstance to one of the most prominent Union men of Nashville, he smiled, and said that the Governor had “his infirmities,” but was “all right” on the whole.

My conversation with him always turned upon political subjects. He was a demonstratively fierce Union man—not
upon anti-slavery grounds, but from constitutional reasons and from hatred of the slave-holding aristocracy, the oppressors and misleaders of the common people, who had resolved to destroy the Republic if they were not permitted to rule it. The constant burden of his speech was that this rebellion against the government of the Union was treason, and that treason was a crime that must be made odious by visiting condign punishment upon the traitors. To hear him expatiate upon this, his favorite theme, one would have thought that if this man ever came into power, the face of the country would soon bristle with gibbets, and foreign lands swarm with fugitives from the avenging sword of the Republic. And such sentiments he uttered not in a tone betraying the slightest excitement, but with the calmness of long-standing and unquestionable conviction. When, in the course of our conversations, I suggested, as I sometimes did, that there were in the reconstruction of the Union other objects to be accomplished fully as important as the punishment of the traitors, he would treat such suggestions with polite indulgence, at the same time insisting with undisturbed sternness, that the Union could not endure unless by a severe punishment of the traitors, treason were forever branded as the unpardonable crime. Indeed, this seemed to constitute the principal part of his political program for the future. No doubt, there were gentler and more amiable currents of feeling in Mr. Johnson's composition, known to his family, friends, and neighbors; but in our political talks, at that time they did not manifest themselves. When, a short time after my first meeting with Mr. Johnson, the Republican National Convention nominated him as its candidate for the vice-presidency, I was, I must confess, one of those who received the news with a certain uneasiness of feeling.
CHAPTER III

The leisure hours of camp life during the winter and spring of 1864 had permitted me to plod through several volumes of Herbert Spencer, and to carry on a somewhat active correspondence with friends in Washington and various parts of the Northern States. The political intelligence brought by letters and newspapers was by no means cheering. To the army mind—that is, to those in the field looking at political happenings from afar, and having nothing in view but to bring the struggle against the rebellion and for the restoration of the Union under the new conditions to a successful issue—the requirements of the situation appeared to be simple and clear. The one thing needed first of all seemed to be that the administration be supported in its efforts to rally the whole force of the Union sentiment of the country against the common enemy. No doubt, there might be differences of opinion as to how this should be done in detail. No doubt, some things had been done by, or under, the auspices of the administration that were open to criticism. No doubt, our government had not been as successful in the field as it should have been. No doubt, there were different theories as to the actual status of the rebel States in or out of the Union, and as to the methods of accomplishing their reconstruction when the rebellion should have been overcome. But in point of fact, the rebellion was not yet overcome, and it was questionable whether it would ever be overcome if the Union forces acted at cross purposes in directing their efforts. And if the rebellion was not overcome, all these disputes would appear to have been vain and idle. But the criticism of
the government—legitimate in itself if it were designed only to enlighten the administration and to lead to a correction of its errors—had assumed a virulent temper, and been turned into attempts to prevent the renomination of Mr. Lincoln.

The most alarming feature of this commotion was that many men were active in it whose patriotism was above question, and whose character stood so high in public estimation that their example might exercise a wide influence. There was much impatience at the slow progress of the war for the Union, and the administration was largely held responsible for it. The most impetuous of the impatient urged that a President must be chosen who would carry on the war with more energy. Not a few serious patriots, especially in the East, were displeased with Mr. Lincoln’s somewhat loose ways of conducting the public business, with his rustic manners, and with the robust character of his humor, and concluded that the Republic must have a President more mindful of the dignity of his office. In some of the States fierce factional fights were raging among the Union men, and one faction would demand the election of another President if Mr. Lincoln seemed to favor the other faction. It was publicly said, and believed by many, that Mr. Lincoln had only one steadfast friend in the lower House of Congress, and few more in the Senate, the disaffection being due partly to the fact that Mr. Lincoln had not been able to gratify the wishes of the Senators and Representatives as to appointments; and partly to differences of opinion as to the reconstruction policy to be adopted. These various elements of discontent combined, would possibly have constituted a formidable force, had they been able to unite upon an opposition candidate who would have satisfied the country that he was better fitted for the presidency in this crisis than Mr. Lincoln. But the only statesman of high standing who in any degree appeared
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available for such a purpose was Mr. Chase, who, with all his great qualities, seemed unable to call forth any popular enthusiasm. Neither could the candidacy of General Frémont, brought forward by the radicals of Missouri, highly respectable and patriotic men, who were embittered by the countenance given by Mr. Lincoln to the "conservative" faction in that State, command much confidence and support.

These distracting movements inside the Union party could therefore only serve to encourage and strengthen the Democrats. With great skill and energy, they worked upon the desire for peace naturally existing and growing among the people as the war dragged on without any distinct prospect of its early termination, and hoped to ride into power on the strength of the peace-cry, and on the charge that the policy of the Republican administration had resulted in utter failure.

Would not the rejection of Mr. Lincoln by the Republican National Convention be tantamount to an open confession of such failure, and thus put a terrible weapon in the hands of the opposition? Was not, quite aside from his exceptional hold upon the esteem and affection of the masses of the people, Lincoln's renomination so natural, indeed, so necessary, that it was difficult to understand how any unprejudiced Union man could oppose it? That, in spite of all this, such opposition should find the support of estimable Union men, was indeed an alarming symptom.

This aspect of the situation disquieted me profoundly. I did not, indeed, seriously apprehend that Mr. Lincoln's nomination could be prevented. But the question was, whether the efforts made to prevent it would not have a demoralizing effect upon the party, and put his success at the election in jeopardy. And in case of the government falling into the hands of the
Democratic party, in whose councils such men as Vallandigham and Fernando Wood wielded much—perhaps decisive—influence, the probability was that either the dissolution of the Union would be acquiesced in, or the Union would be patched up again by means of a compromise involving the preservation of slavery.

In the troubled contemplation of this appalling possibility, it occurred to me that I might perhaps render better service by entering the political campaign as a speaker, than by superintending the training of new troops in my camp near Nashville, for the uncertain contingency of their ever firing a cartridge. I received various letters suggesting the same thing, among them a very urgent one from Mr. Elihu B. Washburne, a prominent member of Congress from Illinois, and another from Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania, who painted to me in strong colors the dangers of the situation, and insisted that I must "go on the stump," as I had done in the campaign of 1860. Finally I concluded that I ought to do so. I wrote to Mr. Lincoln, informing him of my purpose. In his reply he observed that if I did so, it would be at the risk of my active employment in the army. I was willing to take the risk unconditionally, and asked, through the regular military channels, to be relieved of my present duties. This relief was granted, and I promptly gave up my command of the camp and journeyed to Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, where my family were at that time, and asked for permission to visit Washington—military officers being at that time forbidden to visit Washington without special permission from the War Department. I wished to confer with Mr. Lincoln on the political situation, and more particularly to get his view of the exigencies of the campaign. The official permit for a visit to Washington arrived promptly.
Although Lincoln, to the astonishment of his Republican opponents, who would not recognize any popular force behind him, had been renominated with substantial unanimity by the National Convention, the hostile movements in the Republican ranks did not cease. Senator Benjamin F. Wade, from Ohio, one of the oldest, most courageous, and most highly respected of the anti-slavery champions, and Henry Winter Davis, a member of the National House of Representatives from Maryland, a man of high character and an orator of rare brilliancy, rose in open revolt against Lincoln's reconstruction ideas, and issued a formal manifesto, in which, in language of startling vehemence, they assailed the integrity of his motives as those of a usurper carried away by lust of power. And then cries arose in the most unexpected quarters that Lincoln could not possibly be elected. Such men as Horace Greeley and Thurlow Weed, usually hostile to one another in Republican factional fights, united in the gloomy prediction that Lincoln would most surely be defeated; and men of similar importance, severally and as members of committees, plied Lincoln himself with urgent entreaties that he should withdraw from the contest and make room for another more promising candidate. Neither was there much encouragement in the popular temper as it manifested itself during the first two months after Lincoln's renomination. The people seemed to be utterly spiritless. They would hardly attend a mass-meeting, much less inspire the speaker with enthusiastic acclamations. This may have been partly owing to the fact that the Democrats had not yet held their National Convention, and there was, therefore, neither a candidate nor a declared policy of the opposite party to attack. But, surely, the administration party could not have been in a more lethargic and spiritless condition. Its atmosphere was thoroughly depressing.

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I called upon Mr. Lincoln on a hot afternoon late in July. He greeted me cordially, and asked me to wait in the office until he should be through with the current business of the day, and then to spend the evening with him at the cottage on the grounds of the Soldiers’ Home, which he occupied during the summer. In the carriage on the way thither he made various inquiries concerning the attitude of this and that public man, and this and that group of people, and we discussed the question whether it would be good policy to attempt an active campaign before the Democrats should have “shown their hand” in their National Convention. He argued that such an attempt would be unwise unless some unforeseen change in the situation called for it. Arrived at the cottage, he asked me to sit down with him on a lounge in a sort of parlor which was rather scantily furnished, and began to speak about the attacks made upon him by party friends, and their efforts to force his withdrawal from the candidacy. The substance of what he said I can recount from a letter written at the time to an intimate friend.

He spoke as if he felt a pressing need to ease his heart by giving voice to the sorrowful thoughts distressing him. He would not complain of the fearful burden of care and responsibility put upon his shoulders. Nobody knew the weight of that burden save himself. But was it necessary, was it generous, was it right, to impeach even the rectitude of his motives? “They urge me with almost violent language,” he said, “to withdraw from the contest, although I have been unanimously nominated, in order to make room for a better man. I wish I could. Perhaps some other man might do this business better than I. That is possible. I do not deny it. But I am here, and that better man is not here. And if I should step aside to make room for him, it is not at all sure—perhaps not even probable—that he would get here. It is much more likely that the fac-
tions opposed to me would fall to fighting among themselves, and that those who want me to make room for a better man would get a man whom most of them would not want in at all. My withdrawal, therefore, might, and probably would, bring on a confusion worse confounded. God knows, I have at least tried very hard to do my duty—to do right to everybody and wrong to nobody. And now to have it said by men who have been my friends and who ought to know me better, that I have been seduced by what they call the lust of power, and that I have been doing this and that unscrupulous thing hurtful to the common cause, only to keep myself in office! Have they thought of that common cause when trying to break me down? I hope they have."

So he went on, as if speaking to himself, now pausing for a second, then uttering a sentence or two with vehement emphasis. Meanwhile the dusk of evening had set in, and when the room was lighted I thought I saw his sad eyes moist and his rugged features working strangely, as if under a very strong and painful emotion. At last he stopped, as if waiting for me to say something, and, deeply touched as I was, I only expressed as well as I could, my confident assurance that the people, undisturbed by the bickerings of his critics, believed in him and would faithfully stand by him. The conversation, then turning upon things to be done, became more cheerful, and in the course of the evening he explained to me various acts of the administration which in the campaign might be questioned and call for defense. As to his differences with members of Congress concerning reconstruction, he laid particular stress upon the fact that, looked at from a constitutional standpoint, the Executive could do many things by virtue of the war power, which Congress could not do in the way of ordinary legislation. When I took my leave that night he was in a calm mood, in-
dulged himself in a few humorous remarks, shook my hand heartily, and said: "Well, things might look better, and they might look worse. Go in, and let us all do the best we can."

The campaign did not become spirited until after the Democratic National Convention. But then it started in good earnest, and the prospects brightened at once. The Democrats, made overconfident by the apparent lethargy of the popular mind and the acrimonious wrangling inside of the Union party, had recklessly overshot the mark. They declared in their platform that the war against the rebellion was a failure, and that immediate efforts must be made for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to an ultimate convention of all the States for a peaceable settlement on the basis of reunion. Considering the fact that the leaders of the rebellion vociferously, defiantly insisted upon the independence of the Southern Confederacy as a condition *sine qua non* of any settlement, this proposition looked like a complete surrender. It was too much, not only for the malcontents within the Union party, but also for many Democrats. Even the candidate of their own party, General McClellan, who had been nominated for the purpose of conciliating the patriotic war-spirit still alive in the Democratic ranks, found it necessary to repudiate that part of the platform—first, in justice to his own feelings, and secondly, to save the last chance of success in the election. Then came the inspiring tidings of Sherman's victorious march into the heart of Georgia and the capture of Atlanta, kindling all over the North a blaze of jubilant enthusiasm, and covering the declaration that the war was a failure, with contemptuous derision. And, finally, more potent perhaps than all else, the tender affection of the popular heart for Abraham Lincoln burst forth with all its warmth. This tender affection, cherished among the plain people of the land, among the soldiers in the field, and
their "folks at home," was a sentimental element of strength which Lincoln's critical opponents in the Union party had wholly ignored. Now they became aware of it, not without surprise. I believe that, had the Democratic Convention been more prudent, and had no victories happened to cheer the masses, even then "Father Abraham's" personal popularity alone would have been sufficient to give him the victory in the election of 1864. I made many speeches in New York, Pennsylvania, and the Western States as far as Wisconsin, three of which were printed in the collection which was published in 1865. While writing these reminiscences I read them over—let me confess it—with much satisfaction. But that they contributed much to Lincoln's success, I candidly do not believe. They were well meant, but, although they had a wide circulation and much praise at the time, they were really superfluous. In fact, during its last two months, the presidential campaign of 1864 seemed to run itself. With a thoroughly reunited Union party, it became more and more a popular jubilee as the election approached. However, the size of his majority did not come up to the expectation of Lincoln's friends.

A few days after the election I read in the papers the report of a speech delivered by Lincoln in response to a serenade, in which he offered the hand of friendship to those who had opposed him in these words: "Now that the election is over, may not all, having a common interest, reunite in a common effort to save our common community? For my own part, I have striven, and will strive, to place no obstacle in the way. So long as I have been here, I have not willingly planted a thorn in any man's bosom. While I am deeply sensible of the high compliment of a re-election, it adds nothing to my satisfaction that any other man may be pained or disappointed by the result. May I ask those who were with me to join with me in the
same spirit towards those who were against me?" When I read those noble words, which so touchingly revealed the whole tender generosity of Lincoln's great soul, the haggard face I had seen that evening in the cottage at the Soldiers' Home rose up vividly in my memory.
CHAPTER IV

The election over, I reported to the War Department for such duty as might be assigned to me. The ranks of Grant's army operating against Richmond having been fearfully thinned by loss in battle and by disease, the government tried various expedients to replenish them. Among others, a plan was conceived to organize a "Veteran Corps," to consist of old soldiers who, after having served out their three-years' term of enlistment, had left the army, but were still physically able and willing to re-enlist for further service. This "Veteran Corps" was to be commanded by General Hancock, whose conspicuous gallantry in Grant's Virginia campaign had won him the repute of being the kind of commander under whom it was an honor to serve. I was ordered by the War Department to visit the governors of several States and the mayors of a number of cities for the purpose of winning their co-operation in the execution of this scheme. This task kept me traveling a large part of the winter. I succeeded in obtaining from most of the officials applied to very fair assurances of support, which, no doubt, were honestly meant, but were hardly borne out by the results of the promised co-operation.

When I personally made my report at the War Department, Secretary Stanton asked me to bear a confidential communication, not to be put on paper, to Mr. Lincoln, who had gone to City Point, on the James River, in order to have easy and constant conference with General Grant. I found Mr. Lincoln in excellent spirits. He was confident that the fall of Richmond, and with it the total collapse of the rebellion, would [108]
come in the near future. Also of the political situation, of which he spoke with great freedom, he took a hopeful view, much in contrast with the depression of mind which he had shown at our last meeting during the presidential campaign. He felt that his triumphant re-election had given him a moral authority stronger than that which he had possessed before, and he trusted that this strengthened authority, used with discretion and in a friendly and magnanimous spirit, would secure to his opinions concerning the measures of reconstruction he thought it wise to adopt, a friendlier consideration on the part of the leading Unionists in Congress and in the country. He did not say this in terms, but I gathered it from the tone of his utterances. And here I may mention a story thoroughly characteristic of Lincoln’s ways, which I heard in passing through Washington. Charles Sumner had formed a theory of State suicide which gave to the National Government absolute liberty of action as to the status of the States in rebellion and their reconstruction after the return of peace. This theory stood in sharp contrast to Lincoln’s ideas, but Sumner clung to it with his peculiar tenacity. The difference of opinion between the two men was so radical and outspoken that at the time of Lincoln’s second inauguration, an actual rupture of their personal relations was currently reported and widely believed. But in spite of their disagreements and jarrings, Lincoln at heart esteemed Sumner very highly, and Sumner, although sometimes seriously disturbed by Lincoln’s acts or failures to act, had implicit confidence in the rectitude of his character and the justness of his ultimate aims. Now, when Lincoln heard of the rumor speaking of his personal rupture with Sumner, he at once resolved to discredit it by an open demonstration. On the evening of the inauguration ball he suddenly appeared in his carriage with Mrs. Lincoln and Mr.
Colfax, Speaker of the House of Representatives, at Mr. Sumner's house, and invited the Senator to join them. Being asked by the President, the Senator could not refuse. And then, arrived at the ball-room, the President further asked the Senator to offer Mrs. Lincoln his arm and to take her in. The Senator, with grave gallantry, complied, and appeared before all the assembled multitude, if not as a member of Lincoln's family, at least as one of his dearest and most honored friends. After this their difference of opinion continued, although much softened; but there was no more talk of a personal rupture between Lincoln and Sumner.

I spent the better part of a day with Mr. Lincoln on the steamboat off City Point, on which he lodged. When I was ready to leave, he asked me what conveyance I had to take me back to Washington. I answered, the government tug, on which I had come. "Oh," said he, "you can do better than that. Mrs. Lincoln is here, and will start back for Washington in an hour or two. She has a comfortable steamboat to carry her, on which there will be plenty of room for both of you, if you keep the peace. You can accompany her, if you like." Mrs. Lincoln joining in the invitation, I accepted.

Shortly after my return from City Point, I received an order from the War Department to report at once for duty to General Sherman at Goldsborough, North Carolina. I obeyed without delay. The concentration of troops at Goldsborough included, aside from Sherman's army proper, with which he had executed the famous march from Atlanta to the sea, and from Savannah to North Carolina, the Twenty-third Corps, under General Schofield, and the Tenth Corps, under General Terry. These forces were now divided into three armies— the Army of the Tennessee, under General Howard; the Army of the Ohio, under General Schofield, and the Army of
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Georgia, under General Slocum. When I presented my order to General Sherman, he greeted me like an old friend, and ordered me to report to General Slocum for employment in the Army of Georgia. I found with General Slocum a pleasant reception, and as there was at the time no proper command vacant in the Army of Georgia, he appointed me temporarily as his chief-of-staff. From the very beginning our relations were hearty and confidential. There was a general feeling that the final collapse of the Confederacy, and with it the end of the war, could not be far distant. But it was supposed that Sherman's command, after having put itself in communication with General Grant's forces, would still have the honor of participating in the capture of Richmond and of Lee's army. With that view Sherman ordered his forces to be ready to move on the morning of April 11th. But that morning brought us the news that Richmond had fallen, and that General Lee was making an effort to effect a junction with General "Joe" Johnston's army, which was at some distance in our front. Thereupon General Slocum resolved to march directly upon Raleigh, hoping to strike Johnston at Smithfield. It was at the village of Smithfield that I heard rebel bullets whistle for the last time. It appeared that Johnston had left that place and marched to Raleigh, leaving a small rear-guard behind, with whom we had a very slight skirmish. On the 12th, while I was riding by General Slocum's side in the column of march, we observed a horseman galloping towards us, swinging his hat and shouting something to the troops, to which they responded with a wild hurrah. When he came near we understood his shout to be that "Grant had captured Lee's army."

Now there could no longer be any doubt that the end of the war was actually at hand. Indeed, hardly one day had elapsed after our arrival at Raleigh before a flag of truce
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brought a message from General Johnston, asking for a suspension of hostilities and a meeting between him and General Sherman for the arrangement of terms of surrender. The meeting was fixed for April 17th, at a point intermediate between the two armies. Just as he was leaving Raleigh on that morning, Sherman received a telegraphic message from Secretary Stanton, containing the announcement of the assassination of President Lincoln. While Sherman was gone to confer with Johnston the terrible news was kept secret from our troops, to be revealed to them by a general order the next day. I well remember the effect the announcement had upon them. The camps, which for two days had been fairly resounding with jubilation over the advent of peace, suddenly fell into gloomy stillness. The soldiers admired their great generals, and often saluted some of them with enthusiastic acclamations. But their President, their good "Father Abraham," they loved. Him they carried in their hearts as their personal friend and the friend of their homes and families. When the foul deed, by which he had been taken off, was made known to them, they did not vent their feelings in loud tones of anger and vengeance, but they sat around their camp-fires either silent or communicating their wrathful grief to one another in grim murmurs. But as I went around among them, and here and there caught their utterances, it occurred to me that now it was the highest time that the war should cease. If it had continued, and if these men had once more been let loose upon "the enemy's country," there would have been danger of vengeance taken for Abraham Lincoln's blood that might have made the century shudder.

The people of the South themselves felt keenly that the murder of Lincoln was the worst blow that could have fallen upon them. As General Sherman told us, Johnston and the
generals of his army received the bloody news with utter consternation.

It was, indeed, high time the war should cease, but it did not cease without a by-play much to be regretted. On the 18th of April, General Sherman met General Johnston again, and agreed with him upon a treaty of surrender, intended to embrace all the Confederate armies in the field. Its provisions were astonishing to the last degree. It stipulated—subject to the approval of the President—that the Confederate armies should be “disbanded and conducted to their several State capitals, there to deposit their arms and public property in the State Arsenals”; that the Executive of the United States should “recognize the several State governments on their officers and legislatures taking the oaths prescribed by the Constitution of the United States, and where conflicting State governments had resulted from the war, the legitimacy of all should be submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States”; that “all the Federal Courts should be re-established in the several States, with powers as defined by the Constitution of the United States and of the States respectively”; that “the people and inhabitants of all the States be guaranteed, as far as the Executive can, their political rights and privileges, as well as their rights of person and property as defined by the Constitution of the United States and of the States respectively”; that “the Executive authority of the government of the United States should not disturb any of the people by reason of the late war, so long as they live in peace and quiet, and obey the laws in existence at the place of their residence”; in short, that “war was to cease, and general amnesty be granted on condition that the armies be disbanded, the arms distributed, and peaceful pursuits resumed.”

In an article contributed by General Slocum to the "War
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Series" of the Century Magazine, the following passage occurs concerning the "treaty" of peace:

"Pending these negotiations, and after the proposed terms had been made known to the leading officers of Sherman's army, I conversed with nearly all these officers, among them Logan, Howard, and Blair, and heard no word of dissent from any of them. I can now recall to mind but one general officer who, at the time, questioned the wisdom of General Sherman's action, and that was General Carl Schurz. General Schurz was then serving temporarily as my chief-of-staff, and when I returned from Sherman's headquarters about 12 o'clock on the night of the 18th I found General Schurz sitting up, waiting for me. He was eager to learn the terms, and when I stated them to him he expressed regret and predicted just what subsequently happened. He said the public mind of the North would be inflamed by the assassination of Lincoln, and now that the armies of the Confederacy were virtually crushed, anything looking toward leniency would not be well received."

So far as it touches me, this narrative is correct, except in one point. It was not the ground of my objection to the terms that after the assassination of Lincoln "leniency" would not be "well received," but that the government could not possibly permit a general in the field to determine its policy concerning the reconstruction of the "States in rebellion." It required no extraordinary political foresight to predict the prompt rejection of the Sherman-Johnston agreement by the government, as well as by the public opinion of the country. I remember the midnight scene spoken of by General Slocum very vividly. I was very much distressed—not as if there could have been any doubt as to the final outcome of the matter, but on account of General Sherman. With all his companions in arms, I esteemed him very highly, and cherished a genuine

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affection for him. And now, to think that, at the very close of his splendid career in the war for the Union, he should by one inconsiderate act bring upon himself the censure of the government and of the country, was sad indeed. And this one inconsiderate act was so foreign to what had been, and were again to be, his natural tendencies! Here was the same man who, in October, 1863, had written to the Secretary of the Treasury: "By the vicissitudes of war I was again forced into the command of a department. I almost shrink from a command that involves me in civil matters which I do not understand. Politics or the means to influence a civil people are mysteries which I do not comprehend." And in our intercourse of later years he often said to me: "I know nothing of politics, and don't want to have anything to do with politics. I leave all my politics to John,"—his brother, the Senator. And that now, at the supreme moment of the final closing up of the Civil War, when all the people stood on tiptoe to watch and scrutinize every word that was spoken, and every stroke of the pen by those on the theater of great events, he should jump with both feet into politics of the weightiest kind, and in a manner which could not possibly find acceptance with his government and the vast majority of his countrymen—was an almost tragic spectacle.

Of course, his motives were good. He was, whatever may have been said to the contrary, most kindly disposed toward the Southern people and wanted to treat them with the most generous consideration. Besides, he feared that the disbanded rebel armies might form themselves into guerrilla bands and so harass the country by an irregular sort of warfare, very difficult to suppress, for an indefinite period of time, and he hoped that he might induce them quietly to go home and become peaceable citizens at once, by treating them very handsomely.
But he forgot that Grant, receiving the surrender of Lee at Appomattox, had set him an example of handsome treatment; that this example had for him the character of a rule to be followed, and that to diverge from it would under all circumstances have been a dangerous venture.

What was sure to follow, followed swiftly. As soon as the Sherman-Johnston treaty came to the knowledge of the government, it was promptly disavowed; and as soon as it came to the knowledge of the public, the press broke out in a storm of angry denunciation. It is probable that Stanton, who was somewhat given to blunt language, communicated to Sherman the disapproval of the government in more than ordinarily brusque terms, and that the telegraph did not mince matters in acquainting Sherman with what the papers said. At any rate, Sherman's excitable temper was wrought up to the highest pitch of exasperation, which uttered itself with the utmost freedom.

It was on the evening after the arrival of such telegraphic tidings from the North, that I witnessed a scene which I shall never forget. At the so-called "Palace," the Governor's mansion, in Raleigh, where, if I remember rightly, Sherman had his headquarters, about a dozen or so of generals were assembled in a large, bare room. They were all in a disturbed state of mind at the turn affairs had taken, and had come to get from Sherman the latest news. They sat or stood around in rather mute expectation. But Sherman was not mute. He paced up and down the room like a caged lion, and, without addressing anybody in particular, unbosomed himself with an eloquence of furious invective which for a while made us all stare. He lashed the Secretary of War as a mean, scheming, vindictive politician, who made it his business to rob military men of the credit earned by exposing their lives in the service of their
country. He berated the people who blamed him for what he had done as a mass of fools, not worth fighting for, who did not know when a thing was well done. He railed at the press, which had altogether too much freedom; which had become an engine of vilification; which should be bridled by severe laws, so that the fellows who wielded too loose a pen might be put behind bars—and so on, and so on. A foreigner unacquainted with the American character and American ways, hearing this wild outburst, might have believed that here was the beginning of a mutiny of a victorious general against his government. But we, who knew Sherman to be one of the most loyal souls in America, were troubled by it only because we feared that by a similar volcanic eruption in public he might seriously compromise his character before the people.

A day or two later General Slocum entered my tent with a happy face. "All will be well," said he. "Grant is here. He has come from Washington to set things right. Indeed, Grant had come to save his friend Sherman from himself. He showed Sherman that he, Grant, had been instructed by Lincoln himself strictly to abstain from all conferences or arguments of a political nature with the enemy, and how the capitulation at Appomattox had been framed accordingly. Sherman was appeased, except that he continued to bear a bitter grudge against Secretary Stanton, who he thought had wantonly insulted him. General Johnston surrendered his army on the 26th of April, on the same terms on which Lee had surrendered to Grant, and the surrender of other Southern forces soon followed. The war was ended.

As soon as General Johnston's surrender was officially announced, I promptly resigned my commission in the army and returned to my family, who were still sojourning at Bethlehem, in Pennsylvania. Thus my military life was over.
It was a life full of most interesting experiences. It inspired me with a very high esteem for the American volunteer soldier, who, in the aggregate, might have been called the American people in arms. Nothing could have been more magnificent than the patriotic ardor with which the youth of the country—native and foreign-born alike—crowded around the flag of the Republic when President Lincoln called for defenders of the Union. Among those who filled the ranks there were no doubt some adventurous spirits whom the prospects of a fight would have attracted under any circumstances. But it is equally true, doubtless, that the overwhelming majority consisted of men who simply obeyed the voice of duty, which called them, as American citizens, to abandon the daily pursuits of peace, and to offer their lives as a sacrifice to their country on the field of war. And this patriotic enthusiasm at the beginning of the war was by no means a mere momentary, short-lived effervescence. It was a moral element of steadiness, supplying what the volunteer army lacked in discipline. Although the volunteer gradually acquired a sound appreciation of the exigencies of the service as to strict obedience to orders and the observance of certain formalities, yet he never quite accommodated himself to the strait-laced regulations and practices to which the regular soldier is subjected. He was a volunteer not only when he entered the army, but, in a certain sense, he remained largely a volunteer in the course of the war—that is to say, he did or suffered many things not merely because he knew that, as a soldier, he simply must do or suffer them, but because, from his moral sense of duty, he chose to do or suffer them. In what he considered non-essentials his habits were exceedingly loose. The relations between privates and company or regimental, and even higher officers, never were free from that instinctive feeling of equality character-
istic of the American. There was no chasm of caste or fixed social class distinction between the different ranks, and the consciousness of this led to a forgetfulness of military formalities, and sometimes to a decidedly unmilitary familiarity of tone between subordinate and superior. The rule, for instance, that a private must give an officer a military salute whenever and wherever he might meet him, proved very difficult of general enforcement. Two characteristic incidents bearing upon this point are specially vivid in my memory.

One day I had a visit from a major general serving in another army Corps. When my visitor departed I accompanied him to his horse and noticed that the sentry guarding my tent did not present arms to him. Returning to my tent, I sternly asked the sentry: "Why did you not present arms to the General?" He answered with the utmost coolness—he was from a Western regiment: "Why, sir, that General was never introduced to me." There were also instances of superabundant civility. While our Corps was stationed in Virginia in the winter of 1862 to 1863, a Connecticut regiment was attached to my division. It was quite fresh, and was sent on outpost duty, mainly for the purpose of instruction. To see whether the thing was well done, I rode with some officers along the rear of the picket line. The men were generally well posted, face to the enemy, and permitted me to pass behind them unnoticed. But one of them evidently thought that this was discourteous, and would not do. He turned round, presented arms with one hand, took off his cap with the other, and made a profound bow. The spectacle was so comical that my companions broke out in loud laughter. I rode up to the man, corrected his position, and asked him why he had been so elaborately polite. He said that during the last presidential campaign, that of 1860, he had heard me make a public speech which had impressed him
very much, and he thought it no more than proper to give me, besides the military salute, a further mark of respect by uncovering his head and bowing.

The case of our old friend, General Milroy, who occasionally discussed with his men why and how the next move should be made, was, of course, a very exceptional one. Perhaps it was unique. But it is certain that in the volunteer army the relations between officers and men were amicable—not to say fraternal—in a degree which in any European army would be considered subversive of all discipline. Nor could this have been otherwise. Not only was there no social class distinction between them, but the difference between them in point of education and capacity was not so general and not so great as to establish an authoritative superiority of one over the other. There were plenty of men in the ranks who were the equals, if not the superiors, of their lieutenants or captains, or even their colonels in point of intelligence or culture. As to military matters, they were, as a rule, at first, equally uninstructed and inexperienced. Some of the officers had, perhaps, the advantage of having taken part in the drill of some militia company, but that was of little account. The private soldier could, therefore, not see in his officer the man who might be depended upon to know how to do things in an emergency much better than the men he commanded. Thus the authority of such officers depended in a large measure upon the good will of the subordinates. I have already mentioned how on a march in warm weather the column could not be kept close, and how the men sitting down on the roadside would coolly reply to the officers urging them on: "All right, sir; we'll get there in time!"—which in most cases they did. This was so universal an experience that by and by all attempts to maintain very strict order on the march were given up, except in the immediate
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presence of the enemy, when the men saw that such order was really indispensable. And so it was with other things concerning which the men substantially exercised and asserted their own judgment as to whether they were necessary or not. And that judgment was then, if at all possible, gradually and silently accepted by the officers.

Some years later, when I visited Germany again and met the Chancellor, Prince Bismarck, as well as several generals of the Prussian army who had studied the history of our Civil War, they pried me with questions about the organization, the spirit, and the efficiency of our volunteer army. What I told them was substantially what I have put into these pages. It amused them immensely, but, accustomed as they were to judge everything by the high standard of professional instruction and discipline of the Prussian army, they seemed unable to understand how an army like ours could fight. How would it cope with any of the regular armies of European powers arrayed against it on anything like equal terms in point of numbers? They listened to me with a polite smile when I expressed the opinion that no country had human material superior to ours as regards physical development, intelligence, and martial spirit; that in the long run our volunteers could outmarch any European troops, and surpass them in the endurance of any sort of fatigue; that our volunteers, with incredible skill and rapidity, would build roads, and extemporize serviceable railway bridges and viaducts, with nothing but nails and tools, such as axes and saws and hammers and picks and shovels, and pine trees near at hand, and a clever engineer to guide them—I had seen them do it—and that they would construct temporary entrenchments and defenses almost without tools—I had seen them do that, too, many times—and that, in my opinion, they would, in a conflict with a European army,

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perhaps at the beginning of a campaign suffer some reverses by the superiority of European drill and discipline, but soon become acquainted with the tactics of their adversaries, and prove decidedly superior in the long run, especially if the contest were to be fought out on American soil.

Of course, this opinion will hardly be accepted by military men in Europe, as at the beginning of our recent Spanish War it was widely, if not universally, believed in European military circles that when the American volunteers met the Spanish regulars there would be a new experience in store for them. The event showed that, even without the educational reverses at the beginning, the American volunteer could not only cope with the Spanish regular, but, so to speak, walk right over him.

Here is the secret of it, which the European mind, unacquainted with the genius of this country, finds it difficult to understand: Owing to the educational power of free institutions, many things are accomplished in America without much drill and discipline, for which in Europe very much drill and discipline is required.

As to the bravery of the American soldier, Northern as well as Southern, volunteer as well as regular, there can hardly be two opinions. He will not suffer, but rather profit, by any comparison with any other. In his courage there is a peculiar element of national pride. But I must confess that my war experience has destroyed some youthful illusions as to the romantic aspect of bravery or heroism in battle. If I were to venture a definition, I should say that true bravery or heroism consists in conscious self-sacrifice for the benefit of others, or in the performance of duty. And the less expectation of reward or distinction there is connected with the act of self-sacrifice, the more genuine the bravery or heroism will be. The
measuring by this standard of the value of the bravery I saw around me, brought forth some curious results.

Among the men whom I had occasion to observe there were some—not many—who, when they came into contact with the enemy, seemed to be seized with a sort of uncontrollable fury which manifested itself in the utterance of oaths and imprecations, in the shaking of fists and, in some cases, in an apparently irresistible desire to rush forward and "get at them." In some instances this could be taken for an outburst of patriotic passion; in others it looked more like the animal rage of the bull at the sight of a red rag. Most of these men were what would ordinarily be called really "brave"; that is to say, they would walk into the hottest fire with absolute intrepidity, and do the most daring things. But while some of these, when not under fire, were men of consistent character, exemplary conduct, and modest self-respect, others became known as liars, braggarts, gamblers, bullies, ruffians, drunks, and all that is disreputable—utterly unprincipled persons without any virtue except this animal courage. Yet they would sometimes be counted among "the bravest," and occasionally canonized as such.

My experience has taught me that there is no vice, no degree of moral cowardice, that may not sometimes be found in the same person, together with that physical courage and fighting spirit which may make that man a hero in battle, and that there is no virtue, no degree of moral heroism, no spirit of noblest self-sacrifice, which may not sometimes be found in a person unnerved by the sight of blood, or otherwise incapable of meeting an adversary sword in hand.

I observed different classes of men who seemed to take particular delight in especially dangerous ventures. I had two such men for a while on my staff who would on every possible
occasion, even when there was little or no necessity for it, ask permission to dash through the enemy's skirmish line in order to see what forces there might be behind, and who would, doing this, have to run through veritable hail-storms of bullets, going and coming. They repeatedly offered themselves for the most reckless scouting excursions into the country held by the enemy. One of them was a native of Ohio, an enthusiastic patriot, not a blusterer, but a quiet and modest young man of exemplary conduct in every respect, liked by everybody. The other was the son of a German baron of high official position. He had run away from school to Hamburg, where he enlisted as a common seaman on a sailing vessel which carried him to Buenos Ayres. There he fought during the revolutionary troubles under the famous Rosas, first for and then against the dictator. Then he sailed as a common seaman to China, where he served for a time on a piratical craft. Then he came to the United States, where he took service on a vessel bound for the African coast, which he subsequently found to be engaged in the slave trade. Not long after his return to the United States our Civil War broke out and he enlisted in a New York regiment of volunteers, in which he quickly rose to a captaincy. He made himself useful and notable by being always ready to do things which others might have hesitated to do. He was an uncommonly splendid horseman, and a lively companion—not a drunkard, but liable to drink too much on convivial occasions. He was not handsome, nor a man of good manners, but he won the affection of a refined young lady, the daughter of a rich New York family, who once visited our camp, became acquainted with him and wished to marry him. But, happily for the young lady, he preferred the life of adventure and remained in the army. It was probably owing to his superior horsemanship that he somewhat out-
shone his rival in daring feats, but both finally found their 
dead on the battlefield in attempts to reconnoiter behind the 
enemy's skirmish line.

That in the patriotic young officer from Ohio who fought 
and exposed himself consciously for a good cause, bravery had 
the moral attributes of a genuine virtue, there can hardly be 
a question. But what kind of virtue was the bravery—for he 
was unquestionably "brave"—of the young nobleman who 
really did not care what cause he was fighting for, but was 
inspired in his daring exploits mainly—perhaps solely—by his 
sportive delight in meeting danger? Yet, although his bravery 
was merely temperamental, if he had been in a higher and 
more conspicuous position, he would have been celebrated 
among our "heroes."

I must confess that observations like these have made me 
rather distrustful of the moral merit of that kind of courage 
or bravery which is merely, or mainly, temperamental. No 
doubt it has its value, and great value, too, in the arbitrament 
of arms. But we should not be seduced by the glamour it is 
apt to produce upon the imagination, to attribute to it all 
sorts of moral qualities and intellectual faculties which it may 
or may not possess—or rather the possession of which is not 
only not proved, but not even indicated by the display of 
military valor.

What rational answer is there to the question whether the 
moral merit of the bravery shown by the soldier in storming 
a hostile battery is greater than that shown by the fireman in 
saving a child from the flames at the risk of his own life, or by 
the member of the life-saving station on the seashore who 
plunges into the raging surf to rescue a shipwrecked sailor? 
Nay, is not—ceteris paribus—that fireman, or that member 
of the life-saving crew, even a greater hero, morally, consider-
ing that the soldier, acting presumably on the conspicuous theater of the world’s great affairs, is surrounded by everything apt to excite his combativeness and to stimulate his ambition—the inspiring drumbeat and bugle call, the emulation of his comrades, the prospect of having his name trumpeted to the admiration of the world, the expectation of promotions, and rewards, and distinctions in various forms—even of political preferments—while the fireman and the member of the life-saving station, acting on a comparatively humble and obscure scene, has little more to inspire him than his sense of duty and his human sympathy, and may, beyond that, only look for a short laudatory notice in a local newspaper, a word of commendation from his chief, and, perhaps, a medal and a little advantage in promotion?

Yet, the war-hero, the man of martial glory, the bold and successful destroyer of lives—albeit the lives of “enemies”—has held, now holds, and is likely to continue to hold—at least until we reach a higher stage of civilization—a stronger place in popular esteem, or shall we rather say in the popular imagination, than the man who has earned his title to heroism by the saving of lives. And more than that: The martial hero who has distinguished himself as a military leader, on a more or less large scale, is likely to be endowed by the same popular imagination with all possible moral and mental qualifications believed to entitle him to leadership on other fields of human activity, and especially on the political field, on which the bestowal of power depends most on popular favor.

This is the case in this country more than in any other, except perhaps Spain, where there are reasons for it which do not exist here. With the Americans this tendency of the popular mind has probably been strengthened by the great example of Washington, who, in an exceptional degree,
united in himself the aptitude for military leadership with that for the conduct of civil—and especially republican—government. Such a happy combination of great qualities is exceedingly rare. Napoleon and Frederick the Great of Prussia can hardly be called great in the same category with Washington, for if they proved themselves to possess any genius for any species of civil government, it was certainly not government of the republican kind. Our own experience has been that the men with military titles elected to the presidency of the United States succeeded in the performance of the duties of the office, so far as they did succeed, by the abandonment of military methods and ways of thinking and by the cultivation, instead, of purely civil views and the practice of civic virtues. Nothing, for instance, would be more foreign to the genius of our government than the habit of command and the expectation of obedience on the part of the Chief Executive.

Here I may remark that of all the higher military officers I have known, none had a clearer intuitive conception of this than General Sherman. In the opinion of many competent persons, he was the ablest commander of them all. I remember a remarkable utterance of his when we were speaking of Grant’s campaign. “There was a difference,” Sherman said, “between Grant’s and my way of looking at things. Grant never cared a damn about what was going on behind the enemy’s lines, but it often scared me like the devil.” He admitted, and justly so, that some of Grant’s successes were owing to this very fact, but also some of his most conspicuous failures. Grant believed in hammering—Sherman in maneuvering. It had been the habit of the generals commanding the Army of the Potomac to cross the Rappahannock, to get their drubbing from Lee, and then promptly to retreat and recross the Rappahannock again. Grant crossed the Rappahannock,
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got his drubbing from Lee, but did not recross the Rappahannock again in retreat. He sturdily went on, hammering and hammering, and, with his vastly superior resources, finally hammered Lee's army to pieces, but with a most dreadful sacrifice of life on his own part. Now, comparing Grant's campaign for the taking of Richmond with Sherman's campaign for the taking of Atlanta—without losing sight of any of the differences of their respective situations—we may well arrive at the conclusion that Sherman was the superior strategist and the greater general.

I have already mentioned Sherman's letter to the Secretary of the Treasury in which he expressed his own distrust in his faculty for dealing with civic affairs. Several years after the close of the Civil War, at a time when a presidential election was approaching, some Republican newspapers suggested General Sherman's nomination as the Republican candidate. One day about this time I happened to meet the General on a ferry-boat between Jersey City and New York, and in the course of our conversation I referred to the Republican papers so using his name. Sherman at once burst out in his characteristic fashion: "What?" said he, "do they think I am a damned fool? They know that I don't know anything about politics, and am not fit for the presidency. At least, I know it. No, I am not a damned fool. I am a happy man now. Look at Grant! Look at Grant! What wouldn't he give now if he had never meddled with politics! No, they must let me alone. They can't bedevil me!" There was a treasure of the rare wisdom of self-knowledge in this rough speech, and it was thoroughly sincere.

When he called himself a "happy man," there was a tone of just exultation in his words. He was, indeed, a happy man. He had won great renown as a soldier, and an immense popu-
GENERAL WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN

From a Brady negative in the possession of F. H. Meserve
larity all over the Northern country. This he knew, and he thoroughly relished it. All sorts of societies and public organizations had made him their honorary member, and he appeared among them as often as he could. Whenever he entered a theater, which he did very often, the orchestra would strike up “Marching through Georgia,” and the whole audience would rise and clap their hands, sometimes even sing the tune, and his rugged face fairly glowed and beamed with pleasure. Every social circle greeted him as a most welcome guest, and at receptions, and evening parties, and other gatherings, the “pretty girls” would come up and kiss him—and how he did enjoy all this!

As he grew older his mind lost little if anything of its original vivacity. His conversation bubbled with quaint conceits, and odd expressions poured forth in the utmost abundance with great freedom. There could be no more entertaining dinner companion. While he lived in New York he sometimes dined with me and I with him; but he was most interesting when he came uninvited and unexpected, “just to make a call,” which he did now and then in the evening after dinner. Then he usually seemed to have something on his mind that he wanted to talk about. So I remember him one evening after nine o’clock suddenly bursting into my drawing-room, when, after having saluted my family, he at once precipitated himself upon the subject then uppermost in his thoughts. “Do you know,” he said, “that ancient myth of Jason and the ‘golden fleece’ is no mere myth at all. It is history. You know those old Greeks were great pirates and filibusters. They heard somehow that in a foreign country not very far away there were rivers or creeks carrying gold sand, and that the natives managed to get that gold sand by putting sheepskins with the wool on into the rivers or creeks, in which the gold sand float-
ing down stream would stick fast. Those sheepskins with the wool full of gold were the 'golden fleece,' don't you see? Then the Greek pirates sailed for those countries and stole the golden fleeces, and occasionally took some native girls along home with them. That was the origin of the myth of Jason and Medea, but the whole thing is substantially as true as anything in history.” Thus he would go on for a while, in the liveliest style, elucidating his story with all the joyousness of new discovery. This theme exhausted, he would jump up, thank us for the pleasant evening he had had, and leave us as abruptly as he had come. He was indeed a happy man, largely owing to his wise abstinence from affairs for which he did not feel himself fitted; and when he died, everybody that knew him regretted he was not permitted to enjoy his happiness some years longer.

To return to the matter of bravery, I imagine that the average man when first going into battle and hearing the roar of cannon and the rattle of musketry and the whistling of bullets feels an instinctive wish to be well out of it. A few will obey that wish and skulk, or run away at the first opportunity. Another limited class will feel that gaudium certaminis, that joy of the conflict, of which the poets speak, and be impatient to rush forward. The majority will promptly gather up their spirits and then in obedience to a sense of patriotic duty or an impulse of honor or of pride, and encouraged by the presence of their comrades, stand their ground and obey the orders of their commanders to the best of their ability. This is the way the moral element supplements temperamental courage or the lack of it. It is a perfectly natural impulse to duck one's head when a cannon-ball rushes over it. I have seen whole regiments do it, almost without exception, and then break out in a laugh. As troops grow more accustomed to the
sounds and sights which at first are apt to stagger them, they become of course steadier in their courage under fire, so that at last an engagement has little terror for them, unless it be quite unusually fierce and destructive. I have often been asked how I felt in a battle. The answer always was that I did not feel at all—in other words, that my mind was too fully and unceasingly occupied with the things to be done, to permit any feeling to interfere with the sense of responsibility. One is at such moments entirely unconscious of any personal danger. One simply does not think of it. When we read or hear of commanding officers exposing themselves, they usually do so without being aware of it—unless they especially mean to encourage the troops by their example.

But the most potent influence inspiring troops with more than ordinary courage and daring consists in their confidence and pride in their leaders. Napoleon said that an army of sheep commanded by a lion was vastly preferable to an army of lions commanded by a sheep. To be sure, there are no armies wholly composed of lions, and no armies wholly composed of sheep. In all armies the lion element and the sheep element exist in varying proportions. It is the character of the leadership that will make the one element or the other element prevail. This accounts for the striking superiority of the infantry in the Eastern army of the Confederacy commanded by Lee over that of its Western armies commanded by various other generals, some of whom were indeed brave and able, but far from measuring up to Lee's level in the confidence and pride they inspired. Many of Lee's successes were owing to the haughty assurance of his men that under him they could not be beaten or resisted—an assurance which grew too overweening at Gettysburg and led to disaster. I risk little in saying that our men would hardly have succeeded in storming
Missionary Ridge by a front attack if Lee and his men had been on top of it.

The Union army has been blamed for cruel acts of vandalism, committed in the Southern country, especially during the latter part of the war. This charge, which has indeed been very much exaggerated as it went from mouth to mouth, and from newspaper to newspaper, is not entirely groundless. In his report on our march from Chattanooga to Knoxville for the relief of Burnside, General Howard complains that acts of robbery and wanton destruction of property had been committed by some of the soldiers—in a country, too, in which a majority of the population were faithful Unionists. This complaint did not apply to his own troops, but to a corps of Sherman's army which preceded ours on the march. I myself saw evidences of this. I found several houses on the road completely stripped of everything that could be moved. I saw a field covered with feathers from a feather bed that had been ripped open. I saw a cradle standing by the roadside a mile or more away from the nearest human habitation. Evidently, it was the mere lust of looting that had induced soldiers to carry away things so absolutely useless to them. Later, in 1865, when I joined General Sherman's army at Goldsborough, N. C., after its great march through Georgia and the Carolinas, I saw some soldiers frying their bacon on silver platters, and in a general's tent I was treated to the finest Madeira wine poured from a large silver pitcher into silver goblets. When I asked where those things came from, the answer was that the army had been fairly stumbling over them in South Carolina, and that there was a lot of such stuff still left there. I do not mean to be understood as saying that I observed many such instances, but I observed some, and I was told that when the army was foraging for its sustenance in Georgia it was im-
possible to watch it closely enough that nothing but necessary supplies were taken, and further that, when it marched through South Carolina, a feeling seized upon the soldiers that, as South Carolina had started the whole secession mischief, it was no more than right to make the South Carolinians suffer for it.

Many years later I had a conversation with General Sherman on this subject. He frankly admitted that the necessity of "living on the country" by more or less systematic foraging had relaxed the discipline of the troops to a dangerous degree, and that the grudge of the soldiers against South Carolina as the original "secession-hole" and the instigator of the rebellion, had certainly existed and brought forth deplorable consequences. He emphatically denied, however, having made, as he affirmed, the fullest and most careful and impartial investigation, that the fire which destroyed the city of Columbia had been started by his troops. "But," he said, "before we got out of that State, the men had so accustomed themselves to destroying everything along the line of march that sometimes, when I had my headquarters in a house, that house began to burn before I was fairly out of it. The truth is," he added, "human nature is human nature. You take the best lot of young men, all church members, if you please, and put them into an army, and let them invade the enemy's country, and live upon it for any length of time, and they will gradually lose all principle and self-restraint to a degree beyond the control of discipline. It always has been and always will be so. When a fair-minded man who knows something about war, examines the conduct of my troops under the circumstances, he will not be surprised at what they did, but he will be surprised that it was no worse. At any rate, I was very glad when I had my army out of those States."
The Reminiscences of Carl Schurz

By the way, it is a curious fact that in the South, General Sherman himself is still to this day held responsible for all the mischief connected with his famous march. The most ludicrously extravagant stories about his personal conduct are still current there. A Southern lady, a friend much cherished by my family for her character and intelligence, quite seriously told me that General Sherman had himself brought with him from the South over two hundred gold watches. I tried in vain to convince her that the story could not possibly be true. She simply insisted that she knew it was true, that it was very well known down South, and that the proof of it was in the State Department at Washington.

The sayings of such a man as General Sherman on the effect of war upon the morals of the soldiers themselves may be commended to the sober contemplation of those who so glibly speak of war as a great moral agency—how war kindles in the popular heart the noblest instincts and emotions of human nature; how it lifts a people above the mean selfishness of daily life; how it stops the growth of the "vile, groveling materialism" which is so apt to develop into a dominant tendency in a long period of peace; how it turns the ambitions of men into channels of generous enthusiasm and lofty aspirations; and how it is simply a bath of fire from which human society issues cleansed of its dross of low propensities, refreshed in its best energies, and more ardent than ever in devoted pursuit of its highest ideals.

It will, indeed, not be denied that at the beginning of our Civil War there were magnificent demonstrations of enthusiastic and self-sacrificing patriotism on the part of the people, that the war itself abounds with heroic acts, and that it produced the great results of a saved and strengthened Union, the abolition of slavery, and an invigorated consciousness of
national power. But it was not the war that created the enthusiastic and self-sacrificing patriotism of the people. That patriotism existed before the war, and would have existed without it. The war only served to give it an opportunity for demonstrative manifestation. And as to the consolidation of the Union, the abolition of slavery, and the strengthening of the national power—would these things have been of less value if they had been achieved without a war? I will not assert that under the circumstances then existing they could have been so achieved; but would it not, on the whole, have been far better for the physical as well as the moral advancement of the American people, if superior statesmanship had overcome the seeming impossibilities and found a way to achieve them without a war? Would not mankind, and especially the American people, have been the better for it? Is it really true that the war, as such, without the high objects for which it was made, would have "kindled in the popular heart the noblest instincts and emotions of human nature?" Did it not, by the side of the noble emotions and the self-sacrificing patriotism called into action by the high objects to be served, also call into action, at least with a great many of those who took part in it, the brutal instincts of human nature? Did the war really lift the people above the mean selfishness of daily life and stop the dominance of the vile materialism said to grow up in long periods of peace? Did it not rather, by the side of noble desire to help the good cause, call forth a greedy craving on the part of a great many to use the needs of the government and the public distress as an opportunity for making money by sharp practices, and did not the rapid accumulation of fortunes develop during and after the war a "materialistic" tendency far worse than any we had known among us before? Is it really true that our war turned the ambitions of our people into the
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channels of lofty enthusiasms and aspirations and devotion to high ideals? Has it not rather left behind it an era of absorbing greed of wealth, a marked decline of ideal aspirations, and a dangerous tendency to exploit the government for private gain—a tendency which not only ran wild in the business world, but even tainted the original idealism of the war volunteers who had freely offered their lives to the Republic in obedience to patriotic impulse, and finally were made to appear as insatiate clamorers for government pensions, of which many of them never could get enough? Have they not thus been made responsible—many of them, no doubt, unjustly—for the creation of the most monstrous pension system the world has ever known,—a system breeding fraud without end, contributing largely to the demoralization of our politics, pauperizing a multitude of otherwise decent people, and imposing upon the government an enormous financial burden, which, indeed, can now be borne, but which, if the present pension system becomes a ruling precedent, will, in case we have other wars, grow to intolerable dimensions?

In view of these undeniable facts, the eulogists of war among us will do well candidly to study the history of their own country. Such study will cure them of their romantic fancies of the moral beauties of war; as it will also correct the other notion caressed by them, that bravery on the battlefield is the highest form of human prowess and efficiency. They will learn that among a people like ours, it will be easy to find a hundred men ready to storm a hostile battery or to lead a forlorn hope, when they will meet only one with the moral courage to stand up alone against the world, for his conception of truth, right, and justice, and that while it may be a brave thing to confront one's enemies, it is a far braver thing to confront even one's friend in the defense and maintenance of truth.
right, and justice. And this is not a matter of physical courage. It is the moral heroism most needed in a republic.

Although I had resigned my commission and was no longer in the service, I could not abstain from going to Washington to witness the great parade of the two armies, the Eastern and the Western, previous to their final dissolution, and to press the hands of my old companions in arms once more. My experiences during the conflict, and sober reflections thereon, had developed in me a profound abhorrence of war as such. But I must confess, when I saw those valiant hosts swinging in broad fronted column down Pennsylvania Avenue, the Army of the Potomac one day, and the next day Sherman’s army of bronzed veterans—the men nothing but bone and muscle and skin—their tattered battle-flags fluttering victoriously over their heads in the full pride of achievement, my heart leaped in the consciousness of having been one of them. It was a spectacle splendid and imposing beyond description. But was not that which followed a spectacle far grander and more splendid in its significance—the sudden dispersion of these mighty hosts, which looked, and felt, as if they might defy the world, but which, after four years of most bloody and destructive fighting, melted away all at once, as if they had never existed—every man that had wielded the sword or the musket or served the cannon in terrible conflict, going quietly home to his plow, or his anvil, or his loom, or his counting-room, as a peaceable citizen? That this transition from the conditions of war to those of peace, this transformation of a million soldiers into a million citizen-workers, could be accomplished so suddenly, without the slightest disturbance, even without any apprehension of difficulty, was in its way a greater triumph of the American democracy than any victory won on the battlefield.

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At the same time the spectacle presented by the other half of the restored Union was perplexing in the extreme. The Southern armies, too, had been dissolved, and the officers and men had "gone home"—no doubt with the honest intention of conducting themselves as peaceable citizens, in spite of the bitterness of their disappointment. But their situation was bewildering in its embarrassments—a disastrous defeat behind them, ruin and desolation around them, the most perplexing problems of existence before them, and fierce conflicts of opinion as to how this problem could and should be solved.

And alas! Abraham Lincoln was dead. He had been taken off at the moment when he had risen highest in the esteem, the affection, and the confidence of his countrymen; when almost all of those that, at the time of his accession to the presidency, had seen in him only an insignificant country lawyer, or that had lampooned him even as a mere boorish buffoon, or that, during the war, had accused him of weakness, aimless hesitancy, and blundering vacillation—when almost all of them had finally concluded that his policy of patience, sympathetic magnanimity, and just appreciation of public sentiment, although liable to criticism in detail, was on the whole the best to hold all the Union forces together, and thus to save the Republic; and when, whatever differences there may have been between his practical views of reconstruction and the theories of others, the South trusted him that he would treat those "lately in rebellion" with "malice toward none and charity for all," and the North trusted him that he would permit nothing to be done to imperil the liberty of the emancipated slave—he thus being the natural moderator between the victors and the vanquished in the efforts to solve the portentous puzzle left by the war. Alas! he was dead, and the initiatory measures for that solution were confided by fate to
the uncertain hands of Andrew Johnson, of whom nobody knew what to expect. Certainly, nothing could have surprised me more than to receive from him a summons calling upon me to aid him in forming his judgment. How this happened and what came of it I shall soon narrate.
CHAPTER V

The peace which followed the surrender of the Confederate armies in April, 1865, was by no means unclouded. Indeed, it was not to be expected that the passionate antagonisms which for four years had arrayed the North and the South against one another in bloody conflict, would at once yield to a revival of common national feeling and mutual affection. The wounds the Civil War had inflicted upon each were still too fresh. The Southern soldier went home bowed down by the mortification of defeat, ragged, emaciated, and foot-sore, to find his home, maybe, in ruins, his family on the edge of starvation, his country partly devastated and all fearfully impoverished, his people painfully wrestling with the bewildering problem of providing for the coming day. With sullen sullenness the wrath of the Southern heart would, now and then, privately break out at the "ruthless invasion" of the Southern soil by "cruel hordes of Northern hirelings." Meanwhile there was much jubilation at the North over the restored Union. The longed-for day when "Johnny would come home" had at last arrived. One after another the regiments of bronzed veterans, flushed with triumph, returned to the places from which they had gone forth. They were received with joyous demonstrations of welcome and speedily put to work by the activities of a prosperous country. The stories of the dangers they had braved, the valorous deeds they had done, and the victories they had achieved, imparted to every social gathering a tone of glorification. But, after all, very many of the "Johnnies" who had gone to the war, had not come home. There was a ter-
JEFFERSON DAVIS

From a miniature in the possession of the Davis family
rible number of parents who had lost sons, of wives who had lost their husbands, and of children who had lost their fathers. And there were many tales told and eagerly discussed that were more apt to stir resentful and vindictive feelings—tales of the sacrifices made and the anxieties and heartaches suffered by those who had remained at home; tales of the predatory rebel invasions from Canada, such as the raid on St. Albans; tales of rebel plots to burn down the cities of New York and Chicago, and to spread the small-pox and other contagious diseases among our people; grim and ghastly tales of the specter-like appearance of the Union soldiers who had survived the horrors of the prison-pen at Andersonville; and, above all, tales of the dastardly assassination by rebel hands of our good, dear President Abraham Lincoln—a crime never to be forgiven.

The assassination of Abraham Lincoln was indeed a national calamity of most sinister effect just at that critical period. Very cool reasoners might have concluded that it would, as it soon actually did, turn out to have been the work of a handful of half-crazed fanatics of the lower order, utterly devoid, not only of moral principles, but also of the slightest glimmer of common sense—for nothing could have been more obvious to any sane mind than that this crime could not possibly be of the least benefit to the Southern people in their desperate straits, but would only serve to inflame the feelings of their victorious adversaries against them. The well-known fantastic character of that "handsome young actor in America," John Wilkes Booth, who was the organizer and the leading spirit of the murderous plot, might have gone far to convince the public mind that this stupid atrocity committed under such circumstances must have been the offspring of diseased brains, and could not possibly have been designed or
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countenanced by any person capable of sound reasoning. But
the public mind was under the influence of hot feeling. Swift
vengeance overtook the known murderer of Lincoln. The
death of Booth was as luridly picturesque and theatrical as he
himself might have desired. After a reckless flight through
Maryland, across the Potomac into Virginia, constantly tor-
tured by excruciating pain from a broken leg, Booth took
refuge in the tobacco-shed of a Virginia farmer, where on the
night of the 23rd of April he was detected by the pursuing
soldiery. Summoned to surrender, he not only refused, but,
rifle in hand, he rather challenged his pursuers to fight. The
shed was set on fire, and in the flickering light of the flames
he grimly received the bullet which put an end to his life. The
diary which he kept as that of a public character of importance,
showed that to the last his poor brain had been puzzled by the
question why he should be hunted like a wild beast while Bru-
tus and Tell figured as heroes in the history of the world. The
other known members of the conspiracy, except one, were
captured and held for trial, the result of which everybody
foresaw.

But this did not satisfy the public. It was widely believed
that the abominable crime had been the upshot of an extensive
conspiracy among the principal Southern leaders—that it
should be charged to the general wickedness of the rebellion
and must as such be investigated, prosecuted, and punished.
General Grant, one of the calmest of men, seems to have been
under that impression, for he telegraphed to General Ord,
commanding at Richmond, to arrest and put into Libby Prison
Judge Campbell with various others, and even to arrest all
paroled officers unless they took the oath of allegiance. He was
prevailed upon by General Ord to withdraw that order, but he
insisted that "extreme rigor will have to be observed, whilst

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assassination remains the order of the day with the rebels.” In a proclamation issued by President Johnson, the assassination of Abraham Lincoln and the intended assassination of Secretary Seward and others, were declared to have been “incited and encouraged” by Jefferson Davis, and his agents in Canada, Jacob Thompson, late Secretary of the Interior under Buchanan, and Clement C. Clay, late United States Senator from Alabama, and rewards were offered, $100,000 for the capture of Jefferson Davis, and of $25,000 each for those of Thompson and Clay, directly charging them with complicity in the murder of Lincoln.

Jefferson Davis was captured on the 10th of May, 1865, near Irwinville, Ga., by a detachment of a Michigan cavalry regiment. It was reported that trying to escape he had put on some of his wife’s clothes, but that his cavalry boots had betrayed his identity. The story, although somewhat stripped of its comical aspects by subsequent accounts, was widely believed and much relished at the North where many people had during the war been accustomed to see in Jefferson Davis the personification of all that was offensive in the rebellion, and to hold him mainly responsible for all the ills it had inflicted upon the country, and were now rather pleased to see him exposed not only to detestation but also to ridicule. But the capture of Jefferson Davis was a very serious thing, and it was regarded by not a few cool-headed and long-sighted men as a very unfortunate one. It has become well known that President Lincoln wished that the downfall of the Confederacy should not deliver the Chief of the Confederacy into his hands. There was a Lincoln anecdote current at the time which seemed to have good authority behind it. It was this: After Lee’s surrender a friend asked Mr. Lincoln whether, all things considered, he did not think it would be best to let Jefferson Davis
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get out of the country. Lincoln answered by "telling a story" of a Methodist preacher out West, a strict temperance man, who on a hot day was offered a glass of water with a dash of brandy in it, and who replied that he would not object to a drop of something strong in his drink if that drop could be put in "unbeknownst" to himself.

Lincoln's keen mind, no doubt, saw clearly that the capture of Jefferson Davis would burden the government of the United States with a most embarrassing dilemma. The public voice would insist upon the chief of the rebellion being tried and punished for treason. Indeed, he could not possibly be held in captivity forever without being tried. Now his crime of treason had been committed in the South. A trial for treason by a regular tribunal in the South would be a mere farce, for it seemed a foregone conclusion that no jury in the South could be found that would pronounce Jefferson Davis or any leader of the rebellion guilty of treason, unless that jury were wholly composed of negroes; and even then the outcome would be doubtful. A trial by a military commission might indeed result in a verdict of guilty; but resort to a military tribunal for the trial of a political offense after the close of the war—in fact, the greatest State trial of the century, might have looked like a stretch of arbitrary power fitting an old-world despotism rather than this new-world republic.

But the assassination of Lincoln, the charge and the widespread belief that Jefferson Davis and some other leaders of the rebellion had been accomplices of the murderer, and the existence of a vague apprehension floating in the air, that the Republic was still in some danger or other, made the resort to a military commission for the trial of the captured rebel-chiefs more plausible. The idea that those rebel-chiefs, and especially the chiefest of them, the "arch-traitor," as Jefferson Davis
was called, the personal embodiment, as he was popularly regarded, of all the wrongs and sufferings the rebellion had brought upon the country, should go scot free—so scot free—after the soldiers and their folks at home had sung so long to the tune of "John Brown's soul"—"Hang Jeff Davis on a sour apple tree," seemed monstrous to the popular imagination, and any method of bringing him to condign justice, that looked tolerably decent, appeared therefore acceptable. But when the news came forth that Jefferson Davis and his associates were not only to be tried by a military commission, but that the trial was to be conducted in secret, there was much shaking of heads among men who were not entirely carried away by the excitement of the time. My constant concern as to how the light in which the attitude of this republic would appear before the civilized world—an anxious consideration which was omnipresent to my mind—troubled me so much that I resolved to write to President Johnson. When, after resigning my commission in the army, I passed from North Carolina through Washington, and later at the time of the great triumphal parades of the armies of the Potomac and of the West, I had called upon him to pay my respects, he had in a confidential manner discussed with me the events of the day and repeatedly asked me to come again or to let him hear from me by letter. So I wrote from Bethlehem, Pa., on May 13th, 1865:

"Dear Sir:—Permit me to avail myself of the privilege you gave me, to write to you whenever I had anything worthy of consideration to suggest. A few days ago I found it stated in the papers that the trial of the conspirators was to be conducted in secret. I did not believe it until I now see it confirmed. I do not hesitate to say that this measure strikes me as very unfortunate, and I am not surprised to find it quite gen-

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erally disapproved. Yesterday I returned from Philadelphia
where I had spent two days, and I can assure you that among
the firmest supporters of the administration I did not hear a
single voice in favor of it. I admit, I do not know what objects
are intended to be gained by secrecy. I take it for granted
that they are of no futile character. But if it is important that
the accused should be convicted and sentenced, and that, per-
haps with a view to further developments, the testimony as it
appears should be kept from some conspirators still at large, it
is of vastly greater importance that the trial should be abso-
lutely fair, not only in spirit but also in appearance.

"When the government charged, before the whole world,
the chief of the rebellion with having instigated the assassina-
tion of Mr. Lincoln, it took upon itself the grave obligation
to show that this charge was based upon evidence sufficient to
bear it out. I am confident you would not have ventured upon
this step, had you not such evidence in your possession. But
the government is bound to lay it before the world in a man-
ner which will command the respect even of the incredulous.
You will admit that a Military Commission is an anomaly in
the judicial system of this republic; still I will not question here
its propriety in times of extraordinary dangers. At all events,
to submit this case to a Military Commission, a case involving
in so pointed a manner the credit of the government, was per-
haps the utmost stretch of power upon which the government
could venture without laying itself open to the imputation of
unfair play. But an order to have such a case tried by a Mili-
tary Commission behind closed doors, thus establishing a secret
tribunal, can hardly fail to damage the cause of the govern-
ment most seriously in the opinion of mankind.—This is the
most important state trial this country ever had. The whole
civilized world will scrutinize its proceedings with the utmost
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interest, and it will go far to determine the opinion of mankind as to the character of our government and institutions.”

When I wrote that letter, I had, of course, in mind the trial of Jefferson Davis and of the late Senator from Alabama, Clement C. Clay, who, when he found himself charged with complicity in the murder of Abraham Lincoln, voluntarily surrendered himself to General James H. Wilson and was incarcerated with Jefferson Davis in Fortress Monroe. The immediate accomplices of Booth were tried by a Military Court appointed for the purpose and met their fate on the gallows. But as to Jefferson Davis, it soon became painfully clear how correct Abraham Lincoln’s instinct was when in his quaint way he expressed the wish that, “unbeknownst to himself,” the Confederate chieftain might escape. As an exile from his country who had sought personal safety in flight, he would have been unable to do any harm to this republic abroad, and his power would have been greatly lessened to exercise a mischievous influence at home. His prestige as a statesman and as a popular leader had necessarily suffered much by his disastrous failure in the conduct of a war which at various times inspired the hopes of his people with flattering promises of success. While in power he had provoked bitter criticism on the part of many important men in the Confederacy by what was called his self-conceit, his favoritisms, his peevish personal dislikes and grudges, his vindictiveness—in one word his wrong-headedness,—and many of the misfortunes suffered were, not always unjustly, laid to his charge. As a fugitive he would therefore soon have been reduced to a minimum of significance. But now that he was imprisoned in a dungeon, as the great representative of the “lost cause,” the prestige of martyrdom was
thrust upon him. And when by some mistake or official stupidity, chains were, for a very short time, put upon his limbs, he appeared in the aureole of a hero suffering for his people unheard-of torments and indignities at the hands of a ruthlessly vindictive foe. This prestige of martyrdom gave him still a certain measure of influence upon the opinion, or the imagination, of the Southern people. He subsequently used this influence, not as General Lee did in his frank and generous way, to encourage among his friends a loyal acceptance of the new order of things and a patriotic devotion to the restored republic, but rather to foment in a more or less veiled way, a sullen animosity against the Union. He stimulated the brooding over past disappointments rather than a cheerful contemplation of new opportunities. He presented the sorry spectacle of a soured man who wished everyone else to be soured too. Thus he forced unprejudiced observers to conclude that, measured by the true standards of human greatness, he, with all his showy and by no means valueless qualities, wound up his career as a small man.

The evidence of Jefferson Davis' complicity with the assassination of Lincoln, which President Johnson had in his possession when he issued his proclamation offering a reward for Davis' capture, subsequently turned out to be absolutely worthless. It is possible that at the time when the Confederacy tottered toward its downfall and its leaders desperately grasped at straws, Jefferson Davis knew of, and to some extent countenanced, a plot to kidnap and abduct Mr. Lincoln and to hold him as a hostage. But there was nothing to show, and no shadow of probability, that he had any sympathy with Booth's murderous design. After he had been for two years a prisoner in Fortress Monroe, he was indicted and arraigned for treason before the United States Circuit Court at Rich-

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mond, Virginia, and released on bail, Horace Greeley, the old anti-slavery apostle, Gerrit Smith, and Cornelius Vanderbilt being his principal bondsmen. The case, however, as might have been foreseen, was never tried, and in December, 1868, he with all his followers in the rebellion received "a full pardon and amnesty for the offense of treason," suffering no other punishment than the disability to hold office imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.

It cannot, therefore, be said that he and the other Southern leaders, after all that had happened, were harshly treated. On the contrary, the leniency with which the victorious Government, which had them in its power, dealt by them, is without parallel in history. What there had been of popular clamor for the "condign punishment of the traitors" soon died away, and Jefferson Davis was permitted to live a quarter of a century longer in untroubled security on his plantation in Mississippi, where he continued to nurse his grudges against an "unjust fate," but where he was also consoled by unmeasured reverence for his mythical heroism and martyrdom, by a large part of the Southern people whom he had done so much to lead to disaster and misery.
CHAPTER VI

The accession of Andrew Johnson to the presidency at first made no change in the character and tone of his utterances concerning the treatment to be meted out to the rebels. The burden of his speech was at Washington, as it had been, during the war, at Nashville, that "arson was a crime, that robbery was a crime, and that treason was a crime worse than all; that this crime of treason must be made odious and properly punished; that the principal traitors should be hanged and the rest at least impoverished," by which he meant, as on some occasion he said himself, that their large plantations must be taken from them and sold in small parcels to farmers. In fact, there seemed to be reason to apprehend, and it was actually apprehended by many, that under the Andrew Johnson régime the country would have to pass through a disgraceful period of "bloody assizes" before proceeding with the task of rebuilding the political and social structure of the South. In the conversations I had with him, and still more in the conferences he had with some public men of importance, he threw out, indeed, certain hints as to his willingness that the colored people should have some part in the reconstruction of their States, but those hints were too vague to give a clear indication of his purposes. They betrayed rather an unsettled state of mind.

There was much surprise, therefore, when on the 29th of May, 1865, two executive proclamations appeared, one of which, a proclamation of pardon and amnesty, put an end to
the anticipation of a policy of hanging and impoverishing, while the other appointed a provisional governor for North Carolina, whose duty it would be “at the earliest practicable period, to prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper for convening a convention composed of delegates, to be chosen by that portion of the people of said State who are loyal to the United States, and no others, for the purpose of altering or amending the constitution thereof, and with authority to exercise within the limits of said State all the powers necessary and proper to enable the loyal people of the State of North Carolina to restore said State to its constitutional relations to the Federal Government,” etc. The proclamation provided, also, that in “choosing delegates to any State convention, as aforesaid, no person shall be qualified as an elector or shall be eligible as a member of such convention unless he shall have previously taken and subscribed the oath of amnesty as set forth in the President’s proclamation of May 29, A. D. 1865, and as a voter qualified as prescribed by the constitution and laws of the State of North Carolina in force immediately before the 20th day of May, 1861, the date of the so-called ordinance of secession.” The convention that might be elected by such voters, or the Legislature that might be subsequently elected by virtue of the State Constitution as amended by the convention, was to have the power to prescribe the permanent qualifications of voters and their eligibility to office.

And who were the loyal persons that were to be entrusted with such far-reaching powers? Not only the men who during the war had abstained from giving aid and comfort to the rebellion and that maintained their loyalty to the United States, but also those who, having given aid and comfort to the rebellion, had subsequently cleared themselves by taking the oath
of allegiance prescribed by the Amnesty Proclamation, and by thus promising to be thenceforth loyal to the United States. The proclamation of amnesty, indeed, excluded from its benefits several classes of persons enumerated under thirteen heads—mostly persons who prior to joining the rebellion had held certain official positions of trust under the government of the United States, or who had filled similar positions under the Confederate government, and “all participants in the rebellion, the estimated value of whose taxable property was over twenty thousand dollars.” The classes thus excepted no doubt comprised the most intelligent and influential part of the population. But the proclamation provided also that “special application may be made to the President for pardon by any person belonging to the excepted classes,” and the assurance was added that such applications would be liberally considered and complied with. Such applications promptly came in by the thousands and were granted with the liberality promised. However, it was not at all probable that the excluded classes, the men of traditional standing and influence in their communities, would now at once cease to exercise that influence over the multitude that had been accustomed to follow their leadership.

The Amnesty Proclamation, giving the country and the world the assurance that the victory of the Union would not be tarnished by any acts of bloody vengeance, was received with general satisfaction at the North, excepting by a few extremists. But the proclamation ordering the reconstruction of the State of North Carolina caused much misgiving, as it was taken, not as a mere experiment, but as an intended rule for the reconstruction of all the rest. It confined the right of suffrage to the white men. Among the white men of the South there were only a small number who had not, after the secession ordinances had been passed, thrown in their lot with the rebellion.
These comparatively few consistent loyalists did not, as a rule, belong to the influential class. And among these few there were still fewer convinced anti-slavery men. It was therefore certain that a large majority of the voting body in the Southern States so to be reconstructed would consist of men who had taken part in the rebellion and then qualified themselves as voters by taking the oath of allegiance, and that this large majority would stand under the immediate influence of the class of men who had instigated the attempt to break up the Union for the purpose of founding "an empire on the corner-stone of slavery." Nor was it unreasonable to expect that this class of men, if directly or indirectly entrusted with power, would indeed accept the abolition of slavery in point of form, but would spare no effort to preserve as much as possible of its substance.

Availing myself again of the privilege President Johnson had granted to me, I wrote to him about the anxieties among many of his friends caused by the position he had taken in his North Carolina proclamation, and in reply I received from him a telegraphic message asking me to call upon him at the White House at my earliest convenience. I obeyed his summons without delay.

On the way to Washington something strange happened to me which may be of interest to the speculative psychologist. I went from Bethlehem to Philadelphia in the afternoon with the intention of taking there the midnight train to Washington. At Philadelphia I took supper at the house of my intimate friend, Dr. Tiedemann, the son of the eminent professor of medicine at the University of Heidelberg, and brother of the Colonel Tiedemann, one of whose aides-de-camp I had been during the siege of the Fortress of Rastatt in 1849. Mrs. Tiedemann was a sister of Friedrich Hecker, the famous revo-
lutionary leader in Germany, who in this country did distinguished service as a Union officer. The Tiedemanns had lost two sons in our army, one in Kansas, and the other, a darling boy, in the Shenandoah valley. The mother, a lady of bright mind and a lively imagination, happened to become acquainted with a circle of spiritualists and received "messages" from her two sons, which were of the ordinary sort, but moved her so much that she became a believer. The doctor, too, although belonging to a school of philosophy which looked down upon such things with a certain disdain, could not restrain a sentimental interest in the pretended communications from his lost boys, and permitted spiritualistic experiments to be made in his family. This was done with much zest. On the evening I speak of, it was resolved to have a séance. One of the daughters, an uncommonly beautiful, intelligent and high-spirited girl of about fifteen, had shown remarkable qualities as a "writing medium." When the circle was formed around the table, hands touching, a shiver seemed to pass over her, her fingers began to twitch, she grasped a pencil held out to her, and as if obeying an irresistible impulse, she wrote in a jerky way upon a piece of paper placed before her the "messages" given her by the "spirits" that happened to be present. So it happened that evening. The names of various deceased persons known to the family were announced, but they had nothing to say except that they "lived in a higher sphere," and were "happy," and "were often with us," and "wished us all to be happy," etc.

Finally I was asked by one of the family would I not take part in the proceeding by calling for some spirit in whom I took an interest? I consented and called for the spirit of Schiller. For a minute or two the hand of the girl remained quiet. Then she wrote that the spirit of Schiller had come and asked
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what I wished of him. I answered that I wished him by way of identification to quote a verse or two from one of his works. Then the girl wrote in German the following:

"Ich höre rauschende Musik. Das Schloss ist
Von Lichtern hell. Wer sind die Fröhlichen?"

"Gay music strikes my ear. The castle is
Aglow with lights. Who are the revelers?"

We were all struck with astonishment. The sound of the language was much like Schiller's. But none of us remembered for a moment in which of Schiller's works the lines might be found. At last it occurred to me that they might be in the last act of "Wallenstein's Tod." The volume was brought out, and true enough there they were. I asked myself "can it be that this girl, who, although very bright, has never been given to much reading, should have read so serious a work as 'Wallenstein's Death,' and if she has, that those verses, which have meaning only in connection with what precedes and follows them, should have stuck in her memory?" I asked her when the séance was over, what she knew about the Wallenstein tragedy, and she, an entirely truthful child, answered that she had never read a line of it.

But something still stranger was in store for me. Schiller's spirit would say no more, and I called for the spirit of Abraham Lincoln. Several minutes had elapsed when the girl wrote that Abraham Lincoln's spirit was present. I asked whether he knew for what purpose President Johnson had summoned me to Washington. The answer came: "He wants you to make an important journey for him." I asked where that journey would take me. Answer: "He will tell you tomorrow." I asked further whether I should undertake that journey. Answer: "Yes, do not fail." (I may add, by the
way, that at the time I had myself not the slightest anticipation as to what President Johnson's intention with regard to me was. The most plausible supposition I entertained was, that he wished to discuss with me the points urged in my letters.)

Having disposed of this matter I asked whether the spirit of Lincoln had anything more to say to me. The answer came: "Yes, you will be a Senator of the United States." This struck me as so fanciful that I could hardly suppress a laugh. But I asked further: "From what State?" Answer: "From Missouri." This was more provokingly mysterious still; but there the conversation ended. Hardly anything could have been more improbable at that time than that I should be a Senator of the United States from the State of Missouri. My domicile was in Wisconsin, and I was then thinking of returning there. I had never thought of removing from Wisconsin to Missouri, and there was not the slightest prospect of my ever doing so. But—to forestall my narrative—two years later I was surprised by an entirely unsought and unexpected business proposition which took me to St. Louis, and in January, 1869, the Legislature of Missouri elected me a Senator of the United States. I then remembered the prophecy made to me at the spirit-seance in the house of my friend Tiedemann in Philadelphia, which during the intervening years had never been thought of. I should hardly have trusted my memory with regard to it, had it not been verified by friends who witnessed the occurrence.

I have given here my own experience, but do not offer any theory or hypothesis upon which to explain it. The believer in spiritualism may see in it a striking proof of the truthfulness of his belief. It is indeed as striking in this respect as anything that has ever come to my knowledge. But the story I told in the first volume of these Reminiscences of my clairvoy-
ance experiences in Paris, touching a closely kindred subject, was an equally striking one, while it was not pretended that the "spirits" were the active power in the case. Yet the phenomena produced were very similar. Assuming that there was no fraudulent jugglery in the production of these phenomena, which in the cases I have narrated I think there was not, we must conclude that there are forces active in and upon the human mind the nature of which we do not know. Scientific research, such as "experimental psychology," has given names to these forces—"telepathy," "suggestion," "spiritual communication," etc., which indicate interesting problems, but as to the nature of the forces, leave us in the dark. We may be able to see such forces in motion and observe their effects. But what they really are we do not know, and it is questionable whether we ever shall. It is so with a force which some centuries ago might have been called witchcraft, but has now become our familiar servant—electricity. We can make it active. We can control its activity and put it to all sorts of practical uses, but what electricity essentially is, we do not know.

President Johnson received me with the assurance that he had read my letters with great interest and appreciation, and that he was earnestly considering the views I had presented in them. But in one respect, he said, I had entirely mistaken his intentions. His North Carolina proclamation was not to be understood as laying down a general rule for the reconstruction of all "the States lately in rebellion." It was to be regarded as merely experimental, and he thought that the condition of things in North Carolina was especially favorable for the making of such an experiment. As to the Gulf States, he was very doubtful and even anxious. He wished to see those States restored to their constitutional relations with the General Government as quickly as possible, but he did not know
whether it could be done with safety to the Union men and to
the emancipated slaves. He therefore requested me to visit
those States for the purpose of reporting to him whatever in-
formation I could gather as to the existing condition of things,
and of suggesting to him such measures as my observations
might lead me to believe advisable. He accompanied this re-
quest with many flattering assurances of his confidence in my
character and judgment, and added the most urgent expres-
sion of his hope that I would not decline the task. He appeared
to me like a man who had taken some important step under
pressure, against his own inclination, and who was troubled
about himself.

The President's request came as a great surprise to me. I
could not at once understand why he should have selected just
me for this delicate mission. I must also confess that the pros-
pect of spending two or three months of the hottest season of
the year in the Gulf States was by no means alluring. But I
should not have minded that had not the whole affair struck
me as somewhat strange. I asked the President to give me one
or two days to consider the matter, and he kindly assented. I
went to Mr. Stanton, then still Secretary of War, to learn
whether the proposition made to me by the President had been
suggested by him. He assured me that it had not. In fact, he
was as much surprised as I was, but he advised me most ur-
gently to accept at once. He told me that President Johnson
was set upon by all sorts of influences, and that what he needed
most, was to learn the truth. I also consulted Chief Justice
Chase, who told me that in his opinion I had an opportunity
for rendering a valuable service to the country, and that I must
not think of declining. What impressed me strongly was that
neither of them made the slightest suggestion as to what they
expected me to report. The next day I informed President
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From a Brady negative in the possession of F. H. Meserve
Johnson that I was willing to undertake the journey. In order that everything should be clear between us, I repeated to him what I had stated in former conversations and correspondence, that, so far as I was then informed, I considered the reconstruction policy ill-advised and fraught with great danger, but that if my observations should show this view to be erroneous, no pride of opinion would prevent me from saying so. I would consider it my only duty to tell the truth. President Johnson cordially declared himself satisfied and repeated his expressions of entire confidence. The Secretary of War ordered an officer of one of the New York Volunteer regiments still in the service, Captain Orlemann, a gentleman of ability and pleasing manners, to accompany me as my secretary, and all military officers in the Gulf States to give me all the aid and assistance I might require. Thus equipped I set out and arrived at Hilton Head in South Carolina on the 15th of July.

On board of the steamer which carried me there, I had a conversation with a Southern gentleman which might have served as an epitome of the most important of my subsequent observations touching the same subjects. He was a handsome young man, something over thirty; had served as an officer in the Confederate army since 1861; had been captured in battle, fallen ill, spent some time in a Northern hospital, and was now on his way home, not having heard from his family for several months. He did not seem to be a highly educated man, but there was an air of natural refinement about him which invited sympathy. He had not seen much of the North, but enough to feel its immense superiority over the South in all the elements of power. He therefore frankly "accepted" the defeat of the South. He was, or, as he said, had been at the beginning of the war, a prosperous planter, owning about 90 slaves and 4000 acres of land, not far from Savannah. But what was he
now? He supposed his plantation, having been in Sherman's track, was all devastated, his buildings ruined, and his slaves gone. Some of them, he hoped, would come back to him after his return, because he had always treated his slaves well, never having lost any except one, and him by "congestive fever." But what could he do after all this ruination? There was a tone of resigned helplessness in his speech.

I suggested that if many of his former slaves were found still within reach, he might, as other planters did, make fair contracts with them and set them to work as free laborers.

This remark stirred him. He became animated. There was even a slight flurry of excitement in his voice. What? Contracts with those niggers? It would never work. Yes, he had heard of that emancipation business. He knew that was the intention. But—and here he approached me with an air of confidentiality as if to coax my secret, true opinion out of me—now, really, did I think that this was a settled thing? Now, he could tell me that niggers would not work unless compelled to. A free nigger was never good for anything. He knew the thing would not work. No Southern man would expect it to work. No use trying. I sought to convince him that the emancipation of the slaves was indeed a settled thing, and that the Southern people would have to try the introduction of free labor. He sighed and in a polite way gave me to understand that he could not believe it. He knew the nigger. He knew how unfit the nigger was for freedom. Why, was not President Johnson a Southern man, and did he not know equally well that the nigger would not work without compulsion? Contract! No nigger knew what a contract was and would never keep one unless forced to.

I remarked in vain that I had seen reports of the successful working of the contract system in some instances. He
replied that it might work to some extent so long as the Federal soldiers were at hand. But would not the troops soon be withdrawn? And would not the people of the Southern States right soon be left to manage their own affairs? Was not that the policy of the Administration? He had concluded so from what he had heard people say and from what he had seen in the papers. I must see, therefore, that the emancipation business would never work. He pronounced this like a conclusive judgment.

I greatly startled him, as it seemed, with the suggestion, that, deeming the successful employment of negroes as free laborers impossible, he might sell the larger part of his plantation and himself cultivate a small part of it as a farmer. The idea that he should work with his hands, as a farmer, seemed to strike him as ludicrously absurd. He told me with a smile that he had never done a day's work of that kind in his life. He had learned to manage a plantation with slaves on it. But to do a farmer's work—that evidently could not be thought of. Neither did it seem to him possible to sell the plantation and to use the money in some other business pursuit. He could not make any guess as to what his land might sell for. There had not been an acre of land sold in his neighborhood as far back as he could remember. And who would think of buying land there under present circumstances?—He mused for a while in sad silence, and said at last, "No, I can't sell my plantation. We must make the nigger work somehow."

I give this initial conversation so elaborately because I heard it substantially repeated in an endless variety of expressions, scores, aye, hundreds of times during my three months' journey through the Gulf States. I sought conversation with everybody that I could reach—planters large and small, merchants, lawyers, physicians, clergymen, guests I met at city
hotels or country taverns, fellow travelers on railroads or steamboats, men who had served as officers or private soldiers in the war, men who had stayed at home—and whatever different opinions or feelings as to other subjects they might cherish, or with whatever degree of heat or moderation they might express them—on one point they were substantially unanimous with very, very few individual exceptions: "The negro will not work without physical compulsion. He is lazy. He is improvident. He is inconstant. He may sometimes work a little spell to earn some money, and then stop working to spend his money in a frolic. We want steady, continuous work, work that can be depended upon. To get that out of him a negro needs physical compulsion of some sort."

The first of my own personal observations led me to surmise that the success of negro free labor would depend not only on the aptitudes of the laborer, but also on those of the employer. Shortly after my arrival at Hilton Head, General Gillmore, the commander of that district, an officer of high character and great intelligence, took me over the bay to Beaufort, a town on one of the sea-islands celebrated for the quality of the cotton raised there. The plantations had been deserted by their owners at the approach of our forces, had been taken possession of by our government, and then leased to various parties. I was to visit a plantation near by which was managed by such a lessee, a Massachusetts man. We first had to pass through fields cultivated on their own account by freedmen, mostly refugees from other parts of the State, who had arrived there but a short time before. These first attempts of recently emancipated slaves to set up for themselves would have looked rather discouraging had we not known the unfavorable circumstances of haste and disorder under which they had been made. But when we reached the plantation we were to
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visit, the spectacle suddenly changed; fields free from weeds, the cotton-plants healthy, the cornfields promising a rich yield, everything breathing thrift, order and prosperity. We passed by a large log house in which a colored preacher was exhorting his congregation, for it was Sunday. At last we found the lessee in his dwelling, a modest frame house in a grove of magnificent live oaks. We found in him a middle-aged man of plain manners, but keen intelligence. He did not seem to regard his enterprise at all as one of extraordinary difficulty. His system, as he explained it, was very simple. Most of the negroes he employed, he had found on the place. In addition he had selected some outside applicants, with reasonable care. His laborers were paid by the task. Certain kinds of work requiring skill, such as plowing, were better remunerated than others. Every family had a patch of ground assigned to it upon which vegetables or some cotton might be raised. The only incentive to faithful labor was self-interest, which he considered sufficient. No physical coercion, he thought, was necessary. He had met with only one instance of refractory conduct. He threatened the evil-doer with arrest by the provost-marshal of the nearest military post, whereupon the delinquent ran away, never to show his face again. Aside from this case everything had gone on smoothly. All he had to do was to ride over his plantation once in a day or two and to spend with each gang of laborers a few minutes—long enough to inspect the work and to give directions. The negroes were living well, seemed to be saving something, had their school and their meeting house, and their frolics, and the employer looked for a prosperous business. Such was the report of the lessee.

It struck me that—unless this man lied, which I had no reason for supposing—here was proof, not that the general
solution of the problem of negro free labor would be easy, but that it could be accomplished, or at least that a shrewd Yankee, blessed with a good stock of common sense and energy, and experience in the ways of free labor, and unhampered by any prejudice as to what the negro could or could not do with or without physical compulsion, might be just the person to point out the way in which that problem could best be solved.

I am far from saying that all Northern men who undertook the management of Southern plantations were equally successful; nor is it probable that all were as capable as our lessee at Beaufort. I met, indeed, in the course of my tour of investigation, an Iowa farmer who managed a large cotton plantation in another State on the same principles and had a similar story of success to tell. Another Northern man who had a timber-cutting contract to fill, told me that the negroes he employed were equal to the best laborers he had ever had to do with, while a contractor for railroad work near a town complained to me that many of the negroes he had engaged were so much attracted by the delights of town-life that they could not be depended upon for steady work. That Southern white men should quite generally have been rather querulous as to the new order of things did not at all surprise me. Their situation was indeed trying in the extreme. It could not have been more unpropitious for a calm contemplation of the requirements of the time.

I shall never forget my first impressions of Charleston. We ran into Charleston Harbor early in the morning. As we passed Fort Sumter—then a shapeless mass of brick and rubbish into which the bombardment had battered the old masonry—the city of Charleston lay open to our view; on the left a row of more or less elegant dwellings, on the right such buildings as are usually seen in the neighborhood of
wharves. There was no shipping in the harbor except a few quartermaster's vessels and two or three small steamers. We made fast to a decaying pier constructed of palmetto-logs. There was not a human being visible on the wharf. The warehouses seemed to be completely deserted. There was no wall and no roof that did not bear eloquent marks of having been under the fire of siege guns. I was informed that when our troops first entered the city, the wharf region was overgrown with a luxuriant weed, giving it the appearance of a large swamp. Since then it had been cleared up, but in many places the weed insisted upon growing up again with irresistible vigor. Nothing could be more desolate and melancholy than the appearance of the lower part of the city immediately adjoining the harbor. Although the military authorities had caused the streets to be "policed" as well as possible, abundant grass had still grown up between the paving stones. The first living object that struck my view when making my way to the hotel was a dilapidated United States cavalry horse bearing the mark I. C.—inspected and condemned—now peaceably browsing on the grass in a Charleston street. A few cows were feeding in a vacant lot near by, surrounded by buildings gashed and shattered by shell and solid shot. The crests of the roofs and the chimneys were covered with turkey-buzzards, who evidently felt at home, and who from time to time lazily flapped their wings and stretched forth their hideous necks.

Proceeding higher up into the city, we passed through a part of the "burned district," looking like a vast graveyard with broken walls and tall blackened chimneys for monuments, overtopped by the picturesque ruins of the cathedral. At last we arrived at the Charleston Hotel, a large building with a lofty colonnade in front. From that portico the first speeches had been addressed to a jubilant assemblage of Charleston
citizens immediately after the passage of the secession ordinance, hurling defiance at the government of the United States and proclaiming the success of the movement for Southern independence, as a foregone conclusion. The Charleston Hotel had been the resort of the wealthy, of the cream of South Carolina society. At the time of my arrival there, it was managed by a newcomer from the North, one of the New York Stetsons, of Astor House memory. He had put the building in tolerably good order, but the walls and the ceiling of the dining hall showed several spots recently plastered over which, as interpreted by the negro waiters, told interesting tales of scenes of great excitement caused by the Yankee artillery. On the whole the hotel made the impression of a dreary solitude.

As I learned, business in the city was slowly reviving. In the main business streets many buildings had been, or were being, made fit for use, and some stores had been opened by Northern men of recent immigration. A larger influx of Northern enterprise and Northern capital was looked for, but such a prospect did not by any means please all South Carolinians. The idea that Charleston might possibly become a "Yankee City" seemed revolting to the old South Carolina pride. I was introduced to a gentleman of venerable age and high standing in the State who assured me in the course of a long conversation, that he was one of those who fully recognized the exigencies of their present situation and were willing to accommodate themselves to them. He admitted that outside aid was wanted to restore the fallen fortunes of the Southern people. But, he added, South Carolina could not appeal to the North for financial aid without humiliating herself. He did not even know whether financial aid, if offered by the North, could consistently be accepted by South Carolina. He
rather thought not. Nor did he believe that a true South Carolinian would like to sell any of his property to Northern men. State pride forbade it. But South Carolina would go to Europe, raise money there upon the security afforded by her real-estate, and thus work out her own destinies. The old gentleman, who evidently felt himself as South Carolina personified, uttered these sentiments with unaffected gravity and in a tone of conscious dignity unimpaired by adverse fortune—a tone, indeed, which had something of condescension in it. Nothing could have been more pathetic. At the time when the grizzled patrician thus gave voice to his pride in the name of his State he himself was reported to be in pinching want, while some of his fellow citizens in various parts of the State, struggling painfully with the necessities of the day, were actually obliged to accept daily rations from the hands of the Federal garrison to sustain life.

My travels in the interior took me to the track of Sherman's march, which, in South Carolina, at least, looked for many miles like a broad black streak of ruin and desolation—the fences all gone; lonesome smoke stacks, surrounded by dark heaps of ashes and cinders, marking the spots where human habitations had stood; the fields along the road wildly overgrown by weeds, with here and there a sickly looking patch of cotton or corn cultivated by negro squatters. In the city of Columbia, the political capital of the State, I found a thin fringe of houses encircling a confused mass of charred ruins of dwellings and business buildings, which had been destroyed by a sweeping conflagration.

No part of the South I then visited had indeed suffered as much from the ravages of the war as South Carolina—the State which was looked upon by the Northern soldier as the principal instigator of the whole mischief and therefore deserv-
ing of special punishment. But even those regions which had but little, or not at all, been touched by military operations, were laboring under dire distress. The "Confederate money" in the hands of the Southern people, paper money issued by the Confederate government without any security behind it, had, by the collapse of the Confederacy, become entirely worthless. Only a few individuals of more or less wealth had been fortunate enough to save, and to keep, throughout the war, small hoards of gold and silver, which, in the aggregate, amounted to little. The people may, therefore, be said to have been substantially without a "circulating medium" to serve in the transaction of ordinary business immediately after the close of the war. United States money came in to fill the vacuum, but it could not be had for nothing. It could be obtained only by selling something for it in the shape of goods or of labor. The Southern people, having during four years of war, devoted their productive activity, aside from the satisfaction of their current home wants, almost entirely to the sustenance of their army and of the machinery of their government, and having suffered great losses by the destruction of property, had of course very little to sell. In fact, they were dreadfully impoverished and needed all their laboring capacity to provide for the wants of the next day. And as agriculture was their main resource upon which everything else depended, the next crop was to them of supreme importance.

But now the men come home from the war found their whole agricultural labor system turned upside down. Slave labor had been their absolute reliance. They had been accustomed to it; they had believed in it; they had religiously regarded it as a necessity in the order of the universe. During the war a large majority of the negroes had stayed upon the plantations and attended to the crops in the
wonted way in those regions which were not touched by the Union armies. They had heard of Mas’r Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation in a more or less vague way, but did not know exactly what it meant and preferred to remain quietly at work and wait for further developments. But when the war was over, general emancipation became a well understood reality. The negro knew that he was a free man and the Southern white man found himself face to face with the problem of dealing with the negro as a free laborer. To most of the Southern whites this problem was utterly bewildering. Many of them, honest and well-meaning people, admitted to me with a sort of helpless stupefaction that their imagination was wholly incapable of grasping the fact that their former slaves were now free. And yet they had to deal with this perplexing fact, and practically to accommodate themselves to it, at once, without delay, if they were to have any crops that year.

Many of them would frankly recognize this necessity and begin in good faith to consider how they might meet it. But then they stumbled forthwith over a set of old prejudices which in their minds had acquired the stubborn force of convictions. They were sure the negro would not work without physical compulsion. They were sure the negro did not, and never would, understand the nature of a contract, and so on. Yes, they “accepted the situation.” Yes, they recognized that the negro was henceforth to be a free man. But could not some method of force be discovered and introduced, to compel the negro to work? It goes without saying that persons of such a way of thinking labored under a heavy handicap in going at a difficult task with a settled conviction that it was really “useless to try.” But even if they did try and found that the negro might after all be induced to work without physical com-
pulsion, they were apt to be seriously troubled by things which would not trouble at all an employer accustomed to free labor. Many worries of that sort came to my notice, the narration of one of which may do to characterize them all. I wrote it down at the time as a specimen occurrence.

One of our generals commanding the garrisons of a district, was visited by a doctor who owned a plantation in the neighborhood of headquarters. The doctor seemed very much disturbed.

"General," said he, "the negroes in my county are in a terrible state of insubordination, and we may look for an outbreak at any moment. I come to implore your aid." The General, having heard such stories before, and remaining cool, insisted upon the doctor’s telling him in detail the facts and circumstances which so violently agitated him. The doctor repeated with growing emphasis that it was impossible to put up with the demonstrations of insubordination on the part of the negroes; that he would have to seek refuge for his family in the city, for their lives were not safe on the plantation, unless military protection be furnished them. The General still remaining obdurate in asking for particulars, the whole story came out at last. Formerly, the doctor said, the slaves had to retire to their cabins by nine o’clock in the evening. After that nobody was permitted outside. The slaves knew this and quietly obeyed the rule. "But now," the doctor continued, "when their work is done, they roam about just as they please, and when I tell them to go to their quarters, they do not obey me. Negroes from other plantations will sometimes come to visit them, and then they have a sort of meeting and they cut up sometimes until ten or eleven. You see, General, this is alarming, and you must admit that we are not safe."

The General, still undisturbed, wished to know what the
negroes were doing when they had that sort of a meeting. All the doctor could say was that they were talking together, sometimes in whispers, sometimes aloud, having their conspiracies, as he supposed. And then they would even sing and dance and make a noise. The General mildly suggested that this was for the negroes a year of jubilee and that they must be expected to celebrate their freedom in some way. What harm could there be in their singing and dancing? At the North, laboring people sang and danced whenever they pleased, and instead of seeing any harm in it, we rather enjoyed it with them. But the doctor would not be comforted. He repeated again and again that, while this was well enough at the North, his laborers were negroes, who ought to be subordinate, and that, when he told them to retire to their quarters, and they did not do it, he could not possibly tolerate such insolence.

"By the way, doctor," said the General, "have you made contracts with the negroes on your plantation?"

"Yes."

"Do they work well?"

"Pretty well so far. My crops are in pretty good condition."

"Do they steal much?"

"They steal some, but not much."

"Well, then, doctor, what have you to complain about?"

"Oh, General," replied the doctor dolefully, "you do not appreciate the dangers of our situation."

"Now, doctor," said the General with some impatience, "to cut the matter short, has a single act of violence been perpetrated in your neighborhood by a negro against a white man?"

"Yes, sir!" exclaimed the doctor, apparently confident of
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making an impression. "And I will tell you of one that happened right in my family. I have a negro girl, eighteen years old, whom I raised. For ten years she has been waiting upon my old mother-in-law, who lives with me. A few days ago the old lady was dissatisfied with something and told the girl that she felt like giving her a whipping. Now, what do you think? The negro girl actually informed my old mother-in-law that she would not submit to a whipping, but would resist. My old father-in-law then got mad and threatened her, and she told him the same thing. Now, this is an intolerable state of things."

The General could not repress a smile and delivered a little homily to the doctor, to which that gentleman listened with a puzzled expression of countenance. "My dear sir, that girl is a free girl, and you have just as little right to whip her, as you have to whip your neighbor's daughter. She ought to resist when you offer her a whipping, and I hope she will. And I will tell you another thing. Among your former slaves there are probably men who have seen their wives, and young men who have seen their mothers whipped by your order. I think the negroes deserve a great deal of praise for their moderation. Another race, if suddenly freed from slavery after such experiences, would probably have proceeded to cut the throats of those who were in the habit of whipping their wives and mothers. Now go home, treat your people well, and pay them fair wages, and do not come to me again to clamor about danger and insurrection when the freedmen on your plantation dance and sing, and when the girls refuse to accept a whipping."

The doctor left, sorely puzzled about the mysteries of free labor, and when he and the General met again, which frequently happened, the General invariably bantered him with [172]
the question: "Well, Doctor, how does the insurrection in your county come on?"

I have here retold this story as I heard it from the lips of the General, who was a man of veracity, good sense, and sincere sympathy with the Southern people. I myself once had an argument with a Georgia planter who vociferously insisted that one of his negro laborers who objected to a whipping had thereby furnished the most conclusive proof of his unfitness for freedom. And such statements were constantly reinforced by further assertion, that they, the Southern whites, understood the negro and knew how to treat him, and that we of the North did not and never would. This might have been true in one sense, but not true in another. The Southerner knew better than the Northerner how to treat the negro as a slave. But it did not follow that he knew best how to treat the negro as a freedman. And just there was the rub. It was, perhaps, too much to expect of the Southern slaveholders or of Southern society generally, that a clear judgment of the new order of things should have come to them at once. The total overturn of the whole labor system of a country accomplished suddenly, without preparation or general transition, is a tremendous revolution, a terrible wrench, well apt to confuse men's minds. It should not have surprised any fair-minded person that many Southern people should, for a time, have clung to the accustomed idea that the landowner must also own the black man tilling his land, and that any assertion of freedom of action on the part of that black man was insubordination equivalent to criminal revolt, and any dissent by the black man from the employer's opinion or taste, intolerable insolence. Nor should it be forgotten that the urgent necessity of negro labor for that summer's crop could hardly fail to sharpen the nervous tension then disquieting Southern society.
It is equally natural that the negro population of the South should at that period have been unusually restless. I have already mentioned that during the Civil War the bulk of the slave population remained quietly at work on the plantations except in districts touched by the operations of the armies. Had the negro slaves not done so, the rebellion would not have survived its first year. They presented the remarkable spectacle of an enslaved race doing slaves' work to sustain a government and an army fighting for the perpetuation of its enslavement. Stories were told of house-slaves accompanying their masters to the field, or taking care of their unprotected families left behind, with a sentimental attachment truly touching. Some colored people would indeed escape from the plantations and run into the Union lines where our troops were within reach, and some of their young men would enlist in the Union army as soldiers. But there was nowhere any commotion among them that had in the slightest degree the character of an uprising, in force, of slaves against their masters. Nor was there, when after the downfall of the Confederacy, general emancipation had become an established fact, a single instance of an act of vengeance committed by a negro upon a white man for inhumanity suffered by him or his, while in the condition of bondage. No race or class of men ever passed from slavery to freedom with a record equally pure of revenge. But many of them, especially in the neighborhood of towns or of Federal encampments, very naturally yielded to the temptation of testing and enjoying their freedom by walking away from the plantations to have a frolic. Many others left their work because their employers ill-treated them or in other ways incurred their distrust. Thus it happened that in various parts of the South the highroads and by-ways were alive with foot-loose colored people.

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I did not find, so far as I was informed by personal observation or report, that their conduct could on the whole be called lawless. There was some stealing of pigs and chickens and other petty pilfering, but rather less than might have been expected. More serious excesses hardly, if ever, occurred. The vagrants were throughout very good natured. They would crowd around the military posts to learn from the Yankee officers and soldiers something more about their "freedom" and also to get something to eat when they were hungry. Then they had their carousals with singing and dancing and their camp-meetings with their peculiar religious paroxysms. But while these things might in themselves have been harmless enough under different circumstances, they produced deplorable effects in the situation then existing. Those negroes strayed away from the plantations just at the time when their labor was most needed to secure the crops of the season, and those crops were more than ordinarily needed to save the population from continued want and misery. Violent efforts were made by white people to drive the straggling negroes back to the plantations by force, and reports of bloody outrages inflicted upon colored people came from all quarters. I had occasion to examine personally into several of those cases, and I saw in various hospitals negroes, women as well as men, whose ears had been cut off or whose bodies were slashed with knives or bruised with whips, or bludgeons, or punctured with shot wounds. Dead negroes were found in considerable number in the country roads or on the fields, shot to death, or strung upon the limbs of trees. In many districts the colored people were in a panic of fright, and the whites in a state of almost insane irritation against them. Indeed, these conditions in their worst form were only local, but they were liable to spread, for there was plenty of inflammable spirit of the same kind all over the [175]
South. It looked sometimes as if wholesale massacres were prevented only by the presence of the Federal garrisons which were dispersed all over the country. It is painful to imagine what might have happened, had the restraining force of the Federal authority, ready for instant action, not been on the ground.

Indeed, nothing could have been more necessary at that period than the active interposition of the Federal power between the whites and the blacks of the South, not only to prevent or repress violent collisions, but to start the former masters and the former slaves on the path of peaceful and profitable co-operation as employers and free laborers. This was a difficult task. Northern men who had come to the South to purchase or lease plantations enjoyed the great advantage of having money so that they could pay the wages of their laborers in cash, which the negroes preferred. The Southern men, having been stripped almost naked by the war, had, aside from current sustenance, only prospective payment after harvest to offer, consisting mostly of a part of the crop. While many planters were just and even liberal in the making of cash contracts, others would take advantage of the ignorance of the negroes and try to tie them down to stipulations which left to the laborer almost nothing, or even oblige him to run in debt to the employers, and thus drop into the condition of a merepeon—a debt-slave. It is a very curious fact that some of the forms of contract drawn up by former slave-holders contained provisions looking to the possibility of a future restoration of slavery. There was, not unnaturally, much distrust of the planters among the negroes, who, in concluding contracts, feared to compromise their rights as freedmen, or to be otherwise overreached. To allay that distrust and, in many cases, to secure their just dues, they stood much in need of an adviser
in whom they had confidence and to whom they could look for protection while, on the other hand, the employers of negro labor stood in equal need of some helpful authority to give the colored people sound instruction as to their duties as free men and to lead them back to the path of industry and good order, when, with their loose notions of the binding force of agreements, they broke their contracts or indulged themselves otherwise in unruly pranks.

To this end the "Freedmen's Bureau" was instituted, an organization of civil officials who were, with the necessary staffs, dispersed all over the South to see to it that the freedmen had their rights, and to act as intermediaries between them and the whites. The conception was a good one, and the institution, at the head of which General O. O. Howard was put, did useful service in many instances. It would have done more, and avoided some sad and conspicuous failures, had there been greater care in the selection of agents. The duties to be performed required above all things strict integrity, sound sense, discretion and tact. Many of the men appointed possessed those qualities, but others treated the people they had to deal with, to gushes of unctuous cant which spread false notions among the blacks, irritated the whites, and not seldom caused their own honesty to be suspected. I found that in various places military officers were appealed to for advice and help by whites as well as blacks with greater confidence than the officers of the Freedmen's Bureau.

Thus the strain of the situation was somewhat relieved by the interposition of the Federal authority between clashing elements, but by no means as much as was required to produce a feeling of security. The labor puzzle, aggravated by the race antagonism, was indeed the main disturbing influence, but not the only one. By the differences in the character of the
civilization of free society on the one side, and of master-and-slave society on the other, by their long and bitter disputes over the slavery question, and, finally, by the four years of a civil war, in which the two contending parties were divided, not only by diverging sentiments and interests but by a geographical line, the estrangement between the peoples of the North and of the South had become so deep, that the attack upon Southern territory by the Northern armies had been resented by a large part of the Southern whites, almost as a foreign invasion, and the occupation of the South by Northern forces almost like a foreign conquest. Many of the older men, with whom the Union-sentiment which prevailed throughout the country before the slavery dispute became acute and critical, and was in a large sense traditional, found something congenial and sympathetic in the thought of a restored union, and therefore submitted to the result of the war in this aspect with comparatively good grace. But to the younger Southerners, who had grown up in the heated atmosphere of the political feud about slavery, to whom the threat of disunion as a means of saving slavery had been like a household word, and who had always regarded the bond of Union as a shackle to be cast off, the thought of being “reunited” to “the enemy,” the hated Yankee, was distasteful in the extreme. I speak here not of the “poor whites,” who, aside from their animosity against the negro, had no distinct feelings or aspirations of any kind, but suffered developments to pass by them with stolid indifference; but I speak of young Southerners of the educated or semi-educated class whose talk one heard on the streets, in the hotels, and on public conveyances.

They smarted keenly under the sense of defeat. But they would let it be understood that their spirit was unbroken. It was a current phrase among them that the South was indeed “over-
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powered” but “not conquered”; that the war had only proved the fighting superiority of the Southerner over the Northerner, man against man, and that the cause of Southern independence was lost only for the time being, to rise again at some future day with increased strength. To them the Southern Union man who had stood by the Federal Government during the Civil War was a black-hearted traitor who ought not to be permitted to live in the South—and, indeed, in many places Southern Unionists had to suffer cruel persecutions and saw reason to fear for their lives, except under the immediate protection of Federal garrisons. On the first Fourth of July after the close of the war, celebrations of the national birthday were attempted in Savannah and in Mobile, but they were participated in substantially only by colored people who were furiously set upon by white mobs. Public demonstrations in honor of the national flag or the Federal Government were generally denounced as wanton outrages to the Southern people.

Such sentiments of the “unconquered” found excited and exciting expression in the Southern press and were largely entertained by many Southern clergymen of different denominations and still more ardently by Southern women. General Thomas Kilby Smith, commanding the Southern district of Alabama, reported to me that when he suggested to Bishop Wilmer of the diocese of Alabama, Episcopal, the propriety of restoring to the liturgy that prayer which includes the President of the United States, the whole of which he had ordered his rectors to expunge, the bishop refused, first upon the ground that he could not pray for a continuance of martial law, and, secondly, that he would, by ordering the restoration of the prayer, stultify himself in the event of Alabama and the Southern Confederacy regaining independence.

The influence exercised by the feelings of the women of
the South upon the condition of mind and the conduct of the men was, of course, very great. Of those feelings I witnessed a significant manifestation in a hotel at Savannah. At the public dinner table I sat opposite a lady in black, probably mourning. She was middle-aged, but still handsome, and of an agreeable expression of countenance. She seemed to be a lady of the higher order of society. A young lieutenant in Federal uniform took a seat by my side, a youth of fine features and gentlemanly appearance. The lady, as I happened to notice, darted a glance at him which, as it impressed me, indicated that the presence of the person in Federal uniform was highly obnoxious to her. She seemed to grow restless as if struggling with an excitement hard to restrain. To judge from the tone of her orders to the waiter she was evidently impatient to finish her dinner. When she reached for a dish of pickles standing on the table at a little distance from her, the lieutenant got up and with a polite bow took it and offered it to her. She withdrew her hand as if it had touched something loathsome, her eyes flashed fire and with a tone of wrathful scorn and indignation she said: "So you think a Southern woman will take a dish of pickles from a hand that is dripping with the blood of her countrymen?" Then she abruptly left the table while the poor lieutenant, apparently stunned by the unexpected rebuff, and blushing deeply, stammered some words of apology, assuring the lady that he had meant no offense.

The mixing of a dish of pickles with so hot an outburst of Southern patriotism could hardly fail to evoke a smile. But the whole scene struck me as gravely pathetic, and as auguring ill for the speedy revival of a common national spirit. If this was the general temper of the women of the South—which, as I found on my travels it substantially was, then we encountered here a hostile moral force of incalculable potency, which [180]
could not be reasoned with. I do not mean to say that there were no women of social standing in the South capable of appreciating the true interest of the South, which was promptly to accept the legitimate results of the war in good faith and to make the best of the new order of things. But I mean to say that the general tendency of feminine nature to let the emotional impulse interfere with the cool and sober consideration of circumstances and interests, manifested itself at that time in the South with startling vigor. This might indeed have been expected in a country where the warmer sun enhances the vivacity of temperament, making that temperament apt to become peculiarly charming in friendly intercourse, but also peculiarly vehement in a conflict.

Southern women had suffered much by the Civil War, on the whole far more than their Northern sisters. There was but little exaggeration in the phrase which was current at the time, that the Confederacy, in order to fill its armies, had to "draw upon the cradle and the grave." Almost every white man capable of bearing arms enlisted or was pressed into the service. The loss of men—not in proportion to the number on the rolls, but in proportion to the whole white population, was far heavier in the South than in the North. There were not many families unbereft, not many women who had not the loss of a father, or a husband, or a brother, or of a friend to deplore. In the regions in which military operations had taken place, the destruction of property had been great, and while most of that destruction seemed necessary in the opinion of military men,—in the eyes of the sufferers it appeared wanton, cruel, malignant, devilish. The interruption of the industries of the country, the exclusion, by the blockade of the ports, of all importations from abroad, and the necessity of providing for the sustenance of the armies in the field, subjected all classes to va-
rious distressing privations and self-denials. There were bread riots in Richmond. Salt became so scarce that the earthen floors of the smoke-houses were scraped to secure the remnants of the brine drippings of former periods. Flour was at all times pain-
fully scarce. Coffee and tea were almost unattainable. Of the various little comforts and luxuries which by long common use had almost become necessaries, many were no longer to be had. Mothers had to ransack old ragbags to find material for clothing their children. Ladies accustomed to a life of abundance and fashion had not only to work their old gowns over and to wear their bonnets of long ago, but also to flit with their children from one plantation to another in order to find something palatable to eat in the houses of more fortunate friends, who had in time provided themselves. And when at last the war was over, the blockade was raised and the necessaries and comforts so long and so painfully missed came within sight again, the South was made only more sensible of her poverty, for only a few persons in exceptionally favorable circumstances could obtain them, as the South generally was almost absolutely stripped of current money and stood face to face with the wreck of her fortunes, which, to save herself from greater misery, she had to rebuild quickly, with her male population decimated by the war, her resources in a great measure wasted or unavailable, and her traditional labor system utterly dis-
organized. It was, indeed, an appalling situation, looking in many respects almost hopeless. And for all this, her heart full of the mournful memories of the near past and heavy with the anxieties of the present, the Southern woman held the "cruel Yankee" responsible as the wanton originator of all her woes.

It was not to be wondered at that her emotional nature, while the wounds were still fresh, refused to listen to any plea in justification of the war on our part, and that she should give
abundant expression to her sense of injury and outrage. Nor is it strange that her feelings dominated to a great extent the intercourse between Southern and Northern men. A Northerner could hardly hope to be admitted to any Southern social circles on terms of welcome. The men might treat him with a certain businesslike consideration, but he was in danger of snubs of such exquisite frigidity from the ladies, that he would feel, at best, like an unwillingly tolerated, but really intolerable intruder. This state of feeling was much to be deplored, for it obstructed friendly approach between Northerners and Southerners, and thus in a general sense between the South and the North, at a time when such approach would have been most apt to prevent great mischief. In fact, it required the passing of many years to restore a satisfactory degree of cordiality in the social intercourse between the North and the South; and even now, more than forty years after the close of the Civil War, the visitor to the South, if he wishes to keep quite unruffled the temper of his lady friends,—a temper usually so animated, sympathetic, and captivating—will have circumspectly to steer clear of topics touching certain phases of the war period.

From time to time, traveling from State to State, I reported to President Johnson my observations and the conclusions I drew from them. I not only was most careful to tell him the exact truth as I saw it, but I elicited from our military officers and from agents of the Freedmen's Bureau stationed in the South, as well as from prominent Southern men statements of their views and experiences, which formed a weighty body of authoritative testimony coming from men of high character and partly of important public position, some of whom were Republicans, some Democrats, some old anti-slavery men, some old pro-slavery men. All these papers, too, I
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submitted to the President. In them the enthusiast, the cool man of affairs, as well as the pessimist and the cynic had their say. The historian of that time will hardly find more trustworthy material. They all substantially agreed upon certain points of fact. They all found that the South was at peace so far as there was no open armed conflict between the Government troops and organized bodies of insurgents. The South was not at peace inasmuch as the different social forces did not peaceably co-operate, and violent collisions on a great scale were prevented or repressed only by the presence of the Federal authority supported by the government troops on the ground ready for immediate action. The "results of the war" were recognized in the South by virtue of necessity in so far as the restoration of Union and the Federal government were submitted to, and the emancipation of the slaves and the introduction of free labor were accepted in name; but the Union was still hateful to a large majority of the white population of the South, the Southern Unionists were still social outcasts, the officers of the Union were still regarded as foreign tyrants ruling by force; and as to the abolition of slavery, emancipation, although "accepted" in name, was still denounced by a large majority of the former master class as an "unconstitutional" stretch of power to be reversed if possible, and that class, the ruling class among the whites, was still desiring, hoping, and striving to reduce the free negro laborer as much as possible to the condition of a slave. And this tendency was seriously aggravated by the fact that the South, exhausted and impoverished, stood in the most pressing need of productive agricultural labor, while the landowners generally did not yet know how to manage the former slave as a free laborer, and the emancipated negro was still unused to the rights and duties of a free man. In short, Southern society was still in that most
confused, perplexing and perilous of conditions—the condition of a defeated insurrection leaving irritated feelings behind it, and of a great social revolution only half accomplished, leaving antagonistic forces face to face. The necessity of the presence of a restraining and guiding higher authority could hardly have been more obvious. This was the general purport of the opinions of military and civil officers, as well as other persons of consequence which I had collected and submitted to the President, and with which my own observations and reflections entirely agreed.

During the first six weeks of my travels in the South I did not receive a single word from the President or any member of the Administration. But through the newspapers and the talk going on around me, I learned that the President had taken active measures to put the "States lately in rebellion" into a self-governing condition—that is to say, that he appointed "provisional governors," that he directed those provisional governors to call conventions for the purpose of reviving the State constitutions in harmony with the new order of things, the conventions to be elected, according to the plan laid down in the North Carolina proclamation, by the "loyal" white citizens, an overwhelming majority of whom were persons who had adhered to the rebellion and had then taken the prescribed oath of allegiance. On the same basis the provisional governors were to set in motion again the whole machinery of civil government as rapidly as possible. When, early in July, I took leave of the President to set out on my tour of investigation, he, as already mentioned, assured me that the North Carolina proclamation was not to be regarded as a plan definitely resolved upon; that it was merely tentative and experimental; that before proceeding further he would "wait and see"; and that to aid him by furnishing him information
and advice while he was "waiting and seeing" was the object of my mission. Had not this been the understanding, I should not have undertaken the wearisome and ungrateful journey. But now he did not "wait and see." On the contrary, he rushed forward the political reconstruction of the Southern States in hot haste—apparently without regard to consequences.

Every good citizen most cordially desired the earliest practicable re-establishment of the constitutional relations of the late "rebel States" to the National Government. But before restoring those States to all the functions of self-government within the Union, the National Government was in conscience bound to keep in mind certain debts of honor. One was due to the Union men of the South who had stood true to the Republic in the days of trial and danger. They might well claim that they should not be delivered up to the tender mercies of the overwhelming majority of their countrymen without any protection—at least not so long as the vindictive passions left behind it by the Civil War were still hot. And the other was due to the colored people, who had furnished 200,000 soldiers to our army at the time when enlistments were running slack and to whom we had given the solemn promise of freedom at a time when that promise gave a distinct moral character to our war for the Union, fatally discouraging the inclination of foreign governments to interfere in our civil conflict against us. Not only imperative reasons of statesmanship, but the very honor of the Republic seemed to forbid that the fate of the emancipated slaves be turned over to State governments ruled by the former master class without the amplest possible guaranty insuring the genuineness of their freedom. But, as every fair-minded observer would admit, nothing could have been more certain than that the political restoration of the "late rebel
"States" as self-governing bodies on the North Carolina plan would, at that time, have put the whole legislative and executive power of those States into the hands of men ignorant of the ways of free labor society, who sincerely believed that the negro would not work without physical compulsion and was generally unfit for freedom, and who were then pressed by the dire necessities of their impoverished condition to force out of the negroes all the agricultural labor they could with the least possible regard to their new rights. The consequences of all this were witnessed in the actual experiences of every day.

Had the National Government, immediately after the close of the war, given the former slave-holders clearly to understand that, however great the difficulties of the introduction of free labor in the South might be, those difficulties must—absolutely must—be overcome, and that the "late rebel States" would under no circumstances be restored to their constitutional position as self-governing States in the Union until those difficulties had been overcome and the free labor system was in peaceable and reasonably successful operation in the South, most of the perplexities would soon have yielded to honest and hopeful effort and appeared far less serious than the Southern men had originally thought them to be. Much trouble might thus have been avoided. But as soon as President Johnson permitted it to be understood that he purposed to restore those States to their self-governing functions without such preparation, the still existing pro-slavery spirit was naturally flushed with new hope. Word went round at once that soon the States would have full power again to control their own affairs, and that then, the emancipation edicts notwithstanding, the negro would be "put in his place." No secret was made of this expectation. The provisional governor of South Carolina openly admitted that the people of his State still indulged in a
lingering trust that after all slavery might be preserved. When the elections for the constitutional conventions in the different States approached, candidates for seats, in most cases claiming the confidence of the people on the ground of their having been faithful Confederate soldiers during the war, declared frankly that they were at heart opposed to the freedom of the negro, but accepted it, and advised others to accept it, for the simple reason that this was the only way to obtain at once more full control of their own affairs, when the people, meaning the whites of those States, would be able to dispose of the matter as they pleased. Support of the President in his reconstruction policy was, therefore, warmly advocated.

From various quarters I received reports that planters were making extraordinary efforts to hold their former slaves together on their plantations, so that when the hoped-for restoration of slavery came, they might have less difficulty in identifying and reclaiming the slaves belonging to them. The cases of murder or mutilation of straggling freedmen increased in number. Various parish or county governments, organized under the authority of the provisional governors, anticipating the restoration of slavery or so much of it as might be found practicable, adopted ordinances or regulations putting the negroes under the strictest police control, stripping them almost completely of the right of free movement enjoyed by everyone else, and of the right to dispose of their persons and property, and re-establishing to the end of enforcing such regulations, which in many respects were identical with the old slave laws, the old county patrol and other devices designed to keep the negro in absolute subjection. The difference between the conditions contemplated by these regulations and the condition of slavery as it had been was very small. That under these circumstances efforts made by Northerners to establish schools for the edu-
cation of colored people should have met with fierce opposition, was natural. Unless under the immediate protection of Federal troops the negro schoolhouses were set on fire and the teachers driven away. The situation was pungently described in a report addressed to me by Colonel Samuel Thomas, Assistant Commissioner of the Freedmen’s Bureau for Mississippi, in these words: “The whites esteem the blacks their property by natural right, and, however much they may admit that the relations of masters and slaves have been destroyed by the war and by the President’s emancipation proclamation, they still have an ingrained feeling that the blacks at large belong to the whites at large, and whenever opportunity serves, they treat the colored people just as their profit, caprice or passion may dictate.” I found evidence of this at every step; and the worst of it was, that, as I had to confess to myself, it was under existing circumstances as natural as it was terrible and distressing.

At last I came again into contact with the President. Late in August I arrived in Vicksburg, Mississippi, and visited the headquarters of Major General Slocum, who commanded the Department of the Mississippi. I found the General in a puzzled state of mind about a proclamation recently issued by Mr. W. L. Sharkey, the provisional governor of that State appointed by President Johnson, calling “upon the people, and especially upon such as are liable to perform military duty and are familiar with military discipline,” and more especially “the young men of the State who have so distinguished themselves for gallantry,” to organize as speedily as possible volunteer companies in every county of the State, at least one company of cavalry and one of infantry, for the protection of life, property and good order in the State. This meant no more nor less than the organization, under the authority of one of the “States lately in rebellion,” of a large armed military force consisting
of men who had but recently surrendered their arms as Con-
federate soldiers. Two days before my arrival at Vicksburg, 
General Slocum had issued a "General Order" in which he 
directed the district commanders under him not to permit 
within their districts the organization of such military forces 
as were contemplated by Governor Sharkey's proclamation. 
The reasons for such action given by General Slocum in the 
order itself, were conclusive. While the military forces of the 
United States sent to the State of Mississippi for the purpose 
of maintaining order, of executing the laws of Congress and 
the orders of the War Department, had performed their duties 
in a spirit of conciliation and forbearance and with remarkable 
success, the provisional governor, on the alleged ground that 
this had not been done to his satisfaction, and without con-
sulting the Department Commander, had called upon the late 
Confederate soldiers, fresh from the war against the National 
Government, to organize a military force intended to be "in-
dependent of the military authority now present, and superior 
in strength to the United States powers on duty in the State." 
The execution of this scheme would bring on collisions at 
one, especially where the United States forces consisted of 
colored troops. The crimes and disorder, the occurrence of 
which the provisional governor adduced as his reason for or-
organizing his State volunteers, had been committed or connived 
at as the record showed, by people of the same class to which 
the Governor's volunteers would belong. The commanding 
general as well as every good citizen earnestly desired to hasten 
the day when the troops of the United States could with safety 
be withdrawn, but that day would "not be hastened by arming 
at this time the young men of the State."

General Slocum—by the way be it said, not at all an old 
anti-slavery man, but a Democrat in politics—was manifestly
right. He showed me reports from his district commanders which substantially anticipated his order. But the General was anxious to know whether the President had authorized or approved Governor Sharkey's action. This he asked me to ascertain, and I telegraphed to President Johnson the following dispatch: "General Slocum has issued an order prohibiting the organization of the militia in this State. The organization of the militia would have been a false step. All I can see and learn in the State convinces me that the course followed by General Slocum is the only one by which public order and security can be maintained. To-day I shall forward by mail General Slocum's order with a full statement of the case."

Indeed, the policy of organizing the militia in such a State as Mississippi, that is, of re-organizing and re-arming a part of the Confederate army, for the purpose, among other things, of protecting the Union men of the South and the emancipated slaves in their rights, at a time when the Union men were still heartily hated and the reversal of emancipation ardently desired by the very class of men thus to be armed and organized, was so glaringly absurd, that I could not suppose the President possibly to be in favor of it, whatever Governor Sharkey might have told him. Passing through Jackson, the capital of the State, I had long conversations with him in which he had impressed me as a pleasant old gentleman who sincerely cherished Union sentiments and wished all things to come out right, but who was intellectually too feeble to cope with the astute persons who wanted to preserve as much as possible of the system of slave labor and to this end the earliest possible removal of the Federal forces from the South. And persons of that class had entire possession of the amiable Governor. He admitted to me that all the "outrages" he complained of were really committed against negroes and Union men, and that if the
Union troops were withdrawn, the life of no Northern man would be safe in Mississippi. At the same time he was anxious to see the Union forces withdrawn and thus to make room for his militia. It seemed to me impossible that a man of so doltish a brain should have exercised a determining influence upon the President's mind.

It is hard to imagine my amazement when, at two o'clock A. M., of the 1st of September, I was called up from my berth on a Mississippi steamboat carrying me from Vicksburg to New Orleans, off Baton Rouge, to receive a telegraphic dispatch from President Johnson, to which I cannot do justice without quoting the whole of it:

WASHINGTON, D. C., August 30, 1865.

To Major General Carl Schurz,
Vicksburg, Mississippi.

I presume General Slocum will issue no order interfering with Governor Sharkey in restoring functions of the State Government without first consulting the Government, giving the reasons for such proposed interference. It is believed there can be organized in each county a force of citizens or militia to suppress crime, preserve order, and enforce the civil authority of the State and of the United States which would enable the Federal Government to reduce the Army and withdraw to a great extent the forces from the State, thereby reducing the enormous expense of the Government. If there was any danger from an organization of the citizens for the purpose indicated, the military are there to detect and suppress on the first appearance any move insurrectionary in its character. The great object is to induce the people to come forward in the defense of the State and Federal Government. General Washington declared that the people or the militia was the
Army of the Constitution or the Army of the United States and as soon as it is practicable the original design of the Government must be resumed and the Government administered upon the principles of the great chart of freedom handed down to the people by the founders of the Republic. The people must be trusted with their Government and if trusted, my opinion is they will act in good faith and restore their former Constitutional relations with all the States composing the Union. The main object of Major General Carl Schurz's mission to the South was to aid as far as practicable in carrying out the policy adopted by the Government for restoring the States to their former relations with the Federal Government. It is hoped such aid has been given. The proclamation authorizing restoration of State Governments requires the military to aid the Provisional Governor in the performance of his duties as prescribed in the proclamation, and in no manner to interfere or throw impediments in the way of consummating the object of his appointment, at least without advising the Government of the intended interference.

Andrew Johnson, Prest. U. S.

As soon as I reached New Orleans I telegraphed my reply. The President having apparently supposed that I had induced General Slocum to issue his order, I thought it due to myself to inform the President that the order had been out before I saw the General, but that I decidedly approved it. In some localities county patrols had already been organized, but had to be suppressed on account of their open hostility to Union men and freed people. A number of Union men at Vicksburg had declared that unless General Slocum's policy be upheld, they would at once prepare for leaving the State. One of the reasons given by Governor Sharkey for organizing
the militia was that the inhabitants refused to aid our military in the suppression of crime, and the call was especially addressed to the class of people who so refused their aid. This was an insulting proceeding which no general having the dignity of his government at heart, could submit to. The existence of armed bodies not under the control of the military command would inevitably lead to collisions. I was heartily in favor of cutting down expenses, but circumstances did not yet permit the saving by reducing the Southern garrisons. I was profoundly convinced the President would see this himself, were he on the ground. The Union people and freedmen absolutely needed as yet a protecting force. Their safety required that Slocum be openly sustained and that Governor Sharkey be censured for his proclamation. According to the President's own words I had understood the President's policy to be merely experimental, and my mission to be merely one of observation and report. I had governed myself strictly by this understanding, seeking to aid the President by reliable information, believing that it could not be the President's intention to withdraw his protecting hand from the Union people and freedmen before their rights and safety were secured. I entreated him not to disapprove General Slocum's conduct and to give me an indication of his purposes concerning the Mississippi Militia case.

The next day, September 2nd, after having seen Major General Canby, the commander of the Department of Louisiana, an uncommonly cool-headed and cautious man, I telegraphed again:

"To the President: General Canby authorizes me to state that the organization of local militia companies was tried in his Department, but that he found himself obliged to dis-
band them again because they indulged in the gratification of private vengeance and worked generally against the policy of the Government. Sheridan has issued an order in Texas embracing the identical points contained in General Slocum's order."

Thereupon I received on the 6th of September a telegram simply announcing the receipt of my "dispatch of the 30th ultimo," probably meaning my letter from Vicksburg. And then nothing more; not a word indicating the President's policy, or his wishes or his approval or disapproval of my conduct. But meanwhile I had found a short paragraph in a New Orleans paper telegraphed from Washington, only a few lines, stating that the President was dissatisfied with me, and that I was especially blamed for having written to the newspapers instead of informing him. I believed I saw in this news paragraph an inspiration from the White House. Acting upon that supposition I at once wrote to the President reminding him that I had not sought this mission to the South, but had accepted it thinking that I might do the country some service; that the charge that I had reported to the newspapers instead of to the President, was simply absurd; that I had written to the President a series of elaborate reports; that I had, indeed, written a few letters to a newspaper, but that this was well understood by the Secretary of War when he made the arrangements for my journey; that the compensation set out for me—a mere War-Department-clerk's salary—was utterly insufficient to cover the expenses incidental to my travels, aside from transportation and subsistence, among which incidentals was a considerable extra premium on my life insurance on account of my travels so far South during the summer; that, as the Secretary of War understood and appreciated, I had to earn some-
thing in some way to make my journey financially possible, that my newspaper letters contained nothing that should have been treated as official secrets, but incidents of travel, anecdotes, picturesque views of Southern conditions with some reflections thereon, mostly things which would not find proper elaboration in official reports,—and all this quite anonymous so as not to have the slightest official character; and finally that I had a right to feel myself entitled to protection against such imputations as the newspaper paragraph in question contained.

My first impulse was to resign my mission at once and return home. But then I considered that the duty to the public which I had assumed, obliged me to finish my work as well as I could, unless expressly recalled by the President. I would, therefore, at any rate, go on with my inquiries in expectation of an answer from him to my letter. I was outraged at the treatment I was receiving. I had undertaken the journey in obedience to an urgent request of the President, and at serious sacrifice, for I was on the point of returning to my Western home when the President called me off. My journey in the South during the hottest part of the year was in the highest degree laborious and fatiguing. I had to travel many hundred miles in dilapidated railroad cars over tracks which, originally poor, had for years experienced no repairs, at the rate of ten, at best, fifteen miles an hour, and at a temperature not seldom up in the nineties. Where railroad facilities were wanting, I moved from place to place—usually by night to avoid the blistering heat of the day—in carriages, mostly old aristocratic family coaches that had seen better days, now degraded to mean hack service, the upholstery worn out or ripped open, the lanterns gone, the harness pieced together with ropes and trying one's patience by breaking every moment. I remember especially a night ride in Alabama through a long
stretch of woods over a horrible road. Our vehicle had been a
gorgeous family coach once, with satin-covered cushions, from
which now the horse-hair protruded in hideous abundance; the
springs in so enfeebled a condition, that every unevenness of
the road caused a bump lifting us out of our seats, and the
harness,—the "old rig" as our driver called it—snapping so
frequently and in so vicious a manner as to defy to the utmost
not only our endurance, but also, our skill in making temporary
repairs. Fortunately noticing before starting that the lan-
terns of the carriage were lacking, we had provided ourselves
at the last station with a supply of tallow candles, and now,
making our way slowly through the dense darkness of the
woods, one of us, either myself or my companion, Captain
Orlemann, alternately, would stumble, a burning tallow candle
in hand, ahead of the horses to discover stumps, or boulders, or
holes in the road and thus to prevent a total shipwreck. Mean-
time, our driver, a white boy of sixteen or seventeen, with diffi-
culty maintaining himself on the box, would in the intervals
between violent fits of swearing, persistently describe to us
what a magnificent affair he had known this carriage to be,
and how rich and elegant the people had been who had owned
it, but who were now so poor that they had to hire it out as a
livery hack, and had not enough money to keep it in repair.

Such journeys were fatiguing indeed, but they were
hardly worse than the sweltering nights in the wretched country
taverns of those days—nights spent in desperate fights with
ravenous swarms of mosquitoes, if not, in addition, with in-
sects still more offensive. Indeed, the comforts of many a
military camp during the war had been genuine luxury com-
pared with the accommodations offered by most of those hos-
telries. The upshot of it was that when I arrived at New Or-
leans, the limits of my endurance were well-nigh reached, and

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a few days later I had a severe attack of the "break-bone fever," an illness which by the sensations it causes does full justice to its ill-boding name. I thought I might fight the distemper by leaving New Orleans and visiting other parts in pursuit of my inquiries. I went to Mobile for the purpose of looking into the conditions of Southern Alabama, returned to New Orleans, and then ran up Bayou Teche in a government tug-boat as far as New Iberia, where I was literally driven back by clouds of mosquitoes of unusual ferocity. At New Orleans I dispatched an additional report to the President, and then, relentlessly harassed by the break-bone fever, which, as a physician advised me, I would not get rid of as long as I remained in that climate, I set my face northward, stopping at Natchez and Vicksburg to gather up some important information.

At Natchez I witnessed a significant spectacle. I was shown some large dwelling houses which, before the Civil War, had at certain seasons been occupied by families of the planting aristocracy of that region. Most of those houses now looked deserted and uncared for—shutters unhinged, window-panes broken, yards and gardens covered with a rank growth of grass and weeds. In the front yard of one of the houses I observed some fresh stumps and stacks of cord-wood and an old man busy cutting down with an axe a magnificent shade tree. There was something distinguished in his appearance that arrested my attention—fine features topped with long, white locks; slender, delicate hands; clothes shabby, but of a cut denoting that they had originally been made for a person above the ordinary wood-chopper. My companion, a Federal captain, did not know him. I accosted him with the question to whom that house belonged. "It belongs to me," he said. I begged his pardon for asking the further question why he was cutting
down that splendid shade tree. "I must live," he replied with a sad smile. "My sons fell in the war. All my servants have left me. I sell firewood to the steamboats passing by." He swung his axe again to end the conversation. A warm word of sympathy was on my tongue, but I repressed it, a look at his dignified mien making me apprehend that he might resent being pitied—especially by one of the victorious enemy.

At Vicksburg I learned from General Slocum that Governor Sharkey himself had, upon more mature reflection, given up the organization of his State militia as too dangerous an experiment.

I left the South troubled by great anxiety. No fair-minded man could have had my experiences in the Southern country without conceiving and cherishing a profound and warm sympathetic feeling for the Southern people, white as well as black. From what I had seen and heard, the resources of the South in men and means had all through the Civil War, been so enormously inferior to those of the North, that it was fairly amazing how the South could have sustained the desperate struggle four long years—a struggle full of heroic self-sacrifice, the prowess of which extorted admiration. And that gallant devotion had been wasted upon a hopeless cause—the cause of slavery—which, while held sacred by the white people of the South, was abhorred by the moral sense and the enlightened opinion of the century. Now the South found precipitated upon it a problem of tremendous moment and perplexing difficulty—the problem of abruptly transforming a social organism based upon slave labor into a free labor society. Four millions of negroes, of a race held in servitude for two centuries, had suddenly been made free men. That an overwhelming majority of them, grown up in the traditional darkness of slavery, should at first not have been able to grasp the duties of their
new condition together with its rights, was but natural. While on the whole their conduct was better than might have been expected, yet it was equally natural and equally deplorable—that the Southern whites, who had known the negro laborer only as a slave, and who had been trained only in the habits and ways of thinking of the master class, should have stubbornly clung to their traditional prejudice that the negro would not work without physical compulsion. From the fact that a large number of negroes actually did work without physical compulsion, they might have concluded that their prejudice was unreasonable; but—such is human nature—a prejudice is often the more tenaciously clung to, the more unreasonable it is. There was, therefore, a strong tendency among the whites to continue the old practices of the slavery system, to force the negro freedmen to labor for them. Thus the two races, whose well-being depended upon their peaceable and harmonious cooperation, confronted one another in a state of fretful irritation, aggravated by the pressing necessity of producing a crop that season, and embittered by race antagonism. That irritation would have been liable to break out in bloody conflicts on a large scale had not a superior restraining authority interposed. In fact it did so break out on a small scale in places where that authority was not present to make itself instantly felt. The Southern whites wished and hoped to be speedily restored to the control of their States by the re-establishment of their State Governments. To this end they were willing to recognize "the results of the war," among them the abolition of slavery, in point of form. The true purpose was to use the power of the State Governments, legislative and executive, to reduce the freedom of the negroes to a minimum and to revive so much of the old slave code as was thought necessary to make the blacks work for the whites. This tendency was not
unnatural under the perplexing conditions then existing and the morbid state of mind they produced among the whites. Neither was it artfully concealed. It frankly avowed itself in a hundred ways by word and act. Here was the great opportunity of the Federal Government. Had it sternly disapproved that hope by making the South clearly understand that the "States lately in rebellion" would certainly not be restored to full self-government until the introduction of free labor should have been in good faith and successfully accomplished and the rights of the freedmen reasonably secured, the Southern whites would, instead of striving to reverse the new order of things, have endeavored to study and improve their chances and opportunities, thus avoiding the worst troubles. But now President Johnson stepped in, and, directly encouraging the expectation that the States would without delay be restored to full self-control, even under present circumstances, distinctly stimulated the most dangerous reactionary tendencies to more reckless and baneful activity. The poor Southern people thus became the victims of reckless seduction and headed straightway for a sea of disastrous trouble and confusion.

This was my view of Southern conditions when I returned from my mission of inquiry. Arrived at Washington, I reported myself at once at the White House. The President's private secretary, who seemed surprised to see me, announced me to the President, who sent out word that he was busy. When would it please the President to receive me? The private secretary could not tell, as the President's time was much occupied by urgent business. I left the ante-room, but called again the next morning. The President was still busy. I asked the private secretary to submit to the President that I had returned from a three months' journey made at the President's
personal request, that I thought it my duty respectfully to report myself back, and that I should be obliged to the President if he would let me know whether, and, if so, when he would receive me to that end. The private secretary went in again and brought out the answer that the President would see me in an hour or so. At the appointed time I was admitted. The President received me without a smile of welcome. His mien was sullen. I said that I had returned from the journey which I had made in obedience to his demand and was ready to give him, in addition to the communications I had already sent him, such further information as was in my possession. A moment’s silence followed. Then he inquired about my health. I thanked him for the inquiry and hoped the President’s health was good. He said it was. Another pause, which I brought to an end by saying that I wished to supplement the letters I had written to him from the South with an elaborate report giving my experiences and conclusions in a connected shape. The President looked up and said that I need not go to the trouble of writing out such a general report on his account. I replied that it would be no trouble at all, but that I considered it a duty. The President did not answer. The silence became awkward and I bowed myself out.

President Johnson evidently wished to suppress my testimony as to the condition of things in the South. I resolved not to let him do so. I had conscientiously endeavored to see Southern conditions as they were. I had not permitted any political considerations or any preconceived opinions on my part, to obscure my perception and discernment in the slightest degree. I had told the truth as I learned it and understood it with the severest accuracy, and I thought it due to the country that the truth should be known.

Among my friends in Washington there were different
opinions as to how the striking change in President Johnson’s attitude had been brought about. Some told me that during the summer the White House had been fairly besieged by Southern men and women of high social standing who had told the President that the only element of trouble in the South consisted in a lot of fanatical abolitionists who excited the negroes with all sorts of dangerous notions, and that all would be well if he would only restore the Southern State governments as quickly as possible, according to his own plan as laid down in his North Carolina proclamation, and that he was a great man to whom they looked up as their savior. Now it was thought that Mr. Johnson, the plebeian, who, before the war had been treated with undisguised contempt by the slave-holding aristocracy, could not withstand the subtle flattery of the same aristocracy when they flocked around him as humble suppliants cajoling his vanity.

Another opinion was that Mr. Seward, who had remained Secretary of State after Lincoln’s death, had used all the powers of his persuasive eloquence to satisfy President Johnson that all now to be done was simply to restore the Union by at once re-admitting the “States lately in rebellion” to their full constitutional functions as regular States of the Union, and that then, being encouraged by this mark of confidence, the late master class in the South could be trusted with the recognition and protection of the emancipated slaves. That Mr. Seward urged such advice upon the President, there is good reason for believing. Not only was it common report, but it accorded also strikingly with Mr. Seward’s singular turn of mind concerning the slavery question. As after the outbreak of the secession movement he peremptorily relegated the slavery question to the background in spite of its evident importance in the Civil War and of the influence it would inevi-
tably exercise upon the opinion and attitude of foreign nations, so he may have been forgetful of the national duty of honor to secure the rights of the freedmen and the safety of the Southern Union men in his impatient desire to "restore the Union" in point of form. It is not at all improbable that both the influences named combined in determining the course of Mr. Johnson.

I went to work at my general report with the utmost care. My statements of fact were regularly escorted by my witnesses whose testimony was produced in their own language. I scrupulously avoided exaggeration and cultivated sober and moderate forms of expression. It gives me some satisfaction now to say that none of those statements of fact has ever been effectually controverted. I cannot speak with the same assurance of my conclusions and recommendations; for they were matters, not of knowledge, but of judgment. And we stood at that time face to face with a situation bristling with problems so complicated and puzzling that every proposed solution, based upon assumptions apparently ever so just and supported by reasoning apparently ever so logical, was liable to turn out in practice apparently more mischievous than any other. In a great measure this has actually come to pass. There was an almost universal argument among the loyal people that the "States lately in rebellion" should as soon as possible be restored to their constitutional functions. But as to the conditions of that possibility opinions gravely differed. Would it not have been foolish as well as dishonorable to emancipate the negro slaves and even to use them as soldiers of the Republic to-day and then, to-morrow, to turn them over without protection to those who had held them enslaved and who wished to hold them to enforced labor? But how to protect them and to make that protection permanent? It was seriously proposed by
some well-meaning men, in view of the antagonism between the white and the black races, to deport and settle them in some convenient and safe place and thus to take them out of harm’s way. But this plan had for various cogent reasons to be abandoned as a practical impossibility. To protect them temporarily by a military force appeared admissible and proper, but to prolong that military protection indefinitely would have not only been practically difficult but also obnoxious to our principles of government, and prolific of dangerous abuses. The alternative was to enable the emancipated slaves to protect themselves by giving them the suffrage as a means to exercise a certain power in the government as citizens. This had the advantage of being in harmony with our institutions. A grave objection to this plan consisted in the general ignorance of the colored masses. But as it was expected that in the course of time they would divide their votes between the different political parties, it was thought that the ignorance of the blacks would not be essentially worse in its effects than the ignorance already prevailing among the great mass of the Southern white voters, and that the resulting evil could be mitigated by the introduction of an educational or other qualification applicable to blacks and whites alike, and that, at any rate, the evil consequences likely to follow the enfranchisement of the blacks, would ultimately prove less dangerous than those apt to be brought about by any other available method of protecting the rights of the emancipated slaves.

In the concluding paragraph of my report I respectfully suggested to the President that he advise Congress to send one or more investigating committees into the Southern States to inquire for themselves into the actual condition of things before taking final and irreversible action. I sent the completed document to the President on the 22nd of Novem-
ber, asking him at the same time to permit me to publish it, on my sole responsibility and in such a manner as would preclude the imputation that the President approved the whole or any part of it. To this request I never received a reply. I should not have made it, had I not suspected that in some way my report might be suppressed. But subsequently it turned out that another expedient had been devised. Congress met early in the following December. At once the Republican majority in both Houses rose in opposition to President Johnson’s plan of reconstruction. Even before the President’s message was read, the House of Representatives, upon the motion of Thaddeus Stevens, of Pennsylvania, passed a resolution providing for a joint committee of both Houses to inquire into the condition of the “States lately in rebellion,” which committee should thereupon report “by bill or otherwise,” whether in its judgment those States, or any of them, were entitled to be represented in either House of Congress. To this resolution the Senate subsequently assented. Thus Congress took the matter of the reconstruction of the late rebel States as to its final consummation into its own hands, which, under the Constitution, it had a perfect right to do.

On the 12th of December, upon the motion of Mr. Sumner, the Senate resolved that the President be directed to furnish to the Senate, among other things, a copy of my report. A week later the President did so, but he coupled it with a report from General Grant on the same subject. The two reports were transmitted with a short message from the President in which he affirmed that the rebellion had been suppressed; that peace reigned throughout the land; that “so far as could be done” the courts of the United States had been restored, post-offices re-established and revenues collected; that several of those States had re-organized their State gov-
ernments; that good progress had been made in doing so; that the constitutional amendment abolishing slavery had been ratified by nearly all of them; that legislation to protect the rights of the freedmen was in course of preparation in most of them; that indeed here and there the "demoralizing effects of the war" were still to be seen in "occasional disorders" which, however, were local, infrequent, and rapidly diminishing; and that, on the whole, the condition of things was promising and far better than might have been expected. He transmitted my report without a word of comment, but invited special attention to that of General Grant.

The appearance of General Grant's report was a surprise, which, however, easily explained itself. On November 22nd, the President had received my report. On the 27th General Grant, with the approval of the President, started on a "tour of inspection through some of the Southern States," to look after the "disposition of the troops," and also "to learn, as far as possible, the feelings and intentions of the citizens of those States towards the General Government." On the 12th of December the Senate asked for the transmission of my report. General Grant's report was dated on the 18th and on the 19th it was sent to the Senate together with mine. The supposition lay near, and it was generally believed that this arrangement was devised by President Johnson to the end of neutralizing the possible effect of my account of Southern conditions. If so, it was cleverly planned. General Grant was at that time at the height of his popularity. He was, since Lincoln's death, by far the most imposing figure in the popular eye. Having forced the surrender of the formidable Lee, he was by countless tongues called "the savior of the Union." He enjoyed in an extraordinary degree the privilege of military heroes, to be endowed by the popular imagination with all conceivable virt-
ties and capabilities. His word would, therefore, go very far toward carrying conviction. But in this case the discredit which President Johnson had already incurred proved too heavy for even the military hero to carry.

It is more than probable that General Grant, who had no political experience whatever, had permitted himself to be used for the President's purpose without knowing it. His report was, no doubt, perfectly candid. In it he frankly stated that he had hurried through Virginia without conversing with anybody, and that he had stayed only one day in Raleigh, North Carolina, only two days in Charleston, South Carolina, and only one day each in Savannah and Augusta, Georgia. One of his conclusions was "that the mass of thinking men of the South accept the present situation of affairs in good faith." That the mass of the thinking men who called upon him during his hurried visits at Raleigh, Charleston, Savannah and Augusta, told him so, and that they did their best to put things in the most favorable light in order to secure the earliest possible restoration of the Southern States to their self-governing functions, and that General Grant generously accepted that view, cannot fairly be questioned. But he frankly stated that he "did not meet anyone, either those holding places under the Government, or citizens of the Southern States, who thought it practicable to withdraw the military from the South at present, the white and the black mutually requiring the protection of the General Government." He went even so far as to say that "in some form the Freedmen's Bureau is an absolute necessity until civil law is established and enforced, securing to the freedmen their rights and full protection" and "it cannot be expected that the opinions held by men at the South for years can be changed in a day, and therefore the freedmen require, for a few years, not only laws to protect them, but the

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fostering care of those who will give them good counsel, and on whom they can rely." As to the practical things to be done, General Grant's views were not so very far apart from mine; but President Johnson's friends insisted upon representing him as favoring the immediate restoration of all "the States lately in rebellion" to all their self-governing functions, and this became the general impression—probably much against his wish. My report, after its publication as an "Executive Document," became widely known in the country. A flood of letters of approval and congratulation poured in upon me from all parts of the United States. I may be pardoned for expressing here my own opinion of the merits of my work after having critically and retrospectively re-examined it in the course of writing these reminiscences. I am far from saying that somebody else might not have performed the task much better than I did. But I do think that this report is the best paper I have ever written on a public matter. The weakest part of it is that referring to negro-suffrage,—not as if the argument as far as it goes were wrong, but as it leaves out of consideration several aspects of the matter, the great importance of which has since become apparent. Of this more hereafter. On the whole, I venture to say the student of the history of that period will find my description of Southern conditions immediately after the war well worth reading.
CHAPTER VII

I WAS on the point of returning to the West when I received a message from Horace Greeley, the famous editor of the New York Tribune, asking me to take charge of the news-bureau of that journal in Washington as its chief correspondent. Although the terms offered by Mr. Greeley were tempting, I was disinclined to accept because I doubted whether the work would be congenial to me, and because it would keep me in the East. But Mr. Greeley, as well as some of my friends in Congress, persuaded me that, as I had studied the condition of things in the South and could give reliable information concerning it, my presence in Washington might be useful while the Southern question was under debate. This determined me to assent, with the understanding, however, that I should not consider myself bound beyond the pending session of Congress.

Thus I entered the journalistic fraternity. My most agreeable experience consisted in my association with other members of the craft. I found among the correspondents of the press a number of gentlemen of uncommon ability and high principle—genuine gentlemen who loved the truth for its own sake, who heartily detested sham and false pretense, and whose sense of honor was the finest. This was the rule, to which, as to all rules, there were, of course, some exceptions. But they were rare. My more or less intimate contact with public men, high and low, was not so uniformly gratifying. I enjoyed, indeed, the privilege of meeting statesmen of high pur-
pose, of well-stored minds, of unselfish patriotism, and of the courage of their convictions. But disgustingly large was, on the other hand, the number of small, selfish politicians I ran against—men who seemed to know no higher end than the advantage of their party, which involved their own, who were always nervously snifffing for the popular breeze; whose most demonstrative ebullitions of virtue consisted in the most violent denunciations of the opposition; whose moral courage quaked at the appearance of the slightest danger to their own or their party's fortunes, and whose littlenesses exposed themselves sometimes with involuntary frankness to the newspaper correspondent whom they approached to beg for a "favorable notice" or for the suppression of an unwelcome news-item. They were by no means in all instances men of small parts. On the contrary, there were men of marked ability and large acquirements among them. But never until then had I known how immense a moral coward a member of Congress may be. I remember with especial interest occasional talks I had with some of my colleagues of the press in which we "compared notes" about the statesmen whose doings we had to report and discuss in our dispatches. If these statesmen always knew what that journalistic fraternity know and think of them, they would often bow their heads in contrite and grateful appreciation of the discretion and generosity which bury in silence many things that would tickle the ears of the groundlings. It is probably now as it was then, that there are few places in the United States where the public men appearing on the National stage are judged as fairly and accurately as they are in newspaper row in Washington. I remained at the head of the Tribune office at the national capital, according to my promise to Mr. Greeley, to the end of the winter season, and then accepted the chief-editorship of the Detroit Post, a new journal estab-
lished at Detroit, Michigan, which was offered to me—I might almost say, urged upon me—by Senator Zachariah Chandler. In the meantime I had occasion to witness the beginning of the political war between the executive and the legislative power concerning the reconstruction of the "States lately in rebellion."

I am sure I do not exaggerate when I say that this political war has been one of the most unfortunate events in the history of this republic, for it made the most important problem of the time, a problem of extraordinary complexity which required the calmest, most delicate and circumspect treatment,—a foot-ball of a personal and party brawl which was in the highest degree apt to inflame the passions and to obscure the judgment of everybody concerned in it. Since my return from the South, the evil effects of Mr. Johnson's conduct in encouraging the reactionary spirit prevalent among the Southern whites, had become more and more evident and alarming from day to day. Charles Sumner told me that his personal experiences with the President had been very much like mine. When Sumner left Washington in the spring he had received from Mr. Johnson at repeated interviews the most emphatic assurances that he would do nothing to precipitate the restoration of the "States lately in rebellion" to the full exercise of self-governing functions, and even that he favored the extension of the suffrage to the freedmen. The two men had parted with all the appearance of a perfect friendly understanding. But when the Senator returned to Washington in the late autumn, that understanding seemed to have entirely vanished from the President's mind and to have given place to an irritated temper and a certain acerbity of tone in the assertion of the "President's policy." From various other members of Congress I heard the same story. Mr. Johnson, strikingly unlike Abra-
ham Lincoln, evidently belonged to that unfortunate class of men with whom a difference of opinion on any important matter will at once cause personal ill-feeling and a disturbance of friendly intercourse. This is apt to be especially the case when such persons change their position and then get angry at those who will not change their positions likewise. The exhibitions of ill temper on the part of the President could hardly fail to be more or less resented and reciprocated by members of Congress against whom they were directed. By many of them Mr. Johnson was regarded as one who had broken faith, and the memory of his disgraceful exhibition of himself in a drunken state at the Inauguration ceremonies, which under ordinary circumstances everybody would have been glad to forget, was revived, so as to make him appear as a person of ungentlemanly character. All these things co-operated to impart to the controversies which followed a flavor of reckless defiance and rancorous bitterness, the outbursts of which were sometimes almost ferocious.

The first gun of the political war between the President and Congress, which was to rage for four years, was fired by Thaddeus Stevens in the House of Representatives by the introduction, even before the reading of the President's Message, of the resolution already mentioned, which substantially proclaimed that the reconstruction of the late rebel States was the business, not of the President alone, but of Congress. This theory, which was constitutionally correct, was readily supported by the Republican majority, and thus the war was declared. Of Republican dissenters, who openly took the President's part, there were but few—in the Senate, Doolittle of Wisconsin, Dixon of Connecticut, Norton of Minnesota, Cowan of Pennsylvania, and for a short period, Morgan of New York, as the personal friend of Mr. Seward; in the
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House of Representatives Mr. Raymond of New York, the famous founder of the New York Times, acted as the principal Republican champion of the "President's Policy."

Thaddeus Stevens was the acknowledged leader of the Republicans in the House. Few historic characters have ever been more differently judged from different points of view. A Southern writer of fiction has painted him as the fiend incarnate. Others have spoken of him as a great leader of his time, farsighted, a man of uncompromising convictions, intellectually honest, of unflinching courage and energy. I had come into personal contact with him in the presidential campaigns of 1860 and 1864, when he seemed to be pleased with my efforts. I once heard him make a stump-speech which was evidently inspired by intense hatred of slavery, and remarkable for argumentative pith and sarcastic wit. But the impression his personality made upon me was not sympathetic; his face long and pallid, topped with an ample dark brown wig which was at the first glance recognized as such; beetling brows overhanging keen eyes of uncertain color which sometimes seemed to scintillate with a sudden gleam, the underlip defiantly protruding; the whole expression usually stern; his figure would have looked stalwart but for a deformed foot which made him bend and limp. His conversation, carried on with a hollow voice devoid of music, easily disclosed a well-informed mind, but also a certain absolutism of opinion with contemptuous scorn for adverse argument. He belonged to the fierce class of anti-slavery men who were inspired by humane sympathy with the slave and righteous abhorrence of slavery, but also by hatred of the slave-holder. What he himself seemed to enjoy most in his talk was his sardonic humor, which he made play upon men and things like lurid freaks of lightning. He shot out such sallies with a perfectly serious
mien, or at best he accompanied them with a grim smile which was not at all like Abraham Lincoln's hearty laugh at his own jests.

Thus Mr. Stevens' discourse was apt to make him appear as a hardened cynic inaccessible to the finer feelings, to whom it was indifferent whether he gave pain or pleasure. But now and then a remark escaped him—I say "escaped him" because he evidently preferred to wear the acrid tendencies of his character on the outside—which indicated that there was behind his cynicism a rich fund of human kindness and sympathy. And this was strongly confirmed by his neighbors at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, his home, where on one of my campaigning tours I once spent a day and a night. With them, even with many of his political opponents, "old Thad," as they called him, appeared to be eminently popular. They had no end of stories to tell about the protection he had given to fugitive slaves, sometimes at much risk and sacrifice to himself, and of the many benefactions he had bestowed with a lavish hand upon widows and orphans and other persons in need; and of his generous fidelity to his friends. They did, indeed, not revere him as a model of virtue, but of the occasional lapses of his bachelor-life from correct moral standards, which seemed to be well known and freely talked about, they spoke with affectionate lenity of judgment.

When I saw him again in Washington at the opening of the Thirty-ninth Congress in December, 1865, he looked very much aged since our last meeting and infirm in health. In repose his face was like a death-mask, and he was carried in a chair to his seat in the House by two stalwart young negroes. There is good authority for the story that once when they had set him down, he said to them with his grim humor: "Thank you, my good fellows. What shall I do when you are dead and
gone?" But his eyes glowed from under his bushy brows with the old keen sparkle and his mind was as alert as ever. It may be that his age—he was then seventy-four—and his physical infirmities, admonishing him that at best he would have only a few years more to live, served to inspire him with an impatient craving and a fierce determination to make the best of his time, and thus to intensify the activity of his mental energies. To compass the abolition of slavery had been the passion of his life. He had hailed the Civil War as the great opportunity. He had never been quite satisfied with Lincoln, whose policy seemed to him too dilatory. He demanded quick, sharp and decisive blows.

Now that the abolition of slavery was actually decreed, he saw President Johnson follow a policy which in his view threatened substantially to undo the great work. His scornful anger at Andrew Johnson was equaled only by his contempt for the Republicans who sided with the President. He was bound to defeat this reactionary attempt and to see slavery thoroughly killed beyond the possibility of resurrection, at any cost. As to the means to be employed he scrupled little. He wanted the largest possible Republican majority in Congress, and to this end he would have expelled any number of Democrats from their seats, by hook or by crook. When my old friend and quondam law partner, General Halbert E. Paine, who was chairman of the Committee on Elections in the House, told him that in a certain contested election case to be voted upon both contestants were rascals, Stevens simply asked: "Well, which is our rascal?" He said this not in jest, but with perfect seriousness. He would have seated Beelzebub in preference to the angel Gabriel, had he believed Beelzebub to be more certain than Gabriel to aid him in beating the President's reconstruction policy. His leadership in the House was peculiar. His
speeches were short, peremptory and commanding. He bluntly avowed his purposes, however extreme they seemed to be. He disdained to make them more palatable by any art of persuasion or to soften the asperity of his attacks by charitable circumlocution. There was no hypocrisy, no cant in his utterances. With inexorable intellectual honesty he drew all the logical conclusions from his premises. He was a terror in debate. Whenever provoked, he brought his batteries of merciless sarcasm into play with deadly effect. Not seldom a single sentence sufficed to lay a daring antagonist sprawling on the ground amid the roaring laughter of the House, the luckless victim feeling as if he had heedlessly touched a heavily charged electric wire. No wonder that even the readiest and boldest debaters were cautious in approaching old Thaddeus Stevens too closely, lest something sudden and stunning happen to them. Thus the fear he inspired became a distinct element of power in his leadership,—not a wholesome element indeed, at the time of a great problem which required the most circumspect and dispassionate treatment.

A statesman of a very different stamp was Senator Fessenden of Maine, who, being at the head of the Senatorial part of the joint committee on Reconstruction, presided over that important body. William Pitt Fessenden was a man who might easily have been overlooked in a crowd. There was nothing in his slight figure, his thin face framed in spare gray hair and side whiskers, and his quiet demeanor, to attract particular notice. Neither did his appearance in the Senate Chamber impress one at first sight as that of a great power in that important assembly. I saw him more than once, there, walk with slow steps up and down in the open space behind the seats with his hands in his trousers pockets, with seeming listlessness, while another Senator was speaking, and then ask to be heard, and,
without changing his attitude, make an argument in a calm conversational tone, unmixed with the slightest oratorical flourish, so solid and complete that little more remained to be said on the subject in question. He gave the impression of having at his disposal a rich and perfectly ordered store of thought and knowledge upon which he could draw with perfect ease and assurance. When I was first introduced to him he appeared to me rather distant in manner than inviting friendly approach. But I was told that ill health had made him unsociable and somewhat morose and testy, and, indeed, there was often a trace of suffering and weariness in his face. It was also remarked in the Senate that at times he was ill-tempered and inclined to indulge in biting sarcasms and to administer unkind lectures to other Senators, which in some instances disturbed his personal intercourse with his colleagues. But there was not one of them who did not hold him in the highest esteem as a statesman of commanding ability and of lofty ideals, as a gentleman of truth and conscience, as a great jurist and an eminent constitutional lawyer, as a party man of most honorable principles and methods, and as a patriot of noblest ambition for his country.

Being also a man of conservative instincts averse to unnecessary conflicts and always disinclined to go to extremes in action as well as in language, he was expected to exert a moderating influence in his committee; and this expectation was not disappointed as far as his efforts to prevent a final breach between the President and the Republican majority in Congress was concerned. But regarding the main question whether the "States lately in rebellion" should be fully restored to their self-governing functions and to full participation in the government of the Republic without having given reasonable guarantees for the maintenance of the "legitimate
result of the war," he was in point of principle not far apart from Mr. Stevens. The difference between them was rather one of temperamental treatment of the problem, a difference of view as to the means to be used for the accomplishment of a common end. In fact, concerning this common end there was hardly any divergence of opinion among Republicans, save the very few who had openly taken the part of President Johnson and stood unflinchingly by him. There were in those days wonderful displays of acuteness in discussing constitutional metaphysics touching the true status in the Union of the "States lately in rebellion." The question whether those States had, by the rebellion, committed suicide, leaving behind them only so much territory to be governed or disposed of by the general government at pleasure; or whether in spite of their revolutionary attempt to separate themselves from the Union, they had preserved their essential being and identity as States with all the rights and privileges inherent in States of the Union; or whether they had by their revolutionary attempt acquired a character intermediate between those two conditions—was debated with infinite ingenuity in logic-chopping, and sometimes with a good deal of heat.

It must be admitted that, if we accept his premises, Mr. Johnson made, in point of logic, a pretty plausible case. His proposition was that a State, in the view of the Federal Constitution, is indestructible; that an ordinance of secession adopted by its inhabitants, or its political organs, did not take it out of the Union; that by declaring and treating those ordinances of secession as "null and void," of no force, virtually non-existent, the Federal government itself had accepted and sanctioned that theory; that during the rebellion the constitutional rights and functions of those States were merely suspended, and that when the rebellion ceased they were ipso
facto restored; that, therefore, the rebellion having actually ceased, those States were at once entitled to their former rights and privileges—that is, to the recognition of their self-elected State governments, and to their representation in Congress. Admitting the premises, this was logically correct in the abstract.

But this was one of the cases to which a saying many years later set afloat by President Cleveland, might properly have been applied; we were confronting a condition, not a theory. The condition was this: Certain States had through their regular political organs declared themselves independent of the Union. They had for all practical purposes actually separated themselves from the Union. They had made war upon the Union. That war put those States in a position not foreseen by the Constitution. It imposed upon the Government of the Union duties not foreseen by the Constitution; by "military necessity," war-necessity, the Union was compelled to emancipate the negroes from slavery and to accept their military services. The war had compelled the Government of the Union also to levy large loans of money and thus to contract a huge public debt. The Government had, also, in the course of the war the aid of the Union men of the South. It had thus assumed solemn obligations for value received, or services rendered—that is, it had assumed the duty to protect the emancipated negroes in their freedom, the Southern Union men in their security, and the public creditor as to the money due him. This duty was a duty of honor as well as of policy. The Union could, therefore, not consent, either in point of honor, or of sound policy, to the restoration of the late rebel States to the functions of self-government and to full participation in the National Government so long as that restoration was reasonably certain to put the freedom of the emancipated slaves, or
the security of the Southern Union men, or the rights of the public creditors into serious jeopardy.

That such dangers really existed there could hardly be any doubt. I do not say so merely because my own observations on my Southern tour had convinced me that they did exist. In fact the inquiry carried on by the committee of Reconstruction under Senator Fessenden's chairmanship piled proof upon proof of their existence. When the report of that committee came out, it presented a picture of those dangers even gloomier than mine had been. President Johnson himself had, by implication, to a considerable extent admitted them to exist, as is shown by the exceptions he made to his amnesty proclamation and by various other acts, so that in practice he largely vitiated the logic of his theory. And yet in the face of all this he insisted that the "States lately in rebellion" must be at once fully restored to self-government and to participation in the government of the Union. The government of the Union could not be absolved from its duty of honor as well as of policy by any constitutional theory. It found itself in an extra-constitutional situation—a situation of moral duress. It had to perform its manifest duty, even if it could be done only by extra-constitutional means.

It was pretended at the time, and it has since been asserted by historians and publicists of high standing, that Mr. Johnson's Reconstruction policy was only a continuation of that of Mr. Lincoln. This was true only in a superficial sense, but not in reality. Mr. Lincoln had indeed put forth reconstruction plans which contemplated an early restoration of some of the rebel States. But he had done this while the Civil War was still going on, and for the evident purpose of encouraging loyal movements in those States and of weakening the Confederate State Governments there by opposing to them governments
organized in the interest of the Union which could serve as rallying points to the Union men. So long as the rebellion continued in any form and to any extent, the State governments he contemplated would have been substantially in the control of really loyal men who had been on the side of the Union during the war. Moreover, he always emphatically affirmed in public as well as private utterance that no plan of reconstruction he had ever put forth was meant to be "exclusive and inflexible," but it might be changed according to different circumstances.

Now circumstances did change, they changed essentially, with the collapse of the Confederacy. There was no more organized armed resistance to the National Government to distract which loyal State Governments in the South might have been efficacious. But there was an effort of persons lately in rebellion to get possession of the reconstructed Southern State Governments for the purpose, in part, of using their power to save or restore as much of the system of slavery as could be saved or restored. The success of that effort was to be accomplished by the precipitate and unconditional readmission of the late rebel States to all their constitutional functions. This situation had not yet developed when Lincoln was assassinated. He had not contemplated it when he put forth his plans of reconstructing Louisiana and other States. Had he lived, he would have as ardently wished to stop bloodshed and to reunite all the States, as he ever did. But is it to be supposed for a moment that, seeing the late master class in the South, still under the influence of their old traditional notions and prejudices and at the same time sorely pressed by the distressing necessities of their situation, intent upon subjecting the freedmen again to a system very much akin to slavery, Lincoln would have consented to abandon those freedmen to the
mercies of that master class? Can it be imagined that he would have been deaf to the sinister reports coming up from the South, as Johnson was? Would he have sacrificed the rights of the emancipated slave and the security of the Union men to a metaphysical abstraction as to the indestructibility of States? Did he not repeatedly warn against the mere discussion of just such abstractions as something useless and misleading? To assert in the face of all this that the Johnson reconstruction policy was only Lincoln's policy continued, is little less than a perversion of historic truth.

No less striking was the difference of the two policies in what may be called the personal character of the controversies of that time. When the Republican majority in Congress had already declared its unwillingness to accept President Johnson's leadership in the matter of reconstruction, there was still a strong desire manifested by many Republican Senators and members of the House to prevent a decided and irremediable breach with the President. Some of them were sanguine enough to hope that more or less harmonious co-operation, or at least a peaceable *modus vivendi* might still be obtained. Others apprehended that the President's policy with its plausibilities might, after all, find favor with the popular mind, which was naturally tired of strife and excitement, eager for peace and quiet, and that its opponents might appear as reckless disturbers. Still others stood in fear of a rupture in the Republican party which, among other evil consequences, might prove disastrous to their own political fortunes. Several men of importance, such as Fessenden and Sherman in the Senate and some prominent members of the House, seriously endeavored to pour oil upon the agitated waters by making speeches of a conciliatory tenor. Indeed, if Andrew Johnson had possessed only a little of Abraham Lincoln's sweet temper, generous

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tolerance and patient tact in the treatment of opponents, he might at least have prevented the conflict of opinions from degenerating into an angry and vicious personal brawl. But the brawl was Johnson's congenial atmosphere.

I have always been, and am now, of the opinion that, had Lincoln lived, there might indeed have been animated controversies about the matter of reconstruction, but those controversies would never have drowned the voice of calm reason by the clamor of passion. The North would always have believed that Abraham Lincoln would do or advise nothing apt to impair or endanger the freedom and the rights of the emancipated slave and the security of the Union man. The South would always have believed that he never would do anything from motives of enmity or vindictiveness, to inflict unnecessary suffering or humiliation upon his vanquished countrymen. He would thus have been met with universal confidence and good will on the part of the people of both sections. Recognizing with a clear eye the dangers and the requirements of the new situation he would have been careful not to encourage in the white people of the South the hope that after a speedy restoration of their State Governments, they would be permitted to deal with the negroes and the labor question as they pleased. He would, on the contrary, have admonished them with gentle firmness that they must respect the freedom and the rights of the emancipated slave and accept the system of free labor in good faith, and that their States would not be restored to all their self-governing functions until they did so. He would, on the other hand, have admonished the people of the North that in the treatment of their Southern brethren they must temper justice with charity and wise forbearance. Both would have listened to him more willingly than to any other man. And Congress would have been likely to heed the popular voice sup-

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porting that of a President universally beloved and trusted. Thus, I believe,—and there is plenty of moral evidence in Lincoln’s character and career justifying that belief,—Abraham Lincoln would have sought to solve the problem of reconstruction; and I see good reason for believing also that he would have succeeded in accomplishing the essential objects aimed at by the wiser heads among the Republicans—not indeed, without difficulty, but without the spasmodic convulsions which Andrew Johnson’s ill-advised and headstrong course called forth, and without leaving behind so many bitter and mischievous criminations and recriminations to be played upon by the demagogue North and South.

There could have been no more glaring contrast than that between Johnson’s and Lincoln’s ways of meeting such a crisis. The wish to avoid a breach between the President and Congress was still sincere and strong among the members of the Republican majority. The Judiciary committee of the Senate, on January 12, 1866, reported a bill to continue the existence, to increase the personnel, and to enlarge the powers of the Freedmen’s Bureau. It was discussed in both Houses with great thoroughness and in a temperate spirit, and the necessity of the measure for the protection of the freedmen and the introduction of free labor in the South was so generally acknowledged that the recognized Republican friends of the President in the Senate as well as in the House supported it. It passed by overwhelming majority in both Houses, and everybody, even those most intimate with the President, confidently expected that he would willingly accept and sign it. But on the 19th of February he returned it with his veto, mainly on the assumed ground that it was unnecessary and unconstitutional, and also because it was passed by a Congress from which eleven States, those lately in rebellion, were excluded—thus
throwing out a dark hint that before the admission of the late rebel States to representation, this Congress might be considered constitutionally unable to make any valid laws at all. Senator Trumbull in an uncommonly able, statesmanlike and calm speech combated the President’s arguments and moved that the bill pass, the President’s veto notwithstanding. But the “Administration Republicans,” although they had voted for the bill, now voted to sustain the veto, and, there being no two-thirds majority to overcome it, the veto prevailed. Thus President Johnson had won a victory over the Republican majority in Congress. This victory may have made him believe that he would be able to kill with his veto all legislation unpalatable to him, and that, therefore, he was actually master of the situation. At any rate, it seemed to have turned his head. He made the grave mistake of underestimating the opposition.

On the 22nd of February, 1866, a public meeting was held in Washington for the purpose of expressing popular approval of the President’s reconstruction policy. The crowd marched from the meeting place to the White House to congratulate the President upon his successful veto of the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill. The President, called upon to make a speech in response, could not resist the temptation. He then dealt a blow to himself from which he never recovered. He spoke in the egotistic strain usual with him of the righteousness of his own course and then began to inveigh against those who opposed him in the most violent terms. He denounced the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, the committee headed by Fessenden, as “an irresponsible central directory” that had assumed the powers of Congress, described how he had fought the leaders of the rebellion and added that there were men on the other side of the line who also worked for the dissolution of the Union. By this time some of the uproarious crowd felt that he
had descended to their level and called for names. He mentioned Thaddeus Stevens, Charles Sumner and Wendell Phillips as men who worked against the fundamental principles of the government and excited the boisterous merriment of the audience by calling John W. Forney, the Secretary of the Senate and a prominent journalist, "a dead duck" upon whom "he would not waste his ammunition." Again he spoke of his rise from humble origin—a tailor who "always made a close fit"—and broadly insinuated that there were men in high places who were not satisfied with Lincoln's blood, but, wanting more, thought of getting rid of him, too, in the same way.

I remember well the impression made by this speech as it came out in the newspapers. Many, if not most, of the public men I saw in Washington, remembering the disgraceful appearance of Andrew Johnson in a drunken state at the inauguration, at once expressed their belief that he must have been in the same condition when delivering that speech. They simply argued that it would have been utterly impossible for a President of the United States—indeed for any public man of self-respect—to descend to such outrageous railing and such vulgar drivel when in his sober senses. The supposition of drunkenness might, therefore, have been advanced rather to explain and mitigate an offense so outrageous, than to make it appear worse. But to what conclusions would such an excuse lead? The impression made upon the people by this event—for it might well be called an event—was manifested by the press. Most of the newspapers favoring the President's policy were struck dumb; but few ventured a word of defense. Of those opposing him but few raised a shrill cry of indignation; most of them spoke of it in grave but evidently restrained language. The general feeling was one of profound shame and humiliation in behalf of the country.

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In Congress, where Mr. Stevens with his characteristic sarcasm described the whole story of the President's speech as a malignant invention of Mr. Johnson's enemies, the hope of preventing a permanent breach between him and the Republican majority was even then not entirely extinct. On the 26th of February Sherman made a long and carefully prepared speech in the Senate advocating harmony. He recounted all the virtues Andrew Johnson professed and all the services he had rendered and solemnly affirmed his belief that he had always acted upon patriotic motives and in good faith. But he could not refrain from "deeply regretting his speech of the 22nd of February." He added that it was "impossible to conceive a more humiliating spectacle than the President of the United States invoking the wild passions of a mob around him with the utterance of such sentiments as he uttered on that day." Still, Mr. Sherman thought that "this was no time to quarrel with the Chief Magistrate." Other prominent Republicans, such as General Jacob D. Cox of Ohio—one of the noblest men I have ever known—called upon him to expostulate with him in a friendly spirit, and he gave them amiable assurances, which, however, subsequently turned out to have been without meaning. Then something happened which cut off the last chance of mutual approach.

On March 13th the House passed the Civil Rights Bill, which the Senate had already passed on the 2nd of February. Its main provision was that all persons born in the United States excepting Indians, not taxed, were declared to be citizens of the United States, that such citizens of every race and color should have the same rights in every State and Territory of the United States to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to enjoy the full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property as was enjoyed by white citizens. The bill had nothing to do with "social equality" and did not in any way interfere with Mr. Johnson's scheme of reconstruction. In fact, it was asserted, no doubt truthfully, that Mr. Johnson himself had at various times shown himself by word and act favorable to its provisions. It appeared, indeed, in every one of its features so reasonable and so necessary for the enforcement of the 13th Constitutional Amendment prohibiting slavery that disapproval of it by the President was regarded as almost impossible. Aside from the merits of the bill, there was another reason, a reason of policy, for the President to sign it. Had he done so he would have greatly encouraged the conciliatory spirit which in spite of all that had happened, was still flickering in many Republican bosoms, and he might thus, even at this late hour, have secured an effective following among the Republicans in Congress. But he did not. He returned the bill to Congress with a veto message so weak in argument that it appeared as if he had been laboriously groping for pretexts to kill the bill. One of the principal reasons he gave was again the sinister one that Congress had passed the bill while eleven States were unrepresented, thus repeating the threatening hint that the validity of the laws made by such a Congress might be questioned.

Congress promptly passed the bill over the President's veto by a two-thirds majority in each House, and thus the Civil Rights Bill became a law. President Johnson's defeat was more fatal than appeared on the surface. The prestige he had won by the success of his veto of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill was lost again. The Republicans, whom in some way he had led to expect that he would sign the Civil Rights Bill, now believed him to be an insincere man, capable of any treachery.
The last chance of an accommodation with the Republican party was now utterly gone. It had become manifest that he was not stronger than Congress, but that Congress with its two-thirds majority against him was stronger than he, and that element among the party politicians that was prone to join the stronger side for personal advantage, now rallied largely against him. But worse than all, the reactionists in the South who were bent upon curtailing the freedom of the emancipated negroes as much as possible, received his veto of the Civil Rights Bill with shouts of delight. Believing him now unalterably opposed to the bestowal of equal civil rights, such as were specified in that bill, upon the freedmen, they hailed President Johnson as their champion more loudly than ever. Undisturbed by the defeat of the veto, which they looked upon as a mere temporary accident, they easily persuaded themselves that the President, aided by the Administration Republicans and the Democratic party at the North, would at last surely prevail, and that now they might safely deal with the negro and the labor question in the South as they pleased. The reactionary element felt itself encouraged by the President's attitude to the point of foolhardiness. Legislative enactments and municipal ordinances and regulations tending to reduce the colored people to a state of semi-slavery multiplied at a lively rate. The reports of cruelties perpetrated upon freedmen increased in number from day to day. The tone of the press and of public speakers in the South rose to a high pitch of impatient peremptoriness. Measures taken for the protection of the emancipated slaves were indiscriminately denounced in the name of the Constitution of the United States as acts of insufferable tyranny. The instant admission to seats in the National Congress of Senators and Representatives from the "States lately in rebellion" was loudly demanded.
as a constitutional right; and for these seats men were presented who but yesterday had stood in arms against the National Government, or who had held high place in the insurrectionary confederacy. And the highest authority cited for all these denunciations and demands was Andrew Johnson, President of the United States.

The Southern people might well have been pitied for having been seduced into these ill-fated extravagancies. And their seducer might well have been called their worst enemy.

The impression made by these things upon the minds of the Northern people can easily be imagined. Men of sober ways of thinking, not accessible to sensational appeals, asked themselves quite seriously whether there was not real danger that the legitimate results of the war, for the achievement of which they had sacrificed uncounted thousands of lives and the fruits of many, many years of labor, were not in grave jeopardy again. Their alarm was not artificially produced by political agitation. It was sincere and profound, and began to grow angry.

The gradual softening of the passions and resentments of the war was checked. The feeling that the Union had to be saved once more from the rule of the "rebels with the President at their head" spread with fearful rapidity, and well-meaning people looking to Congress to come to the rescue, were becoming less and less squeamish as to the character of the means to be used to that end.

This popular temper could not fail to exercise its influence upon Congress and to stimulate radical tendencies among its members. Even men of a comparatively conservative and cautious disposition admitted that strong remedies were necessary to avert the threatening danger, and they soon turned to the most drastic as the best. Moreover, the partisan motive
was pressed to the front to reinforce the patriotic purpose. It had gradually become evident that President Johnson, whether such had been his original design or not,—probably not—would by his political course be led into the Democratic party. The Democrats, delighted of course with the prospect of capturing a President elected by the Republicans, zealously supported his measures, and flattered his vanity without stint. The old alliance between the pro-slavery sentiment in the South and the Democratic party in the North was thus revived—that alliance which had already cost the South so dearly in the recent past by making Southern people believe that if they revolted against the Federal Government, the Northern Democracy would stand by them and help them to victory. A similar delusion was now encouraged again by the attitude of the Northern Democrats; and the "States lately in rebellion," if reconstructed on the Johnson plan, could be counted upon to send a solidly Democratic delegation to Congress. That delegation would even become proportionately stronger in number than before, since the negro population, only three-fifths of whom had been counted in the basis of representation when they were in slavery, were now as free people counted in full, although they might not be permitted to vote. There was an apprehension that the delegations from the "States lately in rebellion," if so reconstructed, united with the Northern Democrats, might obtain the control of Congress, and then not only undo all legislation had done for the protection of the freedmen,—so as to turn them over helplessly to the mercies of the master class, but also attack the national debt either by repudiating it directly or by making it payable in depreciated paper money. This apprehension was by no means altogether unfounded, for it was not only natural that the South should be overwhelmingly in favor of such direct or indirect repudiation,
but even in the North, especially the western part of it, there developed a strong movement in that direction.

In consequence of all this the belief grew stronger and stronger in the Northern country that the predominance of the Republican party was—and would be for a few years at least—necessary for the safety and the honor of the Republic, and steps taken to insure that predominance, even such as would, in less critical times, have evoked strong criticism, were now looked upon with seductive leniency of judgment. Mr. Stockton of New Jersey was unseated in the Senate upon grounds which would hardly pass muster in ordinary times, to make room for a Republican successor, and even Mr. Fessenden approved the transaction. Advantage was taken in the same body of the sickness or casual absence of some Democratic Senator to rush through a vote when a two-thirds majority was required to kill a veto, and other proceedings were resorted to at a pinch which were hardly compatible with the famous "courtesy of the Senate." But there was more thorough and lasting work to be done to prepare for the full restoration of those States. The Republican majority was by no means of one mind as to the constitutional status of the communities that had been in insurrection against the National Government. I have already spoken of the theory of State-suicide advanced by Mr. Stevens and a comparatively small school of extremists. The theory most popular with most of the Republicans, which was finally formulated by the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, was that the rebel States had not been out of the Union, but had lost their working status inside of the Union, and had to be restored to their regular constitutional relations to the Union by action of Congress, upon such conditions as Congress might deem proper. This theory was most clearly expounded in the House by Mr. Shellabarger of
Ohio, a man of uncommon acumen and force, and it was also adopted in the Senate, Fessenden and Sumner leading, by all the Republicans excepting the very few who sided with the President. But the accepted theory had sometimes to suffer whimsical treatment as to the logic of its application when practical exigencies seemed to demand its being temporarily overlooked. For instance, it happened occasionally that the war was held to be over in certain respects, but to be not over in others, and those States were consequently not good enough States to govern themselves and to be represented, but good enough to be counted in the ratification of an amendment to the National Constitution. Neither did the theory cover the nature of the conditions to be imposed upon late rebel States previous to their full restoration. The question, for instance, whether the extension of the suffrage to the negro race should be one of those conditions, as Sumner upon all occasions strenuously insisted, remained open for future decision.

To meet the dangers which so far had become visible on the horizon, the Joint Committee on Reconstruction devised the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which was long and laboriously debated in both Houses. In the form in which it was finally adopted it declared (1) that all persons born or naturalized in the United States are citizens of the United States and of the States in which they reside, and that no State shall make or enforce any law abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens, nor deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person the equal protection of the laws; (2) that if in any State the right to vote at any election for the choice of National or State officers is denied to any male citizen, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation in Congress or the electoral college
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State; (3) that no person who had taken part in the rebellion, having previously as a National or State officer, military or civil, sworn to support the Constitution of the United States, shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or any State, unless relieved of that disability by a two-thirds vote of each House of Congress; (4) that the validity of the public debt of the United States shall not be questioned, nor shall any debt or obligation contracted in aid of rebellion, or any claim for emancipated slaves be paid.

Thus the Fourteenth Amendment stopped short of the extension of the suffrage to negroes—a subject which many Republicans were still afraid to touch directly. But by implication it punished the States denying that extension by reducing the basis of representation; it excluded from office, unless relieved of the disability by a two-thirds vote of Congress, the most influential class of those who had taken an active part in the rebellion, and it safeguarded the public debt. With only one of its provisions serious fault could be found. Not with that which guaranteed to the freedmen the essential civil rights of free men, nor with that which excluded the freedmen from the basis of representation—so long as they were not permitted to vote, for in that case it would have been unfair to make them serve to augment the political power of others. Only the advocates of negro suffrage might logically have objected to this clause, inasmuch as it by implication recognized the right of a State to exclude the colored people from the suffrage if the State paid a certain penalty for such exclusion. Neither could the clause safeguarding the public debt and prohibiting the
payment of debts incurred in aid of the rebellion be objected to. A really exceptional provision was that which excluded so large a class of Southern men from public office, and just that class a friendly understanding with which was most desirable. I saw this a few years later much more clearly than I did at the time. Regarded as a punishment of "treason," those political disabilities were altogether too lenient. They could in that respect only serve to lay us open to the suspicion that, far from being generous at heart, we would have treated the rebels more severely if we had known how to accomplish it. The disqualification of a very few particularly obnoxious chieftains of the rebellion would have sufficed to satisfy public sentiment. But the disqualification of this large class was, irrespective of justice or generosity, a grave blunder in statesmanship. It struck nearly all those to whom the great mass of the Southern people was accustomed to look up for that sort of leadership which superior intelligence, wealth and social prestige could give. This leadership was by no means destroyed by the disqualification for office, because no other leadership was thereby substituted for it. Those so disqualified could indeed not hold office themselves, but their influence could in a large measure dictate who should, and control their conduct. And there were among the disqualified, especially among those who under the Confederacy had held military rank, many who understood the advantage of accommodation to the new order of things, and who were disposed to promote it. To discourage their good will by chafing their pride was decidedly unwise policy. The provision that their disqualification could be removed by a two-thirds vote in each House of Congress mended the mischief thus done a little, but not enough for the public good.

It was not expressely enacted, but it was generally under-
stood, that those of the "States lately in rebellion," which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, would thereby qualify themselves for full restoration in the Union. Tennessee, where a faction of the Union party hostile to President Johnson had gained the ascendency, did so and was accordingly fully restored by the admission to their seats in Congress of its Senators and Representatives. The full restoration of the other late rebel States would probably have been expedient in the same way, had they followed the example of Tennessee. But President Johnson, as became publicly known in one or two instances, obstinately dissuaded them from doing so, and the fight went on. He also vetoed a second Freedmen's Bureau Bill in which some of the provisions he had objected to in his veto of the first were remedied. But things had now come to such a pass between Congress and the President that his veto messages were hardly considered worth listening to, but were promptly overruled by two-thirds votes in each House almost without debate.

Under such circumstances the Congressional election of 1866 came on. The people were to pronounce judgment between the President and Congress. The great quarrel had created excitement so intense as to affect men's balance of mind. About the time of the assembling of Congress Mr. Preston King of New York (the same rotund gentleman with whom in the National Convention of 1860 I conducted Mr. Ashmun to the chair), who had been a Senator of the United States and had been appointed Collector of Customs by President Johnson, committed suicide by jumping into the North River from a ferry boat in New York harbor. He had been a Republican of the radical type, and when he took the office he supposed the President to be of the same mind; but Mr. Johnson's course distressed him so much that he became
melancholy; his brain gave way and he sought relief in death. Another suicide, that of Senator Lane of Kansas, which greatly startled the country a few months later, was attributed to a similar cause. "Jim Lane" had been one of the most famous Free-State fighters in Kansas Territory. Since then he was ranked among the extreme anti-slavery men and as a Senator he was counted upon as a firm opponent of President Johnson's policy. To the astonishment of everybody he voted against the Civil Rights Bill. This somewhat mysterious change of front, which nobody seemed able satisfactorily to explain, cost him his confidential intercourse with his former associates in the Senate, and brought upon him stinging manifestations of disapproval from his constituents. He was reported to have expressed profound repentance of what he had done and finally made away with himself as one lost to hope. He was still in the full vigor of manhood—only fifty-one years old—when he sought the grave.

The campaign of 1866 was remarkable for its heat and bitterness. In canvasses carried on for the purpose of electing a President I had seen more enthusiasm, but in none so much animosity and bad blood as in this, an incidental object of which was politically to destroy a President. Andrew Johnson had not only manifested a disposition to lean upon the Democratic party in the pursuit of his policy, but he had also begun to dismiss public officers who refused to co-operate with him politically and to put in their places men who adhered to him. This touched partisan spirit in an exceedingly sensitive spot. There could be no clearer proof of President Johnson's "treachery" in the eyes of the ordinary party man. It was the unpardonable crime. When the man so appointed was a Democrat—well, his offense was regarded leniently, for nothing better could be expected of him. But when a Republican ac-
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SENATOR PRESTON KING
cepted office from Andrew Johnson's hands on Andrew Johnson's terms to take the place of an officeholder dismissed for fidelity to his principles, he could not be forgiven. The so-called "bread-and-butter-brigade" was looked down upon with a contempt that could hardly be expressed in words.

But there were more serious things to inflame the temper of the North. The Southern whites again proved themselves their own worst enemies. Early in May news came from Memphis of riots in which twenty-four negroes were killed and one white man wounded. The conclusion lay near and was generally accepted that the whites had been the aggressors and the negroes the victims. In the last days of July more portentous tidings arrived from New Orleans. An attempt was made by Union men to revive the constitutional convention of 1864 for the purpose of remodeling the constitution of the States. The attempt was of questionable legality, but, if wrong, it could easily have been foiled by legal and peaceable means. The municipal government of New Orleans was in possession of the ex-Confederates. It resolved that the meeting of the remnant of the convention should not be held. When it did meet, the police, consisting in an overwhelming majority of ex-Confederate soldiers, aided by a white mob, broke into the hall and fired upon those assembled there. The result was thirty-seven negroes killed and one hundred and nineteen wounded,—and of three of the white Union men killed and seventeen wounded—against one of the assailants killed and ten wounded. General Sheridan, the commander of the Department, telegraphed General Grant: "It was no riot; it was an absolute massacre by the police which was not excelled in murderous cruelty by that of Fort Pillow. It was a murder which the Mayor and the police of this city perpetrated without the shadow of necessity." A tremor of horror and rage ran over
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the North. People asked one another: "Does this mean that the rebellion is to begin again?" I heard the question often.

The Administration felt the blow, and to neutralize its effects a National Convention of its adherents, North and South, planned by Thurlow Weed and Secretary Seward, was to serve as the principal means. This "National Union Convention" met in Philadelphia on August 14th. It was respectably attended, in point of character, as well as of numbers. It opened its proceedings with a spectacular performance which under different conditions might have struck the popular imagination favorably. The delegates marched into the Convention Hall in pairs, one from the South arm in arm with one from the North, Massachusetts and South Carolina leading. But with the Memphis riot and the New Orleans "massacre" and Andrew Johnson's sinister figure in the background, the theatrical exhibition of restored fraternal feeling, although calling forth much cheering on the spot, fell flat, and even became the victim of ridicule as it earned for the meeting the derisive nickname of the "arm-in-arm convention." The proceedings were rather dull, and much was made by the Republicans of the fact, or the apparent fact, that the Chairman, Senator Doolittle from Wisconsin, was careful not to let Southern members say much, lest they say too much. It was also noticed—and made much of—that among the members of the convention the number of men supposed to curry favor with the Administration for the purpose of getting office—men belonging to the "bread-and-butter-brigade"—was conspicuously large. Among the resolutions passed by the convention was one declaring slavery abolished and the emancipated negro entitled to equal protection in every right of person and property, and another heartily endorsing President Johnson's reconstruction policy.

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No doubt many of the respectable and patriotic men who attended that convention thought they had done very valuable work for the general pacification by getting their Southern friends publicly to affirm that slavery was dead never to be revived, and that the civil rights of the freedmen were entitled to equal protection and would have it. But the effect of such declarations upon the popular mind at the North was not as great as had been expected. Such declarations by respectable Southern gentlemen, who were perfectly sincere, had been heard before. In fact, almost everybody in the South was ready to declare himself likewise, and with equal sincerity, as to the abolition of the old form of chattel slavery. But a question of far superior importance was, what he would put in the place of the old form of chattel slavery. Scores of times I have myself heard such declaration, immediately followed by the assertion that the negroes would not work without physical compulsion. The "abolition of slavery forever" was readily assented to by the legislative and the municipal bodies which immediately after the declaration concerning the abolition of slavery would proceed to enact laws, or ordinances, or police regulations under which the freedman was anything but a free man, and under which the promise of the equal protection of the laws was nothing but mockery. \textit{There} was the rub, and this had come to be well understood at the North in the light of the reports from the South which the advocates of President Johnson's policy could not deny nor obscure. The moral effect of the "National Union Convention" was, therefore, very feeble. It was rather regarded as another deceptive contrivance to obtain the assent of the North to a method of reconstruction which would put the emancipated slave again at the mercy of the master class.

This judgment was doubtless too harsh as far as the
motives of the manager of the convention were concerned; but as to the probable consequences of their policy it was but too well founded.

If the members of the National Union Convention thought that their conciliatory utterances would pour oil on the angry waves of the campaign, they reckoned without their host. When a committee appointed for that purpose presented to President Johnson a copy of its proceedings, there was rather a note of defiance to his opponents, than of conciliation, in his response. "We have witnessed in one department of the government every endeavor to prevent the restoration of peace, harmony and union," he said. "We have seen hanging upon the verge of the government, as it were, a body called, or which assumes to be, the Congress of the United States, while, in fact, it is a Congress of only a part of the United States. We have seen a Congress in a minority assume to exercise power which, allowed to be consummated, would result in despotism or monarchy itself." Here was again the thinly veiled threat that, because certain States were not represented in it, the validity of the acts of Congress might be attacked. But worse was to follow. It is a well-known fact that Presidents, under the influence of the Washington atmosphere, are apt to become victims of the delusion that they are idolized by the American people. Even John Tyler is said to have thought so. It may have been under a similar impression that President Johnson, who had great confidence in the power of his influence over the masses when he personally confronted them, accepted an invitation requesting his presence at the unveiling of a Douglas statue in Chicago, and he made this an occasion for a "presidential progress" through some of the States. He started late in August. Several members of his cabinet, Seward among others, accompanied him, and so did General

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Grant and Admiral Farragut by command, to give additional luster to the appearance of the chief.

His journey—the famous "swinging around the circle," a favorite phrase of his to describe his fight against the Southern enemies of the Union, the secessionists, at one time, and against the Northern disunionists, the radical Republicans, at another—was a series of most disastrous exhibitions. At Philadelphia he was received with studied coldness. At New York he had an official reception, and he used the occasion to rehearse his often-told story of his wonderful advancement from the position of alderman in his native town to the Presidency of the United States, with some insignificant remarks about his policy attached. At Cleveland he appeared before a large audience, according to abundant testimony, in a drunken condition. Indeed, the character of his speech cannot be explained in any other way. He descended to the lowest tone of partisan stump speaking. He bandied epithets with some of his hearers who interrupted him. The whole speech was a mixture of inane drivel and reckless asperation. His visit at Chicago passed over without particular scandal. But the speech he made at St. Louis fairly capped the climax. He accused the Republicans in Congress of having substantially planned the New Orleans massacre. He indulged himself in a muddled tirade about Judas, Christ and Moses. He charged that all that his opponents were after was to hold on to the offices, but he would kick them out; and they wanted to get rid of him, and he defied them. And so on. At Indianapolis a disorderly crowd hooted him down and would not let him speak at all.

He returned to Washington an utterly discomfited and disgraced man, having gone out to win popular support, and having earned only popular disgust. There was a bar-room vulgarity in his whole performance the contemplation of which
made self-respecting Americans not merely sad, but angry. Such a lapse might have been overlooked in the conduct of a mayor—even of a governor, or of a member of Congress. But the President! The President of the United States! This was too much. The whole North rang with indignation. President Johnson's supporters hung their heads with shame and dismay. The humorists, pictorial as well as literary, pounced upon the "swinging around the circle" as a fruitful subject for caricature or satire, turning serious wrath into a bitter laugh. Andrew Johnson became the victim not only of detestation but of ridicule.

The campaign was then—about the middle of September—virtually decided. There was no longer any doubt that the election would not only preserve, but materially increase, the anti-Johnson majority in Congress. But before President Johnson started on his ill-starred journey, arrangements had been made for other National Conventions. One of them was designed to bring Southern Loyalists, that is, Southern men who had stood loyally by the National Government, together with Northern Republicans. It met at Philadelphia on the 3rd of September. Senator Zachariah Chandler and myself attended it as delegates sent there by the Republicans of Michigan. It was a large gathering, the roll of which bore many distinguished names from all parts of the country. Southern members having been permitted to say but very little in the Johnson Convention a fortnight before, it was a clever stroke of policy on the part of our managers to give the floor to the Southern loyalists altogether. They availed themselves of their opportunity to lay before the people of the country an account of their experiences and sufferings since the promulgation of the Johnson policy, which could not fail to stir the popular heart. Their recitals of the atrocities committed in the South
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were indeed horrible. Over a thousand Union citizens had been murdered there since the surrender of Lee and in no case had the assassins been brought to judgment. Two more conventions were held, conventions of Union soldiers, one in favor, and the other, and more popular one, in opposition to President Johnson, and the campaign was carried on with all the zest and passion of a presidential canvass, although lacking the parades and other artificial contrivances devised to excite popular enthusiasm. It was a campaign of argument and appeal. But after Mr. Johnson's "swing around the circle" no further exertion could have saved his cause, and no further exertion could have very much augmented the majority against him. I am convinced he would have been beaten without his disgraceful escapade. But his self-exhibition made his defeat overwhelming. The Republicans won in 143 Congressional districts, the Democrats in only 49. President Johnson was more at the mercy of Congress than ever.

During the canvass, I was somewhat in demand as a speaker and addressed large meetings at various places. One of my speeches, delivered at Philadelphia on the 8th of September, was printed in pamphlet form and widely circulated as a campaign document. I have read it again—thirty-nine years after its delivery—and I may say that after the additional light and the experience which this lapse of time has given us, I would now draw the diagnosis of the situation then existing substantially as I did in that speech—barring some—not many—extravagances of oratorical coloring, and the treatment of the disqualification clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.

It was in this campaign that the matter of negro suffrage was first discussed on the hustings with a certain frankness. Efforts have since been made and are now being made, to make
the Southern people believe—and, I deeply regret to say, many of them actually do believe—that the introduction of negro suffrage was a device of some particularly malignant and vindictive radicals, to subject the South to the extreme of distress and humiliation. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Admitting that there were people in the North who, before the passions of the war had subsided, wished to see the rebels and their sympathizers and abettors in some way punished for what they had done, negro suffrage never was thought of as a punitive measure. I may say that in all my intercourse with various classes of people,—and my opportunities were large—I have never heard it mentioned or suggested, still less advocated, as a punitive measure. It never was in itself popular with the masses—reason enough for the ordinary politicians to be afraid of openly favoring it. There were only two classes of public men who at all thought of introducing it generally: those whom, without meaning any disparagement, I would for the sake of convenience call the doctrinaires,—men who, like Mr. Sumner, would insist as a general principle, that the negro, being a man, was as a matter of right as much entitled to the suffrage as the white man—and those who, after a faithful and somewhat perplexed wrestle with the complicated problem of reconstruction, finally landed—or, it might almost be said, were stranded—at the conclusion that to enable the negro to protect his own rights as a free man by the exercise of the ballot was after all the simplest way out of the tangle, and at the same time the most in accordance with our democratic principles of government.

This view of the matter grew rapidly in popular appreciation as the results of reconstruction on the Johnson plan became more and more unsatisfactory. It gained very much in strength when it appeared that the tremendous rebuke admin-
istered to the President's policy by the Congressional elections of 1866, had not produced any effect upon Mr. Johnson's mind, but that, as his annual message delivered on December 3rd showed, he was doggedly bent upon following his course. It was still more strengthened when all the Southern legislatures set up under the President's plan, save that of Tennessee, rejected the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution—some unanimously or nearly so,—with demonstrations of contemptuous defiance. Then the question was asked at the North with great pertinency: Are we to understand that the white people of the "States lately in rebellion" will not agree that all persons born or naturalized in the United States shall be constitutionally recognized as citizens entitled in their civil rights to the equal protection of the laws? That those States insist not only that the colored people shall not have the right of suffrage, but that those people so excluded from the franchise shall even serve to increase the basis of representation in favor of the whites—in other words, that the white people of the South shall come out of the rebellion politically stronger than they were when they went into it? That all those who engaged in the rebellion and fought to destroy the Union shall be entitled to participate on even more favorable terms in the government of the same Union which but yesterday they sought to destroy? That they refuse to safeguard the public debt incurred for saving the Union and wish to keep open the possibility of an assumption of the debts incurred by the rebel States for destroying the Union? No fair-minded man, either Northern or Southern, will deny that after the emphatic rejection of the Fourteenth Amendment by the so-called Johnson legislatures in the South, these questions were most pertinent, and that the mere statement of them could not fail to make a deep and disquieting impression upon the Northern mind.
The reports constantly arriving from the South—reports the truthfulness of some of which was above doubt—answered these questions in the affirmative; and then nothing could be more natural than that many sober-minded citizens, unbiased by any heated partisanship, but sincerely anxious for the future of their country, should have become accessible to the belief that it was wrong and bad policy to let all, or nearly all, the voting in the South be done by men who had been engaged in the rebellion yesterday and who, although they had taken an oath of allegiance, were opposed to the new order of things to-day; and to exclude from the right of voting a great mass of people who, whatever else might be said of them, would at least loyally stand up for the legitimate results of the war. This reasoning, not any impulse of vindictiveness, not any desire to punish or humiliate the white people of the South, was the source from which sprang the resolve to introduce general negro suffrage in the South. This, not a motive of malice, explains also why many well-meaning people, who would rather not have negro suffrage in their own States, favored it for the States lately in rebellion.

Neither was the fact overlooked that the great mass of the Southern negroes were grossly ignorant and in other respects ill-fitted for the exercise of political privileges. Many who then favored negro suffrage would have greatly preferred its gradual introduction, first limiting it, as Mr. Lincoln suggested to Governor Hahn of Louisiana, to those who had served as soldiers in the Union army and those who were best fitted for it by intelligence and education. But this would have reduced the negro vote to so small a figure as to render it insufficient to counteract or neutralize the power of the reactionary element. To this end the whole vote was required, and for that reason it was demanded, in spite of the imperfections it was
known to possess and of the troubles it threatened—which, however, at that period were much underestimated, as is apt to be the case under similar circumstances. How visibly strong the popular demand had grown may be concluded from the fact that President Johnson found himself moved to address a circular to the provisional governors advising that the right of suffrage be extended to persons of color who could read the Constitution and write their own name, and also to those who owned real estate valued at not less than two hundred and fifty dollars. Unfortunately for himself, he impaired the moral credit which otherwise would have been due to this proposition by writing to Governor Sharkey of Mississippi that he hoped it would be favorably acted upon, as such action would "completely foil the Radicals in their attempt to keep the Southern States from renewing their relations to the Union." To him such an extension of the suffrage seemed to be only a shrewd move in his fight with the "Radicals," while with its limitations it would not have furnished to the negroes the meaning of self-protection. Not one of the Southern States, however, acted according to the President's suggestion.

When the session of Congress opened on the 3rd of December it was virtually certain that unrestricted negro suffrage would come and that President Johnson's reconstruction policy would be swept out of the way. The Republican majority without delay passed a bill extending the suffrage to the negroes in the District of Columbia, which then had a municipal government of its own. The President put his veto on the bill, but the veto was promptly overruled by two-thirds majorities in both Houses. Then followed a series of legislative measures designed substantially to substitute for the reconstruction work done by the President a method of reconstruction based upon universal suffrage including the negro
vote, and to strip the President as much as possible of all power to interfere. The first, upon the ground that life and property were not safe under the existing provisional governments, divided the late rebel States into five military divisions, each to be under the command of a general officer who was to have the power to declare martial law and to have offenders tried by military commission, as the condition of public safety and order might seem to them to require. Under this protection conventions were to be elected by universal suffrage including the negro vote and excluding the disqualified "rebel" vote, to frame new State constitutions containing provision for the same sort of universal suffrage, such constitutions to be subject to the approval of the people of the respective States and of Congress. The State officers to be elected under these new constitutions were of course to be elected by the same electorate, and the States were to be regarded as entitled to representation in Congress, after having ratified the Fourteenth Amendment to the National Constitution, and after that Amendment had been ratified by a sufficient number of States generally, to make it a valid part of the Constitution. A supplementary Reconstruction Act gave the military commanders very extensive control over the elections to be held as to the registration of voters, the mode of holding the elections, the appointment of election officers, the canvassing of results, and the reporting of such results to the President and through him to Congress. In order to strip President Johnson of all power to interfere with the execution of this measure beyond the appointment of the commanders of the various military divisions, a provision was introduced in the Army Appropriations Bill which substantially ordained that all military orders and instructions should be issued through the General of the Army (General Grant), who was to have his headquarters at Washington, and that all
orders or instructions issued otherwise should be null and void. And when the generals commanding the several divisions had expressed some doubt as to the interpretation of some provisions of the Reconstruction Act and the President had issued instructions concerning those points which displeased Congress, another act was passed which by way of explanation of the meaning of its predecessors, still further enlarged the powers of the military commanders and made them virtually rulers over everything and everybody in those States. In the meantime, to tie President Johnson's hands still further, the Tenure-of-Office Act had been passed, which was to curtail or hamper the President's power to dismiss officeholders from their places so as to reduce as much as possible his facilities for punishing the opponents and for rewarding the friends of his policy, and thus, as it would now be called, for building up an officeholders' machine for his use.

President Johnson in every case promptly vetoed the bills objectionable to him or fulminated his protests against what he considered unwarrantable encroachments upon his constitutional prerogatives. Some of his messages, reported to have been written either by Mr. Seward or by Mr. Jeremiah Black, a man of brilliant abilities, were strong in argument as well as eloquent in expression. But they were not listened to—much less considered. Mr. Johnson had personally discredited himself to such a degree that his personality fatally stood in his way in anything he advocated. No doubt some of the measures devised to strip him of power as President did great violence to the Constitution in spirit, as well as in form. But the quarrel between Congress and the Executive had so heated the whole atmosphere with political passion, that almost anything that would serve as an effective weapon against the antagonist was apt to be accepted as proper and lawful. The air, not only in
Washington but throughout the country, was buzzing with rumors of iniquities which Andrew Johnson was meditating and would surely attempt if he were not disarmed. He was surely plotting a coup d'état. He had already slyly tried to get General Grant out of the way by sending him on a trumped-up diplomatic errand to Mexico. Although it was very difficult to imagine what kind of a coup d'état President Johnson possibly could think of, yet he was openly charged with entertaining various hellish designs, and there is no doubt that even the most absurd gossip found much lodgment with the people. At any rate, Andrew Johnson was believed to be capable of almost anything. When, therefore, the news came from Washington that Andrew Johnson was to be impeached, to be deprived of his office, it was not only welcomed by reckless partisanship, but as everybody that has lived through those times will remember, it struck a popular chord. There was a widespread feeling among well-meaning and sober people, that the country was really in some sort of peril, and that it would be a good thing to get rid of that dangerous man in the presidential chair.

But for this vague feeling of uneasiness approaching genuine alarm, I doubt whether Congress would ever have ventured upon the tragi-comedy of the impeachment.

It explains also the fact that so many lawyers in Congress, as well as in the country, although they must have seen the legal weakness of the case against Andrew Johnson, still labored so hard to find some point upon which he might be convicted. It was for political, not for legal, reasons that they did so—not reasons of political partisanship, but the higher political reason that they thought the public interest made the removal of Andrew Johnson from his place of power eminently desirable. I have to confess that I leaned somewhat to that
opinion myself—not as if I had believed in the sinister revolutionary designs of Mr. Johnson, but because I thought that the presence of Mr. Johnson in the presidential office encouraged among the white people of the South hopes and endeavors which, the longer they were indulged in, the more grievous the harm they would do to both races. It cannot indeed be said that President Johnson failed to execute the reconstruction laws enacted by Congress by refusing to perform the duties they imposed upon him, such as the appointment of the commanders of military divisions. He even effectively opposed, through his able and accomplished Attorney-General, Mr. Stanbery, the attempts of two Southern governors to stop the enforcement of the Reconstruction Act by the legal process of injunction. But the mere fact that he was believed to favor the reactionary element in the South and would do all in his power to let it have its way, was in itself an influence constantly inflaming the passions kindled by mischievous hopes.

The condition of things in the South had become deplorable in the extreme. Had the reconstruction measures enacted by Congress, harsh as they were, been imposed upon the Southern people immediately after the war, when the people were stunned by their overwhelming defeat, and when there was still some apprehension of bloody vengeance to be visited upon the leaders of the rebellion—as was, for instance, witnessed in Hungary in 1849 after the collapse of the great insurrection,—those measures would have been accepted as an escape from something worse. And had they been accompanied with a generous amnesty and with the assured prospect that the sooner the white people of the South accommodated themselves in good faith to the new order of things, the sooner their States would recover their self-government at home and their constitutional participation in the National Government, it is
not only possible but probable that the transition from slave labor society to free labor society would have been greatly facilitated by a sense of necessity, as well as by the important circumstance that at that period the relations between the whites and blacks were still comparatively kind and forbearing. Even negro suffrage in a qualified form, as General Lee's testimony before the Reconstruction Committee showed, might then have been accepted as a peace offering.

But the propitious moment was lost. Instead of gently persuading the Southerners, as Lincoln would have done, that the full restoration of the "States lately in rebellion" would necessarily depend upon the readiness and good faith with which they accommodated themselves to the legitimate results of the war, and that there were certain things which the victorious Union Government was bound to insist upon, not in a spirit of vindictiveness, but as a simple matter of honor and duty—instead of this, President Johnson told them that their instant restoration to their old status in the Union, that is, to complete self-government and to participation in the National Government on equal terms with the other States, had become their indefeasible constitutional right as soon as the insurgents laid down their arms and went through the form of taking an oath of allegiance, and that those who refused to recognize the immediate validity of that right, were no better than traitors and public enemies. Then nothing could have been more natural than that the master class in the South should have seen a chance to establish something like semi-slavery, and that, pressed by their economic perplexities, they should have eagerly grasped at that chance. No wonder that, encouraged, if not directly called upon by the President to do so, they should have vehemently demanded, as their right, the instant permission to dispose of their home concerns as they pleased, and to take
their old places in the government of the Union again. No wonder that they should have been exasperated by stinging disappointment when this permission was denied. No wonder that, on the other hand, the North took the peremptoriness of that demand for a new outbreak of "rebel insolence." No wonder that, what should have been as gentle as possible a transition from one social state into another, degenerated into an angry political brawl, which grew more and more furious as it went on. No wonder, finally, that when at last the Congressional Reconstruction policy, which at first might have been quietly submitted to as something that might have been worse, and that could not be averted, came at last in the midst of that brawl, it was resented in the South as an act of diabolical malice and tyrannical oppression not to be endured. And the worst outcome of all was, that many white people of the South, who had at first still cherished a kindly feeling for the negroes on account of their "fidelity" during the war, now fell to hating the negroes as the cause of all their woes; that on the other hand the negroes, after all their troubles raised to a position of power, now were tempted to a reckless use of that power; and that a selfish partisan spirit growing up among the Republican majority, instead of endeavoring to curb that tendency, encouraged, or at least tolerated it, for party advantage. Thus, what might have been a measure of peaceable adjustment if it had come in time, now threatened to turn into a veritable Pandora's box of trouble.

I have to confess that I took a more hopeful view of the matter at the time, for I did not foresee the mischievous part which selfish partisan spirit would play in that precarious situation. I trusted that the statesmen of the Republican party would prove clear-sighted enough to perceive in time the danger of excesses which their reconstruction policy would bring
to the South, and that they would be strong enough in influence to combat that danger. Nothing could have been farther from my mind than the expectation that before long it would be my lot to take an active part in that combat on the most conspicuous political stage in the country.

I had, since I left Washington, been quietly engaged in editing the Detroit Post, when one day in the spring of 1867 I received, quite unexpectedly, a proposition from the proprietors of the Westliche Post, a daily journal published in the German language in St. Louis, Missouri, inviting me to join them, and offering me, on reasonable terms, a property interest in their prosperous concern. On further inquiry I found the proposition advantageous, and I accepted it. My connection with the Detroit Post, which, owing to the excellent character of the persons with whom it brought me into contact, had been most pleasant, was amicably dissolved, and I went to St. Louis to take charge of the new duties.

A particular attraction to me in this new arrangement was the association with Dr. Emil Preetorius, one of the proprietors of the Westliche Post. He was a native of Rhenish Hesse, close to the Bavarian Palatinate, where in 1849 the great popular uprising in favor of the National Constitution of Germany had taken place, and of the town of Alzey, which, according to ancient legend, had been the home of the great fiddler among the heroes of the Nibelungenlied—"Volker von Alzeien," grim Hagen’s valiant brother in arms. The city of Alzey still carries a fiddle in its coat of arms. Mr. Preetorius was a few years older than I. He had already won the diploma of Doctor of Laws when the revolution of 1848 broke out. With all the ardor of his soul he threw himself into the movement for free government and had to leave the Fatherland in consequence. But all the idealisms of 1848 he brought with him to
DR. EMIL PRETORIUS
his new home in America. As a matter of course, he at once embraced the anti-slavery cause with the warmest devotion, and became one of the leaders of the German-born citizens of St. Louis, who, in the spring of 1861 by their courageous patriotism saved their city and their State to the Union. He then remained in public life as a journalist and as a speaker of sonorous eloquence. He was a man of absolute rectitude and honor and of infinite goodness of heart. His generosity seemed to know no thought of selfish advantage. There was something inspiring in the constant freshness of his enthusiasms for all that was good and great and beautiful, and his wrath at every wrong and meanness. His intense patriotism was that of a man of lofty ideals, and any service he could render to his country, was to him a source of almost childlike joy. We soon became warm friends, intimate in the best sense of the term. We did, indeed, not always think alike, for he was a much stronger partisan than I was. But no difference of opinion ever cast the slightest shadow upon our mutual confidence and the sincere warmth of our attachment.

As already mentioned, the *Westliche Post* was published in the German language. It may be in place here to say a word about a prejudice entertained by some well-meaning Americans, that the publication of newspapers, and perhaps even the making of political speeches in this republic in any other language than the English, is an undesirable, if not positively dangerous practice. It is said that it prevents immigrants from learning the language of the country; that it fosters the cultivation of un-American principles, notions and habits, and that it thus stands in the way of the development of a sound American patriotism in those coming from foreign lands to make their home among us, and to take part in the working of our free institutions. I think I may say without [257]
undue assumption that from personal contact and large opportunities of observation, I have as much personal experience of the German-born population of the United States, its character, its aspirations, and its American patriotism, as any person now living; and this experience enables me to affirm that the prejudice against the German-American press is groundless. On the contrary, that press does the country a necessary and very important service. In the first place, it fills a real and very urgent want. That want will exist so long as there is a large number of German-born citizens in this republic. There will always be many among them, especially persons of mature years who arrived on American soil without any knowledge of the English language, who may be able to acquire enough of it to serve them in their daily walk, but not enough to enable them to understand newspaper articles on political or similar subjects. Such persons must receive the necessary information about current events, questions to be considered and duties to be performed, from journals published in the language they understand, or they will not have it at all. The suppression of the German-American press would, therefore, be equivalent to the cultivation of political ignorance among a large and highly estimable class of citizens.

It is argued that the existence of the German newspaper is apt to render the German immigrant less sensible of the necessity of learning English. This is the case only to a very limited extent. A large majority of the German immigrants of mature age, being farmers or industrial laborers, do not acquire their knowledge of English in this country through regular linguistic instruction, or by reading books or newspapers, but from conversation or attempts at conversation with their neighbors who do not speak German, and that knowledge will, of necessity, remain very imperfect. Their
acquaintance with the English language will always be, to a
limited extent, of course, a speaking acquaintance, but not
a reading acquaintance. It is not the existence of German
newspapers that will keep them from reading English news-
papers, but it is their inability to read English. German im-
migrants of education will read English newspapers, but
many of them will read German newspapers too, because they
find in them things of interest which the English papers do
not give them. The young people, as a rule, learn English
very quickly and in many instances turn to English journals
for their daily reading. On the whole it may be said that
the German newspapers rank with the English papers of the
same class, according to their environments and their financial
resources. Their tone is throughout clean and wholesome. The
sensational "yellow" class is almost wholly unknown among
them.

The charge that the existence of the German-Ameri-
can press promotes the use of the German language in this
country and thus impedes the development of a healthy Amer-
ican patriotism among the population concerned, can be en-
tertained only by those who do not know the German-Ameri-
cans. I speak from a large personal experience when I say
that their love of their new home and their devotion to this
republic does not at all depend upon their knowledge of the
English language. When not long after my first arrival on
American soil I spent some time in the interior of Pennsyl-
vania, I became acquainted there with farmers and inhabitants
of little country towns, belonging to the class called "Pennsyl-
vania Dutch," who, although their ancestors had come to
this country generations ago, did not speak English but con-
versed only in their Pennsylvania Dutch dialect and read only
newspapers published partly in German, partly in "Pennsyl-
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vania Dutch.” They made upon me the impression of honest, law-abiding, thrifty, cheerful and eminently good-natured folk, appearing, as to the understanding of public affairs, perhaps a trifle more sluggish than their English-speaking neighbors—which may have been owing to their unfamiliarity with the language of the country—but intelligent and alert in the exercise of local self-government, and brimful of that sort of patriotism which swears by one’s country and is ready to fight and die for it. In this respect their ignorance of the English language had not, within my experience, caused them to be inferior to any class of Americans who know only English, and whose patriotism is uncontaminated by the knowledge of any other language.

The same may be said of the inhabitants of German settlements of more recent date who have come with the bona fide intention to make this country their permanent home. Among them German may long remain the language of social and business intercourse, they may be slow in acquiring easy familiarity with the English tongue, but even if they have come here for the mere purpose of bettering their fortunes, they are as a rule not slow in appreciating the benefits conferred upon them by American conditions, and in conceiving an attachment to this republic which before long ripens into genuine devotion. Striking evidence of this was presented by the zeal and promptness with which in all parts of the North by the tens of thousands of young men of German birth flocked around the Union flag at the beginning of the Civil War, and by the patriotic ardor with which, even in the South, especially in Texas, German-born citizens at the peril, and not seldom the sacrifice of their fortunes and even of their lives, stood by the national cause in defiance of the terrorism which at that period was exercised by the secession fanaticism in that region. I
have known German regiments in the Union Army in the ranks of which hardly an English word was heard, and these regiments did not consist of mere adventurers fond of fighting or serving merely for pay, but in the main of German-American citizens eager to serve their adopted country in its hour of need, whether they could read and speak English or not.

I have already mentioned that there are many foreign-born citizens among us whose American patriotism is in one respect finer than that of many a native. This republic being the land of their choice, they want to be and to remain proud of that choice, and to have that pride recognized as just. A man of that class is as sensitive of any reason for casting a slur upon the character of the Republic, as a bridegroom would feel and resent a shadow cast upon the fair fame of his bride. More than once I have heard one of my countrymen, when anything discreditable to the American nation had happened, exclaim with a pathetic accent of sincerest grief: "Ah, what will they think of this in the old country! I hope they will never hear of it." And such truly patriotic sighs were uttered, and perhaps felt, not in English, but in German.

That the existence of the German press tells for the preservation in this country of the German language as a language of social and business intercourse is to a limited extent true. But what harm is there in this? While it is of great use to the older immigrants, it does not keep their children from learning English, even in settlements which are preponderatingly German, for such settlements are no longer isolated as the original German settlements in Pennsylvania were. But it does give the younger generation the advantage of knowing two languages. That kind of American patriotism which takes umbrage at an American citizen's knowledge of a foreign tongue besides the English—a sort of patriotism I have here
and there met with—is certainly too narrow-minded, not to say too silly, to be seriously considered. No educated, nay, no sound-minded person, will deny, that the knowledge of more than one language tends to widen our mental horizon, to facilitate the acquisition of useful intelligence, and thus to broaden education.

But the preservation of the German language among us has done and is still doing this country a peculiar and very valuable service. It is said of the Englishman that he takes his pleasures and amusements seriously, even gravely. The native American also is somewhat inclined that way. He possesses little of the faculty of finding great enjoyment in small things and of thus making his daily life sunny and cheerful. The German possesses that faculty in a high degree. It manifests itself pre-eminently in the German love for music and especially in the cultivation of song. It may almost be said that one of the happiest and most amiable features of the German character is the German "Lied." It constitutes one of the great charms of German social life. Its invasion of American soil, stimulating the love and cultivation of music and thus softening the rigors of American social life by popularizing a harmless and refining enjoyment, has been one of the special blessings the German immigration has brought with it. It seems to me very probable, if not certain, that the blessing of this influence would have been greatly curtailed had the German immigrants upon their arrival upon these shores permitted the German language to disappear from among them, for without the preservation of that language the German Glee Club and the German Musical Society would hardly have become soundly rooted in American soil.
CHAPTER VIII

IN the autumn of 1867 my family went to Wiesbaden, where my wife was to spend some time on account of her health, and I purposed to join them there about Christmas time for a few weeks. Great changes had taken place in Germany since that dark December night in 1861 when I rushed through the country from the Belgian frontier to Hamburg on my way from Spain to America. The period of stupid reaction after the collapse of the revolutionary movements of 1848 was over. King Frederick William IV. of Prussia, who had been so deeply convinced and arduous an Upholder of the divine right of kings, had died a helpless lunatic. King William I., his brother and successor, also a believer in that divine right, but not to the extent of believing as well in the divine inspiration of kings—in other words, a man of good sense and capable of recognizing the superior ability of others,—had found in Bismarck a minister of commanding genius. The sweeping victory of Prussia over Austria in 1866 had resulted in the establishment of the North-German Confederacy under Prussian hegemony, which was considered as a stepping-stone to the unification of all Germany as a constitutional empire. Several revolutionists of 1848 now sat in the Reichstag of the North-German Confederacy, and one of the ablest of them, Lothar Bucher, was Bismarck’s confidential counsellor. The nation was elated with hope and there was a liberal wind blowing even in the sphere of the government. I did not doubt that under these circumstances I might venture into Germany without danger of being seriously molested, yet as my per-
sonal case was technically not covered by any of the several amnesties which had been proclaimed in Prussia from time to time, I thought that some subordinate officer, either construing his duty with the strictness of a thorough Prussian, or wishing to distinguish himself by a conspicuous display of official watchfulness, might give me annoyance. I did not, indeed, entertain the slightest apprehension as to my safety, but I might have become involved in sensational proceedings which would have been extremely distasteful to me, as well as unwelcome to the government. I therefore wrote to Mr. George Bancroft, the American Minister at Berlin, requesting him, if possible, to inform himself privately whether the Prussian government had any objection to my visiting Germany for a few weeks, and to let me have his answer at Bremerhaven upon the arrival there of the steamer on which I had taken passage. My intention was, in case the answer were unfavorable, to sail at once over from Bremen to England and to meet my family there. Mr. Bancroft very kindly complied with my request and assured me in his letter, which I found at Bremerhaven, that the Prussian government not only had no objection to my visiting Germany, but that I should be welcome.

I had hardly been twenty-four hours at Wiesbaden when I was called upon by the president of the police department (Polizei-Praesident) of the province, a high dignitary, who introduced himself as an old university acquaintance and in the most affable manner bade me welcome, assuring me also that it would give him the sincerest pleasure to be of service to me during my stay. He added that he hoped I would visit Berlin before my return to the United States, for I would see many things there which would probably please me as an old Forty-eighter.

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PRINCE OTTO VON BISMARCK

From the painting by Franz von Lenbach
After having spent Christmas with my family in Wiesbaden I went to Berlin. I wrote a note to Lothar Bucher, whom I had last seen sixteen years before as a fellow refugee in London, and whom I wished very much to meet again. Bucher answered promptly that he would indeed be glad to see me again, but would I not like to make the acquaintance of "the Minister" (Bismarck), who had expressed a wish to have a talk with me? I replied, of course, that I should be happy, etc., whereupon I received within an hour an invitation from Count Bismarck himself (he was then only a count) to visit him at eight o'clock that same evening at the Chancellor's palace on the Wilhelmstrasse. Promptly at the appointed hour I was announced to him and he received me at the door of a room of moderate size, the table and some of the furniture of which were covered with books and papers, evidently his working cabinet. There I beheld the great man whose name was filling the world—tall, erect and broad-shouldered, and on those Atlas shoulders that massive head which everybody knows from pictures—the whole figure making the impression of something colossal—then at the age of 53 in the fullness of physical and mental vigor. He was dressed in a general's undress uniform, unbuttoned. His features, which evidently could look very stern when he wished, were lighted up with a friendly smile. He stretched out his hand, which gave mine a vigorous grasp. "Glad you have come," he said in a voice which appeared rather high-keyed, issuing from so huge a form, but of pleasing timbre. "I think I must have seen you before," was his first remark while we were still standing up facing one another. "It was sometime in the early fifties on a railway train from Frankfurt to Berlin. There was a young man sitting opposite to me who, from some picture of you which I had seen in a pictorial paper, I thought
THE REMINISCENCES OF CARL SCHURZ

might be you.” I replied that this could not be, as at that period I was not in Germany. "Besides," I added,—a little impudently perhaps,—“would you not have had me arrested as a malefactor?” “Oh,” he exclaimed with a good-natured laugh, “you mistake me. I would not have done such a thing. You mean on account of that Kinkel affair. Oh, no! I rather liked that. And if it were not highly improper for His Majesty’s Minister and the Chancellor of the North-German Confederacy, I should like to go with you to Spandau and have you tell me the whole story on the spot. Now let us sit down.”

He pointed out to me an easy-chair close to his own and then uncorked a bottle which stood with two glasses on a tray at his elbow. “You are a Rhinelander,” he said, “and I know you will relish this.” We touched glasses, and I found the wine indeed very excellent. “You smoke, of course,” he continued, “and here are some good Havanas. I used to be very fond of them, but I have a sort of superstitious belief that every person is permitted to smoke only a certain number of cigars in his life, and no more. I am afraid I have exhausted my allowance, and now I take to the pipe.” With a burning strip of paper, called in German “Fidibus,” he lighted the tobacco in the porcelain bowl of his long German student pipe and presently blew forth huge clouds of smoke.

This done, he comfortably leaned back in his chair and said: “Now tell me, as an American Republican and a Forty-eighter of the revolutionary kind, how the present condition of Germany strikes you. I would not ask you that question,” he added, “if you were a privy-counsellor (a Geheimrath), for I know what he would answer. But you will tell me what you really think.” I replied that I had been in the country only a few weeks and had received only superficial impressions, but I had become sensible of a general atmosphere of newly inspired
national ambition and a confident hope for the development of more liberal political institutions. I had found only a few old fogies in Nassau, and a banker in Frankfurt, who seemed to be in a disappointed and depressed state of mind. Bismarck laughed heartily. The disgruntled Nassauers, he said, had probably been some sort of surveyors to the late ducal court, and he would wager that the Frankfurt banker was either a member of one of the old patrician families, who thought they were the highest nobility in all the land, or a money maker complaining that Frankfurt was no longer, as it had been, the financial center of Southern Germany. Here Bismarck gave full rein to his sarcastic humor. He had spent years in Frankfurt as the representative of the defunct "Bundestag," and had no end of funny anecdotes about the aristocratic pretensions of the patrician burghers of that ancient free city, and about their lofty wrath at the incorporation of that commonwealth in the Prussian monarchy.

Then he began to tell me about the great difficulties he had been obliged to overcome in bringing about the decisive struggle with Austria, one of the most serious of which difficulties, as he said, consisted in the scrupulous hesitancy of old King William to consent to anything that seemed to be in any sense unconstitutional or not in harmony with the strictest notion of good faith. In our conversation Bismarck constantly called the King "der alte Herr"—"the old gentleman"—or as it might also have been translated, "the old master." One moment he would speak of the old gentleman with something like sentimental tenderness, and then again in a tone of familiar freedom which smacked of anything but reverential respect. He told me anecdotes about him which made me stare, for at the moment I could not help remembering that I was listening to the Prime Minister of the Crown to whom I was
an entire stranger and who knew nothing of my discretion and sense of responsibility. As if we had been confidential chums all our lives, he gave me, with apparently the completest abandon and exuberant vivacity, inside views of the famous "conflict" period between the Crown and the Prussian Parliament when, seeing the war with Austria inevitably coming, he had, without legislative authorization, spent millions upon millions of the public funds upon the army in preparation for the great crisis; how the liberal majority of the chambers and an indignant public opinion, not recognizing the great object of national unification in view, had fiercely risen up against that arbitrary stretch of power; how the King himself had recoiled from such a breach of the constitution; how the King had apprehended a new revolution which might cost each of them his head—which might have become true if they had failed in the Austrian war—how then he had "desperately used his spurs to make the noble old horse clear the ditch and take the risk," and how, the victory having been won, they were, on their return from the war, received by the people with the most jubilant acclamations instead of having their heads cut off, which had pleased the old gentleman immensely and taught him a lesson as to his reckless Prime Minister.

It was not the cautious and conservative spirit of the King alone that he had occasionally to overcome. Still more was he clogged and not seldom exasperated by what he called the stupid old bureaucracy which he had to get out of its accustomed ruts whenever anything new and bold was to be done. He fairly bubbled over with humorous anecdotes, evidently relishing himself his droll descriptions of the antiquated "Geheimrath" (privy-counsellor) as he stared with his bleared eyes wide open, whenever anything unusual was proposed, seeing nothing but insuperable difficulties before him and then

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exhausting his whole ingenuity in finding the best sort of red tape with which to strangle the project. His patience tried to the utmost, he, the minister, would then go to the King and tell him that such and such a rusty official could no longer be got along with and must necessarily give place to a more efficient person—whereupon the "old gentleman," melting with pity, would say, "Oh, he has so long been a faithful servant of the state, would it not be cruel to cast him aside like a squeezed-out orange?—no, I cannot do it." "And there," said Bismarck, "there we are." I ventured to suggest that an offer to resign on his part, if he could not have his way, might make the King less tender of his inefficient friends in high places. "Oh," said Bismarck, with a laugh, "I have tried that so often, too often, perhaps, to make it impressive. What do you think happens when I offer my resignation? My old gentleman begins to sob and cry—he actually sheds tears, and says, 'Now you want to leave me, too?' Now, when I see him shed tears—what in the world can I do then?'" So he went on for a while from one funny anecdote and from one satirical description to another, while I grew more and more amazed at the apparently reckless freedom of his talk with a person unknown to him. My amazement would have been less had I then known what I afterward learned, that this style of conversation was not unusual with him and that the old King only smiled when he heard of it.

He then came back to the Austrian war and he told me much about the diplomatic fencing which led up to it. With evident gusto he told me story after story showing how his diplomatic adversaries at that critical period had been like puppets in his hands, and how he had managed the German princes as they grouped themselves on one side or the other. Then he came to speak of the battle of Koeniggraetz and especially of
that “anxious moment” in it before the arrival of the Crown Prince in the rear of the Austrians, when some Prussian attacks had failed and there were signs of disorder among the repulsed troops. “It was an anxious moment,” said Bismarck, “a moment on the decision of which the fate of empire depended. What would have become of us if we had lost that battle? Squadrons of cavalry, all mixed up, Hussars, Dragoons, Uhlans, were streaming by the spot where the King, Moltke, and myself stood, and although we had calculated that the Crown Prince might long have appeared behind the Austrian rear, no sign of the Crown Prince! Things began to look ominous; I confess I felt not a little nervous. I looked at Moltke, who sat quietly on his horse and did not seem to be disturbed by what was going on around us. I thought I would test whether he was really as calm as he appeared. I rode up to him and asked him whether I might offer him a cigar, as I noticed Moltke was not smoking. He replied that he would be glad if I had one to spare. I presented to him my open case in which there were only two cigars, one very good Havana, and the other of rather poor quality. Moltke looked at them, and even handled them with great attention, in order to ascertain their relative value, and then with slow deliberation chose the Havana. ‘Very good,’ he said composedly. This reassured me very much. I thought if Moltke can bestow so much time and attention upon the choice between two cigars, things cannot be very bad. Indeed, a few minutes later we heard the Crown Prince’s guns, we observed unsteady and confused movements in the Austrian positions, and the battle was won.”

I said that we in America who had followed the course of events with intense interest, were rather surprised at the time that the conclusion of peace followed the battle of Koenig-
KAISER WILHELM I

From the painting by Gustav Richter
graetz so quickly and that Prussia did not take greater advantage of her victory. Bismarck replied that the speedy conclusion of peace had been a great surprise to many people, but that he thought it was the best thing he had ever done, and that he had accomplished it against the desire of the King and of the military party who were greatly elated by that splendid triumph of the Prussian arms and thought that so great and so successful an effort should have a greater reward. Sound statesmanship required that the Austrian Empire, the existence of which was necessary for Europe, should not be reduced to a mere wreck; that it should be made a friend, and, as a friend, not too powerless; that what Prussia had gone to war for, was the leadership in Germany, and that this leadership in Germany would not have been fortified, but rather weakened, by the acquisition from Austria of populations which would not have fitted into the Prussian scheme. Besides, the Chancellor thought that, the success of the Prussians having been so decisive, it was wise to avoid further sacrifices and risks. The cholera had made its appearance among the troops, and, that so long as the war lasted, there would have been danger of French intervention. He had successfully fought off that French intervention, he said, by all sorts of diplomatic maneuvers, some of which he narrated to me in detail. But Louis Napoleon had become very restless at the growth of Prussian power and prestige, and he would, probably, not have hesitated so much to put in his hand, had not the French army been weakened so much by his foolish Mexican adventure. But now when the main Prussian army was marching farther and farther away from the Rhine, and had suffered serious losses, and was threatened by malignant disease, he might have felt encouraged by these circumstances to do what he would have liked to do all the time.

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"That would have created a new situation. But to meet that situation, I would have had a shot in my locker which, perhaps, will surprise you when I mention it."

I was indeed curious. "What would have been the effect," said Bismarck, "if under those circumstances I had appealed to the national feeling of the whole people by proclaiming the constitution of the German Empire made at Frankfurt in 1848 and 1849?"

"I think it would have electrified the whole country and created a German nation," I replied. "But would you really have adopted that great orphan left by the revolution of 1848?"

"Why not!" said the Chancellor. "True, that constitution contained some features very objectionable to me. But after all it was not so very far from what I am aiming at now. But whether the old gentleman would have adopted it, is doubtful. Still, with Napoleon at the gates, he might have taken that jump too. But," he added, "we shall have that war with France anyhow."

I expressed my surprise at this prediction—a prediction all the more surprising to me as I again thought of the great statesman carrying on his shoulders such tremendous responsibilities, talking to an entire stranger,—and his tone grew quite serious, grave, almost solemn, when he said: "Do not believe that I love war. I have seen enough of war to abhor it profoundly. The terrible scenes I have witnessed, will never cease to haunt my mind. I shall never consent to a war that is avoidable, much less seek it. But this war with France will surely come. It will be forced upon us by the French Emperor. I see that clearly."

Then he went on to explain how the situation of an "adventurer on a throne," such as Louis Napoleon, was different [272]
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from that of a legitimate sovereign, like the King of Prussia. "I know," said he with a smile, "you do not believe in such a thing as the divine right of kings. But many people do, especially in Prussia—perhaps not as many as did before 1848, but even now more than you may think. People are attached to the dynasty by traditional loyalty. A King of Prussia may make mistakes, or suffer misfortunes, or even humiliations, but that traditional loyalty will not give way. It may be somewhat disturbed in spots, without on the whole being dangerously shaken. But the adventurer on the throne has no such traditional sentiment behind him. He has constantly to play to the galleries. His security depends upon personal prestige, and that prestige upon sensational effects which must follow one another in rather rapid succession to remain fresh and satisfactory to the ambition, or to the pride, or, if you will, to the vanity of the people—especially to such a people as the French. Now, Louis Napoleon has lost much of his prestige by two things—the Mexican adventure, which was an astounding blunder, a fantastic folly on his part—and then by permitting Prussia to become so great without his obtaining some sort of 'compensation' in the way of an acquisition of territory that might have been made to appear to the French people as a brilliant achievement of his diplomacy. It was well known that he wanted such a compensation, and tried for it, and was maneuvered out of it by me without his knowing what happened to him. He is well aware that thus he has lost much of his prestige, more than he can afford, and that such a loss, unless soon repaired, may become dangerous to his tenure as emperor. He will, therefore, as soon as he thinks that his army is in good fighting condition again, make an effort to recover that prestige which is so vital to him, by using some pretext for picking a quarrel with us. I do not think he is personally
eager for war, and would rather avoid it, but the precariousness of his situation will drive him to it. My calculation is that the crisis will come in about two years. We have to be ready, of course, and we are. We shall win, and the result will be just the contrary of what Napoleon aims at—the total unification of Germany outside of Austria, and probably Napoleon's downfall."

This was said in January, 1868. The war between France and Prussia and her allies broke out in July, 1870, and the foundation of the German Empire and the downfall of Napoleon were the results. No prediction was ever more shrewdly made and more accurately and amply fulfilled.

I have here introduced Bismarck as speaking in the first person. I did this to present the substance of what he said to me in a succinct form. But this does not pretend to portray the manner in which he said it—the bubbling vivacity of his talk, now and then interspersed with French or English phrases; the lightning flashes of his wit scintillating around the subjects of his remarks and sometimes illuminating as with a searchlight a public character, or an event, or a situation; his laugh now contagiously genial, and then grimly sarcastic; the rapid transitions from jovial, sportive humor to touching pathos; the evident pleasure taken by the narrator in his tale; the dashing, rattling rapidity with which that tale would at times rush on, and behind all that this tremendous personality—the picturesque embodiment of a power greater than any king's—a veritable Atlas carrying upon his shoulders the destinies of a great nation. There was a strange fascination in the presence of the giant who appeared so peculiarly grand, and yet so human.

While he was still speaking with unabated animation I looked at the clock opposite me and was astounded when I
found that midnight was long behind us. I rose in alarm and begged the Chancellor's pardon for having intruded so long upon his time. "Oh," said the Chancellor, "I am used to late hours, and we have not talked yet about America. However, you have a right to be tired. But you must come again. You must dine with me. Can you do so to-morrow? I have invited a commission on the Penal Code—mostly dull old jurists, I suppose, but I may find some one among them fit to be your neighbor at the table and to entertain you." I gladly accepted the invitation and found myself the next evening in a large company of serious and learned-looking gentlemen, each one of whom was adorned with one or more decorations. I was the only person in the room who had none, and several of the guests seemed to eye me with some curiosity, when Bismarck in a loud voice presented me to the Countess as "General Carl Schurz from the United States of America." Some of the gentlemen looked somewhat surprised, but I at once became a person of interest and many introductions followed. At the table I had a judge from Cologne for my neighbor who had enough of the Rhenish temperament to be cheerful company. The dinner was a very rapid affair—lasting hardly three-quarters of an hour—certainly not more. My judge from Cologne confidentially remarked to me that his appetite outlived the feast. Coffee and cigars were served in a rather plain looking salon. The guests divided into groups among which the Chancellor went to and fro amusing them with humorous remarks. But before the smokers could have got half through with their cigars, the Minister of Justice, who seemed to act as mentor and guide to the gentlemen of the Penal Code Commission, took leave of the host, which was taken by the whole company as a signal to depart. I followed their example, but the Chancellor said: "Wait a moment. Why should you stand
in that crowd struggling for your overcoat? Let us sit down and have a glass of Apollinaris." We sat down by a small round table, a bottle of Apollinaris water was brought and he began at once to ply me with questions about America.

He was greatly interested in the struggle then going on between President Johnson and the Republican majority in Congress, which was then approaching its final crisis. He said that he looked upon that struggle as a test of the strength of the conservative element in our political fabric. Would the impeachment of the President and, if he were found guilty, his deposition from office, lead to any further conflicts dangerous to the public peace and order? I replied that I was convinced it would not; the executive power would simply pass from the hands of one man to the hands of another according to the constitution and the laws of the country without any resistance on the part of anybody; and on the other hand, if President Johnson were acquitted, there would be general submission to the verdict as a matter of course, although popular excitement stirred up by the matter ran very high throughout the country.

The Chancellor was too polite to tell me point blank that he had grave doubts as to all this, but he would at least not let me believe that he thought as I did. He smilingly asked me whether I was still as firmly convinced a republican as I had been before I went to America and studied republicanism from the inside; and when I assured him that I was, and that, although I had in personal experience found the republic not as lovely as my youthful enthusiasm had pictured it to my imagination, but much more practical in its general beneficence to the great masses of the people, and much more conservative in its tendencies than I had imagined, he said that he supposed our impressions or views with regard to such things were largely owing to temperament, or education, or traditional ways of
thinking. "I am not a democrat," he went on, "and cannot be. I was born an aristocrat and brought up an aristocrat. To tell you the truth, there was something in me that made me instinctively sympathize with the slaveholders as the aristocratic party in your civil war. But," he added with earnest emphasis, "this vague sympathy did not in the least affect my views as to the policy to be followed by our government with regard to the United States. Prussia is and will steadily be by tradition as well as by well-understood interest, the firm friend of your republic, notwithstanding her monarchical and aristocratic sympathies. You may always count upon that."

He asked me a great many questions concerning the political and social conditions in the United States, the questions themselves, in the order in which they were put, showing that he had thought much on those things and that he already knew much about them—in fact more than any European I had met, who had never been in this country. What new information I could give him he seemed to receive with great pleasure. But again and again he wondered how society could be kept in tolerable order where the powers of the government were so narrowly restricted and where there was so little reverence for the constituted or "ordained" authorities. With a hearty laugh in which there seemed to be a suggestion of assent, he received my remark that the American people would hardly have become the self-reliant, energetic, progressive people they were, had there been a privy-counsellor or a police captain standing at every mud-puddle in America to keep people from stepping into it. And he seemed to be much struck when I brought out the apparent paradox that in a democracy with little government things might go badly in detail but well on the whole, while in a monarchy with much and omnipresent government, things might go very pleasingly in detail but
poorly on the whole. He saw that with such views I was an incurable democrat; but would not, he asked, the real test of our democratic institutions come when after the disappearance of the exceptional opportunities springing from our wonderful natural resources which were in a certain sense common property, our political struggles became—which they surely would become—struggles between the poor and the rich, between the few who have, and the many who want? Here we entered upon a wide field of conjecture.

The Chancellor was much interested in hearing from me whether the singular stories he had been told about the state of discipline existing in our armies during our Civil War were true. I had to admit that that state of discipline would in many respects have shocked a thoroughbred Prussian officer, and I told him some anecdotes of outbreaks of the spirit of equality which the American is apt to carry into all relations of life, and of the occasional familiarities between the soldier and the officer which would spring from that spirit. Such anecdotes amused him immensely, but I suppose his Prussian pride inwardly revolted when I expressed the opinion that in spite of all this the American soldier would not only fight well, but would, in a prolonged conflict with any European army, although at first put at a disadvantage by more thorough drill and discipline, after some experience prove superior to all of them.

The conversation then turned to international relations, and especially public opinion in America concerning Germany. Did the Americans sympathize with German endeavors towards national unity? I thought that so far as any feeling with regard to German unity existed in America at all, it was sympathetic; among the German-Americans it was warmly so. Did Louis Napoleon, the emperor of the French, enjoy any
popularity in America? He did not enjoy the respect of the people at large and was rather unpopular except with a comparatively small number of snobs who would feel themselves exalted by an introduction at his court. There would, then, in case of a war between Germany and France, be no likelihood of American sympathy running in favor of Louis Napoleon? There would not, unless Germany forced war on France for decidedly unjust cause.

Throughout our conversation Bismarck repeatedly expressed his pleasure at the friendly relations existing between him and the German Liberals, some of whom had been prominent in the revolutionary troubles of 1848. He mentioned several of my old friends, Bucher, Kapp and others, who, having returned to Germany, felt themselves quite at home under the new conditions, and had found the way open to public positions and activities of distinction and influence, in harmony with their principles. As he repeated this, or something like it, in a manner apt to command my attention, I might have taken it as a suggestion inviting me to do likewise. But I thought it best not to say anything in response. I simply dropped a casual remark in some proper connection that my activities in the United States were highly congenial to me and that, moreover, I was attached to the American Republic by a sense of gratitude for the distinctions which it had so generously bestowed upon me.

Our conversation had throughout been so animated that time had slipped by unawares, and it was again long past midnight when I left. My old friends of 1848 whom I met in Berlin were of course very curious to know what the great man of the time might have had to say to me, and I thought I could, without being indiscreet, communicate to them how highly pleased he had expressed himself with the harmonious co-
operation between him and them for common ends. Some of them thought that Bismarck's conversion to liberal principles was really sincere, that he was charmed with his popularity, and that he would thenceforth endeavor to keep it by being in the true sense a constitutional minister. Others were less sanguine, believing as they did, that he was indeed sincere and earnest in his endeavor to create a united German Empire under Prussian leadership; that he would carry on a gay flirtation with the Liberals so long as he thought that he could thus best further his object, but that his true autocratic nature would assert itself again and he would throw his temporarily assumed Liberalism unceremoniously overboard as soon as he felt that he did not need its support any longer, and especially as he found it to stand in the way of his will. Excepting on the occasion of a formal leave-taking call I was not to see Bismarck again until twenty years later. And again I had, then under very different circumstances, highly interesting conversations with him which I shall duly record in these reminiscences when I reach that period of my life.
CHAPTER IX

I HAPPENED to be in Frankfort-on-the-Main when reports came from America that the impeachment of President Johnson was creating much excitement in the United States. A friend of mine, who had long lived in New York, Mr. Marcuse, took me to the bourse, where I was at once surrounded by a crowd of bankers and brokers, who, no doubt, regarded me as an authority on American affairs and eagerly plied me with questions as to whether the impeachment of President Johnson would lead to revolutionary disturbances. As the Frankfort bourse had been and still was the principal market in Germany for the bonds issued by our Government during and since our Civil War, its worry about the situation in the United States was perfectly natural. I expressed to the throng surrounding me my conviction that whichever way the trial of the President might turn out, there would not be the slightest danger of any revolutionary trouble. My little speech seemed to have a reassuring effect, and "Americans," which had been "weak" during the morning, at once became "strong." Mr. Marcuse looked at me with an ironical smile and said: "Well, well, you will never be rich."

"Why not?" I asked.

"Because you do not watch your chances," Mr. Marcuse answered. "Did it not occur to you that the news from the United States had made Americans go down, that your talk to the crowd would make them go up again, and that, if you had given me a hint to buy before you spoke, we both might [281]"
have made a handsome penny by the transaction?" He often repeated the story as a good joke on me.

When I arrived in the United States again, the impeachment trial was over and President Johnson had been acquitted. There had, indeed, not been any revolutionary disturbance, but the public mind was still much agitated by what had happened. Hardly anybody will doubt to-day that in ordinarily calm times, when the judgment of man is not obscured by passion or dread of great public dangers, the things of which President Johnson stood accused, would not have been thought sufficient to call for the impeachment of a President. But the days of which I speak were still feverish with the resentments left behind by the Civil War and with the nervous apprehension that the results won at so tremendous a sacrifice of blood and treasure, might in some way be lost again. Under such circumstances a judicial temper is not easily maintained. I think I do not exaggerate in saying that an overwhelming majority of the loyal Union men North and South saw in President Johnson a traitor bent upon turning over the National Government to the rebels again, and ardently wished to see him utterly stripped of power, not so much for what he had done, but for what, as they thought, he was capable of doing and likely to do. The Republican Senators who voted for Johnson's acquittal and thus kept him in power no doubt acted conscientiously, justly and patriotically; but although some of them—such men as Fessenden, Grimes, Trumbull, Henderson and others—ranked among the ablest, wisest, and in all respects most meritorious members of that body, they were not only cried down by blatant demagogues as aiders and abettors of a new treason, but also misapprehended by patriotic citizens ordinarily calm and reasonable. When passing judgment retrospectively upon what was thought, and said, and done in those days, we may
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well deplore the violent excitement by which many good citizens permitted themselves to be taken off their feet, and the dangerous proceedings which would have fitted a volcanic South American republic rather than ours; but in justice to the persons concerned we should not forget that immediately after so tremendous a civil conflict, and while the dearly bought results of that conflict were still trembling in the balance, being threatened by the conduct of the chief executive officer of the government, the political situation was a decidedly abnormal one, well apt to cause exaggerated apprehensions as to dangers calling for extraordinary measures of precaution. All the more praiseworthy was the attitude of the Republican Senators who under such circumstances preserved their equipoise and, at the evident risk of their whole political future, faithfully maintained their convictions of right and justice against partisan pressure of rare fierceness. At the same time it must not be forgotten that many of those who approved of the impeachment of President Johnson and who found him guilty, did so, not from mere obedience to popular clamor, but also from a sincere conviction of duty as to the necessities of the peculiar situation.

Not long after my return to St. Louis the Republican State Convention was held for the purpose of selecting delegates for the Republican National Convention which was to meet at Chicago on the 20th of May. I was appointed one of the delegates at large, and at its first meeting the Missouri delegation elected me its chairman. At Chicago, a surprise awaited me which is usually reckoned by men engaged in politics as an agreeable one. The chairman of the Republican National Committee, Mr. Marcus L. Ward, informed me that his committee had chosen me to serve as the temporary chairman of the Republican National Convention. It was an entirely unexpected honor, which I accepted with due apprecia-
The Reminiscences of Carl Schurz

tion. I made as short a speech as is permissible on such occasions, which seemed to be well received, and after the customary routine proceedings surrendered the gavel to the permanent president, General Joseph R. Hawley of Connecticut.

That General Grant would be nominated as the Republican candidate for the presidency was a foregone conclusion. As to the nomination for the vice-presidency there was a rather tame contest, which resulted in the choice of Schuyler Colfax, the Speaker of the National House of Representatives, who at that time enjoyed much popularity and seemed to have a brilliant future before him, but was fated to be wrecked on the rocks of finance.

When the Committee on Resolutions made its report, I observed with surprise that the proposed platform contained nothing on the subject of an amnesty to be granted to any of the participants in the late rebellion. This omission struck me as a grave blunder. Should the great Republican party go into the next contest for the presidency without in its profession of faith and its program of policy holding out a friendly hand to the erring brethren who were to return to their old allegiance, and without marking out for itself a policy of generosity and conciliation? I resolved at once upon an effort to prevent so grievous a mistake by offering an amendment to the platform. Not knowing whether the subject had not been thought of in the committee or whether a resolution touching it had been debated and voted down there, and deeming it important that my amendment should be adopted by the Convention without a discussion that might have let loose the lingering war passions of some hotheads, I drew up a resolution which did not go as far as I should have liked to go, but which would substantially accomplish the double object I had in view—the encouragement of well disposed Southerners and the commitment of the
Republican party—without arousing any opposition. It was as follows:

"That we highly commend the spirit of magnanimity and forbearance with which men who have served in the rebellion, but who now frankly and honestly co-operate with us in restoring the peace of the country and reconstructing the Southern State governments upon the basis of impartial justice and equal rights, are received back into the communion of the loyal people; and we favor the removal of the disqualifications and restrictions imposed upon the late rebels in the same measure as the spirit of disloyalty will die out, and as may be consistent with the safety of the loyal people."

The resolution received general applause when it was read to the Convention, and, as I had hoped, it was adopted and made a part of the platform without a word of adverse debate.

The presidential campaign of 1868 was not one of uncommon excitement or enthusiasm. The Republican candidate, General Grant, was then at the height of his prestige. He had never been active in politics and never identified himself with any political party. Whether he held any settled opinions on political questions, and, if so, what they were, nobody could tell with any assurance. But people were willing to take him for the presidency, such as he was. It is quite probable, and it has frequently been said, that, had the Democrats succeeded in "capturing" him as their candidate, he would have been accepted with equal readiness on that side. He was one of the most striking examples in history of the military hero who is endowed by the popular imagination with every conceivable capacity and virtue. People believe in perfectly good faith that the man who has commanded such mighty armies, and conducted such brilliant campaigns, and won such great battles, must necessarily be able, and wise, and energetic enough to
lead in the solution of any problem of civil government; that
he who has performed great tasks of strategy in the field,
must be fitted to do great tasks of statesmanship in the forum
or in the closet. General Grant had the advantage of such
presumptions in the highest degree, especially as he had, in
addition to his luster as a warrior, won a reputation for wise
generosity and a fine tact in fixing the terms of Lee's sur-
render and in quietly composing the disagreements which had
sprung from the precipitate action of General Sherman in
treating with the Confederate General Johnston. On the whole,
the country received the candidacy of General Grant as that of
a deserving and of a safe man.

On the other hand the Democratic party had not only to
bear the traditional odium of the sympathy of some of its
prominent members with the rebellion, which at that time still
counted for much, but it managed to produce an especially
unfavorable impression by the action of its convention. Its
platform stopped but little short of advocating violence to
accomplish the annulment of the Reconstruction laws adopted
by Congress, and it demanded the payment of a large part
of the national debt in depreciated greenbacks. The flounder-
ing search for a candidate and the final forcing of the nomina-
tion upon the unwilling, weak and amiable Horatio Seymour
presented an almost ludicrous spectacle of helplessness, while
the furious utterances of the fiery Frank Blair, their candidate
for the vice-presidency, sounded like the wild cry of a madman
bent upon stirring up another revolution, while the people
wanted peace. The Democrats were evidently riding for a
fall.

I was called upon for a good many speeches in the cam-
paign and had large and enthusiastic audiences. One of the ex-
periences I had in this campaign I remember with especial
pleasure. The movement in favor of paying off national bonds, not in coin but in depreciated paper money, which found advocacy in the Democratic platform, was in fact not confined to the ranks of the Democratic party. Although the Republican Convention had in its platform sternly declared against any form of repudiation, yet that movement found supporters among the Republicans too, consisting of people of confused moral notions, small politicians eager to win a cheap popularity by catering to questionable impulses, and politicians of higher rank nervously anxious to catch every popular breeze and inclined to bend to it whenever it seemed to blow with some force. That it was in the nature of downright repudiation to pay off in depreciated paper money, bonds which had been sold and purchased with the understanding that they would be paid, principal and interest, in coin, no fair-minded man would deny. But on the other side the ingenuity of the demagogue exerted itself to the utmost in inventing all possible quibbles and quirks to represent the bondholder who had lent the Government money in the days of its distress, as a designing speculator who had taken advantage of our necessities to make usurious investments and who was now trying to suck the blood of our people. The artful cry: "the same money for the bondholder and for the people," meaning that the same depreciated paper currency which had to be used in the daily business of the people, must also be good enough for the public creditor to whom coin had been promised, seemed for a while to acquire much misleading power, especially in the Western States.

In the early part of the campaign I was asked to make a series of speeches in Indiana, and to begin with an out-door mass-meeting at a little place—if I remember rightly its name was Corydon—near the Illinois line, at which a large number of farmers were expected. While a great crowd was gathering
I dined at the village hotel with the members of the local committee. They seemed to have something on their minds which finally came forth, apparently with some hesitation. One of them, after a few minutes of general silence, turned to me with a very serious mien, as if he had to deliver an important message, saying that they thought it their duty to inform me of a peculiar condition of the public mind in that region; that the people around there were all, Republicans as well as Democrats, of the opinion that all the United States bonds should be paid off in greenbacks and that an additional quantity of greenbacks should be issued for that purpose; that there was much feeling on that question, and that they, the committee, would earnestly ask me if I could not conscientiously advocate the same policy, at least not to mention the subject in my speech.

Having been informed that there had been a good deal of greenback talk in that neighborhood, I was not surprised. But I thought it a good opportunity to administer a drastic lesson to my chicken-hearted party-friends. "Gentlemen," I said, "I have been invited here to preach Republican doctrines to your people. The Democratic platform advocates the very policy which you say is favored by your people. The Republican platform emphatically condemns that policy. I agree with it. I think it is barefaced, dishonest, rascally repudiation. If your people favor this, they stand in imminent need of a good, vigorous talking to. But if you, the committee managing this meeting, do not want me to speak my mind on this subject, I shall not speak at all. I shall leave instantly, and you may do with the meeting as you like." It was as if a bombshell had dropped among my committee-men. They were in great consternation and cried out accordingly. I had been announced as the principal speaker. A large number of people had come
to hear me. If I left, there would be a great disappointment which would hurt the party. But I did not mean it—did I?

I assured them that I was in dead earnest. I would stay and speak only on condition that I should feel at perfect liberty to express my convictions straightforwardly and impressively. They looked at one another as if in great doubt what to do, and then, after a whispered consultation, told me that, of course if I insisted, they must let me have my way; but they begged me to "draw it mild." I replied that I could not promise to "draw it mild," but that I believed they were mistaken in thinking that their people, if properly told the truth, would favor the rascally policy of repudiation. They shook their heads and sighed and "hoped there would be no row."

The meeting was very large, mostly plain country people, men and women. The committee-men sat on the platform on both sides of me, with anxious faces, evidently doubtful of what would happen. I had put the audience in sympathetic temper when in due order of my speech I reached the bond question. Then I did not "draw it mild." I described the circumstances under which the bonds were sold by our Government and bought by our creditors; the rebellion at the height of its strength; our armies in the field suffering defeat after defeat; our regular revenues sadly insufficient to cover the expenses of the war; our credit at a low ebb; a gloomy cloud of uncertainty hanging over our future. These were the circumstances under which our Government called upon our own citizens and upon the world abroad for loans of money. Those whom we then called bondholders, lent their money upon our promise that it would be paid back in coin. They did so at a great risk, for if we had failed in the war, they might have lost all or much of what they had lent us. Largely owing to the help they gave us in our extremity, we
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succeeded. And now are we to turn round and denounce them as speculators and bloodsuckers, and say that we will not give them in the day of success and prosperity what we promised them in the day of our need and distress? Would not that be downright knavery and a crime before God and men?

When I had advanced thus far, cries of "Shame! Shame!" came from the audience. Then I began to denounce the vile politicians who advocated such a disgraceful course, first the Democrats who had made such an ignominious proposition a part of their platform, and then the Republicans who, believing that such a movement might develop some popular strength, had cowardly bent their knees to it. By this time my hearers were thoroughly warmed up and when I opened my whole vocabulary of strong language, in all parts of the crowd arose such cries as "You are right!" "Bully for you!" "Give it to them!" "Hit them again!" and other ebullitions of the unsophisticated mind. And when I added that I had been told the whole population of this region was in favor of that crime of repudiating the honest debts of the Republic, and that I had in their name repelled the charge as a dastardly slander, my hearers broke out in a storm of applause and cheers lasting long enough to give me time to look round at my committee-men, who returned my gaze with a smile of pitiable embarrassment on their faces.

When my speech was over I asked them what they now thought of the repudiation sentiment in their neighborhood. Ah, they had "never been so astonished in their lives." One of them attempted to compliment me upon my "success in so quickly turning the minds of those people." But I would not let them have that consoling conception of the facts, and answered that I had not turned the minds of those people at all; that their feelings and impulses were originally honest; that I
had only called forth a manifestation of that original honesty, and that, if the local political leaders had believed in the original honesty of the people and courageously stood up for truth and right instead of permitting themselves to be frightened by a rascally agitation and of pusillanimously pandering to it, they would have had the same experience.

In fact, the same experience has repeated itself in the course of my political activity again and again until a late period. I have had an active part in a great many political campaigns and probably addressed as many popular meetings as any man now living; and I have always found that whenever any public question under public discussion had in it any moral element, an appeal to the moral sense of the people proved uniformly the most powerful argument. I do not, of course, mean to say that there were not at all times many persons accessible to selfish motives, and liable to yield to the seduction of the opportunity for unrighteous gain, and that such evil influences were not at times hard to overcome; but with the majority of the people, notably the "plain people"—using the term in the sense in which Abraham Lincoln was wont to use it—I found the question: "is this morally right?" to have ultimately more weight than the question: "will this be profitable?" We have, indeed, sometimes witnessed so-called "crazes" in favor of financial policies that were essentially immoral, such as the "inflation craze," and the "silver craze," gaining an apparently almost irresistible momentum among the people. But that was not owing to a real and widespread demoralization of the popular conscience, but rather to an artful presentation of the question which covered up, disguised the moral element in it, and so deceived the unsophisticated understanding. And not to that alone, but to the cowardice of politicians of high as well as low rank who, instead of coura-
geously calling things by their right names, would, against their better convictions, yield to what they considered a strong current of opinion, for fear of jeopardizing their personal popularity. I have seen men of great ability and high standing in the official world do the most astonishing things in this respect when they might, as far as their voices could be heard, have easily arrested the vicious heresies by a bold utterance of their true opinions. The moral cowardice of the politicians is one of the most dangerous ailments of democracies.

General Grant's election was a foregone conclusion. There was a widespread feeling that with Grant in the presidential chair, the National Government would be in safe hands.

To me the Republican victory brought a promotion which I had not anticipated while I was active in the campaign. One of the United States Senators from Missouri, Mr. John B. Henderson, had voted in the impeachment trial for the acquittal of President Johnson. He was a gentleman of superior ability and of high character, but he had voted for the acquittal of Andrew Johnson; he had done so for reasons entirely honorable and entirely consistent with his principles and convictions of right, but in disregard of the feelings prevalent among his constituents and in spite of a strong pressure brought upon him by hosts of Republicans in his own State; and as his term as a Senator was just then expiring, this clash was fatal to his prospects of a re-election. The warmest of his friends frankly recognized the absolute impossibility of keeping him in his place. Indeed, all the Republican Senators who had voted for Johnson's acquittal found themselves more or less at variance with their party in their respective States; but Republicanism in Missouri was in one respect somewhat different from Republicanism elsewhere. In Missouri a large part of the population had joined the rebellion. The two parties
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in the Civil War had not been geographically divided. The Civil War had therefore had the character of a neighborhood war—not only State against State, or district against district, but house against house. Guerrilla warfare continued to some extent in the interior of Missouri after the Civil War on a great scale had ceased. In fact, when, during the presidential campaign of 1868, I had to travel in a carriage through a somewhat lonesome region from Springfield in Southwest Missouri to Sedalia—a region in which not a few ruins of burned houses told the story of the neighborhood war that had raged there—I was warned by anxious friends that my journey might be somewhat unsafe and that it would be wise for myself and my companion to travel with revolvers on our laps, ready for action, a precaution which, however, proved unnecessary. The bitter animosities of the civil conflict survived in Missouri much longer than in the Northern States, and any favor shown to "the traitor" Andrew Johnson appeared to the great mass of Missouri Republicans simply unpardonable.

The immediate consequence of Mr. Henderson's course was that his colleague in the Senate, Mr. Charles D. Drake, obtained the directing influence in the party which for the moment seemed to be undisputed. Senator Drake was an able lawyer and an unquestionably honest man, but narrow-minded, dogmatic and intolerant to a degree. He aspired to be the Republican "boss" of the State—not, indeed, as if he had intended to organize a machine for the purpose of enriching himself or his henchmen. Corrupt schemes were absolutely foreign to his mind. He merely wished to be the recognized authority dictating the policies of his party and controlling the Federal offices in Missouri. This ambition overruled with him all others. His appearance was not imposing, but when you approached him, he made you feel that you had to do with a
man full of the consciousness of power. He was of small stature, but he planted his feet upon the ground with demonstrative firmness. His face, framed with gray hair and a short stubby white beard, and marked with heavy eyebrows, usually wore a stern, and often even a surly expression. His voice had a rasping sound, and his speech, slow and peremptory, was constantly accompanied with a vigorous shake of the forefinger which meant laying down the law. I do not know to what religious denomination he belonged; but he made the impression as if no religion would be satisfactory to him that did not provide for a well-kept hell fire to roast sinners and heretics. Still he was said to be very kind and genial in his family and in his circle of intimate friends. But in politics he was inexorable. I doubt whether, as a leader, he was ever really popular with the Republican rank and file in Missouri. But certain it is that most of the members of his party, especially in the country districts, stood much in awe of him.

Mr. Drake, very naturally, wished to have at his side in the place of Mr. Henderson, a colleague sympathizing with him and likely to shape his conduct according to Senator Drake's wishes. He chose General Ben Loan of the western part of the State, a gentleman of excellent character and respectable, but not uncommon abilities. Senator Drake permitted it to go forth as a sort of decree of his that Mr. Loan should be elected to the Senate, and, although the proposition did not seem to meet with any hearty response in the State, he would have been so elected, had not another candidacy intervened. It happened in this wise: I was a member of a little club consisting of a few gentlemen of the same way of thinking in politics who dined together and then discussed current events once or twice a month. At one of those dinners, soon after the presidential election of 1868, the conversation turned upon the impending
election of Senator Henderson's successor and the candidacy of Mr. Drake's favorite, General Loan. We were all agreed in heartily disliking Mr. Drake's kind of statesmanship. We likewise agreed in disliking the prospect of seeing Mr. Drake duplicated in the Senate—indeed fully duplicated—by the election of Mr. Loan. But how prevent it? We all recognized, regretfully, the absolute impossibility of getting the Legislature to re-elect Mr. Henderson. But what other candidate was there to oppose to Mr. Loan? One of our table-round turned to me and said: "You!" The others instantly and warmly applauded. The thought that I, a comparatively new comer in Missouri, should be elected Senator in preference to others who had been among the leaders in the great crisis of the State only a few years ago, seemed to me extravagant, and I was by no means eager to expose myself to what I considered almost certain defeat. But my companions insisted, and I finally agreed that a "feeler" might be put out in the Democrat, the leading Republican journal in St. Louis, of which Colonel William M. Grosvenor, a member of our little table-company, was the editor in chief. The number of Republican papers in the State which responded approvingly was surprisingly large and I soon found myself in the situation of an acknowledged candidate for the senatorship "in the hands of his friends." It seemed that when "stumping" the State in the last campaign I had won more favor with the country people than I myself was aware of. Still, my chances of success would have been slim, had not my principal adversary, Senator Drake, appeared in person upon the scene.

When he learned that my candidacy was developing strength, he hurried from Washington to Jefferson City, the State capital of Missouri, to throw the weight of his personal influence with the Legislature into the scale against me.
By his side appeared General Loan. There was then perfect justification for me to be on the ground with some of my friends. My manager was Colonel Grosvenor, the editor of the Democrats, an uncommonly bright, genial, active and energetic young man. I could not have had a more efficient and more faithful champion, or a more skillful tactician. In their talks with members of the Legislature my opponents were reckless in the extreme. They denounced me as a foreign intruder, as a professional revolutionist, as a "German infidel," as a habitual drunkard, and what not. Our plan of campaign was very simple: Not a word against my competitor, General Loan; no champagne or whisky, nor even cigars; no noisy demonstrations; no promises of offices or other pledges in case of my election; but a challenge to General Loan and also to Senator Drake, if he would accept it, to meet me in public debate before the day when the caucus of the Republican majority for the nomination of a Senatorial candidate was to be held. In the meantime Colonel Grosvenor and the friends with him were to mingle with the members of the Legislature, to watch what was said to and by them and to bring to me those who wished to talk to me personally. Thus the campaign went on for several days. It attracted much attention throughout the North and was commented upon in the newspapers, mostly in my favor. There were some symptoms of friendly zeal in my behalf. My friend, Sigismund Kaufmann, in New York, telegraphed to me that if I needed any money for my campaign, he would put $10,000 at my disposal. I telegraphed back my thanks, but declined the money since I had no use for it. My reliance was upon the public debate.

Senator Drake accepted the challenge for himself and General Loan. Arrangements were made for two meetings on two consecutive evenings. On the first evening I was to
open with a speech of a certain length, and on the second evening Loan and Drake were to answer me, and I was to close. The announcement, as it went over the State, attracted from the country districts—as well as the cities—so many of the friends of the two candidates, who wished to witness what they considered a great event, that the hotels of the State capital were crowded to the utmost and every new arrival increased the excitement.

Remembering the debate between Lincoln and Douglas at Quincy, Illinois, to which I had listened ten years before, I kept my opening speech in calm, somewhat tame, defensive tone, reserving my best ammunition for my closing argument and putting forth in a somewhat challenging manner only a few sharp points which I wished Drake to take up the next evening. The effect of my speech was satisfactory in a double sense. My supporters were well pleased with the courtesy and moderation with which I had stated my position and repelled certain attacks, and Mr. Drake was jubilant. He could not conceal his anticipation of triumph. Before a large crowd he said in a loud voice: “That man was described to me as a remarkable orator, something like Cicero and Demosthenes combined. But what did we hear? A very ordinary talk. Gentlemen, to-morrow night about this hour General Carl Schurz will be as dead as Julius Caesar!” When I heard this, I was sure that his speech would be as bitter, overbearing, and dictatorial as I could wish, and that thus he would deliver himself into my hands.

The next evening the great hall of the assembly was crowded to suffocation. General Loan, my competitor, spoke first. His speech was entirely decent in tone but quite insignificant in matter. Its only virtue was its brevity. It received only that sort of applause which any audience will grant to
any respectable man's utterance which is not too long and not offensive, even if uttered in a voice too low to be heard. Senator Drake then mounted the rostrum with a defiant air as one who would make short work of his antagonists. After a few remarks concerning his attitude on the negro question he took me in hand. Who was I to presume to be a candidate for the Senate? He would, indeed, like to inquire a little into my past career, were it not that he would have to travel too far—to Germany, and to various places in this country, to find out whether there was not much to my discredit. But he had no time for so long a journey, however instructive such a search might be. This insinuation was received by the audience with strong signs of displeasure, which, however, stirred up Mr. Drake to greater energy. Then he launched into a violent attack on the Germans of Missouri, for whose political character and conduct he made me responsible. He denounced them as an ignorant crowd, who did not understand English, read only their German newspapers, and were led by corrupt and designing rings; as marplots and mischief-makers who could never be counted upon, and whose presence in the Republican party hurt that party more than it helped it. Finally, after having expressed his contempt for the newspapers and the politicians who supported my candidacy, he closed with an elaborate eulogy on General Loan and himself, the length of which seemed to tire the audience, for it was interrupted by vociferous calls for me coming from all parts of the house. The immediate effect of Mr. Drake's speech was perceptibly unfavorable to him and his candidate—especially his bitter denunciation of the Germans and of a large part of the Republican party which advocated my election, for many members of the Legislature remembered how important an element those same Germans formed of their constituency, and how
When I rose, the audience received me with a round of uproarious cheers. I succeeded in putting myself into relations of good humor even with my opponents by introducing myself as “a young David, who, single-handed and without any weapon except his sling and a few pebbles in his pouch, had to meet in combat two heavily-armed Goliaths at once.” The audience laughed and cheered again. I then brushed away Mr. Loan’s “harmless” speech with a few polite phrases and “passed from the second to the principal.” The laugh which followed caused Mr. Loan to blush and to look cheap. I then proceeded to take the offensive against Mr. Drake in good earnest. To the great amusement of my hearers I punctured with irony and ridicule the pompous pretense that he was the father of the new constitution with which Missouri was blessed. I then took up his assault upon the Germans. I asked the question who it was that at the beginning of the war took prisoners the rebel force assembled in Camp Jackson and thus saved St. Louis and the State to the Union, and who was foremost on all the bloody fields in Missouri? The whole audience shouted: “The Germans! The Germans!” I asked another question: Where Mr. Drake was in those critical days, and answered it myself, that having been a Democrat before the war pleading the cause of slavery, he sat quietly in his law office, coolly calculating when it would be safe for him to pronounce himself openly for the Union, while the Germans were shedding their blood for that Union. This was a terrible thrust. My unfortunate victim nervously jumped to his feet and called my friend, General McNeil, who was present, to witness that the General himself advised him to stay quietly at home, because he could do better service there than
twenty men in the field. Whereupon General McNeil promptly answered: "Yes, but that was long after the beginning of the war"—an answer which made Mr. Drake sink back into his chair, while the meeting burst out in a peal of laughter. Soon he rose again to say that I was wrong in imputing to him any hostility to the Germans, for he was their friend. My reply instantly followed that then we had to take what he had said of them to-night as a specimen of Mr. Drake’s characteristic friendship. The audience again roared with laughter. But the sharpest arrow was still to be shot. I reviewed the Senator’s career as a party leader—how he had hurled his anathema against every Republican who would not take his word as law, thus disgusting and alienating one man after another, and now seeking to read out of the party every man and every newspaper, among them the strongest journal in the State, that supported me. Almost every sentence drew applause. But when I reached my climax, picturing Mr. Drake as a party leader so thinning out his following that he would finally stand "lonesome and forlorn, surrounded by an immensity of solitude, in desolate self-appreciation," the general hilarity became so boisterous and the cheering so persistent, that I had to wait minutes for a chance to proceed. I closed my speech in a pacific strain. There had been talk that, if I were elected, the unseemly spectacle would be presented of two Senators from the same State constantly quarreling with one another. I did not apprehend anything of the kind. I was sure, if we ever differed, Senator Drake would respect my freedom of opinion, and I certainly would respectfully recognize his. Our watchword would be: "Let us have peace."

When I had finished, there was another outbreak of tumultuous applause and a rush for a handshake, the severest I have ever had to go through. With great difficulty I had to work [300]
my way to my tavern and to bed, where I lay long awake hearing the jubilant shouts of my friends on the streets. The first report I received in the morning was that Mr. Drake had quickly withdrawn from last night's meeting, before its adjournment, had hurried to his hotel, had asked for his bill and the washing he had given out, and when told that his shirts and collars were not yet dry, had insisted upon having them instantly whether wet or dry, and then had hurried to the railroad station for the night train East. The party-dictatorship was over, and its annihilation was proclaimed by the flight of the dictator.

The same day the caucus of the Republican members of the Legislature took place. I was nominated for the Senatorship on the first ballot, and on motion the nomination was made unanimous. My election by the Legislature followed in due course. No political victory was ever more cleanly won. My whole election expenses amounted only to my board bill at the hotel, and, absolutely unencumbered by any promise of patronage or other favor, I took my seat in the Senate of the United States on the 4th of March, 1869. My colleague, Mr. Drake, courteously escorted me to the chair of the president of the Senate, where I took the oath of office.
I REMEMBER vividly the feelings which almost oppressed me as I first sat down in my chair in the Senate chamber. Now I had actually reached the most exalted public position to which my boldest dreams of ambition had hardly dared to aspire. I was still a young man, just forty. Little more than sixteen years had elapsed since I had landed on these shores, a homeless waif saved from the wreck of a revolutionary movement in Europe. Then I was enfolded in the generous hospitality of the American people opening to me, as freely as to its own children, the great opportunities of the new world. And here I was now, a member of the highest law-making body of the greatest of republics. Should I ever be able fully to pay my debt of gratitude to this country, and to justify the honors that had been heaped upon me? To accomplish this, my conception of duty could not be pitched too high. I recorded a vow in my own heart that I would at least honestly endeavor to fulfill that duty; that I would conscientiously adhere to the principle salus populi suprema lex; that I would never be a sycophant of power nor a flatterer of the multitude; that, if need be, I would stand up alone for my conviction of truth and right; and that there would be no personal sacrifice too great for my devotion to the Republic.

My first official duty was to witness, with the Senate, the inauguration of General Grant as President of the United States. I stood near the same spot from which, eight years before, I had witnessed the inauguration of Abraham Lincoln—a remarkable contrast,—then the anxious patriot, in the hour
of stress, with pathetic tenderness appealing to the wayward children of the nation, now the victorious soldier speaking in the name of the restored national authority. General Grant's inaugural address, evidently his own work, was somewhat crude in style, but breathed a rugged honesty of purpose. With particular rigor it emphasized our obligations to the national creditor—in striking contrast to Mr. Johnson's last annual message, which had stopped little short of advising downright repudiation. On the whole, General Grant's accession to the presidency was welcomed by almost everybody with a sense of relief. It put an end to the unseemly, not to say scandalous, brawl between the executive and the legislative branches of the National Government, which at times came near threatening the peace of the country. It was justly expected to restore the Government to its proper dignity and to furnish, if not a brilliant, at least a highly decent and efficient business administration. As General Grant had really not owed his nomination to any set of politicians, nor even, strictly speaking, to his identification with a political party, he enjoyed an independence of position which gave him peculiarly favorable possibilities for emancipating the public service from the grasp of the spoils politician, and the friends of civil service reform looked up to him with great hope.

His personal popularity was then at its meridian. The great services he had rendered to the country as a soldier received unstinted appreciation. With regard to him the Republic was certainly not ungrateful. Citizens of every rank or condition vied with one another in manifesting their sense of thankful obligation to him by showering upon him presents as well as praise. Everybody wished him well—even his political opponents, who remembered the generosity of his treatment of the defeated enemy, and who were sympathetically
touched by the winged word he had sent forth: "Let us have peace!" It was well known that, like General Zachary Taylor, he entered upon the high duties of the presidency without any political experience; but there was widespread, if not general, confidence that his native good sense would guide him aright, or, if that should ever fail, the best of the wisdom and patriotism of the land would be sympathetically at his elbow to help him over his troubles. Thus everything apparently tended to smooth his path, and a period of comparative political quiet seemed to be in prospect.

Considering General Grant's past career, such anticipations were apt to be somewhat oversanguine, for it was not unnatural that in the absolute absence of political experience he should not only have had much to learn concerning the nature and conduct of civil government, but that he should also have had much to unlearn of the mental habits and the ways of thinking he had acquired in the exercise of large, indeed, almost unlimited, military command. This was strikingly illustrated by some remarkable incidents.

As usual the nominations made by the President for Cabinet offices were promptly ratified by the Senate without being referred to any committee. But after this had been done, it was remembered and reported to President Grant, that one of the nominees so confirmed, Mr. A. T. Stewart, of New York, whom President Grant had selected for the Secretaryship of the Treasury, as a person engaged in commerce, was disqualified by one of the oldest laws on the statute book—in fact, the act of September 2, 1789, establishing the Treasury Department. That this law, which provided that the Treasury Department, having the administration of the custom houses under its control, should not have at its head a merchant or importer in active business, was an entirely proper, indeed, a necessary
one, had never been questioned. The next morning, March 6th, I had occasion to call upon President Grant for the purpose of presenting to him a congratulatory message from certain citizens of St. Louis. I found him alone engaged in writing something on a half sheet of note paper. "Mr. President," I said, "I see you are busy, and I do not wish to interrupt you. My business can wait." "Never mind," he answered, "I am only writing a message to the Senate." My business was quickly disposed of, and I withdrew. In the course of that day's session of the Senate a message from the President was brought in, by which, after quoting the statute of September 2, 1789, the President "asked that Mr. Stewart be exempted by joint resolution of the two Houses of Congress from the operation of the law" which stood in Mr. Stewart's way. There were some signs of surprise among Senators when the message was read, but Mr. Sherman at once "asked unanimous consent to introduce a bill" in accordance with the President's wish. But Mr. Sumner objected to the immediate consideration thereof because of its great importance. This stopped further proceedings, and the bill was laid on the table never to be heard of again. However, the President's message had evidently made an impression, and there was forthwith a little council held in the cloak-room which agreed that some Senator should without delay go to see Mr. Elihu B. Washburne, the new Secretary of State, who was General Grant's intimate friend and who was urgently to be asked to suggest to the President that, while there was now perfect good feeling all round, it would be prudent for him to drop Mr. Stewart and to abstain from demanding the suspension or the repeal of good laws which he found in his way. Whether Mr. Washburne did carry this admonition to President Grant, I do not know. Probably he did; for Mr. Stewart was promptly
dropped. Mr. Boutwell, of Massachusetts, was made Secretary of the Treasury in Mr. Stewart's place, and the repeal or suspension of the old law was never again heard of.

So this incident passed over harmless. But the cloak-room of the Senate, where Senators amused one another with the gossip of the day, continued to buzz with anecdotes about President Grant's curious notions of the nature and functions of civil government. One of those anecdotes told by a Senator who was considered one of the best lawyers in that body, and one of the most jealous of the character of his profession, was particularly significant. He heard a rumor that President Grant was about to remove a Federal judge in one of the Territories of the United States. The Senator happened to know that judge as a lawyer of excellent ability and uncommon fitness for the bench, and he went to the President to remonstrate against so extreme a measure as the removal of a judge unless there were cogent reasons for it connected with the administration of the office. President Grant admitted, that as far as he knew, there was no allegation of the unfitness of the judge as a judge, "but," he added, "the Governor of the Territory writes me that he cannot get along with that judge at all, and is very anxious to be rid of him; and, I think, the Governor is entitled to have control of his staff." The Senator closed his story by saying that he found it to be a delicate as well as a difficult job to make the great General in the chair of the President of the United States understand how different the relations between a territorial governor and a Federal judge were from those between a military commander and his staff officers. The anecdote was received by the listeners with a laugh, but the mirth was not far from head-shaking apprehension. However, there being sincere and perfect good will on both sides, things went on pleasantly in the expectation that
the military hero at the head of the government would learn what he needed to know, and that the men in political places of power would treat him with due consideration and fairness.

It was a few days later when I met President Grant at an evening reception given by Colonel Forney, the Secretary of the Senate. I was somewhat surprised when I saw the President coming toward me from the opposite side of the room, saying: "Senator, you have not called to see me at the White House for some time, and I have been wanting to speak to you." All I could say in response was that I was very sorry to have missed a conversation I might have had with him, but that I knew him to be a busy man who should not be robbed of his time by merely conventional visits. He repeated that he wished very much to see me. Would I not call upon him at my earliest convenience some evening? I put myself at once at his service, and went to the White House the next night. He received me in the library room and invited me to sit with him on a sofa. He plunged forthwith into the subject he had at heart. "I hear you are a member of the Senate Committee that has the San Domingo treaty under consideration," he said, "and I wish you would support that treaty. Won't you do that?" I thought it would be best not to resort to any circumlocution in answering so point-blank a summons, but to be entirely frank. I said I would be sincerely happy to act with his administration whenever and wherever I conscientiously could, but in this case, I was sorry to confess, I was not able to do as he wished, because I was profoundly convinced it would be against the best interests of the Republic. Then I gave him some of my dominant reasons; in short, acquisition and possession of such tropical countries with indigestible, unassimilable populations would be highly obnoxious to the nature of our republican system of government; it would greatly aggra-
vate the racial problems we had already to contend with; those tropical islands would, owing to their climatic conditions, never be predominantly settled by people of Germanic blood; this federative republic could not without dangerously vitiating its vital principles, undertake to govern them by force, while the populations inhabiting them could not be trusted with a share in governing our country; to the difficulties we had under existing circumstances to struggle with in our Southern States, much greater and more enduring difficulties would be added; and for all this the plan offered absolutely no compensating advantages. Moreover, the conversations I had had with Senators convinced me, that the treaty had no chance to receive the two-thirds vote necessary for its confirmation, and I sincerely regretted to see his administration expose itself to a defeat which, as I thought, was inevitable.

I spoke with the verve of sincere conviction, and at first the President listened to me with evident interest, looking at me as if the objections to the treaty which I expressed were quite new to him and made an impression upon his mind. But after a little while I noticed that his eyes wandered about the room, and I became doubtful whether he listened to me at all. When I had stopped, he sat silent for a minute or two. I, of course, sat silent too, waiting for him to speak. At last he said in a perfectly calm tone as if nothing had happened: "Well, I hope you will at least vote for the confirmation of Mr. Jones, whom I have selected for a foreign mission."

I was very much taken aback by this turn of the conversation. Who was Mr. Jones? If the President had sent his nomination into the Senate it had escaped me. I had not heard of a Mr. Jones as a nominee for a foreign mission. What could I say? The President's request that I should vote for Mr. Jones sounded so child-like and guileless, at the same
time implying an apprehension that I might not vote for the confirmation of Mr. Jones, which he had evidently much at heart, that I was sincerely sorry that I could not promptly answer "Yes." I should have been happy to please the President. But I had to tell him the truth. So I gathered myself together and replied that I knew nothing of Mr. Jones, either by personal knowledge or by report; that it was the duty of the Committee on Foreign Relations to inquire into the qualifications for diplomatic service of the persons nominated for foreign missions and to report accordingly to the Senate, and that if Mr. Jones was found to possess those qualifications, it would give me the most genuine pleasure to vote for him.—This closed the conference.

A few days later there was a meeting of the Committee on Foreign Relations. After having disposed of some other business, Charles Sumner, its chairman, said in his usual grave tone: "Here is the President's nomination of Mr. Jones for the mission to Brussels. Can any member of the Committee give us any information concerning Mr. Jones?" There was a moment's silence. Then Senator Morton, of Indiana, a sarcastic smile flickering over his face—I see him now before me—replied: "Well, Mr. Jones is about the most elegant gentleman that ever presided over a livery stable." The whole committee, except Mr. Sumner, broke out in a laugh. Sumner, with unbroken gravity, asked whether any other member of the Committee could give any further information. There was none. Whereupon Mr. Sumner suggested that the nomination be laid over for further inquiry, which was done.

At a subsequent meeting the Committee took up the case of Mr. Jones again. It was a matter of real embarrassment to every one of us. We all wished to avoid hurting the feelings of President Grant. There had been no malice in Senator Mor-
ton's remark about the elegant gentleman presiding over a livery stable. Morton was one of the staunchest administration men, but he simply could not resist the humor of the occasion. I do not recollect what the result of the "further inquiry" was. I have a vague impression that Mr. Jones turned out to be in some way connected with the street-car lines in Chicago, and to have had much to do with horses, which was supposed to be the link of sympathy between him and President Grant. However reluctant the Committee was to wound the President's feelings in so personal a matter, yet it did not think it consistent with its sense of duty and dignity positively to recommend to the Senate to confirm the nomination of Mr. Jones. It, therefore, if I remember rightly, reported it back to the Senate without any recommendation, whereupon the Senate indulgently ratified it.
A SKETCH OF
CARL SCHURZ'S POLITICAL CAREER
1869-1906
BY
Frederic Bancroft and William A. Dunning
PREFATORY NOTE

During the last three decades of the nineteenth century Mr. Schurz's political influence was unique. In preparing the chapters to cover this period and to supplement his Reminiscences we have been fully conscious that any effort to preserve the peculiar flavor of his own work would be futile. It has been our purpose, therefore, merely to describe the salient features of his activity in public affairs. We have endeavored less to chronicle a multitude of biographical facts than to exhibit, in actual relation to the history of the time, the intellectual characteristics and political aspirations that were conspicuous and potent in his career.

To Dr. Herbert Putnam, the Librarian, and Mr. Worthington C. Ford, Chief of the Division of Manuscripts, we are under special obligations for the interest they have taken in rendering serviceable to us the vast and splendid resources of the Library of Congress. The Librarian of Columbia University also has generously extended to us helpful courtesies which we gratefully acknowledge.

F. B.
W. A. D.
THE RISING SENATOR

WHEN Mr. Schurz entered the Senate the political conditions centering in that body were very peculiar. The arduous conflict between President Johnson and Congress had shifted the center of gravity of our constitutional system far over on the legislative side, and the Senate especially had gained unprecedented prestige and importance. Through the Tenure of Office Act Senators were enabled, as never before, to influence the personnel of the civil service and thus to check and control the presidential policy in every branch of the administration. The consequences were serious. In the absence of unified and certain control the civil service had become demoralized beyond even its wartime state. The Senate was displaying an overweening hauteur as if it were the government. In the heat of the fierce struggle with Andrew Johnson these exceptional conditions had been little thought of, although they were factors in determining the acquittal of the President on impeachment, and also in inspiring the first concrete proposition for a civil-service reform. Soon after Grant took possession of the White House the relation of the Senate to the offices became a subject of serious debate.

The new President, assuming that there was no longer any reason for the restrictions that had been imposed upon the powers of his office when Johnson filled it, suggested the repeal of the Tenure of Office Act. The House, always restless under any access of power to the Senate, promptly and enthusiastic-
ally supported the President’s suggestion. In the Senate, however, a strong opposition was manifested. A number of the ablest Republican Senators, having supported the passage of the act by grave doctrines of constitutional law and with a serious purpose of exalting the authority of the Senate, were reluctant to reverse themselves. But Grant grimly announced that he would make no removals till his hands were freed. Under pressure of this attitude, so grievous to the spoils-mongering Congressman, and of the general desire among the Republicans to have harmony between the legislature and the new Executive, a disingenuous bill was patched up and passed that in a devious manner restored the power of removal to the President.

The debate on this subject, running through March, 1869, gave to Mr. Schurz an opportunity to put on record, at the very outset of his senatorial career, the conviction and purpose which were peculiarly to distinguish his whole public life, and to make it unique in American politics. In the effort to adjust the different views as to what should be done with the Tenure of Office Act, a proposition was made to suspend its operation for a time, instead of repealing it. This suggestion was on its face ignoble, but it received considerable support, especially from those who were tormented with a desire for an immediate "clean sweep" of the Johnson incumbents. Schurz voted for the motion to suspend on wholly different grounds. The great need of the time, he declared, was the abolition of the spoils system and of Congressional patronage, and the establishment of appointment through examination. The more the existing system and its evils should be discussed, the nearer would be the accomplishment of reform. If the Tenure of Office Act should be suspended for a time, the end of the period fixed would bring a fresh discussion of the general subject—a result
wholly desirable and warranting support of a proposition otherwise unjustifiable.

The purpose thus announced naturally failed of realization in the particular form here proposed. But Schurz held fast to his policy; and on December 20, 1869, he introduced a bill embodying a far-reaching system of civil-service reform. This incorporated the scheme already advocated for several years by Representative Jenckes, of Rhode Island, but extended its provisions over a much greater number of offices. In taking up the advocacy of this project Schurz identified himself with a group of Senators—Trumbull, Thurman, Sumner, Bayard—that included some of the best minds in public life. However, many influences conspired to render comprehensive reform impossible at this time. To the majority of Congressmen patronage and spoils were indispensable instruments of party success, and party success was the sole practical method of promoting patriotic ends. President Grant, by throwing his powerful influence in favor of reform in the manner of appointments, insured the adoption of a measure in 1871 under which a commission was established and a system of examinations was instituted. But by the time it was fairly in operation some of the strongest supporters of the reform had become antagonistic to the administration, and the consequent alienation between these men and Grant made it possible for the congressional adversaries of the reform to reduce the new system to a nullity, for a time, by refusing the necessary appropriations. However, the law remained and furnished a basis for the developments of later years.

The same intellectual and political traits of which Mr. Schurz's zeal for civil-service reform was born made his hostility to the administration inevitable. His whole conception of public policy was far above the play of merely personal and
party interests. He had no taste for political controversy that turned mainly on the rivalry of ambitious leaders, or for the creation of efficient vote-getting machinery without reference to the principles and the vital issues that the votes should sustain. Perhaps his indifference to these considerations was, at times, extreme for a statesman in a democracy; but it gave to his senatorial career exceptional seriousness and dignity. From his first appearance in the debates, the lofty tone of his speeches, emphasized by graceful diction and impressive delivery, at once commanded the close attention of his colleagues on the floor and of large audiences in the galleries. Every formal speech also had much of the literary quality of a well-rounded essay on the subject under discussion; and his argument always appealed to minds capable of grasping the larger aspects of history and philosophy. Although there was no lack of satire and cutting denunciation for false theories and objectionable projects, mere personalities and unreasoned invective were disliked and avoided. Consequently Schurz early won from serious opponents a degree of respectful consideration that Sumner, popularly regarded as the leader of the Senate, had never been able to secure. The characteristic qualities of Schurz's senatorial oratory were especially manifest in his speeches on Reconstruction, and on the attempted annexation of Santo Domingo.

In the spring of 1869, eight of the eleven secessionist States were in normal relations with the general government, and were politically in the hands of the Republicans, to whom, by enfranchising the freedmen and disfranchising many whites, Congress had given control. The remaining three States, Virginia, Mississippi and Texas, completed the steps necessary to readmission, and came up for formal acceptance by Congress in the winter of 1869-70. By this time social and
CARL SCHURZ IN 1879

From the collection of Joseph Keppler
CARL SCHURZ'S POLITICAL CAREER

political conditions throughout the South were revealing the difficulties of the new dispensation. Against the rule of Northern men and negroes, extravagant, inefficient and corrupt, the Southern whites reacted through secret organizations, terror and violence. The Ku Klux and their deeds made a gruesome record in many localities, and the inability of the State governments to suppress the disorders exposed the frailty of the new political régime.

In Congress, Republican sentiment was seriously divided as to the method of dealing with the Southern situation. All factions agreed in requiring the three States yet to be admitted to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment; and the same requirement was imposed upon Georgia, whose Conservative legislature, by the exclusion of negro members from their seats, had brought the State into a process of re-reconstruction. But when the radicals in Congress undertook to press through a barefaced project for prolonging the term of the Republican governor and legislature in Georgia, regardless of the State law, the moderate Republican Senators joined the Democrats and thwarted the scheme.

Schurz gave hearty aid to the moderates. Abating nothing of his confidence that reconstruction through negro suffrage had been the least objectionable policy, he declined to recognize that the maintenance of Republican party supremacy in the restored States was a sufficient ground for continued interference by the central government. The widespread political and social disorders in the South were regarded by hot partisans like Senators Morton, Drake and Wilson as expressions of the old rebellious spirit in the whites and of a malignant purpose to thwart by violence the building up of the Republican party in the reconstructed States. Louisiana and Georgia had been lost by the Republicans in the presidential elections in 1868;
Tennessee and Virginia had chosen Conservative or Democratic State governments in 1869. The tendency thus manifested was held by the extremists to justify any degree of rigor in maintaining Republican ascendancy in the other States.

Schurz regarded such a spirit as in the highest degree mischievous. In the long debates on the Georgia question and on the Enforcement Act during the spring of 1870, he set forth his general views on the Southern situation. Like every other rebellion in history, ours must have its epilogue, he said; and the unrest and disorder in the South were incidents of this. They had a far deeper source than mere party politics; they were evidences of that "process of second fermentation" through which he anticipated that all the Southern States would have to pass. The proper treatment of this condition must be like that of a fever: watchfulness and care in guiding its course, but no radical or drastic action till time should have done its work. The "inveterate habits, opinions and ways of thinking of Southern society" must be transformed, and such a change can be of but slow growth. The greatest obstacle to a restoration of sound conditions would be legislative and executive action of purely partisan and extra-constitutional character. This would confirm the influence of the worst elements in the South and would provoke a disastrous Democratic reaction. The great need of the time, he believed, was that the Southern question should be wholly detached from partisan politics, and that the national government should leave the reconstructed States to work out their own problems. The most important positive action that Congress should take was the removal of the disabilities that still excluded many of the ablest Southerners from political life.

There was discernible in Mr. Schurz's attitude on the
Southern question a profound discontent with the practical working of negro suffrage and of Republican party machinery in general as well as in the reconstructed States. By the end of the year 1870 this feeling became a matter of national notoriety by the sensational course of politics in Missouri. The factional division of the Republicans in this State, manifested in the contest that put Schurz into the Senate, came to a decisive issue in 1870 on the question of repealing the extremely rigorous laws by which Confederate sympathizers were disfranchised. The original justification for these laws had long ceased to have force, and their chief function was to furnish unscrupulous Republican politicians with the means to maintain party supremacy in State and local affairs. The liberal element of the party took up the demand for an immediate abolition of the whole system. The radicals, who controlled the party machinery, opposed the demand, and, by shrewd and unscrupulous manipulation of the mass of negro voters just created by the Fifteenth Amendment, secured control of the State convention.

To Schurz the procedure of the radical politicians was objectionable from every point of view. It promoted among the whites a policy of exasperation and proscription where he believed conciliation and concord were needful; it identified the newly enfranchised negroes with a cause that must bar them from all cordial relations with the better class of whites and leave them the dependents of mere political schemers; and it exhibited, in the methods through which the convention had been packed by the radicals, the particular kind of party trickery that he most abhorred. Accordingly he went into the convention with a fixed purpose to sever, if necessary, his connection with the regular organization. There he lashed the radicals without mercy, but, not unnaturally, with slight effect on the
The proposition of the liberals to incorporate in the platform a plank favoring the immediate removal of disabilities was lost. Thereupon the liberals, headed by Schurz and Gratz Brown, organized a new convention, adopted a platform calling for the immediate removal of all disabilities, nominated Brown for Governor, and, with the aid of the Democrats, who coalesced with the bolters, triumphantly carried the State.

In this Missouri campaign, the radicals had the unqualified support of the administration. The federal officeholders in the State were constrained by the most drastic methods of pressure then in vogue to contribute money and labor to the cause; and President Grant, in a letter to the collector of internal revenue at St. Louis, expressed the conviction that Schurz and Brown were merely aiming to put the Democrats in power, and urged his correspondent to stand by the regular party ticket. Though read out of the Republican party by this high authority, Mr. Schurz did not cease to maintain that he stood true to the principles of Republicanism and that it was the radicals who had deserted those principles. In a speech delivered in the Senate, December 15, 1870, with the laurels of the Missouri victory fresh upon him, he told with great effectiveness the story of the liberal movement. Referring to the plank for which he himself was responsible in the national platform of 1868, favoring the removal of disabilities, he argued that the liberals were wholly in the spirit of Republican policy, and that the President had been misled into his belief to the contrary. This argument was followed in the speech, however, by a very philosophical and eloquent analysis of existing political conditions, with a conclusion that indicated how lightly the speaker regarded any party tie that involved fidelity to a name or tradition or organization rather
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than to a living practical principle. Both old parties, he thought, had done their specific work, and the Republicans, if they wished to retain their cohesion, must assume the task of progressive reform, though the new issues were not yet clear and well-defined.

Such lax and speculative allegiance only confirmed the distrust with which Schurz was regarded by spoils-loving, domineering partisans. A number of causes had by the end of 1870 brought the President much under the influence of the men of this kind. Schurz's chivalrous and independent course in Missouri politics was not the only occasion of his being out of favor with Grant. Not a little had been contributed to this result by the Senator's course in connection with the President's famous attempt to annex Santo Domingo.

A protocol providing for the annexation of this petty republic was negotiated by the President's private secretary, General Babcock, when in Santo Domingo on other business in the summer of 1869. Babcock's proceedings were of a grossly irregular character. The Cabinet, when it learned that annexation had been arranged for, refused to indicate even tolerance for the project, and Mr. Fish, the Secretary of State, offered his resignation. Nevertheless Grant, with fearlessness not born of wisdom, took up the heavy task of compelling annexation. While otherwise ignoring the attitude of his Cabinet, he induced Secretary Fish, by cogent personal appeals, to remain in office and to take the necessary steps for giving formal regularity to Babcock's negotiation. As a result, a treaty was signed just before Congress met in December, 1869. The President then undertook to insure ratification by the Senate. One unique feature of Babcock's diplomacy had been a pledge in the original protocol that the President would privately use all his influence to make the idea of annexation
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"popular" among the members of Congress and thus secure its accomplishment. In the spirit of this pledge, a series of urgent interviews with Senators was promptly begun and continued until the Dominican question was decided.

At this session Fessenden, an important member of the committee on foreign relations, died, and Sumner, the chairman of this committee, promptly brought about the succession of Schurz to the vacant place. The intimate friendship between Sumner and Schurz made this closer association highly agreeable, while the cosmopolitan character of Schurz’s experience and philosophy insured valuable help in dealing with international problems. On no other regular committees did Schurz continue to serve to the end of his senatorial term. For short periods he was a member of the committees on military affairs, on pensions and on territories, but he apparently found nothing in the duties involved to warrant an effort to retain his membership in any one of them.

Mr. Schurz has above described the President’s appeal to him in behalf of the Santo Domingo enterprise. Grant called on Sumner at his house about New Year’s day, 1870, and requested his support for the ratification of the treaty with Santo Domingo. The experienced Senator was thrown off his balance by this surprising and unprecedented method. Evading a direct answer, he proclaimed himself at the same time "an administration man." Grant probably heard or remembered nothing of the reply save this phrase; for he always afterwards asserted that Sumner had promised his support. But Sumner soon made up his mind that annexation was quite undesirable. Schurz had from the earliest intimation of the project strongly antagonized it, and he now became Sumner’s most ardent and industrious coadjutor in preventing ratification. One night many years later, as he was leaving the Arlington Hotel, in
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Washington, Mr. Schurz stopped in front of the Sumner house, now the east side of the Arlington "Annex," and pointing up to the second story said to his companion: "Ah, how many long evenings I have passed with Sumner up there in his library! It was there that we planned the defeat of Grant's scheme to annex Santo Domingo." Though Sumner's great reputation and his violent personal quarrel with Grant made him the most conspicuous figure in the opposition to annexation, it was in fact Schurz who did most of the careful planning through which the President was defeated.

The task would have been an easy one if the ratification of the treaty had depended solely on the merits of the case. At first very few Senators manifested any positive desire for annexation, and the mass of the Republicans were indifferent, with a leaning toward opposition. Yet upon this indifferentism a deep impression was made by the terrible earnestness with which the President continued to press his policy. It was but a year since Andrew Johnson had left the White House, and many Republicans recoiled with terror from the idea of another breach with the Executive. They dreaded less the peril of annexing Santo Domingo than that of dividing the Republican party from its official chief. Thus party considerations finally prevailed with most of the Republican Senators. Against such considerations Schurz was peculiarly unfitted to make headway; for his whole intellectual habit precluded him from properly estimating the idea of party per se. However, with the aid of the Democrats, he and Sumner were victorious: ratification was refused by the Senate, June 29, 1870, by a vote of 28 to 28, two-thirds being required to ratify.

Grant, though intensely irritated by this outcome, was far from convinced that he was defeated. At the next session of
Congress, in December, 1870, his annual message contained an elaborate plea for annexation and suggested the method of joint resolution, as in the case of Texas, or of a commission to negotiate a new treaty. During the summer the President had in various ways strengthened his hold on those who had supported him, and at the same time had manifested an intense personal bitterness toward Sumner, whom he held chiefly responsible for the failure of the treaty. Sumner had conceived _pari passu_ a cordial contempt for Grant, which, though not publicly proclaimed, was none the less a matter of general knowledge. When, therefore, the question of annexation was again brought forward by the annual message of 1870, a resounding clash between the Senator and the administration was expected, and it duly came.

Morton, one of the leaders of the President's supporters, introduced in the Senate a resolution providing for a commission to visit Santo Domingo and report upon conditions there. This was intended, so Morton assured Sumner, merely as a means of dropping the whole matter in a manner that would show some respect for the President. Sumner, however, spurned the suggestion that it be allowed to pass unopposed, and by a tirade beginning, "The resolution before the Senate commits Congress to a dance of blood," made public and irreparable the breach with the President. This speech, crammed as it was with the most offensive imputations upon Grant and his advisers, grieved the more judicious of Sumner's friends. It diverted attention from the issue of annexation, on which public opinion favored the opposition, to that of the personal animosity between Grant and Sumner, on which no arts of malignant rhetoric could win the sympathy of the people from their silent military hero. The debate on the resolution turned largely upon Sumner's personal motives and methods, and he
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was very roughly handled by the friends of the President, especially Zachariah Chandler and Roscoe Conkling.

To Schurz the turn given to the affair by this war of personalities was in the highest degree distressing. In temper and self-control he was thoroughly unlike the Massachusetts Senator. He feared for the effect upon Sumner personally, and for the effect upon the main question. In a frank conference with the President while the treaty of annexation was before the Senate, Schurz had learned how tenacious Grant was of his purpose to acquire Santo Domingo. The ostentatious repudiation of the Missouri liberals during the State campaign of 1870 had been public notice that the presidential favor would be withdrawn from Senators who, like Schurz, refused to support the Dominican policy. In a number of States there was a promising opportunity to constrain senatorial votes by administration pressure through the party machine. Under such circumstances Schurz was seriously alarmed lest, despite the contrary professions of Morton, a scheme to present anew the direct question of acquisition might suddenly reveal itself. The surest way of meeting this danger was to get public opinion back to the main issue. This he undertook to do in a very serious address to the Senate, on January 11, 1871. He studiously avoided all the extraneous topics that Sumner's invective had brought into the discussion, and confined himself practically to the single question of annexation. It was typical of Schurz's superior methods of developing and leading public opinion.

The argument of the speech was made to turn chiefly on the undesirability of tropical expansion. At the first suggestion of the annexation of Santo Domingo, Schurz had felt instinctively that, apart from the question whether any increase of territory was desirable, the direction of this proposed in-
crease should condemn the project. This thought was elaborated in a broad philosophical review of human history showing that the tropics are ill-adapted to the development of a high civilization—that they produce social and political systems in which the extremes of slavery and despotism are sure to prevail. All the troubles of the United States about slavery had been due, he argued, to the tendencies in the South toward tropical conditions and methods in politics. European peoples had throughout history sought without ceasing, but in vain, to acquire power and prestige in warmer regions than their own. A romantic longing for the South had impelled many a happy nation to ruin; and, with words that could have come only from one trained amid the ideals and traditions that inspired the German reform movement of 1848, he illustrated his thought by reference to his native land. "It was on the beautiful plains of Italy that the German Empire spent its strength. It was in hunting after Southern shadows that it frittered away its great opportunities of home consolidation. It was, so to say, in the embraces of that beautiful Southern siren that the German Empire lost its manhood." As recent and immediately appropriate illustrations of the dangers to be shunned, he cited the experiences of Great Britain in India, France in Mexico, and Spain and France in Santo Domingo itself. "Do not," he concluded, "touch a scheme like this; do not trifle with that which may poison the future of this great nation; beware of the tropics."

This speech was much applauded and praised. In later years Mr. Schurz classed it as one of the best three of his senatorial career. Its effects on fellow-Senators, was, of course, not in proportion to its merits. Morton's resolution was passed by heavy majorities in both Houses; a commission under its provision went to Santo Domingo and made a report favorable.
to annexation. But Grant, realizing at last that public opinion was not with him, despaired of his undertaking. As we shall see, he was more ready than his critics to let the matter rest.

Meantime the discussion had sharpened the line of division between the friends and the enemies of the administration among the Republicans in Congress, and had furnished the President's critics with ample material for the forthcoming contest.

At the opening of the Forty-second Congress, March, 1871, the Republican senatorial caucus substituted Cameron for Sumner as chairman of the committee on foreign relations. This action—the removal of an important chairman without his consent—was a very unusual one, and was regarded by Sumner as revenge, dictated by the administration, for the Senator's activity in thwarting the President in his Santo Domingo policy. In reality other factors entered into the matter, though their influence was not fully understood at the time. Schurz and other Senators, even some who acted regularly with the administration group, protested with much warmth against Sumner's deposition, but in vain.

At this same session Grant, urged by Morton and others of his special supporters, committed himself to the application of the national war power to the suppression of the Ku Klux disorders. To this policy Sumner gave his full support, for to him it seemed to be only a new phase of the old anti-slavery movement, which so long had the first place in this thoughts. Schurz, while not less a philanthropist, was a philosophical public man, and since 1865 he had closely studied the Southern question, kept an open mind, and had become a resident of the South. His actual experience of negro suffrage in Missouri, and his clear insight into the purely partisan influences that so powerfully operated in promoting the administration's Ku
Klux policy, compelled him to choose a course of action different from that of his dear friend Sumner. Practically all the other Republican Senators of the anti-administration group agreed with Schurz. Prestige had usually given to Sumner the nominal leadership of this group. Now, so far as there was any leadership, it fell to Schurz.

At the end of March, 1871, the Santo Domingo affair made its last appearance in formal debate. Sumner had introduced a series of resolutions censuring the use made of the navy in connection with Babcock's visits and with later proceedings under the preliminary protocol. This touched the weakest spot in the presidential case; for with cheerful disregard of all the nice points of diplomatic and international practice, Grant, Secretary Robeson, Babcock and sundry naval commanders had practically taken armed possession of Santo Domingo and committed acts of war against Hayti with no right whatever, but merely in anticipation of the ratification of the treaty. Schurz's speech on these resolutions was an extremely effective demonstration in public law. Morton, presuming, as he often did in colloquy with Schurz, that the latter's foreign nativity implied a lack of familiarity with our history, sought to trip him up by reference to the opening of the Mexican War, but spoke incautiously and without due preparation. Schurz easily, completely and ludicrously discomfited him. Sumner's resolutions failed, of course, to pass, but their chief purpose was attained in drawing public attention to some very reckless acts of the administration.

On the Ku Klux question, which was the chief subject of debate in the spring of 1871, a determined purpose was manifested by the radical leaders, when once they had secured the support of the President for their policy, to make it the supreme test of party fealty and to use it for effecting the re-
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nomination and re-election of Grant in 1872. The celebrated Ku Klux Act became law on the 20th of April, 1871. It not only gave the federal courts extensive jurisdiction for the punishment of the outrages, but also authorized the President to declare in rebellion regions infested by the Ku Klux, and to suspend the *habeas corpus* and suppress the disorders by military force. Substantially, this expressed the theory that the South was again, as it had been in 1861, in insurrection against the authority of the national government. The widespread Ku Klux organization was, the radicals asserted, a revival of the great rebellion, and the Republican party, under the man who had crushed the rebels in the open field, must see to it that they should not triumph by secret conspiracy.

Schurz vigorously opposed this legislation. His reasoning was the same as on the less drastic bills of a year earlier (above, p. 320). He believed the numbers of the Ku Klux to be grossly exaggerated and their purpose to be grossly distorted. The outrages ascribed to the mysterious order were, he said, no new thing, but merely expressions, less numerous and less shocking than just after the surrender in 1865, of the general unsettlement due to the social revolution in the South. The bad government of reconstruction had aggravated the evils and postponed their abolition; but time would bring the return of order. There was nothing in the situation to warrant the proposed legislation, with its excessive centralization, its ruthless overriding of the rights of the States and its “new doctrine of constructive rebellion—the first step toward a doctrine of constructive treason.”

To the sharp and insistent demand of those who pressed the measure, that it be a test of fealty to the Republican party, Mr. Schurz took pains to give an unmistakable reply:—“I stand in the Republican party as an independent man.” He
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categorically declared that he would not be a partisan; he was a "liberal Republican," and specifically announced the liberal creed: "We desire peace and good will to all men. We desire the removal of political restrictions and the maintenance of local self-government to the utmost extent compatible with the Constitution as it is. We desire the questions connected with the Civil War to be disposed of forever, to make room as soon as possible for the new problems of the present and the future."

The significance of this pronouncement was not misunderstood. It foreshadowed a political movement, on the lines of that recently successful in Missouri, against the policies and the men of the present Republican administration. It pointed to a readjustment of party lines and particularly to a firm resistance to the renomination of Grant. In the Senate the group of out-and-out anti-administration Republicans was small—Schurz, Ferry of Connecticut, Trumbull of Illinois, Tipton of Nebraska. Among the newspaper editors and other influential men of the party there was, however, a very widespread dissatisfaction with Grant. Greeley, Halstead, Horace White, and Samuel Bowles were especially outspoken and effective.

However pure Grant's motives and intentions, his actual conduct of the administration had been far from praiseworthy. Through love of his friends and his relatives he had given office to an unusual number of wholly unqualified persons, who had brought discredit upon him as well as themselves. His gratitude to the Congressmen who had sustained his Dominican policy had turned the federal civil service in a number of States into a mere machine for the promotion of personal political ends. Morton in Indiana, Conkling in New York, Chandler in Michigan, Cameron in Pennsylvania and Butler in Massachusetts, for example, were autocrats of their respective States through the patronage bestowed by the President.

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In the reconstructed States of the South the favor of the administration was used to support especially scandalous abuses. At New Orleans, in connection with internal dissension in the Republican party, the United States troops and a revenue cutter were openly employed in promoting the fortunes of the faction which enjoyed the favor of Casey, a brother-in-law of Grant and collector of the port. In view of the policy of the Ku Klux act it appeared to many anxious Republicans that a purpose was afoot to carry the election of Grant in 1872 by the setting up of military rule again in the South.

All these various conditions kept the spirit of watchfulness and intrigue active among public men during the recess of Congress in 1871. Schurz remained in close touch with those of a liberal trend of thought, and shaped the project of thwarting the re-election of Grant. When the houses re-assembled in December the two factions in the Senate were eagerly and equally intent on opportunities for parliamentary attack and partisan advantage. Early in the session Schurz and Sumner found an opening through which to assail the administration, as they had done before, for reckless conduct in matters touching foreign nations. Information came to them that during the Franco-Prussian War great quantities of arms had been sold to France under circumstances that suggested jobbery and corruption in the War Department and outrageous disregard of the duties of a neutral. Schurz first ascertained that the record of the State Department was entirely blameless, and further that the German government would not take advantage of any revelations to call the United States to account. Having thus provided against any possibility of foreign complications, the attack was opened.

Sumner offered a resolution proposing an inquiry and investigation concerning the sale of arms to France, and on
February 13, 1872, made a speech in support of the resolution. He had not well mastered the details of the affair; and hence, while his charges of improper conduct by the government were clear enough, the evidence to sustain them was not so presented as to make out a very impressive case. Schurz was not intending to take a prominent part in the debate, but when the administration cohort—Morton, Carpenter, Conkling and others—rushed to the defense of the War Department, Sumner, laboring heavily, peremptorily summoned Schurz to his aid. From the 15th of February to the end of the month the Missouri Senator sustained with but little assistance the burden of a most violent political debate. The climax of his labor and his triumph came on the 19th and 20th.

The debate created great excitement and attracted large audiences to the galleries. On the 19th Conkling made an elaborate speech in defense of the administration, attacking Sumner and Trumbull. The whole White House coterie was in the galleries to witness the overthrow of its adversaries. As soon as Conkling was through, Schurz demanded the floor to reply instantly, but an adjournment was moved and carried, assuring him the floor for the next day. Mrs. Schurz, who had listened to Conkling, was very much dejected and told her husband on the way home that she did not think he could answer Conkling's speech. He tried to restore her courage and then employed the better part of the night in studying the documents once more and in arranging his ideas for the reply. But he could not prevail upon his wife to accompany him to the Senate the next day. When he arrived at the Capitol he found the avenues of the Senate chamber filled with so great a crowd that he could with difficulty make his way through it. As soon as Schurz got the floor, Fenton of New York moved that the doors of the Senate chamber be opened to admit the ladies who could not
find room in the galleries. This was agreed to, and in a few minutes every sofa and every square foot of standing room in the chamber were filled. This audience was indeed inspiring and he never in his life spoke with so much nervous energy, fire and immediate effect. The crowd on the floor and in the galleries would at last break out at every touch, and the presiding officer found it very hard to restrain them. When Schurz finished, the larger part of the audience, after having indulged themselves in all sorts of demonstrations, rose to depart, and proceedings in the Senate had to be suspended for about a quarter of an hour. When the orator was just closing, Mrs. Schurz, who had after all been too restless to stay at home, arrived at the Senate chamber and tried in vain to get in. In a moment the crowd began to pour out, and Sumner, who was looking for some friends, met her in the lobby and, stretching out his hands, cried: "Oh, Madam, I congratulate you. Your husband has just made the greatest speech that has been heard in the Senate for twenty years." "It was indeed," said Schurz, in recalling this incident to Sumner's biographer many years later, "not the best speech, for the subject was comparatively small, but the greatest parliamentary triumph I ever had in the Senate."

To break the effect of Schurz's remarkable eloquence, which all the newspapers of the land acknowledged and recorded, his adversaries turned their batteries almost exclusively upon him and his personal aims. Morton represented him as seeking merely to turn the German vote over to the Democrats, and dwelt with special iteration upon Schurz's public declaration that he would not support Grant under any circumstances. Conkling pressed again the intimation made before, that Schurz, in order to besmirch the administration, had acted in collusion with some spy or emissary of a foreign
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power. In his most sonorous and rasping language the showy New York Senator charged Schurz with putting on airs of personal courage; with indulging in cowardly insinuations that the President was corrupt; and with seeking to deter those who would properly resent such insinuations by "frisky and portentous proclamation" of the danger which they would incur.

Conkling was evidently in a state of intense irritation and he exposed himself to a quick and deadly retort. "If I did and said anything yesterday that looked like strutting," said Schurz, "then I most sincerely beg the Senate's pardon; for I certainly did not want to encroach upon the exclusive privilege of my honorable and distinguished associate from New York. If I did and said anything that looked like boasting, let me assure you, sir, that it was not the remark that 'even if I met a thousand of his kind I would not quail'; for I would not consider that a striking demonstration of courage."

Carpenter of Wisconsin harped upon the charge that Schurz, in seeking to fasten wrong-doing upon his own government in relation to another power, was false to patriotic duty and forgetful of the sentiment "My country, right or wrong." Schurz avowed his devotion to that sentiment with this addition: "My country, right or wrong: if right, to be kept right; if wrong, to be set right."

The arduous and brilliant fortnight of parliamentary fencing brought small results so far as the original issue was concerned. A committee of investigation was appointed by the Senate, but the administration majority saw to it that neither Sumner nor Schurz was a member. The latter was permitted, however, to question witnesses. In May a report was made acquitting the officials of all wrong-doing in connection with the sale of arms. Mr. Schurz, while admitting that the testi-
mony fell short of establishing guilt by legal evidence, felt that this failure was due to the hostile attitude of the committee toward the accusers, and believed all his life that the War Department had acted recklessly and illegally and that illegitimate money-making was at the bottom of the business.

This debate increased twentyfold Mr. Schurz’s forensic reputation. He had already won a recognition as one of the strong men of the Senate in the serious discussion of large problems and policies; now he also ranked with those who were most dangerous in the quick parry and thrust of impromptu partisan debate. Conkling never spoke to Schurz again, for Schurz’s disdainful sarcasm gave him as painful a wound as he received when Blaine likened him to a turkey-gobbler. The attitude of the administration press during and after the debate gave conclusive if disagreeable evidence of the new importance achieved by the Missouri Senator. Ingenious and malignant slanders assailed him from all sides with redoubled frequency, but throughout it all there was the grumbling admission that his work on the floor of the Senate had been wonderfully adroit and effective.
II

THE LIBERAL REPUBLICAN

In the national Liberal Republican movement of 1872 Mr. Schurz was from the outset the leading spirit. His non-partisan success in Missouri, his brilliant achievements in the Senate, and both the moral tone and the intellectual quality of his appeals to public opinion, whether as journalist or as popular orator, had won him the applause of thinking men in all parts of the country; while tens of thousands of the best German-Americans had long regarded him with pride and welcomed his friendly political counsel.

During the recess of Congress in the summer and autumn of 1871, he varied the quiet course of his editorial occupation in St. Louis with political addresses, notably at Chicago early in August and at Nashville late in September. The spirit and purpose underlying these speeches are best expressed in a long, confidential letter to Sumner, of September 30th:

"Grant and his faction carry at present everything before them by force majeure. The organization of the Republican party is almost entirely in the hands of the office-holders and ruled by selfish interest. In all you say about Grant, you are unquestionably right. You ask me, what can be done to avert the calamity of another four years of such rule? I answer, we must act with energy. I am fully determined not to sit still. I doubt now whether we can prevent his nomination. The men who surround him stop at nothing. But I shall not support him. Neither shall I support the Democrats. Far
from it. But I think,—in fact I firmly believe,—in case of Grant's nomination we shall have a third movement on foot strong enough to beat both him and the Democrats. I have commenced already to organize it, and when the time comes, I think it will be ready for action...

"A very large number of Southerners, especially young men who have become disgusted with their old leaders, care nothing about the Democratic party; but they detest Grant. They are sincerely willing to uphold the new order of things in every direction, if they are generously treated. I enclose the heading of a subscription list, the programme of an association which I started when at Nashville. It will be composed of Republicans and former rebels—in fact of all who are willing to work for the objects stated. How do you like that platform? Does it not contain everything you ever fought for? Well, this organization will soon make its public appearance—and I would ask you not to mention the subject to anybody until you see it referred to in the papers. It is intended to establish similar associations all over the South and corresponding ones in the Northern States, and during the winter this can be accomplished. Before the time for holding the Republican National Convention arrives, this will be a power fit to absorb the best elements of both parties,—and there is the prospect of beating the Democrats on one and the personal-government-men on the other side.—If I could only impart to you my convictions—and they are very carefully formed and sincere—of the right manner of treating the Southern question, how glad I would be! You ought to be the great leader of this movement which will create the party of the future. It is the only manner in which the equal rights of all can be permanently secured in the South. All your Ku Klux and enforcement-laws avail nothing, if we do not
find the means to control public opinion, and this is the way to do it. . . .

"I know that in the efforts I am now making, I have the hearty sympathy of large masses of people, not only Democrats by any means, but Republicans who are not corrupted by the patronage or frightened by official terrorism. Here in the West you can observe clearly how this movement is disintegrating the Democratic party. Our action in this State last fall has disorganized that party altogether. The late rebels are doing admirably well. They pronounce themselves without reserve for the new order of things; the old Democratic leaders can do so little with them that they despair of their own party.

"Now, I am working for substantial results, and I see many cheering signs of the times. The great evil we have to overcome is that party spirit which turns everything to selfish advantage and has created a sort of terrorism to which but too many submit. . . ."

The movement as it thus lay in the thoughts of this tireless reformer was indeed fascinating. His ideal was a great moral uprising of the people, of such volume and scope as to sweep away the existing party machinery, with the corruption and abuses which it fostered, and to establish in its stead a new political order, in which intelligence, honesty and efficiency should have their due place in the conduct of the government, and principles, not men, should fix the lines of party division. This evangel of an ideal organization constituted the artistic crown of all his speeches in support of the liberal movement. Yet he never long lost touch with the actualities of the existing situation, and was as keen as the most matter-of-fact of his associates in urging upon audiences and correspondents the practical means of promoting the reform.

The first step in giving concreteness to the national move-
ment was the action of a great Liberal Republican mass meeting at Jefferson City, Missouri, on January 24, 1872. This meeting adopted resolutions demanding that the Republican party stand for amnesty, tariff reform and civil-service reform, and inviting all Republicans desiring these reforms to meet in national mass convention at Cincinnati on May 1. Mr. Schurz was naturally in close touch with this Missouri meeting and accepted it as the best available instrument for promoting the ends to which he was committed. There was nothing non-partisan, however, in the assembly at Jefferson City. The purpose accentuated in its proceedings was to make the movement distinctively Republican—to force the nomination by the regular party convention of some one else than Grant. That a candidate should actually be named at Cincinnati was considered by some influential Liberals, notably Trumbull, as neither necessary nor desirable. All that they aimed at was so imposing a demonstration of reform sentiment among Republicans as to convince the administration faction that the renomination of Grant would mean the loss of the election. In the background, however, always lay the possibility of action according to the Missouri precedent of 1870—a nomination that should be endorsed by the Democrats in case the heart of the Grant faction should be hardened beyond relenting.

For this last resort Mr. Schurz had personally little desire. His distrust of the Democracy as an organization was deep and abiding. In Missouri, after the victory of 1870, he had been greatly disquieted by the election of Francis P. Blair, Jr., a peculiarly radical Democrat, to be his colleague in the Senate. That the Democrats should have exacted so heavy a price for their alliance with the Liberals confirmed in Schurz his despair of progress through the old party. His hope
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was that the organization would disintegrate and that the liberal men of it would individually join the party of reform.

By the middle of April it had become clear to the well-informed that the Grant Republicans, though seriously disturbed by the Cincinnati movement, were resolved to persist in their purpose of a renomination. The adhesions to the Liberal cause had been formidable in numbers and importance; many famous Republicans had endorsed the call to Cincinnati; but many others, equally famous, like George William Curtis and Charles Sumner, of undoubted sympathy with the loftiest political ideals, had not enlisted with the Liberals. Moreover, the rank and file of the party that had chosen Grant in 1868 did not welcome the demand that they abandon their hero. In such circumstances the reformers had no recourse but to make a nomination at Cincinnati, and to look to the Democracy for much of the support needed to insure success in the election.

To Mr. Schurz this turn of affairs was far from pleasing. It naturally brought into the foreground the discussion of men rather than measures, of personalities rather than principles. While most of his associates arrayed themselves in active and eager support of this or that candidate for the nomination, he refrained from announcing any preference, and strove only to insure that the convention should be free from the ignoble methods and influences which usually characterized such assemblies, and that no man should be nominated who did not represent, in antecedents and character, the highest ideals of Republicanism and reform.

The Liberals assembled at Cincinnati May 1st. Schurz was acknowledged to be, as Horace White wrote at the time to Trumbull, "the leader and master mind of this great movement." As was inevitable, however, men and interests that were alien to the aims and ideals of its leader had become in-
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involved in the movement, and these disturbing elements made themselves conspicuous from the outset. Against the spirit of intrigue and petty jealousy which they manifested, Schurz entered an eloquent protest. He was chosen permanent chairman of the convention and on May 3rd delivered an address which is probably unique in the annals of political assemblies. All the abundant resources of his oratorical faculty were applied to the purpose of holding his hearers to an exalted conception of their mission. After a perfunctory though eloquent denunciation of the administration and a eulogy of the reformers he warned these against methods of action that would imperil all they had gained. It will ruin the cause of reform forever, he declared, "if we attempt to control and use this movement by the old tricks of political trade, or fritter away our zeal in small bickerings and mere selfish aspirations. We must obey the purest and loftiest inspirations of the popular uprising which sent us here." "No merely personal consideration, whether negative or positive, should be controlling. I earnestly deprecate the cry we have heard so frequently: 'Anybody to beat Grant!' There is something more wanted than to beat Grant." Mere availability he begged the convention to leave out of account in their choice of a candidate; "superior intelligence coupled with superior virtue" must be sought. Not merely an honest and a popular man, but a statesman is needed. In seeking for such a man "let us despise, as unworthy of our cause the tricky manipulations by which, to the detriment of the public, political bodies have so often been controlled." Personal friendship and State pride, while noble, must be laid aside, he argued, for the sake of duty to the country and responsibility for its future.

In vain were these appeals addressed to the convention. The spirit they sought to exorcise ruled many of the delegates,
who were not of the stuff to respond to the chairman's lofty sentiments. Four names had been especially canvassed in the ante-convention discussions as to the presidential candidacy—Charles Francis Adams, Lyman Trumbull, Horace Greeley and David Davis. Of these only Adams and Trumbull were regarded by Mr. Schurz as in all respects fulfilling the ideal requirements. Greeley and Davis, however, were supported by many of the busy intriguers whose spirit and methods he had just denounced. He had been privately assured by such influential Democrats as August Belmont and Theodore Randolph that Adams, if nominated at Cincinnati, would be accepted by the Democracy; but the friends of Greeley in particular insisted that only their favorite was certain to secure Democratic endorsement. The New York and Pennsylvania delegates in the convention included many members whose only interest in the affair was a desire to get even with Grant for having preferred Conkling and Cameron to Fenton and Curtin respectively in the Republican faction-fights in the two States. These delegates, veterans of many a bitterly contested political field, had no thought of cleansing themselves and adopting the unwonted moral standard set up by Schurz and his friends, but promptly began to work on the familiar lines and with the familiar methods to secure the nomination for the man of their preference.

Of the leading candidates Davis and Greeley were notoriously most eager for preferment, and least in sympathy with the spirit in which the Liberal movement had been conceived. A project to secure a successful combination of the Davis and the Greeley forces was suddenly put aside for a deal with Gratz Brown and his friends. Brown, who had been proposed as a candidate for the Presidency by the Missouri delegation, was not generally recognized as having the quali-
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ties of more than a "favorite son." Yet he seemed to be a promising possibility for the second place. Ever since the election of Frank Blair as Senator from Missouri a coolness had existed between Brown and Schurz, because the latter had strongly objected to Blair's candidacy, while Brown had supported it.

Brown did not go to Cincinnati for the opening of the convention. Irritated, however, by reports that Schurz was seeking to divert the votes of Missouri to Adams, and vexed, in all probability, by Schurz's prominence and influence, Brown, accompanied by Blair, hastened to Cincinnati before the balloting began, and promptly came to an understanding with the Greeley men. Accordingly, after the first ballot, in which Adams led with 203 votes and Brown received 95, Brown ascended the platform, withdrew his name and urged the nomination of Greeley. The effect was seen on the second ballot, when Greeley's vote rose to equal that of Adams. The two remained very close till the sixth ballot, when, under the skillful and persistent pressure and manipulation of the intriguers, the change of votes to Greeley began, and he was nominated. Brown was duly rewarded for his services, by receiving on the second ballot the nomination for the Vice-Presidency.

Greeley's nomination was a heavy blow to Schurz. It destroyed in an instant the whole fabric of the reform movement as he had so laboriously shaped it. Greeley was ludicrously remote in personality and notoriously separated in principle from the ideals which the true Liberals had avowed. To secure and retain the support of the New York and Pennsylvania protectionists, of whom Greeley was the spokesman, the Liberal leaders had with much reluctance surrendered the tariff plank of the Missouri platform. The convention's committee on resolutions frankly admitted that sentiment in regard
to the tariff was hopelessly divided. This was far from the method of uncompromising devotion to principle as Schurz had conceived it; it was an initial concession to the idea of availability, and the fact and manner of Greeley's nomination completed the deviation thus begun. Under date of May 11, 1872, Schurz wrote to Samuel Bowles, the editor of the Springfield (Massachusetts) Republican: "I cannot yet think of the results of the Cincinnati convention without a pang. I have worked for the cause of reform in the largest sense of the word in good faith. I was frequently told at Cincinnati that I might exercise a decisive influence upon the selection of the candidates, and probably it was so. I did not do it because I considered it a paltry ambition to play the part of a President-maker, and because I desired that the nomination should appear as a spontaneous outgrowth of an elevated popular feeling, which would have made it stronger and more valuable. Everything seemed to promise so well. And then to see a movement which had apparently been so successful beyond all reasonable anticipations at the decisive moment taken possession of by a combination of politicians striking and executing a bargain in the open light of day—and politicians, too, belonging to just that tribe we thought we were fighting against, and the whole movement stripped of its moral character and dragged down to the level of an ordinary political operation; this, let me confess it, was a hard blow; and if I appear in the light of a defeated party, I do not under such circumstances object."

Though his cause was lost, Mr. Schurz had the satisfaction of knowing that he had won the admiration and esteem of all the purest and noblest spirits in the Liberal movement. Commendation of his attitude in the convention and regrets that he had been overborne came to him from every direction.
Most astonishing was the effect of the Cincinnati episode upon one of his most venomous journalistic critics of those days. The New York Times, a strong supporter of the administration, had during the winter and spring singled out Schurz for vindictive abuse. The teeming vocabulary of denunciation possessed by the editor, Louis J. Jennings, had been exhausted in epithets applied to the Senator, who had in one instance of peculiarly elaborate and malicious misrepresentation gratified his assailant by a tart and vigorous reply on the floor of the Senate. It was to be expected that the humiliation of Schurz at Cincinnati would be greeted by the Times with diabolical exultation. What actually happened was a frank and unqualified reversal of judgment by the editor. On May 9th, a leader opened with these words: "There is nothing more agreeable than to find reason to believe that our estimate of a public man has been less favorable to him than his merits deserve; with regard to the Cincinnati convention especially we must make this revision of our judgment in reference to Senator Schurz. . . . His speech at that convention was worthy of the extraordinary enthusiasm with which he is regarded by men of unquestionable ability and sagacity . . . and it was also a speech of which any public man might reasonably be proud." Although Schurz had been unjust, the editor maintained, in some respects to Grant and unfair "in denouncing us as liars," he did his best at Cincinnati "to obtain a fair expression of public opinion and to defeat the paltry intrigues of political hacks."

The nomination of Greeley wrought great demoralization among the Liberal leaders. Some who had been very prominent in the movement, like Stanley Matthews, promptly repudiated the ticket and gave up the struggle for reform. Others, particularly the more earnest advocates of free trade, began to
agitate for a new convention and another candidate, Greeley was accepted, however, by many of the Liberal chiefs, like Samuel Bowles of the Springfield Republican and Horace White of the Chicago Tribune, though with little of the normal campaign enthusiasm. To the support of the nomination came now the influence of many Democratic leaders, who, little as they liked Greeley, felt that they had gone too far in promoting acceptance of the Liberal cause to turn back because the candidate did not please them. From the South, moreover, came so many and so influential voices in favor of Greeley that his rejection by the Democracy was impracticable.

During the busy weeks of discussion and adjustment that followed the Cincinnati convention, Mr. Schurz, though in constant consultation with all the factions of the Liberals, made no public announcement as to whether he would or would not support Greeley. His correspondence with the candidate was as unprecedented as the speech to the assembly by whom the candidate was named. On May 6th, Schurz addressed to Greeley a very long letter designed, as the writer explained, "to state to you with entire candor my views on the present state of things. Whatever may come there shall be honesty between us." As to candor, the letter certainly left nothing to be desired. It rehearsed the story of the bargain between the Greeley men and the Brown men, and affirmed Schurz's regretful conviction that "the first fruit of the great reform, so hopefully begun, was a successful piece of political huckstering," which "could not fail to shake the whole moral basis of the movement. . . . In its present shape it does not longer appeal to that higher moral sense which we hoped to have evoked in the hearts and minds of the people. Its freshness and flavor are gone and we have come down to the ordinary level of a campaign of politicians." The result of this situation
Schurz depicted in the gloomiest colors. Not only the revenue-reformers, but especially the Germans in a body had abandoned the cause when the nomination was made. The most prominent German leaders of the West, he said, were "not only dissatisfied, but fully determined to oppose the ticket with their whole strength and deaf to argument—unwilling, as they said, to be the victims and tools of Frank Blair and New York politicians. . . . To the best of my information my paper [the Westliche Post] is to-day the only German paper in the country which has come out for the ticket." . . . As to the prospects of success in the campaign, Schurz wrote without much hope. "I should not be troubled by any difficulties in the way did I still see and feel the same moral force as before by which to combat and overcome them. But all is changed. That element which was least inspired with the great and noble tendencies of this movement stands before the people as its controlling power, and that element cannot conduct a campaign like this successfully." The letter contained reiterated expressions of undiminished confidence in Greeley's personal uprightness: "I am very far from suspecting you of having been a party to this arrangement. I believe in you as a pure and honest man." In conclusion Schurz wrote that he was not clear "whether it is best to go on in the direction we have taken or to begin again at the beginning. I confess frankly to you that I cannot tell yet what I shall do for my part. I ask you only to believe that whatever I may do will not be dictated by any selfish motives, but by the sincerest regard for you and my best convictions of duty. I shall be happy if you will speak to me with the same frankness which has inspired every word of this letter."

The invitation of this concluding sentence was cordially accepted by Greeley in this reply:
"Dear Sir:

"I have just read your letter of the 6th. I think I can fully enter into your feelings, since I expected to be called upon to support Adams or Davis for President under circumstances scarcely dissimilar from yours. I knew, and you can easily assure yourself, that the sympathizers with our movement in the South were nearly all for me, yet they were represented at Cincinnati by delegates who nearly all opposed me. They represented the money that brought them to Cincinnati, not the people they left behind them. And the 'Revenue Reformers' from this quarter were not Republicans at all, but frauds. They had not been near a Republican meeting before for years, if ever. Still I expected to support a ticket which I knew did not deal fairly with the people behind it.

"Of course the most of the Germans dislike me, not so much that I am a Protectionist as that I am a Total Abstinence man. They will not vote for me so generally as they would have voted for Adams or Trumbull. And still I believe that I shall receive 75,000 Republican votes in Illinois, and her electoral vote. Even should she go against me I hope we shall be able to do without her. We shall carry New York, Connecticut, New Hampshire, New Jersey and the South with hardly a break. I hope the Northwest will help us some; if she does not, we must endeavor to get on.

"From the first I peremptorily refused to have anything to do with bargains or arrangements of any kind. They were proposed from several quarters and rejected with scorn. Hence I did not see how my nomination could be effected with the South so shamefully misrepresented.

"I wish, in what we may have to say hereafter, the words [330]
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"Free Trade" would suit you as well as "Revenue Reform." The former phrase has a definite meaning; the latter seems to me a juggle.

"If I might presume to advise you I would say Wait: Take time for reflection and consultation. I do not see how this course can harm anyone. I am confident that the 'sober second thought' will bring us all into proper relations.

"With many thanks for your personal good will and kindness, I remain,

"Yours,
"HORACE GREELEY."

From these initial letters, and with increasing clearness from others that followed, it was evident that the "frankness" which characterized them was not likely to promote any remarkable degree of harmony between the candidate and the Liberal chief—between the man whose nomination was the product of "political huckstering" and the man whose demand for revenue-reform was a "juggle" and whose associates in the demand were "frauds." On May 18th, Schurz wrote that the chances were heavily against Greeley's election, that another Liberal Republican ticket was soon to be in the field, and that the acceptance of the Cincinnati nomination ought to be postponed till the outlook became more clear. Greeley replied, dissenting entirely from Schurz's view of things, and declaring: "I shall accept unconditionally."

Meanwhile friends of Schurz and Greeley took up the task of repairing the breach which the frankness of the correspondence between the two men was steadily widening. The result was told to Schurz in a letter from Horace White dated June 9th. Mr. White after an evening with the candidate at the house of Waldo Hutchins, wrote "Greeley made the im-
pression on me of a sincere, confiding man. He argued like a baby with me about his right to write that letter to you in answer to one you wrote to him, since, as he said, he did not nominate himself at Cincinnati, had no communication with Gratz Brown or any of his friends thereon, etc., etc. He ended by acknowledging that he had done wrong, and authorizing me to go down to the Tribune office to-day and insert an article saying that his correspondence had become so voluminous that he could not undertake to answer any more letters. His Astor House headquarters are to be broken up immediately."

The reference in Schurz's letter of May 18th to another Liberal ticket alluded to a conference which was being planned by those who were dissatisfied with the Cincinnati ticket. A call for this conference, signed by Schurz, J. D. Cox, Otten dorfer, Bryant and others, brought together some three score men at the Fifth Avenue Hotel, New York, on June 20. A free discussion, participated in by representatives of all shades of feeling on the situation, showed a predominant opinion that Greeley should be accepted. This opinion was sustained in a forceful speech by Mr. Schurz, closing the conference. The conviction at which he had arrived was that the possibility of ideal reform through the present election had been destroyed by the painful and distressing result reached at Cincinnati, and that the only question now was the perfectly practical one: Which of two unsatisfactory candidates would afford the more promise of success for a true reform four years hence? To this question he believed the answer clearly was: Greeley.

In the spirit of this declaration Mr. Schurz made a number of speeches during the campaign. They were naturally against Grant rather than for Greeley, and they lacked the quality which a different candidate and a less hopeless cause
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would have inspired. The overwhelming triumph of Grant was not unexpected by Mr. Schurz and was received in a spirit of true philosophy, which did not permit the ideal of reform to lose for a moment the sway which it held over his mind.
III

THE SENATORIAL FREE LANCE

WHEN the Senate met in December, 1872, after the humiliating tragedy of the Greeley campaign, the position of Schurz and his fellow Liberals had apparently little in it of present comfort or of future cheer. Yet events began at once to give them justification and encouragement. In Louisiana a fierce struggle for the control of the State between two factions of carpetbaggers led to the installation and support, through use of federal troops, of that faction which was headed by Kellogg, and supported by Casey, Grant's brother-in-law, and other prominent Federal officials. The events at New Orleans and at other Southern capitals greatly shocked public sentiment at the North; and even the administration Senators were divided as to the soundness of the President's policy. Morton was the chief supporter of the President in Louisiana matters, and very skillfully thwarted all attempts to loosen the grip of Kellogg on the gubernatorial chair, which federal bayonets closely guarded. Schurz, in debate with Morton in February, was hardly more severe than Carpenter and other Republican Senators in denunciation of Kellogg and the administration; but all effort to move Grant was in vain. The situation gave obvious strength, however, to the whole Liberal contention that the policy of the President in the South tended to the destruction of liberty and order not only in the reconstructed, but also in the other States of the Union.

Such conditions confirmed the fears and predictions of
Schurz as to the tendencies of the Grant régime in Southern affairs. At the same time the stream of legislative and administrative scandals began the steady flow which long before the end of Grant's second term demonstrated Schurz's Cassandra-like accuracy in foretelling a general decline of moral tone in political life. During the winter of 1872-73 the Credit Mobilier revelations, followed by the "salary-grab," brought many respectable reputations into the mire. A sensational case of bribery in Kansas, in which one Caldwell had with little effort at concealment bought his election to the United States Senate, gave Schurz an opportunity, at the special session of the Senate in March, 1873, to make a glowing denunciation of the corrupt influences that were at work all around Congress, especially in connection with the great corporations. At the next session, 1873-74, scandals multiplied. The notorious Sanborn contracts forced a Secretary of the Treasury to resign; gross irregularities in the Interior, the War and the Navy Departments were either revealed or strongly suggested; and fraud and extravagance in the government of the District of Columbia led to the peremptory abolition of the whole system, with a vigorous slap at the President, by a nearly unanimous vote of the Senate, when he sought to appoint to office under the new order his crony, A. H. Shepherd, the chief offender under the old. It was indeed a malodorous flood of corruption and disgrace, and the high-water mark was reached at the revelations of the infamous Whiskey Ring frauds and the sale of post-traderships by Secretary Belknap in 1875 and 1876.

Meanwhile, in the autumn of 1873 the great financial and industrial crisis occurred, which introduced a wholly new element into the political situation and crossed the lines that separated the parties with troublesome questions of the finances
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and the currency. Inflation or contraction, "greenbacks" or specie resumption, were the problems with which Congress was called upon to struggle; and throwing himself with ardor into the long and complex discussion of these subjects, Mr. Schurz added new laurels to those already won for cogent doctrine and effective debate. He was the ardent and uncompromising champion of sound money and the early resumption of specie payments. Other leading exponents of the same ideas, especially John Sherman, chairman of the committee of finance, were greatly embarrassed by the party conditions to which they felt obliged to make much concession. Throughout the West the demand for more "greenbacks" was almost as widespread and importunate among Republicans as among Democrats. Hence the Western Republican Senators felt the situation very keenly and were disposed to take half measures where they actually believed that drastic legislation was needed to put the currency on a sound basis. Three prominent Western Republicans, Morton of Indiana, Logan of Illinois, and Ferry of Michigan, committed themselves definitely to an expansion of the paper currency. Therefore they became Mr. Schurz's chosen antagonists.

In the early months of 1874 the inflationist sentiment was sufficiently strong to carry a bill through both houses providing for an increase of the greenbacks by some forty-four millions of dollars. This bill President Grant, after much hesitation, vetoed. In the discussion of the bill, which assumed at times a very bitter tone, Schurz did heroic work. On the 14th of January and the 24th of February he made speeches which set forth with marked effectiveness the doctrine as to commercial crises and inconvertible currency that represented the best scientific thought of the day. History and economic theory, marshalled with fullness of knowledge and exactness
of reasoning, were the foundation of his argument. These speeches were the product of much technical study and laborious preparation, and commanded the attention of scholars and statesmen alike.

The speech of February 24th was particularly strong. It and the two on Santo Domingo were considered by himself the best of his senatorial career. The public most enjoyed some personal incidents of the debate, which were unimportant except in bringing out certain qualities of the debaters. Morton of Indiana and Cameron of Pennsylvania pleaded that the existing situation in the United States was unique, and not to be judged by principles derived from the history of other times and other places. Schurz felt that this argument, or, rather, pretentious begging of the question, was insincere and that his adversaries, from motives of mere party expediency, were misrepresenting their real convictions. He made no effort to conceal his contempt for such subterfuges, and gave full play to his formidable powers of sarcasm and irony. This led to unusually sharp encounters. Morton replied with asperity, and employed that pitiable last resource of native politicians against such an antagonist—that a foreigner is unable to understand this country. Schurz in return struck a vital point by showing that the inconsistencies of Morton's record on the currency question,—inconsistencies that were exceedingly marked and were notoriously determined by the trend of popular feeling in the West,—indicated that Morton understood the shifting of public sentiment better than he did the science of public finance. Morton was prompt to retort with the "tu quoque" which Schurz's abandonment of the regular Republican party suggested. To an independent and a man of principles, this retort had no force whatever. Morton admitted that he himself had changed his opinions and would do so again
whenever he came to think them wrong; he boasted, as partisans should, that he had never so changed his mind as to be obliged to go out of his party: "I have never betrayed my principles; I have never betrayed my friends; I have never betrayed those who elevated me to power, and sought to use that power for their destruction." Schurz's reply combined sharp criticism with an epigrammatic expression of his philosophy of political action: "I want him to point out in my record a single principle that I ever betrayed. I want him to show in the platforms of policy I have favored a single contradiction. He will not find one. He has never left his party; I have never betrayed my principles. That is the difference between him and me."

It is always difficult for a man of Schurz's qualities to conceal a certain righteous indignation at the evasions and ignorance of presumptuous politicians. Logan, whose forte was heat rather than light, would have been insufferably exasperating if he had not often displayed an amusing lack of information and of logic. Schurz evidently believed Morton to be insincere rather than ignorant. To that Senator's oft-repeated and pompous cant—that the peculiar circumstances of the United States warranted deviation from sound economic principles—Schurz replied in these words: "Sir, when I want to discuss mathematics or geometry with anyone I shall require him to assent to certain fundamental propositions before we proceed; for instance, the proposition that two and two make four, and that a straight line is the shortest way from one point to another. When a gentleman who wants to discuss mathematics or geometry with me asserts that two and two make four in another country but not here, and that the proposition that a straight line is the shortest way from one point to another may have been believed in five hundred years ago,
but is not suited to the progressive spirit of our times, and that the shortest way from one point to another is a curve, I shall tell him: 'You had better go to your hornbook, study your multiplication table, and look at Euclid, who may not have been born here and who died several hundred years ago, but from whom, after all, you might derive some very valuable information.'

The outcome of all the discussion was, to Schurz's great disgust, a measure, patched up to secure a sufficient majority in Congress and at the same time the President's approval, providing for substantially twenty-six millions of additional "greenbacks."

The next session of Congress opened just after the elections of 1874, in which the Republicans met with a general and overwhelming disaster. A new bill dealing with the currency situation was now promptly framed by Sherman and, by the most rigorous party pressure, was ultimately put into such shape as to insure its passage by the Republican majority. This was the famous Resumption Act, setting January 1, 1879, as the date for the payment of the greenbacks in coin. The bill was very defective in many respects, and ambiguous in others, and was at once sharply attacked by Schurz at these weak points. The ambiguities had been left by the Republican caucus because through that process alone could any agreement be reached. Schurz, always free from partisan considerations, was at liberty to expose the weaknesses of the measure, and did so without mercy. But under the pressure of party exigency that had brought the Republicans together, his opposition was overridden and the measure was passed as reported. Because it had some good and important features, he voted for it, but with the regret that he could not get amendments that would make the act more positive and rational. 

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The elections of 1874 transferred the control not only of the lower house in Congress, but also of State and local governments generally, from the Republicans to their adversaries. The Grant régime—to the destruction of which Schurz had devoted all his hopes and energies for years—was mercilessly repudiated by the people. In this, of course, Schurz found much cause for gratification. "How Sumner has been avenged!" he wrote to a friend just after the election. But at the same time it was evident that the elections in Missouri had put the control of the State entirely into the hands of the extreme or "Bourbon" Democracy, on the eve of the expiration of Schurz's senatorial term, March 4, 1875. Only a campaign or two earlier, after Schurz had broken his party ties to insure that the injustice to this class of Democrats should cease, he was everywhere received by them with irrepressible enthusiasm. The demonstrations of favor sometimes went so far that a little company of lank and vigorous rustics would seize him and bear him on their shoulders amid wild shouts. This was exceedingly distasteful to him, whose enthusiasms were purely intellectual. On a particularly irritating occasion of that sort, he remarked: "Oh, yes, you are wonderfully fond of me now, but you will soon choose a Confederate brigadier to succeed me." Even after the election of 1874 some of his friends tried to convince him and themselves that the triumphant Missouri Democracy would have enough of the Liberal spirit to send him back as their Senator. He did not for a moment share this delusion. He knew a thousand times too much of practical politics to forget that if republics are ungrateful, parties are greedy. True to his early prophecy, the Democratic legislature of Missouri in a few weeks elected General Cockrell as his successor.

Meantime he was actively considering private arrange-
ments for the future, and consulting with his friends, especially in the East, concerning some new occupation worthy of his abilities and agreeable to his tastes. He received offers for large literary undertakings of historical character, and at one time contemplated moving to Massachusetts to be near the best libraries and in touch with the many highly intellectual friends that he had made in that region. His project was approved by F. W. Bird of Boston and by Samuel Bowles of Springfield, the latter characteristically warning Schurz against the narrow and provincializing influence of Boston and suggesting that he might find Springfield or Northampton more to his taste. Bowles also suggested, what would doubtless have appealed very strongly to Schurz, that a return to the Senate from Massachusetts might not be a too remote possibility.

During the final months of senatorial labor in the winter of 1874-75 he had occasion once more to arraign the administration for its renewed interference by force in the affairs of Louisiana. A well-rounded and philosophical discussion of the tendency of things represented by this policy of the administration was the last formal oration of Mr. Schurz on the floor of the Senate.

Two weeks after he ceased to be Senator he wrote to F. W. Bird: "I see some reason to hope that the year 1876 will present an opportunity for a movement such as that of 1872 ought to have been." This expression suggests the fidelity of the writer to the ideals of the Cincinnati convention, and reveals that in March, 1875, he was revolving in his mind a project to secure in 1876 the triumph that the Liberal Republican movement of 1872 had lost through an unfortunate nomination.

During the first half of Grant's second administration the
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Liberal Republican party faded gradually out of existence. Its organization disappeared; its members sought shelter, some again in the Republican, some in the Democratic fold. But Mr. Schurz and his thoroughly kindred spirits could have no thoughts of party affiliation while maladministration, corruption or false notions of public finance were in control. The greenback and inflation heresy affected both parties, but it found a distinctly better reception among the Democrats. The Independents were radical hard-money men, and they found in President Grant's veto of the worst inflation bill in the spring of 1874 partial atonement for the shortcomings of his administration. With the return of the old war horses of the Bourbon Democracy among the victors of 1874 came frequent proclamations of the ancient party spirit. This still further repelled the Independents. But there was in the Democratic as in the Republican party an element in strong sympathy with the ideals of the reformers, and the possibility of securing through these elements an effective recognition of reform by both parties was the thought that determined Mr. Schurz's preparations for the next presidential campaign.

Throughout the spring of 1875 there was much correspondence on the subject between Schurz and the various members of the brilliant coterie of intimates who looked to him as leader. E. L. Godkin, Horace White, General J. D. Cox, Samuel Bowles, Charles Nordhoff, Murat Halstead, and the sons of Charles Francis Adams, especially Henry and Charles Francis, Jr., were prominent in this group, and a number of them met Schurz at a private dinner in New York at the end of April, where the plan of campaign for the next year was thoroughly canvassed. Shortly afterwards Mr. Schurz crossed the ocean to spend several months in Europe.

During the summer State politics in Ohio took a turn
that enlisted the serious attention of the Liberal group. Charles Francis Adams, Jr., wrote Schurz on June 28th that Ohio was where "our battle for '76 is to be lost or won," and deplored the absence of the leader from the country. "I do verily believe," Adams continued, "that if you could be turned into Ohio this year with Grosvenor as your lieutenant to organize the Independent vote . . . a wholly new face would be put on the relations of parties to public questions in the conflict of next year." The thought was taken up by Halstead and Nordhoff at a conference in Cincinnati. They wrote identical notes in July, urging Schurz to return in time for the campaign. The Democrats had renominated Governor William Allen and had pushed to the front as the chief issues inflation and the repeal of the Resumption Act. Rutherford B. Hayes was the Republican candidate and stood stoutly for resumption and hard money. Adams renewed his urging that Schurz should take a hand in the contest, declaring that Allen's election would be a shocking blow to the Liberal cause. "The weapon with which to kill him is the German vote; it is the only effective weapon at hand, and you are its holder. You must come back in time to strike in just at the close, with all the freshness and prestige of your recent German reception." Several prominent Ohio Liberals added their entreaties to those of his more intimate friends, and Mr. Schurz, wholly in sympathy with their purpose, curtailed his vacation and reached home in the middle of September.

He went promptly to Ohio and spoke frequently in both German and English, in support of Hayes. But he took great pains to emphasize his detachment from both parties, confining himself in his speeches to the money question and avoiding personal relations with the candidate whom he was supporting. Hayes was elected by a small majority. "I got home this
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morning,” wrote Charles Francis Adams, Jr., to Schurz, “serene in the knowledge that ‘old Bill Allen’s’ gray and gory scalp was safely dangling at your girdle.” The chairman of the Republican State Committee formally ascribed to Schurz much of the credit for the victory. At the same time the chairman apologized for not having paid Schurz's campaign expenses and offered to do so. This offer, acceptance of which would have compromised the whole theory and purpose of the speaker’s participation, was declined. “I was glad,” Schurz wrote, “to have an opportunity to do what I did do, and feel amply compensated by the result.”

Such moral satisfaction, however, does not provide for the necessities of life. So the Ohio campaign was followed by a particularly long and full season of public lecturing. Schurz’s picturesque career, his philosophical mind and inspiring eloquence had for over a decade and a half made him a favorite on the lyceum stage. This enabled him easily to supplement his never large income, whose most regular, if not always most considerable, source was journalism. During the long and tedious lecturing tours of this autumn and the winter of 1875-76 he labored incessantly, by correspondence and personal conference, upon the scheme for “a movement such as that of 1872 ought to have been.” In November, 1875, when it seemed possible that the nomination of Grant for a third term would be attempted, Schurz was full of a project for insuring the nomination of Charles Francis Adams, Sr., by both parties. But shortly afterward the House of Representatives almost unanimously passed a resolution against a third term. With Grant eliminated, Adams ceased to be the most available candidate for the Independents, and Morton, Conkling, ex-Speaker Blaine and Bristow, Secretary of the Treasury, became the leading candidates for the Republican nomination. Schurz
soon began to agitate for Bristow, whose mettle as an aggressive and efficient reformer had been tested.

Blaine, however, was developing great strength, and was favorably regarded by many of the Independents, because he had advocated some liberal measures and was always mentally alert and winning. Morton and Conkling were his strongest rivals. As Grant’s lieutenants and ready champions, between them they commanded most of the strictly partisan support. The passions of the wartime were dozing. In order to draw off from Morton and Conkling their peculiarly partisan support, Blaine, on January 10, 1876, found an opportunity in the House of Representatives to make a spectacular attack on the ex-Confederates and in the most lurid colors to describe the horrors of the Confederate prisons. The effect was instantaneous. Northern prejudice blazed forth. Blaine stalked to the center of the stage. But he had not foreseen the influence of such a maneuver on the Independents that had favored him. Many of them promptly withdrew their misplaced confidence.

Schurz had long correctly estimated Blaine’s character. On January 4, 1876, and before this new revelation, Schurz wrote to Bowles: "Strong efforts are made here [New York City] for Blaine and Bristow. Our friend [William Walter] Phelps has again succumbed under the ‘personal magnetism’ of the former, and Nordhoff also. It seems they have so engaged themselves that the chances of recovery are slim. I do my very best, but with little hope.” Six days after Blaine’s sensational speech Schurz sent Bowles this cheerful comment: “It seems almost as if Blaine had virtually killed himself as a candidate, as I always thought he would. He may seemingly revive, but I am sure he will die of too much smartness at last.”
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Blaine, of course, had no love for Schurz or his ideals, but rightly estimated the importance of obtaining the support of the head and front of the Independent movement. Much stronger opponents than Phelps or Nordhoff had succumbed to that proverbial magnetism and those famous displays of cordiality, which were almost irresistible even when wholly insincere. He plied Schurz with them from time to time, without success. Once when Schurz was at Charles Nordhoff's, Blaine appeared and renewed his solicitations after Nordhoff withdrew. When Schurz left, Blaine accompanied him. As they neared Lafayette Square, Blaine realized that, as his usual methods were unavailing, it was time for a grand coup. Growing more and more friendly and ardent, still without the desired effect, he threw his arm almost around his companion's neck, and looking him appealingly in the face said, "Carl, you won't oppose me, will you?"

Meantime Schurz had been revolving in his mind a plan for a conference of Independents to devise measures "to prevent the campaign of the centennial year from becoming a mere scramble of politicians for the spoils." The next four months were devoted to the elaboration of this plan. Quietly and with the utmost care to avoid the participation of such elements as wrecked the Cincinnati movement, the adhesion was secured of hundreds of Republicans and Independents whose names meant influence and votes.

At the most critical stage of this movement a terrible domestic affliction came upon its leader. Mrs. Schurz died March 15, 1876. Kindly and tender ministrations of the multitude of friends who surrounded the stricken husband did not avail to restore the mental balance requisite for the work in hand until weeks had been lost.

At last, however, in April the formal invitations, signed by Schurz, Theodore Woolsey, Horace White, William Cullen
Bryant and Alexander H. Bullock were issued for a conference at the Fifth Avenue Hotel on May 15th. Nearly two hundred of those invited—a much larger proportion than had been expected—attended the conference. Among those present, representing many States, were college presidents and professors, clergymen, men of letters, philanthropists and others of light and influence. The care taken to avoid the errors of 1872 was rewarded: the "practical politicians," who had brought disaster at Cincinnati, were happily absent, and the proceedings were harmonious, cautious and advisory. President Woolsey of Yale was chosen to preside, and the chief feature of the deliberations was the adoption of an address to the American people, prepared by Mr. Schurz. This formulated the needs of the time in the familiar demand for administrative reform and for the regeneration of parties through independent action of the voters. The part of the address that excited greatest interest was a series of paragraphs describing the types of politicians for whom the reformers would not vote. No names were mentioned, but the mordant phrases clearly etched the familiar forms of all the leading Republican aspirants, save Bristow, for the Presidency. Blaine, Morton, Conkling, as well as every "dark horse" whose availability might lie in his weakness and indisposition to offend, instead of in his power and resolution to crush all obstacles to reform, were thereby barred by the Independents. The adoption of the address was followed by the appointment of an executive committee, with power to reconvene the conference in case of need, which was understood to mean a failure of the Republicans to make a proper nomination.

Before the Republican convention assembled at Cincinnati, June 14th, Blaine was suffering from something more than his own "smartness": he was in the coils of his own corruption, like Laocoön in those of the serpent. He was un-
der suspicion and investigation when the conference was in session, and ere the convention met he had been seriously compromised by the facts disclosed in the Mulligan letters. Although his supporters largely outnumbered those of any other candidate, his chances were blighted. Bristow, Morton and Conkling failed to find enough support outside of their own States. By mere force of the elimination of the real leaders, Hayes, the "favorite son" of Ohio, came to the front in the balloting and was nominated.

Hayes had been assiduously pressed upon the attention of the party ever since his election as Governor of Ohio in 1875, but until recently the effect had seemed slight. As early as February, 1876, Captain A. E. Lee, the secretary of Governor Hayes, confidentially opened communication with Mr. Schurz and furnished him with a full account of Hayes' views on all the leading issues of the day. There had been no doubt on the currency question. Captain Lee convinced Mr. Schurz that Hayes also agreed with him as to the South and civil-service reform. At intervals throughout the period preceding the Republican convention Schurz received other information that gave him a pretty clear notion as to Hayes' qualities and inspired confidence that he would respond to correct influences. Consequently when Bristow was unable to impress the convention, Hayes attracted the favorable attention of many Independents. Soon after the nomination Schurz announced, at first only privately, his satisfaction with Hayes, and other prominent members of the Fifth Avenue conference did so, more or less openly.

Still others, including some who had been very near to Mr. Schurz, doubted that Hayes possessed the sterling requirements, and preferred Tilden, who was confidently expected to be the Democratic candidate. Among these were Hoadley
and Stallo of Ohio, Ottendorfer of New York, and both the elder and the younger Charles Francis Adams. Gustav Koerner of Illinois also went into the Democratic camp. It was significant of political conditions and of Schurz's good influence that Koerner, immediately after the nomination, begged Schurz to withhold for a time the publication of his support of Hayes, because if the Democrats became convinced that they could not win the Independents, they might turn away from Tilden and throw themselves into the arms of the inflationists. "We want both parties to nominate hard-money men, so that, in either case, the election of a Republican or Democrat, one of the great objects of the Liberal Republicans would be accomplished."

Schurz's choice soon became publicly known. To many of the Liberals it was a bitter disappointment, and some of them only stopped short of questioning his motives; for they understood his attitude to indicate his return to the regular Republican ranks, which he and they had abandoned in 1872. And his action was rightly regarded as signifying the termination of the Liberal Republican movement as such, which he had done most to inspire and support.

He would have preferred a new and a reform party, but next to that he had aimed to overthrow the Grant régime, to discredit such Republican politicians as Morton and Conkling and the artful Blaine, and to compel their party to choose reform leaders and a new and liberal policy. Accordingly he considered that the sweeping away of all these men and the selection of Hayes had granted much that the Liberal Republicans had demanded and was an earnest of other improvements in the near future.

Schurz's conclusion to support Hayes soon brought the two men into intimate relations. At a personal interview about
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July first, and in a copious correspondence thereafter, the ideas of the reform leader as to the contents of the letter of acceptance were energetically pressed upon the candidate. Schurz submitted at the request of Hayes a draft of the paragraph on civil-service reform, and several expressions in this draft, as well as the whole tenor, were adopted. It was at Schurz's suggestion, also, that Hayes' pledge not to be a candidate for re-election was placed immediately after the paragraph on civil-service reform, so as to emphasize the close relationship of the two subjects. The currency question Hayes at first thought should be ignored in his letter, but he finally accepted Schurz's judgment to the contrary. The letter as published proved very satisfactory to reformers and confirmed to Hayes the adhesion of a large fraction of the Independents.

While the excellent effect of the letter pleased and encouraged Mr. Schurz, certain features of the conduct of the campaign gave him much pain and stimulated strong remonstrances to Mr. Hayes. How absurdly inappropriate was the selection of Zachariah Chandler as chairman of the National Campaign Committee! But in those days neither the candidate nor the White House dictated either platforms or managers. While admitting that it would be a delicate matter for Hayes to interfere, Schurz nevertheless thought that something ought to be done. He dwelt especially upon the bad effect of the policy that Chandler would probably adopt—of levying assessments on the officeholders. Schurz's fears were promptly realized; and he, as promptly, besought Hayes to interfere and to put an end if possible to the exaction of so-called "voluntary contributions" from the officers of the government. This urgent appeal impressed Hayes. A few weeks later Schurz received from him a copy of a note he had sent to the secretary
of the National Committee, protesting against the assessments and begging that they be discouraged.

Throughout the campaign Mr. Schurz spoke with all his earnest dignity and eloquence for the side to which he had committed himself. At the same time he was in close and frequent communication with the candidate, ready to counteract any influences unfavorable to reform. Tilden had so strong a record as a reformer that the Republican cause seemed, as the campaign approached its crisis, to be in serious peril. To the shrewdest partisans, particularly Blaine and Morton and Conkling, it appeared that the only hope of success lay in emphasizing the Southern question and the possibility of rebel triumph through Democratic success. Schurz labored energetically against this view. His letters to Hayes were frequent and urgent. He claimed that unless precedence should be given to the reform issues, the Independent voters, eager for reform, would go to Tilden. "The cry for a 'change' is immensely powerful. People say, Governor Hayes is an honest man, but what good will it do to elect him if his administration is controlled by Morton, Conkling, Cameron, Chandler, Blaine, etc.—and off they go where they are sure of a 'change.' I could show you a number of letters from men of Republican sympathy, of cool judgment and more or less prominence and influence, who have taken or are inclined to take that course. . . . I feel that the subject I am discussing with you is a delicate one, but I can speak about it with entire frankness and candor, because I have no ax of my own to grind. If you are elected you will not find me among those who ask for or expect place or favor. I have been long enough in public positions to become sensible of their worthlessness as an element of human happiness, and especially since my recent bereavement I have absolutely no ambition in that line."

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Mr. Hayes not unnaturally took a different view of the situation, and all the strength and pertinacity of Mr. Schurz's representation were of little avail. Theoretically he may have liked Schurz's beneficent policy, but he could not leave out of account the party and its actual leaders although they might merit disparagement. On September 15th, Hayes wrote: "... the canvass daily brings to the front more and more as the two leading topics, the danger of the united-South victory, and the Tilden record as a reformer." In accordance with this feeling the candidate gave his whole support during the last six weeks of the campaign to a policy of exploiting Southern horrors and "viewing with alarm." Schurz, however, firmly adhered to his own chosen method of promoting the Republican cause. He alone of the leading speakers on that side subordinated the Southern question and put stress on that of administrative reform, as the ground for supporting Hayes and Wheeler.

In the exciting controversy that attended the disputed counts in three Southern States and Oregon, Mr. Schurz had little part. His arduous labors in the campaign were followed by another protracted period of lecturing. Even if he had been free from the demands of this private occupation, he would hardly have found a useful place in the complexities of the times. If he had assumed the functions of "visiting statesman," he would probably have fared like General Barlow, in Florida—flouted and ostracized by his associates for manifesting an open mind and a judicial spirit. The situation demanded the most intense partisanship, and this Schurz could never have supplied. He sought to influence Hayes in his attitude toward the contest, but the influence of others was triumphant. Especially in respect to Louisiana and its unsavory returning board, Schurz had formed during his sena-
torial term the most positive opinions, and these forbade the recognition of any element of righteousness to the Radical party there; but Hayes wrote on December 6th: "I am overwhelmed with callers congratulating me on the results declared in Louisiana. I have no doubt that we are justly and legally entitled to the Presidency; my conversation with Sherman, Garfield, Stoughton and others, settles the question in my mind as to Louisiana." Against the complacent assurance thus reached by the candidate, it was wholly in vain that Schurz pointed out the inherent weakness of any title that should rest on an act of the Louisiana returning board.

When the controversy was transferred to Congress, Schurz exerted all the influence that he could command in favor of a settlement through the agency of the Supreme Court. When at last the Electoral Commission was proposed, he earnestly supported the bill. Against the reported resolution of Hayes to accept the result as declared by the President of the Senate without reference to any other agency, Schurz entered a strong protest, entreaty and the candidate to submit to the judgment of some less biased tribunal.

But whatever the differences of opinion between Hayes and Schurz during and after the campaign, substantial harmony between them was restored when Hayes' inauguration became likely. During the latter half of January, Schurz was invited to make suggestions about the inaugural address and also the membership of the Cabinet. In response he was most urgent that the Cabinet should agree as to civil-service reform, and with this in view he suggested the names of persons for the various portfolios. Evarts, who became Secretary of State, was accordingly recommended. For the Treasury, Schurz strongly urged Bristow as the one man who had shown conclusively his aggressive strength as a practical reformer. John
Sherman was not referred to in Schurz's letters, doubtless because of the conviction, confirmed by Republican correspondents of the highest standing, like Morrill of Vermont, that, partisanship would sooner or later overcome any reforming impulses which Sherman might feel. Hayes' project of selecting one member from the South drew from Schurz the suggestion that the selection should be made from without the party lines—an idea which, though submitted with much doubt, was nevertheless acted upon by the President.

As early as December Mr. Schurz had received an intimation from General J. D. Cox, that Hayes had Schurz in mind for the Cabinet, in case the disputed count should be decided in favor of the Republicans. In February, when such a decision had become highly probable and Hayes' intentions toward Schurz had been confirmed, Schurz urged Murat Halstead to press Hayes to appoint Bristow, rather than Sherman, Secretary of the Treasury. Halstead characteristically replied: "You suggest that I go to Columbus to meet Hayes and talk Bristow. I saw him here and talked Schurz. . . . Sherman for the Treasury engaged certain. It does not seem worth while to combat the inevitable. . . . I was very urgent with Hayes to appoint you and ascertained that he had an opinion that there was no premiership in the Secretary of State, and he thought there was more room for civil-service reform work in the Interior than in the War Department. . . . Is there some danger that if you went into the Cabinet you would be a disturbing element? How would you get along with Sherman if Evarts, Hawley and Harlan were in? The Governor's remarks in reply to my urgency would be agreeable reading, but I do not feel at liberty to recite them."

Shortly afterward, on February 25th, Hayes wrote to
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Schurz: "... I do not, or have not desired to be committed on Cabinet appointments until the issue was reached. But it is perhaps proper to say that, if elected, it has for a long time been my wish to invite you to take a place in the Cabinet. I think it would be fortunate for the country, and especially for myself, if you are one of the members of the Cabinet. I am not likely to change that opinion. The Interior Department is my preference for you. The Post Office would come next." Schurz's reply to this invitation expressed a willingness to accept the Interior, but declared that for the Post Office Department a degree of practical business ability and experience was required that he did not believe he possessed.

The announcement of President Hayes' choice of his Cabinet was well received by the liberal and reforming element of his party, but evoked much caustic criticism from the radical and machine men, who foresaw that they were to have small influence in the new administration. They strongly resented the assignment of the Post Office to an ex-Confederate, General Key, but the bitterest comment was directed against the nomination of Schurz. Key, it was said, was frankly a Democrat and had never been anything else, and his appointment was a mere bit of amiable folly; but Schurz was a renegade who had deserted the Republicans in 1872 and had rejoined them only to do the party renewed damage. It was held to be especially insulting that such a man should be designated to succeed Zachariah Chandler, whose stalwart devotion to his party had been unswerving. The insufferable insult of Principle to Partisanship! The rumor that the Republicans would try to prevent the confirmation of Schurz's nomination was not surprising. To meet such a contingency some of his admirers strongly urged the Democratic Senators to vote for confirm-
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tion. It was especially gratifying to Mr. Schurz to learn that this movement was participated in by former senatorial colleagues and by Oswald Ottendorfer, who had sharply differed with him in the campaign of 1876. When the Senate came to vote on the nominations for the Cabinet no considerable opposition was made to the prospective Secretary of the Interior.
IV

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

The two great problems of policy that confronted the new administration were those of civil-service reform and a readjustment in the South. Mr. Schurz had much practical knowledge of the Southern problem, but only slight responsibility in the efforts to solve it. He had heartily approved Mr. Hayes' purpose to abandon South Carolina and Louisiana to the whites; but he had felt and expressed much doubt as to the outcome of the President's project—especially exhibited in the appointment of Key—to build up a respectable white Republican party in the South.

As to the policy of civil-service reform, Mr. Schurz was recognized on all sides as the specialist of the administration. In his own department he promptly furnished practical illustrations of the new system. The bureau chiefs and other principal subordinates were all required to submit to him full projects for the application of the merit system in the appointment and promotion of the clerical force. Starting with these wholly practical suggestions, he worked out his plan and put it into operation. Competitive examinations were provided for as the sole channel for entrance into the service; and he announced that promotion in rank and salary should depend upon like tests, together with a comparison of records as to efficiency.

This was indeed something new—so new and apparently idealistic that the politicians looked upon it as a huge, unpractical joke, and so extremely absurd that they had to hold their sides as they laughed. Finally, recovering that distinguished [377].
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air that comes, even to the naturally wise, only after years of important political experience, they significantly nodded their heads and deigned to remark: "O, yes, we understand politics and human nature. This efficiency-and-competitive-examination business is well enough to talk about,—to clerks and to the simple country people. We know Carl Schurz [which they variously pronounced shers or shirts, but never correctly, shoorts]; we've seen him advocatin' reform after reform, includin' that ludicrous fiasco, Horus Greeley. Since then Shers has grown less youthful and hasn't tried to climb so many rainbows. At last he has returned like the prodigal son; now he knows, or'll soon learn, how to respect Republican ways, or he'll be out of office mighty quick. He'll not long get on without our influence!" To make sure of it, that "influence" at once manifested itself by a deluge of demands upon the Secretary for office—demands oral and demands epistolary; some pleading, others threatening; some for recognition of political service in the past, others for compensation in advance for proffered service in the future. All applicants were alike in their confident persistency. And even they and the Secretary were also alike in that they were equally persistent and had many very weary months—he in reiterating, and they in hearing, his unchanging and unchangeable rule,—as lucid in expression as it was unwelcome in its import,—that clerkships were obtainable only through competitive examinations.

And even yet the thought had not dawned in the minds of the pestering politicians, that if a reformer is both sincere and intelligent, he does not forget that the only time he can ever put his ideas and himself to a test is when he obtains responsible official position. Schurz was ambitious for distinction; his whole nature craved it as a woman's does affection.

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Office, position, influence, were opportunities to achieve distinction in advancing the causes for which he had earnestly enlisted. In one of his letters to Hayes during the campaign of 1876, he had written: "The first thing that I want is to promote certain objects of public importance and to that end to preserve, as a private citizen, some influence on public opinion and the esteem of those whose respect is worth having. I can do that first by telling the people what I honestly believe to be true and what I can reasonably prove to be true." It was by close adherence to such rules of personal action that he became rich in "the esteem of those whose respect is worth having," and was able to advance his favorite reforms. Such was the distinction he sought.

An instance that throws much light on the Secretary's methods and on the conditions with which he had to deal was that involving a woman clerk in the Patent Office, who was also the Washington correspondent of a prominent Republican newspaper in Ohio. Its editor early besought the Secretary to promote her, declaring that her work as correspondent during the last presidential campaign had been very efficient. By direction of the Secretary the woman's superiors in the Patent Office looked up her record as clerk, with the result that she was recommended for dismissal. Schurz ordered, however, that she be merely reduced in rank and that she have another chance to justify her retention. The editor soon blew a fierce epistolary blast on account of the treatment of his protégée, expatiating on the service she had done by her letters during the campaign, declaring her entitled to promotion on this score, and concluding with the warning so terrible to politicians, that whatever might be done in this case would be regarded as "directly personal" to the newspaper. To an impractical re-
former the natural reply to this insolent outburst would have been the dismissal of the woman and the termination of the correspondence. Mr. Schurz realized, however, that such a course might make her the victim of another's wrongheadedness, and that he had to deal with an aggravated case of spoilsman's fever. Accordingly he addressed to the excited editor a long, calm letter, pointing out, with exaggerated gravity, that the excellence of the woman's work as a correspondent gave her a claim to increase of rank and pay on the staff of the newspaper, but not on that of the Patent Office, and setting forth the elementary principles of civil-service reform. The Secretary then gave closer personal attention to the case, satisfied himself that the clerk concerned was a bright, respectable and hard-working woman, with a reasonably good defense against the charges on which she had been reduced in rank. He therefore transferred her to another branch of the department's service, where she continued to labor with eminent efficiency till near the end of his term, turning often aside from her avocation of enlightening the people of Ohio on things social and political at the Capital, to express in private letters her sense of the greatness and justice of the Secretary of the Interior. The truculent editor was mollified by Schurz's action if not convinced by his argument, and appropriately made his last appearance in the letter files of the Secretary as an earnest seeker after office for himself.

In all the other aspects of the reform which he had preached, Mr. Schurz was as faithful to his ideals as in the matter of minor appointments. Though some branches of the Interior Department, especially the Land Office and the Indian Bureau, had been, especially under Grant, notorious haunts of the spoilsmen, nothing like a clean sweep was undertaken, but, greatly to the disgust in many cases of the friends
of the Secretary, removals were made only after investigation had shown specific cause in connection with specific persons. Political grounds, whether affecting the administration in general or himself in particular, Mr. Schurz consistently declined to take into account in manning the offices under him or in advising the President as to other departments. His old Liberal associates in some cases sought his influence in behalf of such readjustment of the federal offices as would sustain them against their factional adversaries. In his own State in particular, he was importuned to guide the distribution of places with a view to destroying the power of those who had obstructed the political prosperity of the Liberals and of Schurz himself. His answer, in June, 1877, to a suggestion of this sort expressed concisely but completely the principle on which he acted:

"I have received your letter of the 18th inst. and sincerely appreciate the friendly sentiments which prompted it. As you do not expect a reply in detail, I would only say that in the management of what is called the patronage in Missouri, I shall feel in duty bound, as far as I exercise an influence, to act upon those principles with regard to the civil service which I have always advocated. This will preclude anything and everything like a personal policy looking to ulterior ends. Ever since I have been in official life I have adhered to the rule of regarding the official position occupied by me at the time, as the last one ever to be held by me, and as decisive of my reputation as a public man. We can only perform a duty well when we perform it for its own sake. In that way I am always in danger of giving some dissatisfaction to my friends who interest themselves in my success, but I do not see how that can be avoided."

It was not without Secretary Schurz's influence that Presi-
dent Hayes formally proclaimed the general divorce of the administrative service from partisan politics by the celebrated order of June 22, 1877, saying that "no officer should be required or permitted to take part in the management of political organizations, caucuses, conventions or election campaigns," and "no assessments for political purposes on officers or subordinates should be allowed." That other departments were less scrupulous than the Interior Department in conforming to the President's order, created awkward situations from time to time. An internal-revenue collector or a postmaster might be found actively promoting the cause of his party or his faction while a land register or pension agent was required to abstain.

Similar results and contrasts came from the administration's policy of giving federal offices to the most prominent Southern Republicans, almost regardless of character and qualifications, who had lost positions as a result of the Democratic victories in their States. No Secretary was able to keep his department entirely free from these political pensioners. Of course Mr. Schurz opposed this policy as far as it was proper for a Secretary to oppose the President. Consequently the Interior Department almost entirely escaped the heavy burden of odium soon incurred by the administration, which was chargeable for the most part to John Sherman's methods in the Treasury Department. Such inconsistencies damaged the administration and the cause of reform, but Mr. Schurz's aims and methods were unchanged.

The failure of the stalwart Grant wing of the Republican party to retain popular confidence was due to the widespread conviction that a general house-cleaning throughout the federal service was necessary. Reformatory investigations were now instituted in nearly all the departments. The most spectacular
and politically influential results were reached by the Treasury Department, in connection with the New York custom house. A drastic reform of this institution involved the administration in a bitter conflict with Senator Conkling and his followers. Hardly less embarrassing was the hostility aroused by the reformatory procedure of Mr. Schurz in the Bureau of Indian Affairs.

The conduct of this office, especially in connection with the furnishing of supplies to the reservation Indians, had long been the subject of unpleasant rumors. Shortly after taking office the new Secretary appointed a commission, consisting of three experienced subordinates in the department, to examine and report fully upon the whole system in its actual working. The investigation quickly revealed conditions and practices that in some measure justified the suspicions current, though inefficiency and carelessness were more manifest than positive corruption. Accordingly the commissioner and the chief clerk of the bureau were removed and a general stiffening up of the Indian administration was instituted. The displaced officials and methods were not, however, without friends. In January, 1878, when the manner and results of the house-cleaning were made public, the Secretary became the object of severe criticism. No less a personage than General Sherman testified publicly to the efficiency of the ex-commissioner. And a certain academic statesman of very brief experience, subsequently president of a New England college, and always given to posing before youthful and unsophisticated audiences, called the Secretary of the Interior "a fraud, fond of theatrical attitudes and sensational effects and who desires to make a reputation as a reformer, but who has not any of the stuff out of which reformers are made." The criticisms of these and of other excellent persons—well-meaning but misinformed about
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both the Secretary and the Indians—were gleefully re-echoed by the real enemies of reform. And a strong opposition beset Mr. Schurz at every step in his efforts to improve the administration's Indian policy.

The chief problems inherited from the Grant régime were connected with the disturbances in the plains and mountains of the far West. Railway building, mine opening, and the rapid progress of settlement by the whites had completely transformed the conditions of Indian life. All the tribes, even the largest and most far-ranging, were forced to be content with relatively narrow reservations, and to look to the government for supplies with which to eke out the ever-diminishing product of the chase. To keep the restless and unruly tribesmen on their reservations and the no less unruly white men off, was a task frequently beyond the powers of the agents, and the army had to be appealed to. In view of repeated bloody conflicts, culminating in the slaughter of Custer and his command by the Sioux in the summer of 1876, a feeling had gained wide prevalence that a total change of policy was necessary. Under President Grant religious and philanthropic societies and individuals had been formally endowed with consultative and advisory functions in the management of Indian affairs, with the idea of promoting civilization on the reservations. The "peace policy" represented by this system was now declared by many to be a hopeless failure, and it was urged that the management of the Indians should be taken entirely out of the hands of the Department of the Interior and given to the War Department. Since the army had ultimately to come in and settle all the serious issues that arose, it would be better in every sense, so the argument ran, that the whole situation be under military control from the outset. Generals Sherman and Sheridan strongly advocated this view, and it was urged by
other high officers also, whose frequent and severe campaigns in the late Indian wars gave much weight to their opinions.

The underlying support of this proposition was the conviction that the Indian could never be civilized and that the only possible solution of the problem which he embodied was to confine him, under strict military supervision, on reservations from which all uplifting contact with white men was barred, till he should become extinct by virtue of his own incurable barbarism. Such a general view of the matter Mr. Schurz confessed he himself held when he entered the Interior Department. But additional study changed his opinion. From the good and wise men of various religious denominations whom Grant's policy had brought into co-operation with the Indian Bureau, notably William Welsh of Philadelphia, the Secretary soon learned how much of hope and of achievement was bound up in the peace policy. He became the supporter and the efficient leader of those who wished to maintain and develop the old system.

In the autumn and winter of 1877 a joint committee of Congress investigated at length the feasibility of transferring the Indians to the War Department. Mr. Schurz appeared on December 6th, and presented a statement which summed up in his most effective manner the case for the status quo. He announced his conviction that the proper policy in dealing with the Indians was that of guiding them to the practice of agriculture or grazing on their reservations, as a first step toward self-support and toward the occupation of the land in sev-eralty. Education should begin, with the other instrumentalities of civilization. Such a policy, he contended, would be the most conducive to peace and the most economical. It ought to be retained and developed; but the army would be no proper agency for its execution. Military men and methods were in-
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dispensable for emergencies; the long, slow process of raising the red men out of barbarism, however, required qualities in those who guided it that the army could not supply.

In addition to his skillfully formulated statement before the committee the Secretary further sustained his views by a sharp public comment in January, 1879, on severe criticism of the Indian Bureau's methods by General Sheridan. The general on this as on other occasions of public controversy displayed more spirit than poise, and he fared badly in the encounter. In February an adverse vote in the House put an end to the project of transferring the Indian Bureau. Mr. Schurz received hearty acknowledgments from the friends of the Indians for his contribution to this happy result. He became from this time a powerful ally of those who were laboring to civilize the wild tribes. His annual report for 1879 outlined every feature of the policy which was destined to achieve such signal success in the break-up of tribal life during the ensuing quarter century. The education of Indian youths was one prime element in this policy, to the end of introducing "civilized ideas, wants and aspirations," and the influence of Mr. Schurz was decisive in putting Indian education on a firm foundation. He co-operated in the original experiment with Indian pupils at Hampton in 1877; gave the deciding word for the establishment of Captain Pratt with fifty children at Carlisle in 1879; and with all his power sustained the institution thus founded as well as other similar enterprises in the West. His last report as Secretary, in 1880, emphatically declared that these enterprises had already passed the stage of experiment and were, as agencies for promoting the civilization of the Indians, highly successful.

It was one of the queer coincidences that often give interest to public life that just when Mr. Schurz was so effec-
tively promoting a rational Indian policy he became the object of unmeasured abuse by many good persons who professed aims like his. In the summer of 1879 arose the agitation about the Poncas, which continued both to vex and to amuse the Secretary while he remained in office. The Poncas were a small, peaceable tribe of Indians who had long lived in quiet upon their reservation in southeastern Dakota. Prior to the administration of President Hayes it became necessary to readjust the boundaries of the Sioux reservation, in order to leave the Black Hills open to the influx of miners. To give satisfaction to both the Sioux and the gold seekers was a difficult task, and in the absorption of its work in this respect, Congress overlooked the Poncas altogether, and assigned their land to the Sioux. When the error was discovered, it seemed hazardous to reopen the matter so far as the Sioux were concerned, and accordingly it was determined to remove the Poncas to a new reservation in the Indian Territory. The removal was effected just as Mr. Schurz took office, and the manner of it, like the action which made it necessary, was shockingly unjust to the poor Indians. Many of them died as a result of the unfavorable conditions on the new reservation, and in the spring of 1879 some of them left their new home and undertook to return to their former abode. When this enterprise was checked by the action of federal troops, a rather startling change was effected in the situation by the action of the federal district court in Omaha. Judge Dundy granted a writ of habeas corpus on an application in behalf of one of the Indians named Standing Bear, and set him free. The intrinsic justice of the action in this particular case could hardly be disputed. As to the point of law, however, the judge's decision opened up an alarming vista of future complications in the administration of Indian affairs. Restless braves and ambitious
attorneys could, on the principle here laid down, thwart the government in its efforts to control the movements of the Indians. Despite this prospect, however, Mr. Schurz, when he looked into the case, decided not to take an appeal to the Supreme Court, but to let the matter pass without agitation. He felt keenly the wrong that had been done to the Poncas, but he believed that far greater wrongs would result if any attempt were now made to undo the action of Congress. By personal observation during the summer of 1879 as well as through reports of various officials, he assured himself that the tribe, however much it had suffered at the time of the change, was far better off than it had been on its northern reservation, and, moreover, that its return to the north would expose it to incessant attacks from the Sioux, with most disastrous results.

The Secretary's disposition to let the Ponca matter disappear from the public view was not shared by a former Indian agent, the Rev. Mr. Tibbles, who organized a systematic agitation in behalf of the Indians. With Standing Bear and an Indian girl called Bright Eyes, Tibbles traveled across the country, enlisting much interest in the fate of the tribesmen. In Boston, his success was complete, and large amounts of money were raised for the purpose of effecting through the courts the restoration of the Poncas to their land and their rights. For failing to take steps in this direction, Mr. Schurz was subjected to violent abuse. Well-meaning but hysterical women and men, with more sentiment than common sense, joined heartily in the attacks on the Secretary. Tibbles found himself a national character, and reveled in his greatness. Mrs. Helen Hunt Jackson, a true philanthropist, who wished to be to the Indian what Harriet Beecher Stowe was to the slave, took up the cause of the Poncas, and earnestly sought to enlist the Secretary's energies in their behalf. Schurz [388]
found in Mrs. Jackson a suitable medium through which to express his own views on the subject, and his two letters to her were models of calm, courteous, effective demonstration, thus making a happy contrast with the performances of his critics. Still the legal point involved seemed unintelligible to a great many of the Indians’ zealous friends, and the attacks on the Secretary continued. Politicians took up the matter from motives that would hardly stand investigation. Such high-minded men as Governor Long of Massachusetts and Representative Dawes each found occasion during 1880 to attack Mr. Schurz, and each of them received a sharp retort. The Rev. Mr. Tibbles, though he raised considerable money for the purpose of testing the rights of the Poncas, never brought the issue into court; indeed the decision of Judge Dundy, being in favor of Standing Bear and being accepted without appeal by the government, left no way open for further litigation. A thorough investigation of the condition and desires of the Poncas revealed that they were prosperous and happy, and not at all desirous of returning to their old home. So this mistaken agitation died out.

The joyous sequel to the whole affair was appropriately commented on by the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, in an amusing letter to the ex-Secretary, in August, 1881:—"I was greatly rejoiced on my return from a sea trip to find that the Ponca war was at last ended, that Bright Eyes had capitulated to Tibbles, and that Tibbles had surrendered to Bright Eyes." The maiden and the missionary, in short, had united in marriage. The Assistant Secretary feared that poor Bright Eyes had made a mistake when she "buried all the wrongs of her race in a greater upon herself," but he was willing to forgive her if it should appear that the act had effectually disposed of Tibbles.

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Besides the agitation about the Poncas, the Secretary was called upon to deal with a tragic outbreak among the Utes in Colorado in the autumn of 1879. The agent on the reservation of one branch of this tribe, Mr. Meeker, was killed, and the women of his family were carried into captivity; later a detachment of troops hurrying to the defense of the whites was defeated with the loss of its commander. When the people and the government of Colorado displayed a purpose to take the Utes in hand and revenge all wrongs by practically exterminating the tribe, a very high degree of tact combined with vigor was shown by the Secretary. Ultimately a settlement was effected through a special agent of the department, by bringing about a surrender of the small number of bad Indians who alone were responsible for the outbreak. Though trouble ensued again, about a year after the original murder, on account of fatal altercations between some of the Indians and some of the whites, this incident also was adjusted without collision with the State authorities. Mr. Schurz’s conduct of this Ute matter, manifesting as it did a degree of exact and impartial justice toward the Indians, won him no sympathy from the excited whites, and left him the object of as cordial dislike in Colorado by the deadliest foes of the Indians, as was felt toward him by their warmest, if misguided, friends in Massachusetts.

In addition to these and other assaults which Mr. Schurz had to endure in connection with the management of his own special department, a rather disproportionate number of those that originated in hostility to the administration in general were directed primarily at him. The thorough-going politicians instinctively felt that he was a thorn in their path. Throughout Hayes’ term factional feeling was very strong in the Republican party. The President’s policy in the South was bitterly
resented by the section of the organization that had sustained
the Grant régime, and Mr. Blaine also, with a large and en-
thusiastic following, assumed an attitude of opposition on this
point. To both these factions the Secretary of the Interior
became the favorite target for their spleen. In the summer of
1877 Mr. Whitelaw Reid, once closely identified with the re-
form movement which Schurz directed, opened the columns of
the New York Tribune to a series of vitriolic lampoons by
Gail Hamilton upon the administration, in the course of which
the Secretary of the Interior received special attention. The
political relationship of the editor, and the family relationship
of the writer, to Mr. Blaine left no doubt as to the inspiration
of these attacks. In the spring of 1878 the Senator from
Maine himself entered the arena. Schurz had early in his term
as Secretary instituted vigorous measures for ending the ex-
tensive and inveterate depredations of lumbermen upon the
forests of the public domain. The action of the government
was violently attacked on the floor of the Senate by Blaine,
who represented Schurz's measures as a harsh and oppressive
application of European methods, by an official of Prussian
birth, to high-spirited and freedom-loving American citizens.
From the Grant section of the party, also, came a particu-
larly violent onslaught in March of 1878, through Senator
Howe, of Wisconsin, though in this the offensiveness of
Schurz's German nativity was reduced to the minimum, in
view of the large foreign-born element in Wisconsin's popula-
tion.

The Secretary's philosophy and sense of humor preserved
him from discomfort under these attacks. All the ingenious
innuendo which imputed un-American influence to him would
disappear, he knew, when he should be again needed to win
the German vote for the Republicans. Only once did he feel
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called upon to resent an allusion to his foreign birth. In the winter of 1880-81 Senator Dawes, in the course of a sharp criticism of certain summary measures in dealing with troublesome Indians, ventured upon the same kind of attack that Blaine had employed four years earlier. "It has been a relief to me," said Dawes, "in examining our treatment of these weak and defenseless people to find that these methods are not American in their origin, but bear too striking a resemblance to the modes of an imperial government carried on by espionage and arbitrary power. They are methods which I believe to be unique and which I trust will not be naturalized." The opening afforded by this rather ill-advised allusion was too attractive to be neglected by such a master of irony as Schurz. In an open letter to Dawes the Secretary, after quoting the foregoing words, retorted:

"You have succeeded in making yourself understood. From the Pequot war to our days there never was an Indian unjustly killed in this country until a German-born American citizen became Secretary of the Interior. All has been peace, love and fraternity. The red man has for three centuries reposed securely upon the gentle bosom of his white brother, and no man to make him afraid, until this dangerous foreigner in an evil hour for the Republic was clothed with authority to disturb that harmonious accord and to disgrace the American name with espionage in Indian camps and the blood of slaughtered victims; and all this he did in an effort to naturalize on American soil the dark and cruel methods of imperial governments, of which this foreigner notoriously is, and has always been, a faithful and ardent worshiper and champion. And 'it is a relief' to your patriotic soul that there is hope this wicked naturalization scheme will never succeed. It is pleasant to reflect that there is one man at least among us who even under [392]"
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such threatening circumstances will not despair of the Repub-lic."

In the State and Congressional campaigns of 1878 the Republicans, especially in Ohio and Massachusetts, urgently appealed to Schurz for assistance. In these States the greenback movement, blending at this time with the rising silver issue, was seriously alarming the Republican leaders. Schurz was counted as a veteran champion of sound money, and he now repeated in Cincinnati his oratorical triumph there in 1875. His speech attracted an extraordinary degree of attention, and competent judges called it the decisive influence in holding the State in the Republican column. Boston, also, whose staid respectability was shuddering at the audacious financial heresies with which Benjamin F. Butler was infecting the people, gave Schurz a most cordial reception. In both cities he confined himself to questions of currency and finance and frankly proclaimed, as of old, his disregard of party bonds. "'The party, right or wrong,' has never been my battle cry and it never will be," he told the Bostonians. But he assured them, as "the conviction of an independent man," that at the present time and on the momentous issue of resumption and sound money, the Republican party was the nation's better hope.

In the spring of 1879 the plan to nominate Grant the next year came into the open by the action of the Republican State convention in Missouri. The movement grew steadily, especially under the stimulus of Grant's return in September from his spectacular tour around the world. In every Southern State old-time carpet-baggers enthusiastically rallied to the cause of their former protector. In three of the greatest Northern States Conkling, Cameron and Logan, by ruthless control of the party organization, insured a compact and formidable mass of Grant delegates to the national convention.

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The development of the Grant "boom" naturally aroused active opposition on the part of friends of Blaine and other aspirants for the nomination. It also served to revive and re-unite many of the former Independents, to whom the Secretary of the Interior was from the outset the particular counselor and friend. Both the pressure of his official duties and his sense of official propriety forbade him to take open and ostentatious part in the conflict; but his influence was none the less intimate and real. Through him was conveyed to Hayes the urgent but futile demands of Missouri and Pennsylvania Independents that the renunciation of a second term should be canceled, lest detriment should come to the Republic. To Schurz was communicated every shifting phase of the great battle which MacVeagh, Barker, Lea and the other Philadelphia reformers fought against the Cameron domination. He debated often and anxiously with various Independents the expediency of John Sherman's candidacy, sharing with others the conviction that while Sherman might serve a useful purpose in defeating the nomination of Grant, he promised little else in the promotion of reform. Schurz, finally, was kept fully aware of the widespread preference for Garfield among all shades of anti-Grant Republicans, and probably felt that his nomination would be as much of a mercy as the circumstances would permit.

In the spring of 1880, as the date for the Republican convention approached, the probability of Grant's nomination became very strong. Lack of agreement among the opponents of the third term was largely responsible for the situation. Before this alarming prospect the Independents, with Secretary Schurz constant in urging and advice, organized a demonstration on the lines that had been followed in 1872 and 1876. A
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conference was held at St. Louis on the 6th of May, at which resolutions denouncing the third term were adopted and provision was made for the appointment of a committee of one hundred to meet in New York in case of Grant's nomination and take appropriate action. The organization of this committee duly proceeded, under Schurz's close observation and counsel; and it was practically completed when the action of the Republican convention in nominating Garfield rendered further procedure by the "anti-third-termers" unnecessary.

Garfield was nearer to Schurz's ideal of a presidential candidate than any man whose name had been seriously brought forward in the Republican party. Yet, as candidate, Garfield manifested disquieting tendencies in respect both to persons and to principles. His generous and enthusiastic impulses led him, in the development of a hot and doubtful campaign, to yield to influences that compromised his intellectual consistency. His attitude toward civil-service reform gave special distress to Mr. Schurz. In the Republican convention a resolution favoring the reform and demanding its promotion was rejected by the committee on resolutions, but was moved in the convention by the Massachusetts delegation. Opposition to the resolution was strong, and the debate elicited the ever-famous query of the outraged Flanagan of Texas: "What are we here for, if not to get the offices?" The plank was adopted, however, though with every indication that its serious supporters were in fact but few. Garfield's letter of acceptance, so far from counteracting this effect by a vigorous plea for reform, gave but the most perfunctory approval to the resolution, and coupled this with what amounted to a repudiation of all that the Hayes administration had stood for in respect to Congressional patronage and the political activity of office-holders.
Schurz promptly wrote an energetic letter of protest to Garfield, lamenting the latter's defection from the cause of reform. Garfield's only reply was a denial of defection, and an explicit disapproval of what Hayes had done—thus illustrating the difference between logic and politics.

Neither party was entirely in line with Mr. Schurz's ideas on the questions he considered vital and urgent—the tariff, the currency, and civil-service reform. But the Republicans, led by an experienced civilian, seemed likely to be less unfavorable to those ideas, especially in regard to currency and the civil service, than the Democrats led by a soldier. Had the Democrats nominated a seasoned reformer on a reform platform, one could easily imagine Mr. Schurz resigning his Secretaryship and leading the Independents to the support of the Democratic candidate. In the existing dilemma it was, for non-partisans, a choice of evils. And Schurz's position in Hayes' Cabinet was expected to help him exert a good influence over the Republicans.

Unfortunately, Garfield's attitude allowed partisanship unrestrained control. The campaign managers resorted, with slight attempts at concealment, to the assessment of office-holders and to other old-time methods, and sought as usual, to distract attention from them by "viewing with alarm" the wicked Democrats. The hideousness of secession, the impenitence and malignity of the "rebel brigadiers," and their fell purpose to subject the North to the domination of the "solid South"—furnished a theme for even the more sane and reputable orators. The time, they declared, was hardly less critical than in 1860, and the duty of patriots no less clear and peremptory than then.

Mr. Schurz spoke for the Republicans in the doubtful States of Indiana, Ohio, New York, New Jersey and Con-
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His speeches and those of the typical Republican orators of that year were altogether different in temper. He was untouched by the partisan contagion. He assured his audiences that the situation was in no sense critical—that it demanded reason, not passion, in its consideration. He made no reference to the "rebel brigadiers"; he displayed no fear of the "solid South." He paid high tribute to Hancock as a soldier and a patriot, for he had seen the General in battle and was not afraid to speak the truth. At the same time he set forth simply, dispassionately, but with a force that no intelligent and fair-minded reader of to-day can resist, his reasons for believing that the welfare of the country would be best promoted by the election of Garfield. That the value of Schurz's method was not ignored by the practical politicians at headquarters, is indicated by the statement of the secretary of the National Committee that about half a million copies of his speech at Indianapolis had been circulated, including the English and the German versions.

The success of Garfield was received with cheerfulness by Secretary Schurz, although he knew that it would be politically impracticable for him to be retained in the Cabinet. The intimate relations between the President-elect and Mr. Blaine would alone have forbidden the thought of continuance in office. On the 8th of March, 1881, Mr. Schurz retired from the Department of the Interior, amid rather unusual expressions of good will and affection from his subordinates in the service.

Two weeks later he was the guest of honor at a banquet in Boston, tendered by a group of distinguished men who desired to signify their high appreciation of his public service and also their special disapproval of the blundering a several Massachusetts men had made upon him. Such
tentions gave him his greatest pleasures, for they were indeed demonstrations of "the esteem of those whose respect is worth something": they marked his success and enlarged the audience willing to hear "what I honestly believe to be true and what I can reasonably prove to be true." Here he spoke with frankness of the Hayes administration and also formally renewed his confession of faith as an Independent. "Our National Government has, I think, succeeded in proving once more the falsity of the old assertion, that corruption is an inevitable concomitant of democratic institutions. Whatever mistakes may have been made by the late administration,—and I frankly admit that they were not a few,—it is generally conceded that it has demonstrated the possibility of honest, business-like, and morally-respectable government in this republic; and the new administration, I have no doubt, means to do no less, but will endeavor to do more."

He described the opportunity of the Independent in these words: "At this moment the two political parties are pretty evenly balanced. In quiet times like ours, that is, on the whole, a healthy condition. It reminds both parties that neither of them can venture upon mischief without seriously impairing its prospects for the future. Between them stands an element which is not controlled by the discipline of party organization, but acts upon its own judgment for the public interest. It is the Independent element; which, in its best sense and shape, may be defined as consisting of men who consider it more important that the government be well administered than that his or that set of men administer it. This Independent element not very popular with party politicians in ordinary times; it is very much in requisition when the day of voting comes. It render inestimable service to the cause of good govern-
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and wisdom, and from purely patriotic motives. Ours must necessarily be, in a certain sense, a government of and by political parties; but it will be all the better for the country if it is a party government tempered by an unselfish, enlightened, and patriotic independent opinion."

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Before Mr. Schurz left the Interior Department he was confronted with an almost embarrassing number of propositions for future occupation. Journalistic enterprises were naturally the most prominent. He also cherished, with increasing fondness, the desire to write a comprehensive history of the United States, with special reference to the Civil War. Doubtless as tentative preparation for this task, he agreed in the spring of 1881 to contribute *Henry Clay* to the American Statesmen series of biographies. By the study of Clay he would secure the necessary background and perspective for the period with which his personal experience made him familiar. But this pleasing prospect of a life of historical research and literary creation—of which he began to dream at Bonn when a callow student under Kinkel—was soon displaced by an equally attractive and more remunerative enterprise in journalism.

The control of the New York *Evening Post* was purchased by Henry Villard, who transferred a part financial interest and the absolute editorial control to Carl Schurz, E. L. Godkin and Horace White, with the first-named as editor-in-chief. On May 26, 1881, this arrangement went into effect; and the *Nation*, which Mr. Godkin had raised to so distinctive a position in the periodical world, became, with but little transformation, the weekly edition of the *Evening Post*. The extraordinary ability and experience represented by this trio

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of editors attracted much attention and brought much prestige to this journal. But skeptical voices were not wanting, with suggestions that such a combination of "all the talents" might be as unfeasible in journalism as it once proved to be in the English government.

The skeptics were justified by the event. Mr. Schurz and Mr. Godkin, in their separate spheres, had been great admirers of each other. Intellectually they were in general of the same aristocratic type. On the proper solution of the great problems of social and political progress they were in substantial agreement; but their methods of promoting the proper solution tended to diverge. Schurz's practice was to reason with his adversaries; Godkin's was both to reason and to lash them. There was also a basic difference in the temperaments of the two men. For the mass of people who had failed to reach his own intellectual level Schurz felt sympathy; for those whom his truly great powers could not convince Godkin often felt contempt or at best indifference. At a time when capital and labor were in frequent conflict and politics was shifting from constitutional to economic and administrative issues, such differences of feeling must produce unpleasant results. The purely technical side of editorial management also gave occasion for trouble. Godkin as editor of the Nation had highly appreciated contributions from Schurz. In the winter of 1872-73, under an arrangement by which the authorship was kept a secret, Schurz sent letters from Washington with much regularity, though he refused the proffered compensation for them. Schurz as superior editor was much less to Godkin's taste. The quality given to the Post by the new management fell short, indeed, of pleasing either of the men. The oratorical and didactic habit of Schurz could not blend with the more distinctively journalistic talent of Godkin. However unlike in
their attitudes toward inferiors, Schurz and Godkin were, in dealing with men of their own kind, about equally positive and tenacious. Because friction in the conduct of the Post could not be avoided, Mr. Schurz withdrew from all connection with it, in the autumn of 1883. Yet with few if any even temporary exceptions, Mr. Godkin and Mr. Schurz treated each other with the courtesy due their high moral and intellectual qualities, and maintained friendly relations to their last days.

Once more free from routine, Mr. Schurz’s thoughts reverted to the promised biography and the cherished history. The one had made but little progress and the other none at all. Besides the editorial tasks of these two and one-half years, the multifarious distractions of life in New York had interfered with literary plans. As he was a distinguished citizen qualified for active and intelligent participation in the musical and the artistic, as well as the political and the social, activities of the great city, the calls upon him were increasingly numerous and exacting. He heartily enjoyed the indulgence of his various tastes and associations, but of course had to pay the penalty in loss of time needed for work in a few chosen fields.

If he had possessed an independent fortune, he would earlier have found more time to devote to literature. But the production of literature, and most of all historical literature, is unremunerative. Although both thrifty and industrious, probably he never felt entirely comfortable financially for a whole year unless he was adding to his income by labors that were not wholly those of a man of letters. Politics may have aided him in journalism and on the lyceum stage; but his salary as Senator and later as Secretary was inadequate to the needs of the extensive social obligations of his position.

About the time when his withdrawal from the Evening
Post ended his chief journalistic income—for his income from his share in the St. Louis Westliche Post was small, except when he was a regular contributor to that newspaper—losses in connection with unfortunate investments swept away much the larger portion of his never large property. When his financial condition became known to a group of his New York admirers, chiefly of German origin, early in 1884, they subscribed $100,000 to be tendered as a gift. As soon as he heard of the project he disapproved of it. With the keenest appreciation of the friendly and generous motives of the contributors, he felt with equal keenness the obligations that would be involved in acceptance. In a letter of March 21st, expressing concisely the complexity of his feelings, he announced that he could not accept the gift in any form, and requested that the enterprise be abandoned.

By this time the approach of the presidential campaign was engrossing his attention. The Garfield-Arthur term had been peculiarly favorable to the growth of independence in politics. Garfield’s assassination, the Pendleton act greatly extending the civil-service reform, the overwhelming defeat of the Republican “machines” in Pennsylvania and New York in the State elections of 1882—formed a sequence of events that could not be misinterpreted. The grosser evils, at least, of spoils politics were under the ban of strongly aroused public opinion. Both when editor and subsequently Mr. Schurz had contributed much to this result.

The problem before him and his Independent associates was like that of the last three campaigns—to insure if possible the nomination of an unexceptionable candidate by the Republicans, or failing in that, to bring pressure upon the Democrats to the same end. Early in the winter a formal announcement of the Independent programme was planned for Washington’s
Birthday, 1884, in Brooklyn. On that occasion Schurz made the chief address. Its reception was very encouraging. There was an intense feeling against Blaine among Republicans. Yet as the date of the Republican national convention drew near, the energy with which Blaine's candidacy was promoted made his success almost certain. This was the outcome the Independents most deprecated. Nevertheless, Blaine was nominated on the fourth ballot. Mr. Schurz, who was on the platform of the convention as a distinguished guest, took out his watch, noted the time and, turning to an old friend, remarked: "That is the hour and minute which will go down in history as marking the death of the Republican party."

This prophecy probably reflected in some measure the persistence in the speaker's mind of the conviction that had almost continually possessed him since the early seventies—that the old parties had outlived their usefulness. Much more, however, did it express the depth of his feeling that the nominee was unworthy. He considered the popular man from Maine a particularly objectionable example of those politicians to whom politics is a sport—a great game played before millions of spectators—in which success means the triumph of a person rather than the promotion of social truth and justice. In the revelations of 1876 as to Blaine's connection with land-grant railroads, Schurz saw the confirmation of his impression and much more. The aggressive tone given to our diplomacy in South America when Blaine was Secretary of State had aroused grave apprehensions. Schurz had never parted from the belief that the United States must walk in the paths of peace, and especially must beware of the tropics. Yet when the test came in 1884, he felt that the stress must be laid on the issue of personal honesty and public morality. In September of 1882 Blaine had published in the Chicago Tribune a long
attack on Schurz, directed to showing in particular that in their respective Cabinet careers Schurz had grossly betrayed, while Blaine had systematically sustained, the principles of civil-service reform. This attack was prompted by a severe article on Blaine in the Evening Post, which was not unnaturally attributed to Schurz. It happened, in fact, that Schurz, who was away on his vacation, knew nothing about the Post article until long after its appearance. He accordingly wrote to the editor of the Tribune in a satirical strain, assuring him that "this whole fusillade against the author of the remarks in the Evening Post is directed to an entirely wrong address," and concluding: "While I, had I been in editorial charge of the Evening Post at the time, should perhaps have preferred to treat Mr. Blaine's posing as a civil-service reformer and as an opponent of the spoils system rather mildly and good-naturedly, in the light of a joke, I am indeed of the opinion, seriously, that the author of the Mulligan letters can never be, and ought not to be, President of the United States." It was Mulligan-letters Blaine,—self-exposed as both accepting, and seeking more, private pecuniary advantage in return for official favors conferred when Speaker of the House of Representatives,—that Schurz was to oppose in the campaign of 1884. He had a keen eye for the moral issue, and it meant so much to him that he always expected it to be successful.

The nomination of Blaine was followed at once by a great Republican bolt. A week after the Republican convention, the Democrats nominated Cleveland, and thus furnished the bolters with a candidate to whom they were ready to give unqualified support. The personal preference of Mr. Schurz had been for the nomination of Senator Bayard, with whom he was on terms of intimacy and affection. But Bayard did not greatly attract the bulk of the Independents; and among the
Democrats, though he had much strength, the conditions of availability were strongly against him. On June 28th, just before the Democratic convention, Schurz wrote to Bayard: "We are together against Blaine and for honest government. I should be glad to see you in the presidential chair on the 4th of March, 1885. If my vote could put you there I should not hesitate a moment. If you are nominated I shall work for your election to the best of my ability." Bayard was then urged, in case his own nomination became clearly impossible, to throw his influence in favor of Cleveland, as the only other Democrat who could secure the Independent vote and defeat Blaine. To this policy Bayard very cordially assented: "I hold and shall treat all personal questions and ambitions as quite secondary to the chief object, a nomination by the Democratic convention which shall justify the combination of all the opposing forces to Blaineism."

As soon as the two parties had put their candidates in the field, the organization of the anti-Blaine Republicans proceeded rapidly and absorbed practically the whole time and energy of Mr. Schurz. The line of action was that of co-operation but not coalescence with the Democrats. "Republican and Independent" associations were formed to carry on the campaign, but long before it was ended the sprightly malice of the New York Sun made "Mugwump" the usual designation for these Independents. On July 22nd they held a national conference at New York and promulgated an address defining their policy. The meeting was planned and the address was written by Mr. Schurz. A national headquarters was established at 35 Nassau Street, New York, where he had general supervision and his suggestions were carefully followed.

On August 5th he opened the speaking campaign by an address in Brooklyn. Its specific feature was a dispassionate
analysis of Blaine's record in connection with the Mulligan letters, and its general philosophy was the deadly peril of subordinating rigid moral ideals to party advantage. During September and October Schurz stumped the country from Indianapolis to New Haven, speaking at some twenty-five different places. The contest proved a particularly desperate one. Blaine had a wonderful hold on the rank and file of his party, especially in the West. The moral issue was befogged in the popular thought by serious charges of private immorality in earlier years on the part of Cleveland. Western Republicans especially received with stolidity the exhortations to save the country by voting for such a Democrat. Blaine was defeated by only the narrowest possible margin. The closeness of the result really emphasized the triumph of the Independents, for it left no room to doubt that they determined the outcome. And the victors and the vanquished agreed, however reluctantly, that the chief laurels belonged to Mr. Schurz.

With the laurels came responsibilities. The accession of the Democracy to power, after twenty-four years of exclusion, would test as nothing else could the strength of the hold which civil-service reform had obtained. From the executive departments, especially the Interior, anxious inquiries poured in upon Mr. Schurz as to whether a "clean sweep" was coming, and eager requests were made for his influence. These often pathetic appeals were not needed to arouse him to vigorous activity in this cause. In the very letter congratulating Cleveland on his election Schurz said: "The crucial test will not be the tariff question, for that, I am confident, will settle itself more easily than many people suppose; but it is civil service that will present itself for consideration at once, and unless decided rightly, will continue to harass you without ceasing." On various phases of this theme he was to write continually for two years.
It was not on this topic alone, however, that his opinions were given to Mr. Cleveland. The President-elect was inexperienced in national politics, was almost morbidly conscious of the fact, and eagerly seized every opportunity for trustworthy counsel. On December 6, 1884, in answer to Schurz's offer to "serve you in any way, as a private citizen," Cleveland wrote: "You may be sure that I shall be most glad to hear your views at length in this time of anxiety. I wish that I might ask you to write to me as one whose only desire is to merit the opinion of those who trust him, but one who knows little of what awaits him in his new sphere of duty." The response to this modest and engaging invitation was a long letter, December 10, in which Schurz set forth with the utmost candor his opinions on the whole situation. There was much in this letter like the advice given to Hayes eight years earlier. Cleveland was assured that his strength with the people depended upon his character as a reformer, and that he would be the more sharply criticized on this account. "Whenever Arthur did a creditable thing people would say 'He is, after all, a better man than we thought he was.' If you should do things not up to the mark, people will say 'He is not as good as we thought he would be.'" This shrewd suggestion was followed by the same advice that had been given to Hayes, that the three great patronage departments—Treasury, Post Office and Interior—be assigned to "men who understand reform as you do, who believe in it as you do, who are willing to fight for it as you are." "Experience has convinced me that no President, however firm and courageous he may be, can succeed in systematic reform if he has to carry on the reform against his own Cabinet."

As to the personnel of the Cabinet, it was the deliberate policy of Mr. Schurz and the Independents to refrain
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from positive suggestions. The matter was distinctively one for adjustment within the Democratic party lines. Criticism of the names proposed was, however, pre-eminently the privilege of Cleveland's Independent supporters. To Mr. Schurz the choice of Bayard, Lamar and Garland was especially agreeable; and Bayard's reluctance, on account of his modest private fortune, to become Secretary of State, evoked earnest entreaties that he should make the sacrifice required for the public good. The one name on Cleveland's tentative list that caused genuine panic among the Independents was that of William C. Whitney of New York. Cleveland's original purpose was to make him Secretary of the Treasury; but partly through the strong opposition stimulated by the Independents and partly through Whitney's distrust of his own fitness for that office, this plan was given up and he was assigned to the Navy Department. Daniel Manning was selected for the more important Treasury Department, though his appointment gave but little comfort to the Independents. To Cleveland Schurz wrote, after a conference on the subject: "While the three Southern men named [Bayard, Lamar, Garland] are all United States Senators of renown and experience, the Northern men [Manning, Endicott, Vilas] are all new men without experience and established standing in public affairs."

In a letter of March 2d to Lamar, Mr. Schurz expressed his dissatisfaction without reserve. The selection of Manning he declared to be a terrible load for the Independents to carry, because Manning was without standing in national affairs and had the reputation of a mere machine politician. Whitney would complete the discrediting of the administration with those who were expecting an era of reform and of high-minded government. Schurz was not personally acquainted with Whitney and admitted that he might be honest and clever; but found [409]
that the only public reputation he had achieved was that of being the son-in-law of Senator Payne and of having contributed $25,000 to the Democratic campaign fund. "Is it not known to the President that one of the most scandalous and alarming signs of the times consists in the invasion of the Senate by millionaires who have no distinction but their money? Is it the business of a reform administration to invite the millionaire who has no other distinction than his money also into the Cabinet? These questions will be asked. What answer can we give to the patriotic men who followed our lead?"

Cleveland had been in the White House but a few weeks when his policy in the matter of the offices became the center of an extremely fierce contest between the Democrats of "spoils" proclivities and the Independents. Shortly after the election the National Committee of the Independents had, with Mr. Cleveland's previous approval, presented to him an address of congratulation, and he had in his formal answer professed his purpose to apply the principles of civil-service reform in appointments to office, and to refrain from removal of Republican incumbents before their terms expired. This policy was not, however, to derogate in any degree from his fealty to the Democratic party. At Washington, surrounded by eager party leaders, he found strict adhesion to reform principles in removals and appointments practically impossible, save at great risk to other important elements of his policy. Whether risk or complete sacrifice, the radical Independents urgently demanded it in the name of plighted faith. The spoilsman, in the name of party interest, were as insistent in the opposite direction. The result was naturally indecisive. During the first year the record showed many conspicuous instances of appointment and removal on strictly reforming principles, and for these the President received mod-
erate praise from the Independents and immoderate abuse from the spoilsmen. During the second year, with party spirit intensified through the conflicts of the Republican Senate with the President, the trend of things was very distinctly adverse to the reformers, and the sources of praise and censure were transposed. Throughout all this fluctuation of policy, however, the conformity of the administration to the merit system so far as it had been embodied in the Pendleton Act was unquestioned. It was not his fidelity to the law, but his fidelity to his pledge about removals that was the core of the strife between the reformers and the spoilsmen.

Mr. Schurz followed the course of the administration with absorbing interest and anxiety. Every important episode in connection with the civil service called forth letters to the President in which the early invitation to Schurz to express his views "at length" was in general interpreted with liberality. Hearty praise or frank censure were bestowed upon Cleveland's acts according to their relations to Schurz's ideals. The two men had and always retained great respect and admiration for each other's personality; but their fundamental political creeds were quite distinct. Cleveland was a Democrat, with Independent sympathies; Schurz was, in the existing party situation, an Independent pure and simple. Schurz felt in his heart that the natural purpose of the President to promote the further success of the Democratic party was both hopeless and undesirable. Yet in judging the President's acts the critic wisely adopted the President's point of view, and invariably represented the thorough and unfaltering application of reform principles as indispensable to the future welfare of the Democracy. Toward the end of 1886 Mr. Schurz became convinced, with all the more radical reformers, that the current of presidential favor had turned definitely against their ideals.

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In the annual message of December, 1886, Mr. Cleveland reiterated his hearty approval of civil-service reform, but he put a fly into the ointment when he spoke of the harm done to the cause by "the misguided zeal of impracticable friends." This public rebuke, greeted as it was with unrestrained merriment by the spoilsmen, confirmed the opinion of the extreme reformers that they had nothing more to hope for from the administration. At the request and urging of many of them and in accordance with his own feeling, Mr. Schurz, December 15, addressed to the President an epistolary essay which expressed without any reserve whatever the feelings of the writer. It was cast in the form of a demonstration that unless Mr. Cleveland changed his attitude toward the aims of the Independents, he could not be politically saved; but there was manifested little hope that the change would come, and hence the letter was more like a reproachful farewell. The President was informed that the Independents had lost or were fast losing all their faith in the sincerity of his professions. "Until recently . . . the worst things laid to your charge were construed as mere errors of judgment, and perhaps occasionally a certain stubbornness of temper in sticking to an error once committed. But . . . this confiding belief has been seriously shaken. . . . There is a condition of public confidence under which all a man does is construed favorably, and there is another under which all is construed unfavorably. You have had all the advantages of the first. If I am not mistaken you are now standing on the dividing line between the two." From a review of the weak points that had developed in the administration, particularly in connection with the Attorney-General and the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Schurz derived the conclusion that if an election were at hand the President would have no chance of
success against any Republican candidate but Blaine, and but the slightest chance against even him. The Independents have been alienated and the spoils Democrats, who at heart despise the President, are jubilant. The spoilsman "understand perfectly who those are whom you dismiss as 'impracticable friends' and men of 'misguided zeal.' They remember well that this is the same taunt those men had to hear from the Republican side when they threw their political fortunes to the winds, repudiated Blaine, turned their backs upon their party and supported you who promised to be the champion of their common principles. And the spoilsman eagerly believe that the spirit which inspires that taunt now cannot be very different from that which inspired it on the other side two years ago." The President's attempt to please both reformers and spoilsman, Mr. Schurz assured him, had failed. "I warned you more than once that your principal danger was to sit down between two chairs. I am afraid you are virtually there now."

It is hardly surprising that from this time the President manifested much irritability in his communications to Mr. Schurz and other aggressive reformers. A striking illustration of this occurred in the following August. The National Civil Service Reform League, which had been organized in 1881, was very active in agitation for its cause, under the presidency of George William Curtis. Its annual meeting of 1887 was announced for August in Newport. A gentleman whom Mr. Cleveland had appointed to an important place in the New York custom house, was an active member of the executive committee of the League. To the utter and almost comical consternation of this official, he received from the President a warning not to attend the Newport meeting, on the ground that it would involve the same interference in politics that [413]
other officeholders had been ordered to desist from. Mr. Cleveland declined to permit him, any more than any other officeholder, "to embarrass and discredit me in what I know and you know . . . to be honest efforts to give the people good government." The President later apologized for this letter, confessing that it was written under the influence of great irritation. The cause of this feeling was obviously the expectation that the League would strongly denounce the administration. Curtis' presidential address did indeed set in strong light the wide gap between the administration's performance and the reformers' hopes; but the criticism seems to have been less offensive than the President had anticipated. The Newport speech, Cleveland wrote, "has given encouragements that will bear bad fruits," and "has certainly made it a little harder for me"; yet he construed it "quite differently from those who desired to make capital out of it against the administration."

Mr. Schurz naturally expressed unqualified approval of Curtis' address. It is the business of the Mugwumps, he wrote Curtis, to stand up boldly and demand extremes in reform, even though they are charged with demanding the impossible. The uncompromising spirit of reform thus manifested was hopelessly irreconcilable with the party programme which the President was now preparing, and so it came about that, without any rupture of personal friendship, the relations between Schurz and Cleveland lost for a time the intimacy which had prevailed since 1884.

During these years of earnest effort to influence the political current, Mr. Schurz had formally entered the field of literature. In the winter of 1884-85 he traveled for four months through the South, visiting all the States except Mississippi. His purpose was partly to acquire material for his proposed
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history of the United States and partly to study the transformations in social conditions since his famous observations and report twenty years earlier. In May, 1885, he summed up the results of his tour in a pamphlet of thirty-three pages entitled *The New South*. His judgments on the general course of events in reconstruction as well as on the undoing of reconstruction were eminently just and candid. In the South he found the present full of prosperity, and the future very hopeful. He believed that economic usefulness would be the solution of the negro problem. When the blacks should make a little more progress in the accumulation of property and in general intelligence their party allegiance would become divided; the diversification of industry, already far advanced, would at the same time divide the whites; and through the normal operation of economic and political motives the color line would disappear, whites and blacks voting side by side in the party to which their interests assigned them. Not giving sufficient weight to the persistency of race antipathies, Mr. Schurz's predictions to-day seem doubtful of fulfillment; but when they were made they expressed the faith of Secretary Lamar and many other philosophical Southerners.

*The New South* attracted less attention than its literary and philosophic merits deserved. After its publication Mr. Schurz devoted himself seriously to the *Henry Clay*, which was finished in the summer of 1886 and published late in the following winter. The reception which it met with was in the highest degree flattering. Though Clay was in almost every respect remote from the ideals of character and statesmanship that his biographer worshiped, the justice and fidelity of the portrait were universally recognized. Aged veterans of the dim decades before 1850, Whigs and Jackson Democrats alike, testified to Schurz, in letters of tremulous prolixity,

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their satisfaction with his treatment of the man whom they had known. Scholarly historical critics admired the insight and accuracy of the biographer in dealing with the social and political environment of his subject. Literary critics found in the volumes that sense of form and style which entitled the author to the freedom of their guild. Not the least interesting to Mr. Schurz were words of more than perfunctory appreciation from men like ex-Senator Drake and Senator Dawes, with whom his political relations had been anything but cordial.

The success of the *Henry Clay* gave a great renewing impulse to the project of a more extensive historical work. At the same time the idea of a volume of personal reminiscences, long vaguely in Mr. Schurz's mind, began to take definite form under the operation of various influences. His sixtieth year, 1889, was approaching; several publishers solicitously urged the plan; and many friends, including ex-President Hayes, insisted that the preparation of an autobiography was an imperative duty.

With the idea of procuring material for both these literary enterprises Mr. Schurz resolved upon a visit to Europe. He hoped to find in various diplomatic archives important light on the foreign relations of the United States during the period of which he was to write; and in Spain and Germany he desired to refresh his memory on episodes of his personal career. Private business affairs also demanded attention in Hamburg, where the family interests were still important. Accordingly he crossed the Atlantic in April, 1888, and did not return till late in November. Although this trip had small results in the promotion of his literary projects, it was rich in personal experiences and pleasures, as well as in tributes to his reputation as a public man. In Germany, he was sought out with marks of respect and honor by many who stood first in politics.

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and in culture. During his absence Harrison was elected to succeed Cleveland. This was the first presidential campaign since 1852 in which Mr. Schurz had not taken an active part as a public speaker.

On his return to New York it was quickly revealed that the business aspect of his trip had had important results, for in December the announcement was made that with the new year he would assume the duties of general American representative of the Hamburg-American Steamship Company. The assumption of an income-producing routine had been in Mr. Schurz's mind ever since he left the Evening Post. In 1885 he had negotiated for a controlling interest in the Boston Advertiser, but had not been able to see a sufficiently attractive financial outlook in the project. The Boston Post also was under consideration at the same time, but without result. The Hamburg-American connection was in many respects more agreeable than any other business could have been. Although not a man of business training, as he had told Hayes, he had been a close student of international affairs in commerce as well as in diplomacy. And he formed this business connection with the confident expectation that his time and strength would not be so engrossed as to prevent the prosecution of his literary labor. He found it impossible, however, to resist the temptations to take active part in the social and political movements of the time, and these, with the business routine, continually crowded out his much loved but less insistent projects. He gradually became convinced that his hope of successfully combining the steamship agency with literary productivity was ill-founded, and on July 1, 1892, after holding his position at the urgent request of the company for six months longer than he wished, he severed his connection with the Hamburg-American Line.

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VI

EDITOR OF "HARPER'S WEEKLY," POLITICAL SAGE

LESS than a week after leaving the Hamburg-American office Mr. Schurz was requested by Harper and Brothers to supply for their *Weekly* the leading editorial in place of George William Curtis, then fatally ill. Save for the accompanying sorrow on account of the affliction of this very dear friend, no task could have been more to the taste of Mr. Schurz, and it was continued from week to week. On the last day of August, 1892, Mr. Curtis died, and the *Weekly* of September 10 contained a warm, eloquent and fraternal tribute to his memory, doubtless written by Mr. Schurz. The arrangement under which the leading editorial was furnished every week was understood to be temporary and strictly secret. Both parties were so well satisfied, however, that the contributions continued for nearly six years, but, of course, Schurz's style and ideas were soon recognized. After January, 1897, his articles were signed, and thus exchanged the vague and mystic authority of the paper for the clear and definite authority of his own name and reputation.

For various reasons this connection with a substantial weekly journal was very opportune for Mr. Schurz. It enabled him to exercise an influence on public opinion without binding him to the drudgery and responsibility of daily editorial routine; and it came to him at the very moment when the political situation was such as to excite his deepest and most hopeful interest. Harrison and Cleveland were at this
time, the summer of 1892, in the midst of their second contest, and the chief issues were the tariff and the currency.

We need to take only a glance backward to appreciate how deep and hopeful Schurz's interest was. It will be recalled that his disappointment with Cleveland's civil-service achievements at Washington, a few years earlier, was profound and almost bitter; but the famous tariff message of December, 1887, had revealed a spirit and purpose in the President that made an irresistible appeal to nearly all the Independents, and they had supported Cleveland in his unsuccessful campaign of 1888. The Harrison administration, not yet ended, had afforded no inducement to the Independents to transfer their sympathy and support to the Republicans. Blaine's foreign policy had caused grave apprehension among conservative men. Cleveland's tariff challenge had been met with the McKinley Bill. The long dormant Southern question had been revived by the Federal Elections Bill. The threatening free-silver agitation had not been opposed except by the disastrous Sherman Silver-Purchase Act. Every leading item of Republican policy, in short, was offensive to Schurz's strongest convictions.

Accordingly Schurz and his political friends had eagerly supported the project of renominating Cleveland in 1892. The chief obstacle to this project was the violent and unscrupulous opposition of David B. Hill, then Governor of New York, and Tammany Hall, who together had absolute control of the Democratic State organization. In State and municipal politics Mr. Schurz had, since settling in New York, become prominent in every movement against Tammany and its allies. It gave added zest, therefore, to his efforts in favor of Cleveland's nomination, that success would mean the defeat of the Hill-Tammany combination. For the promotion of his de-
sire to see Cleveland renominated, Schurz naturally recurred
to the familiar device of a pre-convention demonstration by the
Independents. His faith in the efficiency of this procedure was,
however, less strong than it had once been; and after much de-
liberation the plan was abandoned. There were many informal
discussions and much correspondence with influential Demo-
crats and Independents. Ex-Secretary Whitney, who was look-
ing after the Cleveland interests in New York, sought Schurz
for consultation as early as February, 1892; and he carried in
his pocket to the Chicago convention in June, an address and
a sheaf of resolutions drafted by Schurz for use, in case of
need, to commit various State delegations irrevocably to Cleve-
land. In a letter of July 8th, thanking Schurz for his aid,
Whitney explained why the drafts were not used:

"One has to feel the atmosphere to know whether it is
wise to do any certain thing. I had the address signed by the
New Jersey delegation and ready to be passed by Connecticut,
when we got Indiana, and I felt that we were then in danger
of crowding the two little States too far into the front. The
silent weight of the three was such that I was afraid of my
prepared machinery—so with the resolutions, which I read to
my colleagues and had ready to adopt in case we called our
forces together. We did not dare to call them for fear we
should count up less than two-thirds and give them a chance
to howl. So I decided to let the current run and crowd them
with the rush of our claims and the popular strength we were
developing.

"It wasn't a fight at all. We hadn't to swear fealty to
each other.

"It was a grand, mad, enthusiastic rush over the whole
field. You never saw anything like it before."

But the machine politicians of New York were not in
that "grand, mad, enthusiastic rush over the whole field," and their hostility was still evident as the subsequent campaign advanced. Cleveland's Democratic managers were indeed anxious. At length, in September, mainly through the activity of ex-Secretary Whitney, the chiefs of the hostile factions were brought to a personal conference with the candidate. This widely discussed incident was followed by the announcement that the machine would support Cleveland, and there was no lack of intimation and down-right assertion that this result was due to satisfactory pledges as to the patronage in case of Democratic success.

Mr. Schurz's health forbade his usual active participation in the campaign as a public speaker. In lieu of it he decided to write a formal political letter to the Brooklyn Independents. This letter was almost ready to be sent,—in fact, he was correcting the proofs,—when the newspapers began to scatter the unsavory reports of Mr. Cleveland's alleged surrender to the machine. In the prospective letter Mr. Schurz had spoken as one reformer to another, and had expressed confidence that they could all find satisfaction in Cleveland's tariff-reform policy and especially in his attitude of defiance to the Hill-Tammany machine. Here was indeed a dilemma. But less for Mr. Schurz than may be supposed. He resolved to ascertain at once whether the predilections of the Independents for Mr. Cleveland had again caused them to form too good an opinion of him. In case the man especially loved "for the enemies he had made" had entered into an alliance with those enemies, "my letter does not fit the situation," Schurz wrote. "As it now stands, my letter, if it attracts attention, might cause Mr. Cleveland to be asked whether he himself agreed with the sentiments expressed by me. ... This might be to Mr. Cleveland a very embarrassing question. He might per-
haps say that he was much pleased to see me think so well of him, but that he took on the whole a view of things different from mine. Such an answer would be calculated to make me appear very ridiculous. Now I do not wish to embarrass Mr. Cleveland nor do I wish to appear very ridiculous." Accordingly Schurz directed that, unless Cleveland’s approval of what was written should be obtained, the letter should not be read at the approaching meeting. All the difficulties of the situation were removed, however, by authentic reports that were sent to Mr. Schurz of what had passed between Mr. Cleveland and the machine leaders. The candidate had made no pledges; he had wholly dominated the recalcitrant politicians, and had brought them, unhappy and grumbling, to recognize him as their master. Then the letter was sent. It made a great political sensation, not only on account of its strong arguments, especially for a reduction of the tariff, but also because it destroyed those false reports about Cleveland’s surrender and discomfited the men that at least found consolation in them. It was widely circulated as a campaign document.

Each number of Harper's Weekly throughout the campaign contained a leader by Schurz in which he discussed, with his peculiar lucidity and moral vigor, the different questions of interest to open-minded voters. More than one of these editorials shows that he was as thorough a master of the tariff question as he was of the currency question; and that he was as far from being a victim of the sophistries of protection as he was of those of “rag-money.” But as yet few beyond an intimate circle knew that these articles came from his pen.

The great triumph of the Democratic ticket in November gave profound satisfaction to Mr. Schurz. His most eloquent expression of this feeling was in an address at the annual
dinner of the Reform Club of New York on December 10, 1892. The occasion took the character of a jubilation over the result of the election by Cleveland Democrats and Independents. The President-elect attended and made an address. Schurz followed, speaking on "Moral Forces in Politics." To these forces he ascribed the decisive influence in the late campaign. Not the professional politician, he said, but the flouted and despised idealist had correctly gauged the feelings of the American people. The party sense had been overwhelmed by the moral sense. "What," he asked, "are these moral forces? They are that patriotism which subordinates every other consideration to the general welfare, honor and greatness of the country; that instinct of justice which loves right as right, abhors wrong as wrong, and wishes every man to have his due; that sense of duty which incites a conscientious endeavor to understand what is best for the country and for every citizen in it; that honest purpose and courage to do what is right which inspire sympathy and respect for honest purpose and courage in others; that proud manliness which disdains shams and subterfuges, and admires with a hearty admiration a straightforwardness defying opposition and a plucky disinterested zeal for the public good doing the best it can." Such forces, he claimed, animated the rank and file of the Democrats to rise against the protective tariff and its trail of corrupt politics. Such forces, too, inspired the Independents—"the men who, as has been said of Edmund Burke, 'sometimes change their front but never change their ground'; the men who, in struggling for good government, had the courage to expose themselves without the shelter of a party roof over their heads; the men whom the partisan politician calls 'those enlightened, unselfish and patriotic citizens who rise above party,' provided they rise above the other party, but whom he calls 'a lot of
dudes and Pharisees amounting to nothing' when they happen to rise above his own party." Under the inspiration of the occasion the orator pictured the possibility of welding the Independents with the Democrats into a permanent party organization. Though the Independents had supported "rather a cause and its champion than a party and its leader," they did not, he declared, despise loyal attachment to a party. "They sincerely and highly appreciate and esteem organization in the service of principles, ideals and sound policies. But they distrust principles and ideals in the service of organization; and they condemn and despise organization without principles and ideals. If the Democratic party wishes to attach them firmly and loyally to its organization, it has only to attach itself firmly and faithfully to the principles, ideas and policies which attracted them."

This conception of the meaning and purpose of party was in the long familiar vein of Mr. Schurz's philosophy; but it was altogether novel for him to suggest anything like permanent attachment to the Democracy. So far as the idea was more than a passing reflection of the occasion, it sprang from the hope that the old party was to be revolutionized through the leadership of Mr. Cleveland. To him the Independents gave ungrudging fealty. As Schurz said at the Reform Club dinner, addressing the President-elect: "Here you are among friends —friends who share not only one or two, but all the articles of your political faith, whether they touch constitutional principles, or the tariff, or the currency, or the reform of the public service; friends devoted heart and soul to the great cause you represent, and heart and soul devoted to you, because you honestly and courageously represent it."

But in the events that crowded thick and fast upon the newly installed administration the hope of a triumphant Cleve-
land Democracy faded steadily away. With all his high purpose, rugged force and iron will, the President could not cope with the social and economic powers that were rising against him. The Democracy was revolutionized, but not by him or for him. His tariff policy was wrecked by the capitalistic Democrats of the East. As Mr. Schurz had foreseen, the danger was not that the revision would be too radical, but that it would not be radical enough. Cleveland’s currency policy, after a brief but spectacular triumph, was wrecked by the populistic Democrats of the West. Through the stirring politics of this transformation, Mr. Schurz supported with voice and pen the President’s policies, and found some comfort in the unmistakable progress of at least one of his ideals, the reform of the civil service.

Upon the death of Mr. Curtis, in 1892, Mr. Schurz, already president of the New York Civil Service Reform Association, was chosen to succeed him as president of the National Civil Service Reform League. The words in which the work of Curtis had been described by Schurz now became precisely applicable to his own position: “He was not only president , . . , re-elected from year to year without any question, but also the intellectual head, the guiding force and the moral inspiration of the civil-service-reform movement. The addresses he delivered at the annual meetings of the League were like milestones in the progress of the work; . . . he reported to the country what had been done and what was still to be done, enlightening public sentiment, encouraging his fellow-laborers and distributing, with even-handed justice, praise and reproof among the political parties as they deserved it.” . . .

That Schurz should doubly succeed Curtis was a rare compliment to the mental and moral qualities of the two men. Their mutual respect and sympathy had long been complete.
Curtis lived closer to letters than Schurz; and Schurz, closer to politics than Curtis. They first met and became friends when both were young men and members of the Republican National Convention of 1860. The victory that Curtis there achieved through oratory caused the principles of the Declaration of Independence to be incorporated into the Republican platform and gave Schurz a recollection which he, nearly half a century later, called one of the most inspiring of his life. Twelve years after that occasion Curtis heard Schurz's speech about the sale of arms to France, and pronounced it "unquestionably altogether the finest speech I ever heard." The most beautiful and appropriate eulogy of Curtis came from Schurz, who said: "And as he was the ideal party man and the ideal Independent, so he might well have been called the finest type of the American gentleman."

The time, attention and manual labor devoted by Mr. Schurz to the one matter of civil-service reform would have been enough for the average man well past his sixtieth year. No detail of the movement in either national, State or city administration failed sooner or later to demand his attention and profit by his advice. With President Cleveland he discussed, less lengthily and impatiently but not less candidly than in the first term, the shortcomings of the departments in respect to the spirit of the reform. Governor Morton, by whose election in 1894 the long domination of the Hill-Tammany combination in New York State was ended, was skillfully influenced to give effective if somewhat wavering support to much-needed extensions of the reform at Albany. When Governor Black, who succeeded Morton, adopted the cause of the spoilsmen and proceeded to "take a little starch out of the civil service," Mr. Schurz headed a delegation of protest against the bills and made an address, March
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3, 1897, to the Governor which must stand as a masterpiece of conclusive argument and indignant denunciation expressed without the slightest deviation from the external forms of propriety and courtesy. In the city government a reform mayor, troubled with the bickerings of some of the reformers most concerned in the administration of the civil-service laws, was glad to lay the complications before Mr. Schurz and solve the problems through his ready and effective aid.

Municipal politics in general contributed much to occupy Mr. Schurz during these busy years. In the perennial conflict between "bossism" and enlightened politics his interest was early enlisted, as has been mentioned, in the opposition to Tammany Hall. From 1886 to 1894 Tammany controlled the city, and Mr. Schurz's rôle was only that of a protesting leader of the helpless but undaunted non-partisan minority. The election of 1894 brought triumph at last, in the success of a fusion of Republicans and reformers which nominated W. L. Strong for the mayoralty. This result was due in large measure to an "anti-vice crusade" conducted by the Rev. Dr. Parkhurst, which led to the revelation of gross corruption in the police department. The new mayor summoned Theodore Roosevelt to head the board of police commissioners, and Roosevelt's downright and strenuous policy in enforcing the excise laws precipitated a serious split among the reformers. In the elections of 1895 their leaders maintained the fusion with the Republicans; but the German element of the reformers, disgusted with the rigid enforcement of the excise laws, broke away and supported Tammany, while a little knot of radicals, holding that fusion with the Republican machine was as immoral as fusion with Tammany, devoted themselves to an excited campaign against both the main parties, but especially against their fellow-reformers.

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Mr. Schurz was deeply interested in this election. He was distressed to see the withdrawal of the Germans from the fusion, though he sympathized with them in their discontent with the excise laws; and for the radicals also he had the fellow-feeling of a man who had sacrificed much in standing for principle rather than for temporary political success. The radicals had high hopes of gaining his outspoken approval and support, but he eventually came out for the fusion. His speech at Cooper Union, on October 30, 1895, embodied probably the most definite and possibly the only clean-cut defense of opportunism, in the best sense, that he ever made. Addressing himself to the dissident reformers, he said:

"In the course of my life I have taken part in two great reformatory movements—that for the abolition of slavery, which has finally succeeded, and that for the reform of the civil service, which, I doubt not, is going to succeed. In working for these objects I have gathered certain experiences and learned certain lessons which our friends of the Good Government Clubs will permit me to lay before them.

"It is well to uphold high ideals before our own minds and the minds of others, and faithfully to strive for their realization. But if you cannot reach that realization at once, do not despise little steps and even roundabout ways that will bring you nearer to it, however slowly.

"When for the attainment of a good public object you need the aid and co-operation of a great many people, which you almost always do, you cannot afford to confine yourselves to only those who think exactly as you think and who are animated by exactly the same motives that you have. If you do, you will indeed form a very fine and select circle, but you will be apt to cut a poor figure at the polls, and fail to get the power by which to accomplish your good public object. It
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is often necessary to make little concessions in order to obtain good results of high value. . . ."

The somewhat unwonted, however justifiable, philosophy sustained by Mr. Schurz on this occasion did not avail to secure the triumph of the reformers. Tammany won the election, and two years later, in 1897, renewed its success and resumed control of the city.

Meanwhile the epoch-making presidential campaign of 1896 took place. The national Democratic party, so far from realizing the ideal of Schurz's Reform Club speech of 1892, repudiated Cleveland and all his works, set up a demand for the free coinage of silver and nominated William J. Bryan for the Presidency. The new leaders who came to the front with Bryan—Tillman, Altgeld and others—were unwonted figures in the national political arena, and seemed to be born of populism and socialism. In Mr. Schurz this transformed Democracy aroused, of course, only dread and repulsion. Its free-coinage dogma revived the memory and the spirit of the middle seventies, when he had fought so effectively against greenbacks and inflation. Yet he felt no enthusiasm for the candidate or the leadership under which the Republicans chose to oppose Bryanism. To follow McKinley, whose name had become the world-wide synonym for high protection, and Hanna, in whom unscrupulous political methods were already finding a cynical champion, was a hard necessity for a reformer and so-called free-trader. But Mr. Schurz met this situation, as he had met many a similar one, by a rigid adherence to the rôle of Independent. His rejection of the Democratic platform and candidate was, of course, prompt and emphatic. Demands for his assistance on the stump then came thick and fast from the Republican organizations, but these were all refused. While his health was such as to render
compliance with these demands to any great extent a physical impossibility, there were other causes active in determining his course. The Republican national campaign was managed by ex-Senator Powell Clayton; and when a request signed by this gentleman came to Mr. Schurz, the declination could not have lost anything in emphasis from the memories that clustered about Clayton's name.

As the campaign developed it became evident that the decisive battle ground was to be the Middle West. Husbanding his strength for a great effort on this field, Schurz went to Chicago and on September 5th, under the auspices of the American Honest Money League, a non-partisan organization, made his plea for sound currency. The speech had all the vim, fire and vote-getting cogency that had characterized his campaign work a score of years earlier. It was void of reference to McKinley or the Republican party, and presented only an annihilating assault on the historical, economic and political bases of the free-coinage platform. The effect of the address was seen not only in the enthusiasm with which it was greeted by the Republicans and Gold Democrats, but particularly in the attention given to it by the Bryan party. Governor Altgeld, who was by far the strongest of the silver men in purely intellectual debate, found it expedient to make formal reply to the argument of Mr. Schurz, and the latter, with the joy of combat roused to its old-time maximum, returned to the fray with an elaborate rejoinder at Peoria late in October.

The result of the November voting brought many congratulations to Mr. Schurz on the influence he was supposed to have had in the result. His own profound satisfaction at the defeat of Bryan was not accompanied by an equal joy over the election of McKinley. He regarded with grave apprehension the influences that were likely to be in the ascendant under
the new administration. One of his friends in high financial circles in New York, where alarm over the free-coinage movement had been excessive, let his relief over the outcome find expression in a suggestion that occasioned the following letter from Mr. Schurz to Mr. Hanna:

"Yesterday I learned from Mr. ——, to my utter dismay, that he had spoken to you of the desirability of my being in Mr. McKinley's Cabinet. I hasten to say to you—although I hope it is hardly necessary to do so—that this was not only without my knowledge, but that, had I had the least suspicion of Mr. ——'s intention to do so, I should have put a peremptory veto on it. The fact is, I not only do not entertain any such desire, but, on the contrary, were my opinion asked about it, I would distinctly advise against anything of the kind. I think it would be a public misfortune if any prominent sound-money Democrat or Independent, by accepting any place liable to be looked upon as a reward for services rendered, gave the public the slightest reason for thinking that the motives impelling those classes of citizens to support Mr. McKinley for the Presidency had been other than personally disinterested and purely patriotic. Moreover, I think that to compose a Cabinet of heterogeneous elements is as a matter of policy very questionable. Experience speaks rather against it. What might properly be done in case of an entire realignment of political parties, I will not say. But such is not our present situation.

"I trust you will permit me to speak to you confidentially about the manner in which, in my humble opinion, Mr. McKinley might show his appreciation of the services rendered by his allies in the late election. It strikes me that he might do so by giving friendly consideration to their views when shaping the policy of his administration, and, secondly, by
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retaining in office, or by reappointing, a number of especially efficient and meritorious officers now in the national service, as Mr. Cleveland did in the case of the postmaster of New York City. This would be in the line of the principles of civil-service reform which have always found in Mr. McKinley a faithful and efficient defender in Congress. I am sure such action would be very highly appreciated by the enlightened opinion of the country and greatly strengthen him in public confidence."

This letter exhibits the spirit by which all the relations of Mr. Schurz to the new President were guided. Only in civil-service reform was there common ground, and it could hardly be hoped that the demands of the extreme reformer would be satisfied by McKinley's unaggressive temper where the sturdy and stiff-backed Cleveland had failed. In his last year Cleveland did indeed win something like unqualified approval by a sweeping extension of the classified service and by important applications of reform principles in other respects. Probably Mr. Schurz's most sanguine hope was that McKinley might be deterred from undoing what had been actually accomplished. The early months of the new administration afforded much opportunity for Mr. Schurz to preach his favorite doctrines to the President. Copious correspondence and two personal interviews contributed to fortify Mr. McKinley's good purposes against what he confessed was a tremendous pressure by the spoilsmen, and late in July, 1897, his favor to the reform was signalized by an executive order greatly restricting removals on political grounds.

The cordial relations of the two men continued, however, to be limited to this single aspect of public policy. In October, 1897, the President ventured to ask Schurz to aid the
Republicans in their campaign in Ohio. The declination was, though courteous, prompt and decisive. Two grounds were given: first, that the effort to elect Seth Low as mayor of New York was keeping Schurz very busy; and second, the Republican platform of Ohio would make it “rather irksome to me to appear in that campaign.” Both reasons involved a fundamental antagonism to the President’s party: the support of Low in New York signified among other things a deadly hostility to the State leadership of T. C. Platt, who was reputed to be very influential with the administration; and the repudiation of the Ohio platform meant antipathy to the tariff policy which had only in July taken legislative form in the Dingley Act.

More than five years had now (1897) elapsed since Mr. Schurz retired from business with the expectation of devoting himself to the writing of history. Of systematic study in the field of his projected work on the Civil War nothing had even engaged his serious attention save a long and unfinished essay on Charles Sumner. A short study of Lincoln had appeared in 1891, and was at once generally pronounced a classic; and it was expected that Mr. Schurz’s intimacy with Sumner and sympathetic view of his policies would some day do as much for the historical repute of the Massachusetts Senator as the earlier study had done for the great President.

But however deep the interest of Mr. Schurz in the past, it could never overcome the demands of the present. Besides the questions of politics—national, State and municipal—in which the extent of his active participation has been indicated, a multitude of private or only semi-public enterprises and occasions appealed, and rarely in vain, for the aid and entertainment of his attractive oratory.  

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Especially frequent were the appeals of the German-Americans, whose representative public speaker he was generally recognized to be. The list of his addresses before their various organizations is long and most diverse. He spoke at the memorial services to Emperor William I., Bismarck, Lasker, Steinway and others; at the banquet to Ambassador White; at the jubilee of the New York Liederkranz in 1897; at the banquet celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the revolutionary movement of 1848, and on many other important occasions. As honorary member of the Chamber of Commerce, he was frequently called upon for memorial or ceremonial addresses. One of his most entertaining speeches was at a banquet of the piano-makers of New York, for he was born a musician as well as an orator.

The time-and-strength-consuming potency of these various avocations is to be properly appreciated only when it is remembered that he was never satisfied with the results of momentary inspiration, and whenever it was possible made careful preparation for his speeches, writing them out with his own hand and revising them again and again.

In April of 1898 one unremitting drain upon his energy was removed by the termination of his connection with Harper's Weekly. The political convictions as well as the financial interests of the proprietors dictated a change in the policy of the paper to bring it more nearly in harmony with the popular sentiment that was clamoring for war and territorial expansion. No concession to such a sentiment could ever be expected of Mr. Schurz, and hence his weekly editorials ceased. The rupture of this relation was the first of many that were produced by the Spanish War. He was now past his sixty-ninth birthday. At forty he had successfully antagonized Grant's project of tropical expansion and had met no popular disapp-
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proval of his course. Now, with three score and ten close at hand, he antagonized, as we shall see, a similar project, only to find at every turn a tumult of flouting and jeers as the American people overwhelmed his protests with exultant boasts of a world mission.
VII

ANTI-IMPERIALIST AND THE END

The premonitory signs of that interesting psychological condition of the American people which culminated in the war with Spain were noted by Mr. Schurz with increasing anxiety and alarm. Secretary Blaine's "vigorous" policy in respect to the Latin-American states and the Behring Sea seal fisheries contributed much to the sum total of his dislike for the Harrison administration. The peremptory suppression by Cleveland of the project for the annexation of Hawaii elicited his warm approval, though the President's cautious and guarded statement as to his attitude was hardly on the level demanded by Schurz's uncompromising hostility on principle to tropical expansion. "I do not now say," Cleveland wrote on March 19, 1893, "that I shall hold annexation in all circumstances and at all times unwise, but I am sure we ought to stop, look and think. That is exactly what we are doing now." In an article on "Manifest Destiny" in Harper's Magazine for October, 1893, Schurz set forth at length the grounds on which the acquisition of Hawaii ought to be definitely dropped in the interest of the national welfare.

When in December, 1895, Mr. Cleveland astonished the world by his memorable message on the Venezuelan boundary question, and the American people with impressive unanimity sustained him in defying and humbling the British government, Mr. Schurz was one of the indignant few who promptly declared that message both unwise and unnecessary, and strove
to check the grim trend toward war. He joined heartily in the movement for a treaty of arbitration with Great Britain, and wrote and spoke at every opportunity on behalf of this project. The danger of hostilities with Great Britain passed away, but the spirit which the crisis had so clearly revealed remained active and unappeased. A craving for war and territorial expansion, as the conclusive demonstrations of self-conscious national power, was shown by many signs to have firm possession of the popular mind. In the spring of 1898 the Cuban situation furnished sufficient occasion, and war with Spain ensued.

The events that led to intervention in Cuba were followed by Mr. Schurz with positive mental distress. From personal experience he could clearly foresee the sufferings that war would entail; he despised the agitators, journalistic and political, who were most conspicuous in inflaming the popular mind against Spain; and most of all he feared the effects of success upon the future of our institutions. As the crisis approached in April, he labored strenuously to avert the disaster. So long as he wrote for Harper's Weekly his editorials were insistent on peace. For the New York Chamber of Commerce he drafted the resolutions that it adopted on April 7, declaring that "war with its incalculable horrors and miseries, when brought about without peremptory necessity, is not only a calamity but a crime." In a short speech supporting these resolutions he pictured the frightful scenes he had witnessed among the wounded at Gettysburg, and declared that while he was not for peace at any price, he was equally opposed to the idea of war at any price. He used all of his never great influence with the President to stiffen Mr. McKinley's sincere but ineffective preference for peace. On April 1st he wrote to the President: "The conservative and unselfishly patriotic senti-
ment of the country stands behind your peace policy with confidence, gratitude and admiration. . . . You will gather imperishable honors by every effort to save even a last chance of honorable peace at this moment of the decisive crisis."

A week later Mr. Schurz wrote that “the war fever stirred up by the ‘yellow journals’ is on the point of receding,” and urged that whatever the outcome of the crisis, the utmost pains should be taken to remove every ground for suspicion that the annexation of Cuba was the secret motive of the government’s action. On the 11th of April McKinley’s message was sent to Congress recommending intervention for the single purpose of ending the disorders and suffering in Cuba. Though war with Spain was clearly contemplated, the President’s tone was wholly pacific and humane, and offered no suggestion of imperialistic ambition. Schurz thanked him for his “excellent message,” and added: “I have no doubt that the people will sustain you in your efforts for peace.” This pleasant conventionality could not disguise the fact that the mass of the people, like the majority of Congress, at heart preferred war, and war duly came.

With the progress of hostilities Schurz’s whole anxiety was to check the growth of that spirit of conquest which was so bountifully nourished by military and naval success. Though the annexation of Cuba had been formally excluded from the policy of our government, Porto Rico and the Philippines soon presented the problem of expansion in a field concerning which no pledges had been made. The Hawaiian project also was revived in a more aggressive spirit than ever. Against every suggestion looking to the incorporation of any of these territories into our system Mr. Schurz was instant in opposition. His letters to the President received less and less attention as other influences assumed irresistible sway over Mr.
McKinley's mind, but as early as June 1, Schurz outlined and powerfully sustained, in a letter to the President, the policy on which the anti-imperialistic movement was developed. The pledge to leave Cuba free must be interpreted, Schurz argued, as an announcement of a general attitude in reference to territory brought under our control by the incidents of war. Porto Rico, like Cuba, must be made independent; and the Philippines must be disposed of to some power like Holland or Belgium. Thus the burden and responsibility of troublesome dependencies would be escaped, and the United States would occupy the proud and most advantageous position of "the great neutral power of the world." Thus, also, our trade would receive its utmost expansion with the minimum risk, and our republican institutions would escape the peril that lies in political connection with alien and inferior peoples.

Schurz urged McKinley to make strong and repeated representations to the American people and to the world in the sense of this policy and thus lead the public conscience to insist upon its adoption. But the President was by nature a follower rather than a leader of popular opinion, and the whole trend of events, when the negotiations for peace began, was toward the acquisition of all the Spanish dependencies save Cuba. Remembering how earnestly Schurz had opposed the annexation of Santo Domingo a generation earlier, it is not hard to imagine his feeling about acquiring so remote and alien a possession as the Philippines. The anguish he suffered was shared by a considerable group of his surviving associates of early Republican days, and was strikingly expressed in a letter from John B. Henderson, Schurz's predecessor in the Senate: "Almost every magazine I read, every newspaper coming into my hands . . . and every act of the administration of the government for the success of which I worked
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so hard and you worked so effectively . . . all seem to be in a conspiracy to convict me of insanity. Am I crazy or not? If you say so, I shall contend no longer. If we conclude after consultation that I am really sane, then for God's sake, for the sake of humanity and for the good of our common country, let us cry aloud and spare not."

To interpose what resistance was possible to the sweep of expansionist sentiment, its adversaries organized a "National Conference on the Foreign Policy of the United States." Schurz drafted the call and made the chief address at the conference on August 18th. His speech was an earnest and eloquent development of the suggestions made to the President in the letter of June 1st. Expansion was opposed on grounds of morals and honor, of institutional policy and of commercial interest. The question of morals was put by the orator, *suo more*, in the foreground: "It may be somewhat old-fashioned, but I still believe that a nation, no less than an individual man, is in honor bound to keep its word . . . that honesty is and will remain the best policy. And now I ask the advocates of annexation among us whether, if this republic under any pretext annexes any of the Spanish colonies, it does not really turn this solemnly advertised war of liberation and humanity into a war of self-aggrandizement. I ask them what they will have to say when our detractors repeat against us their charges of hypocrisy and selfish interest. I ask them who will trust us again when we appear once more before mankind with fine words about our unselfish devotion to human freedom and humanity. I ask them whether as patriotic men they really think it will become or profit this great American republic to stand before mankind as a nation whose most solemn professions cannot be trusted."

His argument on the effect of expansion upon our politi-

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cal institutions was the same that he had employed in the Santo Domingo debate and on many an occasion since. He dwelt on the practical certainty that the islands, if annexed, would be proposed for admission as States of the Union. The acquisition of Porto Rico would lead, he prophesied, to that of Santo Domingo, Hayti and probably Cuba. "But we shall hardly stop there. Being once fairly started in the career of aggrandizement regardless of consequences, our imperialists will find an open ear when they tell us that our control of the Nicaraguan Canal cannot possibly be safe unless that canal be bordered on both sides by United States territory, and that therefore we must have the whole country down to that canal and a good piece beyond. That would bring us another lot of about 13,000,000 of Spanish-Americans mixed with Indian blood, and perhaps some twenty Senators and fifty or sixty Representatives, with seventy to eighty votes in the electoral college, and with them a flood of Spanish-American politics, notoriously the most disorderly, tricky and corrupt politics on the face of the earth. What thinking American who has the future of the Republic at heart will not stand appalled at such a prospect?"

On the question of our commercial interest, he argued with much statistical data that we should get far better results in direct and open competition with other nations than in monopolizing the trade of the islands taken from Spain. Porto Rico, like Cuba, should be made an independent republic, and the Philippines, under a guarantee of economic freedom, should be turned over to some such state as Holland or Belgium for political administration. "If American diplomacy is not skillful enough to bring about such results in the final settlement, it would certainly not be skillful enough to handle the more thorny problems which it would surely have
to deal with in case all those islands should pass into our full possession."

No such considerations, however, could stem the tide that swept the administration toward the policy of annexation. In his abhorrence of such an outcome Mr. Schurz made opposition to it the touchstone of his political sympathies. He saw that it had become the paramount question of the time, and took his stand without regard to whether it separated him from old friends or brought him into association with former enemies: his politics had always been based upon chosen policies, not upon chosen friendships. In the autumn of 1898 Mr. Roosevelt, fresh from his spectacular career in Cuba, was nominated for Governor by the Republicans of New York. Many claimed that his election would signify the triumph of the civil-service-reform principles for which Schurz had long worked ardently. But Schurz saw another Roosevelt than the quondam civil-service commissioner. In fact, Roosevelt’s imperialistic aspirations were notorious, and he took occasion early in the campaign to proclaim them with unmistakable emphasis. Schurz promptly abandoned his cause. "We have long been friends," he wrote, "and I ardently hoped to be able to support you for the Governorship. . . . I continued to hope until I read the report of your Carnegie Hall speech. . . . It makes it impossible to support you . . . I cannot tell you, remembering our long and sincere friendship, how painful it is for me to be obliged to say this."

The announceement of his opposition to Roosevelt brought Schurz scores of regrets and reproaches from old associates in reform movements in the State. They regarded Roosevelt as the peculiar champion of anti-machine politics and administration in State affairs; Schurz regarded him as primarily a candidate for the Presidency of the United States on a platform
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favoring conquest and annexation. Voting for Roosevelt, Schurz wrote to a friend, is practically nominating him for the Presidency, and his accession to the higher office will be ruinous to the country. Senator George F. Hoar, whose dread of expansion led him to appeal to Schurz for aid in resisting it, sought at the same time to calm the latter's fears about Roosevelt. "I do not think," Hoar wrote, "there is the slightest possibility that he will ever be nominated for the Presidency, and if he were nominated and elected I think that all questions of imperialism would have got settled long before he would have a chance to influence them for good or evil."

In the light of the future Schurz figured as at least the equal of Hoar in accuracy of political prediction. The two men were too far apart in their views as to the importance of party ties to get anything like the same angle of observation on any question of policy. Schurz wrote to Hoar: "You are a strong party man, which I am not, and what I am now going to say may possibly shock you. I believe that the only thing that can save the Republic from being rushed over the precipice is the defeat in the coming election of all or nearly all the Republican candidates, either for State offices or for Congress, who have conspicuously come out in favor of that expansion policy." Schurz's confidence that imperialism could be killed by Republican defeat proved as ill-founded as Hoar's belief that Republican victory would kill it. The two men counseled together earnestly but in vain, while the ratification of the treaty of peace was pending in the Senate. The great difficulty was to find a positive programme for maintaining order in the Philippines without taking armed possession of them. Hoar adopted Schurz's suggestion that the matter should be arranged by a conference of the great powers, looking to a
joint guarantee of good government and autonomy. But this, like every other plan proposed, offended the chauvinistic spirit that had been aroused by the war, and for very lack of any practicable project for letting the Philippines alone, the treaty which took them under the sovereignty of the United States was ratified in February, 1899. Then ensued the long war to bring the natives into subjection, with the repulsive incidents of all such hostilities with inferior races.

The course of events stimulated Mr. Schurz to a series of orations in his best and strongest style against the new and alarming spirit of our political life. He could not and would not believe that expansion was more than a passing delusion, which would yield to time and proper treatment. With unabated zeal he pressed upon the public the lessons of history and of reason as to the incompatibility between the new imperialistic spirit and the institutions and traditions of the Republic. At the University of Chicago on January 4, 1899, and at Philadelphia on April 7th, he delivered elaborate addresses on the great problems of the time. Meanwhile the relatively few and scattered but very earnest sympathizers with the cause he was sustaining organized for their propaganda, and Schurz promptly associated himself with their proceedings. In November, 1898, he had been made a vice-president of the Anti-Imperialist League, which had its headquarters at Boston, and thenceforth he was an untiring counselor in every phase of the activity of the organization.

The breach with the semi-independent and semi-reforming Roosevelt and the association with the protectionist and intensely partisan Hoar alike illustrate the strength of Schurz's conviction that all other political issues had become subordinate to that of expansion. As the presidential campaign of 1900 approached he feared that his unpopular views on imperialism
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might irreparably damage the cause of civil-service reform. On this account he announced that he would decline re-election as head of both the National League and the New York Association. At the urgent entreaty of his old associates he ultimately consented to retain his place as president of the State organization; but he persisted in bringing to an end his official leadership of the National League.

It became pretty evident that Bryan and McKinley would again be the opposing candidates in 1900, and that the Democrats would antagonize imperialism. Schurz soon began to show signs of a purpose to support Bryan. As early as November 5, 1899, he wrote to a friend expressing his utter distaste for both the Bryan and the McKinley-Hanna groups, but declaring that if he should be forced to choose between them "I shall consider it my duty—a horrible duty—to swallow all my personal disquiet and to defeat—or at least try to defeat—imperialism at any cost." During the winter and spring preceding the nominating conventions of 1900 he took an active part in the efforts that were made to reunite the Democratic factions that had separated on the silver issue in 1896. The chief interest of Mr. Schurz in the enterprise was the hope it afforded of a strong party opposition to imperialism; and that this would also contribute to the relegation of the free-coinage issue to the background. To bring the greatest possible pressure upon the Bryan leaders the anti-imperialist leagues kept up a spirited agitation throughout the spring against the course of the administration in seeking to subdue the Filipinos. To this agitation Mr. Schurz contributed not only unremitting consultation and counsel, but also a formal oration at a great meeting of anti-imperialists at Cooper Union, New York City, on May 24, 1900. For a time he was quite sanguine of converting the free-silver Democracy into an instrument for

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the restoration of ancient American ideals, and of encouraging Mr. Bryan to become a triumphant champion of insular independence. The Kansas City convention gave a serious shock to his hopes. Here the Democracy, nominating Bryan, did indeed take a strong position against imperialism and did in terms pronounce this the paramount issue; but it coupled with these satisfactory declarations a formal reiteration of the extreme free-coinage doctrine of 1896; and Mr. Bryan, during the campaign, devoted to the silver question an amount and kind of attention that repelled all voters who thought the currency issue still vital.

When it was foreseen that the campaign would take this unsatisfactory course a number of efforts were made by groups of Mr. Schurz's friends to organize a respectable third-ticket movement. He followed their various enterprises with interest and sympathy, but was hardly surprised when all failed. Left to the alternative he had anticipated nearly a year before, he supported Bryan, as he had supported McKinley four years earlier, by the negative method of striving to defeat the opposing candidate. However painful and unpopular it might be, he did not hesitate. A hundredfold more wrong-doing and misfortune than he foresaw, or even feared, in regard to San Domingo and the West Indies, a generation earlier, had come to pass in the Orient. The intensity of his feeling was expressed in a letter to Charles Francis Adams: "I have carefully and laboriously studied what has happened in all its details and bearings, and that study has profoundly convinced me that the story of our attempted conquest of the Philippines is a story of deceit, false pretense, brutal treachery to friends, unconstitutional assumption of power, betrayal of the fundamental principles of our democracy, wanton sacrifice of our soldiers for an unjust cause, cruel slaughter of innocent people,
and thus of horrible blood guiltiness without parallel in the history of republics; and that such a policy is bound to bring upon this republic danger, demoralization, dishonor and disaster infinitely more ruinous in ulterior effect than anything that has been predicted as likely to follow Mr. McKinley's defeat. This is my honest conviction. I, for one, cannot therefore conscientiously cast a vote of constructive approval and real encouragement, and I cannot advise others to do so."

His principal part in the canvass was an address, under the auspices of the Anti-Imperialist League, at Cooper Union on September 28th. On November 5th he again wrote to Mr. Adams: "Now on the eve of the election let me say to you that for a considerable time I have not expected Mr. Bryan to succeed." The ground of this feeling was the candidate's proceedings on the free-silver issue. Schurz added that he felt disposed at one time to withdraw from the campaign and keep quiet, but he concluded, as in 1872, that despite the candidate some good could be done by remaining active for the cause. Bryan's exclamation in a public speech in New York City, "Great is Tammany! And Croker is its prophet," filled Schurz with intense disgust, which he expressed with "Bah! Wasn't it awful!" Writing a few months later to one of his old German friends, he said of this campaign of 1900: "My position then, as you well saw, was a real martyrdom. . . . That the cause against which I spoke would be victorious in the election was perfectly clear to me. But if I had not protested against it, I should have belied my whole moral existence."

The overwhelming triumph of McKinley in 1900 left Mr. Schurz in a very unhappy frame of mind. His faith in the American people and in the future of their institutions was rudely shaken. No room was left for doubt that the course of the administration in the insular matter was approved by the
great majority of the voters. It was not in Mr. Schurz's nature, however, to abandon so righteous a cause. He continued to sustain the agitation of the anti-imperialists, whose special aims now were, first, to expose and check the demoralization of the army, as manifested in the inhuman methods employed in subduing the Filipinos; and, second, to secure some formal pledge from the government of the United States that Philippine independence was the ultimate goal of its policy. The counsel and drafting pen of Mr. Schurz, after Roosevelt succeeded McKinley in the White House, exerted considerable influence in checking the cruelties and in helping to bring about an official declaration, however vague as to time, that the Filipinos were some day to have their independence.

There was rarely a year when Mr. Schurz was not busy with some phase of New York City politics or public interests. In the mayoralty campaign of 1901 he supported and spoke for Seth Low, the candidate of the fusionists, though the opposing candidate, Edward M. Shepard, had long been Mr. Schurz's intimate personal friend and close political associate. Mr. Shepard had the somewhat quixotic conception that he could head the Tammany ticket and then carry out his aims as a reformer. Mr. Schurz lamented his course, without questioning Mr. Shepard's motives. Each respected the purpose of the other and the ability with which it was sustained; and the campaign, which resulted in Shepard's defeat, left no trace on the personal relations of the two men.

Mr. Schurz was much engaged also, during the years following 1900, in the cause of civil-service reform, especially in his own State and city. The wrecking of the Democratic party in the East by the Bryan movement and the translation of Mr. Roosevelt to Washington left New York State in the hands of a Republican "machine," the spirit and method of which
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were peculiarly obnoxious to Mr. Schurz, and hostile to the administrative reforms for which he had so earnestly striven. As president of the State Civil Service Reform Association he kept constantly in touch with the currents of conflict, and labored with unabated zeal for the promotion of his cause. The drafts made upon his time and strength by this single interest were enormous.

The conditions under which the presidential campaign of 1904 were fought were full of comfort to Mr. Schurz. The Republicans were practically committed, by Mr. Root's speech as temporary chairman of the convention, and the Democrats were formally committed by their platform, to ultimate withdrawal from the Philippines. This fact materially qualified Mr. Schurz's anxiety over this aspect of imperialism. Both on account of other prominent issues and on account of the personalities of the candidates, he was bound to prefer Parker to Roosevelt. At seventy-five it was hardly to be expected that Mr. Schurz should take the platform. He did, however, contribute his share to the discussion by a letter to the secretary of the Parker Independent clubs that by its cogency and exhaustiveness proved his mental powers to be still at their maximum. The letter was very widely circulated, and, a month before the election, was declared by Judge Parker himself to be "the most valuable contribution that has thus far been made to the campaign."

Though the strenuous career of the political orator was now closed to him, Mr. Schurz was still in active demand for other occasions. It was hard for him to refuse some of the calls. In 1904 he spoke on German Day at the St. Louis exposition, and at a conference on international arbitration at Carnegie Hall in New York. In June, 1905, he visited the University of Wisconsin to receive the degree of Doctor of
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Laws, and delivered the address which is the customary accompaniment of such academic distinction.

Before this time, however, his fondness for platform work had greatly declined, doubtless because he became even more painstaking in preparation as he grew older, while his physical strength naturally lessened. In November, 1903, Charles Francis Adams, as president of the Massachusetts Historical Society, urged him to make the address on Mommsen, recently deceased, before the society, which had enrolled Mr. Schurz and the great German historian among its chosen few honorary members. Mr. Schurz's informal answer to Mr. Adams showed that he was anxious to escape so serious and laborious a task, and he protested with something of jest, but at least half in earnest: "If there is anything I detest it is making speeches. It is the bane of my life." Nevertheless he made an informal talk before the society; for he appreciated the honor it had conferred on him, and he could not resist the opportunity to express his admiration of Mommsen before a learned and dignified body most of whose members were his own personal friends.

What enabled him to decline nearly all invitations to speak in public was his eager interest in his purely literary work; for at last he had settled down to methodical labor on his memoirs. In a letter of August 23, 1901, he said: "I have been writing down this summer some reminiscences of my life, and begin to like the work." Regretting that he had not kept a diary, so as to avoid "things we only think we remember," he related a conversation with Sybel, the German historian. After one of his visits to Bismarck, Schurz was asked by Sybel what the great Chancellor had told him about the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870. When Schurz repeated what Bismarck had said, Sybel remarked with a smile: "Well, well! [450]
Bismarck has told that story so often that he must actually have come to believe it."

The method followed by Mr. Schurz was that of the historian rather than of the mere recollection-monger, and thus it entailed great labor. His zest increased as the work progressed; but once more his characteristic preference for the present over the past diverted him temporarily into another, but related, field. Reviewing his own early experiences in American politics brought the old emotions of the slavery issues before his mind, and current discussion of the disquieting conditions in the South in respect to the races combined with the reminiscent influence to turn him to a new study of the negro problem. His essay on this subject was published in McClure’s Magazine for January, 1904. Its spirit was substantially the same that pervaded the two papers by Mr. Schurz on the same general subject at nearly twenty-year intervals in the past—the report to President Johnson in 1865 and the essay on "The New South" in 1885. He found in the developments of the last two decades no reason for discarding his early diagnosis of Southern ills or his early prescription for their remedy. The denial of political rights to the blacks he deplored as full of peril to both races; and he earnestly preached the gospel of education to economic and social usefulness as the sole means of salvation both to the negroes and to Southern society as a whole. He keenly desired to arouse popular free-thinking on the subject, and was confident that out of his rich experience and study he could be helpful. But the prevailing thought of the time was alien to his philosophy. Expansion had emphasized the concept "inferior races," and thus had given dominance to views about the negroes which he could furnish with no support. In describing the purpose of his essay to a friend he wrote: "I have touched the moral and ideal aspect of the matter but slightly.
and confined myself to practical considerations, wishing to produce a certain practical effect upon the better class of Southerners without distinction of party. For the same reason I have abstained from laying any stress upon the fact that there is a strong affinity between the treatment of the negroes and the imperialistic policy.”

The progress of his memoirs, meanwhile, became steady and reassuring. In the autumn of 1905 the serial publication of the earliest part began, and brought to the author shoals of congratulations from both sides of the ocean. The success of his work, whether as history, as biography or as literature, was assured from the outset of its appearance, and the gratification of Mr. Schurz was deep and devout. Perhaps the most eminent living American man of letters passed this judgment: “The first installment of Mr. Schurz’s autobiography is one of the most beautiful and valuable pieces of work of a most delightful sort, that I have ever read.”

Under the stimulus of the extraordinary favor with which his account of his life was received he labored on it with cheerful and engrossing vigor, though without losing touch with public questions. The cause of the anti-imperialists was especially near to him, and his hope of hastening the day of Philippine independence was particularly keen. In March, 1906, he felt sure, as he wrote, that “public opinion is decidedly turning our way,” and he was full of suggestions for promoting the movement.

When exchanging personal news with an old friend in February, 1906, hardly a fortnight before completing his seventy-seventh year, Mr. Schurz cheerfully remarked: “After I finish my memoirs I shall take up the Sumner and complete that.” His mind seemed filled with only happy thoughts—at last reveling in the pleasures of successful and
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BAS-RELIEF OF CARL SCHURZ

By Miss Winifred Holt, 1903
highly praised literary composition. Seven years had now elapsed since March 2, 1899, when he had completed his three score years and ten. His seventieth birthday had been distinguished by two banquets,—one at Delmonico's, given by his American friends, and the other given by the German Liederkranz, in their hall,—where very large and distinguished companies rehearsed the long list of his strivings for the public welfare, and showered upon him praise and good wishes. The suggestion of sadness, inevitable on such occasions, found no reflection in either his words or his feelings. Since then the years that make old age had come with little warning and rested lightly. Physically he was in good condition, save that his hearing was less keen and he perhaps more frequently suffered from a malady to which he had long been subject. Mentally he was as vigorous and alert as ever. The joy that he had always found in formulating his thoughts was unabated. His correspondence was almost preposterously large for a man in private life. The range of his personal friendships was as extensive as that of his interest in public affairs, and contributed thus mightily to the demands upon his attention. With the progress of the years his name had become a feature of the official directories in a great variety of philanthropic and educational movements, in addition to those political organizations with which his whole life was identified. The Germanic Museum of Harvard University, the Germanistic Society of America, the National Arbitration Conference, the State Charities Aid Association, and the organization for the erection of a monument to General Sigel in New York were among the societies that bore his name on the list of their managing boards and commanded his interest and influence.

In his family he was very happy, with his four children, two daughters and two sons, until, in the summer of 1900, a
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cruel fate carried off his younger son, Herbert, at the opening of a most promising manhood. For several years during the '90's his household gods were at Pocantico Hills. He became so fond of his spacious and well-stocked library, of the bracing air and picturesque scenery of this region, that he almost rid himself of the fascination that close contact with public affairs and busy intellectual persons had over him. Later his home for several years was in East Sixty-fourth Street. From there, in 1902, he moved to a house in East Ninety-first Street, next but one to the residence of his warm friend Andrew Carnegie. There he lived, when in the city, during the remainder of his days. For several of his last years he passed the bleakest months in Augusta, Georgia, and his summers were always spent on the heights above Bolton Landing, Lake George, within speaking distance of the dearest of all his life-long friends, Dr. Jacobi, and in a neighborhood of New York German-Americans, who regarded him as a patron-saint and for each of whom he had almost paternal affection.

The seriousness of all his public utterances caused a popular notion that he was a man of stern and unsympathetic temperament, devoid of humor and indifferent to social pleasures. This was altogether erroneous. The very birds that sang as he took his favorite forest-walks were hardly more light-hearted than he. In the family circle or among relatives and intimate friends he overflowed with humor. Pleasantries on all sorts of subjects, serious and trifling, the latest bit of amusing news, tales of laughable experiences or dreams, gentle irony and exaggeration, and an insatiable fondness for the ridiculous were conspicuous during his leisure. Whoe'er sat quite informally at his table cannot forget his mellow laugh, and how naturally and unpretentiously he told his anecdotes, indulged in playful jests and joined in the amusement they oc-
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Nasioned. Fortunately the autobiography gives some glimpses and preserves a few traces of the cheerfulness and the geniality that pervaded his private life, so beautiful in its simplicity, so charming in its happy blending of grave with gay, of high endeavor with philosophical contentment.

He seemed to be more rather than less cheerful as he feared "the shadow feared of man." Soon after his return from the South, in the middle of April, 1906, he wrote in a letter to an intimate friend, eagerly inquiring about prospects in the Philippine matter: "I returned from the South last Saturday, having so far escaped the bronchial troubles which used to afflict me about this season, and save old age, have little to complain of." Not many days later symptoms appeared which soon became very serious. As the disease developed he was able to read in the distressed faces of his children that his condition was hopeless. He accepted his fate with resignation; gave some instructions about his abruptly ended work; and said that his only deep regret was that he must leave his memoirs unfinished. When bidding farewell to those about him, he sought to comfort them with the assurance, "Es ist so einfach zu sterben"—it is so simple to die. The end came in the early morning of May 14, 1906.

THE END

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