Supply of Sherman's Army
During the Atlanta Campaign

By
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Captain ROGER S. FITCH, 2d Cavalry

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
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PREFACE

This volume is mainly made up of quotations from original orders, letters and reports, found in the Official Records of the Union and Confederate armies and relating to the Supply of General Sherman's Army during the Atlanta Campaign. It was originally begun at the instance of Lieutenant Colonel John F. Morrison, General Staff, Senior Instructor, Department of Military Art, Army Service Schools, and has been used in connection with the Staff College course in "Supply".

The best maps for use in connection with this volume are those found in the official atlas that forms part of the Official Records above mentioned and designated as "Map Illustrating the 1st (2d, 3d, 4th, 5th) Epoch of the Atlanta Campaign".

DUNCAN K. MAJOR, Jr.
ROGER S. FITCH.
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Supply of Sherman's Army During Atlanta Campaign

The campaign in Georgia in the summer of 1864, which terminated in the capture of Atlanta and which is generally known as the Atlanta Campaign, furnishes an excellent study in the methods used in the supply of an army at a distance from its base.

Railroads and railroad transportation have been greatly improved since that day, but the demands of a modern army have correspondingly increased, and the general principles of supply remain the same.

In order properly to appreciate the greatness of the task confronting Sherman it is necessary to make a brief review of the supply conditions in the Mississippi Valley in and prior to the Spring of 1864.

Almost from the beginning of the war, St. Louis and Nashville were the principal supply centers of the western armies. The depots at these cities furnished supplies not only for the Atlanta Campaign but also for the troops operating in the Mississippi Valley and to the southwest. We shall later on consider them more in detail.

In 1862 Nashville became the advance base for the Army of the Cumberland, Louisville and St. Louis still remaining the main depots of supply.

From 1862 to 1864 Nashville steadily grew in importance as a base. Here were erected storehouses for supplies of all kinds. Large warehouses for quartermaster, commissary, ordnance and medical supplies were built and extensive railroad and quartermaster shops established. Saw-mills were set up and prepared lumber for the construction of bridges, store-
houses, hospitals, etc. Large base hospitals were established for the reception and care of the sick and wounded, and one of the principal remount depots of the Cavalry Bureau was here maintained.

Nashville very naturally became the base of operations for Sherman's army in the Atlanta Campaign. It was in itself a tremendous depot of supplies, fed from the purchasing depots at Louisville, St. Louis and the north in general. At the time the campaign opened it was so complete in all its appointments that, should communication with the north have been severed, it could still have supplied for several months all the varied needs of Sherman's army. In a letter from General Meigs, Quartermaster General, United States Army, to General Thomas, dated April 10, 1864, he stated that on that date there were at Nashville 24,000 rations and grain for 50,000 animals to January 1st, 1865.

That some idea of the magnitude of the business carried on at Nashville may be realized, it might be stated that in the Quartermaster Department alone there were employed in March, 1864, 15,175 men. Of this number 4,510 were connected with the military railroads, leaving 10,665 for essentially quartermaster work. This same department issued during the campaign 41,122 horses, 38,724 mules and nearly 4,000 wagons. These items represent but a fraction of those furnished by the department, which was also responsible for the transportation of all supplies to the front.

Nashville was connected with Louisville by the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, while the Cumberland, Ohio and Mississippi rivers furnished water communication with St. Louis. As, however, the Cumberland river was navigable for only a portion of the year and because the Louisville & Nashville Railroad was liable to interruption by the raids of
guerillas or of Confederate cavalry in force, it was necessary to take every possible precaution against a failure of supplies; for this reason a third line of communication to the rear was opened via the Nashville & Northwestern Railroad and the Tennessee river. The railroad, at the beginning of the war, had been completed for a distance of 25 miles from Nashville and some work had been done on it from this point to Johnsonville, 78 miles from Nashville and which could be reached at all seasons of the year by light draught vessels on the Tennessee river. The building of 53 miles of railroad therefore gave Nashville a third line of supply, one which was good all the year round and which involved but a short railway haul. During August, September, and October, 1864, the season of low water in the Cumberland river, large quantities of supplies were forwarded by this route to Nashville.

The growing importance of Nashville had not diminished the value of St. Louis and Louisville as points of supply. These two cities continued to be the primary base of supplies for the troops operating in the Mississippi Valley and to the southwest. With reference, however, to Sherman's base at Nashville, the depots at St. Louis and Louisville became mainly collecting points which acted as feeders to Nashville.

At this time the quartermaster depots at St. Louis and Louisville were directed by Brigadier General Allen of the Quartermaster Department, who had an assistant in immediate charge of each depot. At the Louisville Depot, the duties were divided as follows:

1. Chief of Depot.
2. Officer in charge of railroad transportation.
3. Officer in charge of river transportation.
4. Officer in charge of forage and miscellaneous supplies.
5. Officer in charge of quarters and fuel and miscellaneous disbursements.
6. Officer in charge of clothing, camp and garrison equipage.
7. Officer in charge of animals, corrals and city transportation.

The St. Louis Depot was organized along similar lines.

In order to indicate the extent of the operations of the St. Louis and Louisville depots the following message is inserted:

LOUISVILLE, April 9, 1964.
(Received 10:40 p.m.)

General M. C. Meigs,
Quartermaster General.

Have shipped since the 1st of November to the 25th of March, 138,000 bushels corn, 572,000 bushels oats, and 16,000 tons of hay. This does not include shipments made the depots at Memphis, Vicksburg and Natchez, of which I have no returns. Can ship from St. Louis in April and May 200,000 bushels of grain each month, and 2,000 tons of hay. It will be useful for me to know how much forage will be required at New Orleans. I get no returns from there.

R. ALLEN,
Brigadier General and Quartermaster.

General Sherman assumed command of the Military Division of the Mississippi on March 18, 1864, and at once began making preparations for the proposed campaign. Chattanooga, at this time, was strongly held by part of the Army of the Cumberland under Thomas. The most advanced post of the Federals was at Ringgold, 15 miles southeast of Chattanooga. Twenty miles farther southeast, at Dalton, was the main Confederate Army under Johnston.

Sherman calculated on a force of 100,000 men (with 35,000 animals) for the active operations, besides troops for guarding his line of communications.
His command was to be made up from the Departments of the Ohio, Cumberland and Tennessee. As already stated, Nashville was naturally selected as his main base of supplies. Chattanooga as naturally became his advance base.

Chattanooga was 151 miles from Nashville. The distance alone would have been sufficient reason for accumulating a large amount of supplies at Chattanooga. In addition, the only line of communication was a single line of railroad in very poor repair and passing through a section intensely hostile to the Federals; moreover, the proposed campaign was to carry the army still further into the enemy's country. All these circumstances combined to make it absolutely necessary to establish an advance or secondary base, and Chattanooga, from its location, was the natural place to select.

Chattanooga as a depot of supply soon became in importance second only to Nashville. Storehouses of all kinds were built, as well as sawmills, railroad repair shops and a rolling mill for straightening the iron rails that the enemy had bent and twisted. Additional hospitals were built, large corrals established, etc., etc.

The following table is inserted as showing the number and size of new storehouses that were under construction about May 1, 1864:
List of Military Storehouses Built and in Process of Construction at Chattanooga, Tennessee, May 1, 1864.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>By Whom Used</th>
<th>Conditions</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>On river front of Market</td>
<td>150 by 40</td>
<td>Capt. C. K. Smith, A. Q. M.</td>
<td>Completed May 1, 1864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>300 by 50 each</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>On river near Market Street</td>
<td>50 by 20</td>
<td>Capt. A. D. Baker, C. S.</td>
<td>do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>In rear of depot quartermaster's office</td>
<td>204 by 40</td>
<td>Capt. H. M. Smith, A. Q. M.</td>
<td>do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>On Market Street</td>
<td>250 by 50</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>115 by 50</td>
<td>Buildings for Eng. Dept.</td>
<td>One-fourth completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>In rear of market house</td>
<td>300 by 50</td>
<td>Buildings for Com'y. Dept.</td>
<td>do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>On Market Street</td>
<td>460 by 50</td>
<td>Buildings for Ord. Dept.</td>
<td>do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>On river bank</td>
<td>Brick M'g'ne</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>One-third completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>In rear of depot quartermaster's office</td>
<td>154 by 40</td>
<td>Buildings for Qm. Dept.</td>
<td>Foundation being laid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, Office Chief Quartermaster, Ringgold, Ga., May 6, 1864.

L. C. EASTON, Lieut.-Colonel and Chief Quartermaster.
It is to be understood, however, that the buildings did not house the vast supplies of forage, for all had of necessity to be kept in the open under paulins.

By the time the campaign opened, General Sherman had collected at Chattanooga about one month's supplies for his army. Supplies were also collected at Decatur and at Bridgeport on the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad. The railhead of the line of communications of the Army of the Cumberland during the Chickamauga Campaign and siege of Chattanooga had been located at this latter point. It therefore probably offered facilities for the storage of supplies. It was only about forty miles southwest of Chattanooga.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT AND ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE
Huntsville, Alabama, April 2, 1864.

Major-General W. T. Sherman,
Military Division of the Mississippi.

General:

Since my return from Chattanooga I have been down to Whitesburg, on the Tennessee River, distance 9 miles from this place, over an excellent macadamized road. I have also been over to Athens to consult with General Dodge in relations to roads on the south side of river.

From all the information I can gather, I am decidedly of the opinion that this is the best point to establish our principal depot.

First: There are plenty of buildings for storehouses.

Second: The road from here to the river is excellent, and will not be materially affected by the weather.

Third: The steamboat which can be spared from Chattanooga will enable us to transport supplies across the river to any desired point.

Fourth: It is one of the places we will have to occupy until our lines are so far advanced as to enable us to change our base of supplies, and, furthermore, we may find it necessary to establish general
hospitals. I shall make the necessary arrangements to have this for the principal depot and give directions for having a field work thrown up on the hill on the east side of town, unless otherwise directed.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAS. B. McPHERSON,
Major-General, Commanding.

While it may have been General Sherman’s original intention to use Huntsville as a depot of supply for the Army of the Tennessee during the campaign, this was probably based on that army marching overland from Huntsville and Lebanon. As the campaign actually developed, however, the greater part of the 15th and 19th Corps were sent by rail to Chattanooga and thence to Rossville and Gordon’s Mill, the train, artillery and cavalry alone going by road. Huntsville as a depot was therefore of no further use after the opening of the campaign, as Chattanooga was much more convenient and easy of access.

Accumulation of Supplies by Rail.

Having considered the several depots we will next take up the methods and means employed by General Sherman in the accumulation of supplies at the front preparatory to the opening of the campaign. After having visited his army and corps commanders upon assuming command of the Military Division of the Mississippi General Sherman immediately repaired to Nashville where, in his own words he “addressed himself specially to the troublesome question of transportation and supplies”. To quote further from his memoirs: “I found the capacity of the railroads from Nashville forward to Decatur and to Chattanooga, so small, especially in the number of locomotives and cars, that it was clear that they were
barely able to supply the daily wants of the armies then dependent on them, with no power of accumulating a surplus in advance. The cars were daily loaded down with men returning from furlough, with cattle, horses, etc.; and, by reason of the previous desolation of the country between Chattanooga and Knoxville, General Thomas had authorized the issue of provisions to the suffering inhabitants."

The outcome of this situation was the issue of the following order:

**HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI**

Nashville, Tenn., April 6, 1864.

General Orders, No. 6.

To enable the military railroads running from Nashville to supply more fully the armies in the field, the following regulations will hereafter be observed:

I. No citizen nor any private freight whatever will be transported by the railroads, save as herein-after provided.

II. Officers traveling under orders or on leave of absence, sick or furloughed soldiers departing from or returning to their regiments, and small detachments of troops will be transported on the orders of post commanders, of Brigadier General Andrew Johnson, Military Governor of Tennessee, or of the commanding officer of either of the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, or the Tennessee, or of the Military Division of the Mississippi. Bodies of troops will not be transported by railroads when it is possible for them to march, except upon the order of the commanding officer of some of the military departments above named. Civil employes of the various staff departments will be transported on the order of the senior and supervising quartermaster of the Department of the Cumberland, at Nashville, Tenn., or of the commanding officer of either of the military departments above named. Employes of the railroads will be transported on the order of the superintendent or chief engineer of the railroads.

III. No citizen will be allowed to travel on the railroads at all, except on the permit of the com-
manding officer of one of the three military departments or of the Military Division of the Mississippi, and when their transportation will not prevent that of any army supplies, of which the proper officer of the quartermaster's department will be the judge.

IV. Express companies will be allowed one car per day each way, on each military road, to carry small parcels for soldiers and officers. One car per day more on each road for sutlers' goods and officers' stores may be allowed by the senior and supervising quartermaster at Nashville, at his discretion; these cars to be furnished by the express companies and attached to the passenger trains. When a sufficient surplus of stores has been accumulated at the front, the senior and supervising quartermaster aforesaid may increase this allowance, but not before.

V. Stores exclusively for officers' messes, in very limited quantities, after due inspection by the inspecting officer at Nashville, Tenn., of sutlers' goods, and all private stores, shipped to the front, will be passed free on the several roads, on the order of the senior and supervising quartermaster Department of the Cumberland, at Nashville, Tenn.

VI. Horses, cattle, or other live stock will not be transported by railroad, except on the written order of the commanding general of the military departments.

VII. Trains on their return trips will be allowed to bring up private freight, when the shipment thereof does not interfere with the full working of the roads, of which the senior and supervising quartermaster at Nashville will be the judge.

VIII. Provost-marshals have nothing to do with transportation by railroads. Their passes merely mean that the bearer can go from one point to another named in their pass, but not necessarily by rail. The railroads are purely for army purposes.

IX. When the rolling stock of the railroads is increased, or when a due accumulation of stores has been made at the front, increased facilities may be extended to passengers and private freight, of which due notice will be given. Until that time citizens and sutlers must use wagons.

X. Until the railroad is relieved, all military
posts within 35 miles of Nashville and 20 miles of Stevenson, Bridgeport, Chattanooga, Huntsville, and Loudon must haul their stores by wagons.

XI. The general manager of the railroads, and his duly appointed agents and conductors, will control the trains and will be authorized to call on every passenger for his orders for transportation by railroad, that they may be returned to the general manager or superintendent. The military guard will enforce good order, and sustain the agents and conductors of the roads in their rightful authority, but will report any mismanagement or neglect of duty through their officers to these headquarters.

XII. Until other arrangements are perfected, commanding officers on the request of railroad managers, will furnish details for providing wood or water at such points as may be necessary to supply the trains.

By command of Major General W. T. Sherman:

R. M. SAWYER,
Assistant Adjutant General

While this order called forth an appeal to President Lincoln by the poor Union people of East Tennessee, it remained in force and by it the daily accumulation of supplies at the front was doubled. But even this was not found enough.

General Sherman reports:

"I accordingly called together in Nashville the master of transportation, Colonel Anderson; the chief quartermaster, General J. L. Donaldson; and the chief commissary, General Amos Beckwith, for conference. I assumed the strength of the army to move from Chattanooga into Georgia at one hundred thousand men, and the number of animals to be fed, both for cavalry and draught, at thirty-five thousand; then allowing for occasional wrecks of trains, which were very common, and for the interruption of the road itself by guerillas and regular raids; we estimated it would require one hundred and thirty cars, of ten tons each, to reach Chattanooga daily, to be reasonably certain of an adequate
supply. Even with this calculation, we could not afford to bring forward hay for the horses and mules, or more than five pounds of oats or corn per day for each animal. I was willing to risk the question of forage in part, because I expected to find wheat and corn fields, and a good deal of grass, as we advanced into Georgia at that season of the year. The problem then was to deliver at Chattanooga and beyond, one hundred and thirty car loads daily, leaving the beef-cattle to be driven on hoof, and all the troops in excess of the usual train-guards to march by the ordinary roads. Colonel Anderson promptly explained that he did not possess cars or locomotives enough to do this work. I then instructed and authorized him to hold on to all trains that arrived at Nashville from Louisville, and to allow none to go back until he had secured enough to fill the requirements of our problem. At the time he only had about sixty serviceable locomotives, and about six hundred cars of all kinds, and he represented that to provide for all contingencies he must have at least one hundred locomotives and one thousand cars.”

In order to further increase the capacity of the railroad, General Sherman recommended that empty trains return via Decatur. The correspondence on the subject is interesting and is as follows:

STEVENVSON, March 28, 1864—3 a.m.

Major R. M. Sawyer:

I have your dispatch. Your orders to General Brayman and Veatch all right. Write a note to superintendent of railroad in Nashville that I have been over all the road and am of the opinion that all loaded trains should make a continuous circuit from Nashville by way of Decatur to Stevenson, and back to Nashville over the old road with empty cars. A separate set of trains could run from Stevenson up to Chattanooga and beyond. Not a citizen or pound of private freight should be carried until all the troops have been supplied.

Inform Colonel Donaldson to the same effect, and that General Allen says the mules at Larkinsville,
Woodville, etc., should be supplied with oats immediately.

Tell Colonel Donaldson that I find citizens and private freight carried on the cars, and the officers all along the road complain that they can not get requisitions filled for forage or even clothing.

This must be remedied at once. I find at least a dozen locomotives here appearing idle, empty cars also, and am satisfied by making the circuit described the present stock of the road could do double the work. If wood or water is needed on the new road, I will order my troops to provide any quantity necessary. Tell railroad Superintendent he can make his permanent arrangements.

W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
Nashville, April 3, 1864.

General Allen,
Louisville, Ky.

I have yours of the 2d. The difficulties of transportation to the front are all plain to me. I have made orders to stop all civil business and freight, and the cars to be devoted exclusively to dead freight. If I could prevail on the railroad superintendent to make other modifications I could further increase the work of the railroad. I have no knowledge of McCallum's action, and am indeed more embarrassed than I can well express by the anomalous nature of my authority over this and the staff departments generally. So many independent machines will produce a collision sooner or later, yet I will be as patient as possible.

I want in the next thirty days a surplus of stores to the front, equal to sixty or seventy days' supply, but I see but little chance yet of getting it. It will be too late to wait for the cars and locomotives contracted for by McCallum.

W. T. SHERMAN,
Major General.
Staff Departments

The letters quoted above also show the peculiar relations of the Superintendent of the Military Railroads to the Commander of the troops in the field. This, however, is only in keeping with the relation of the officers of the other staff departments to General Sherman, and which the General complains of in the following letters:

NASHVILLE, TENN., March 24, 1864.
(Received 2:30 a.m. 25th)

Adjutant-General,
Washington.

I find my staff officers curiously situated, as Lieutenant-Colonel Donaldson and Colonel Beckwith proposing to act under special orders of the Secretary of War. I want my own staff under my own sole control, but of course subject to any inspection the Secretary of War or the Commanding General may order. I will assign these officers to duty according to their rank, without changing their post at all. I understand that Colonel Swords is not subject to my orders, and therefore shall name General Robert Alien as Chief Quartermaster.

W. T. SHERMAN,
Major General.

In reply to the above letter the following was received:

WAR DEPTRTMENT
Adjutant General’s Office
Washington, March 25, 1864—3 p.m.

Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman,
Comdg. Mil. Div. of the Miss.,
Nashville, Tenn.

Sir: Your telegram of yesterday’s date has been submitted to the Secretary of War, who instructs me to reply—

First. That Colonel Donaldson and Colonel Beckwith are assigned to their respective duties at
Nashville by the War Department, in accordance with the established rules of the service. They form no part of your staff and are not subject to your assignment.*

Second. That neither Colonel Swords nor General Allen are subject to your assignment, but are assigned to their duties by the Quartermaster General, under the direction of the Secretary of War; and only in case of misconduct, requiring immediate action, are they subject to your orders, other than to answer requisitions for supplies.

Third. If any commissary or quartermaster within the limits of your command, though not under your orders, misbehave or fail to perform their duty, you are authorized to suspend them and report the facts to the War Department, through the chief of the proper bureau, for action, and, if necessary, you are authorized to place the party in arrest until the direction of the Secretary of War can be obtained.

Fourth. These regulations have uniformly prevailed, and their observance by commanders of departments and military divisions is essential to the service, but any suggestion from you will be considered and carried out so far as the service and the proper administration of the War Department will admit.

* * * * *

F. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant General.

In connection with the above subject the following correspondence is inserted:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
Nashville, Tenn., April 6, 1864.

General M. C. Meigs,
Quartermaster-General,
Washington, D. C.

General:
I ought to have an officer of your department

*Here we see an anomalous condition of affairs, viz., a commander of an independent army in the field forbidden to exercise any control over the principal supply officers at his own base of supplies.
with me whose power is co-extensive with my own, whom I can freely converse with, explain plans, figures, reports, and everything. Now I have to deal with four independent departments, besides depot and district supervising quartermasters. Any one you name will be satisfactory to me, especially General Robert Allen. You saw enough out here to know that a general commanding should have such a quartermaster close by him all the time to direct the harmonious working of this vast machinery.

I am, with respect

W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
Nashville, April 8, 1864.

General Robert Allen,
Louisville.

Dear General:

Draw me up a programme whereby orders may issue from the War Department enabling you to act as my chief with power to visit by yourself or inspectors every part of my command, to direct the course and accumulation of supplies, the distribution of the means of transportation, and all details purely pertaining to your department. I must have some quartermaster whose sphere is co-ordinate with my own, and the Quartermaster-General seems to recognize the necessity.

I suppose you can remain at Louisville, though I would prefer you to be near me, especially if we advance beyond the Tennessee.

I enclose you a copy of my General Orders, No. 6, which will give us daily some thirty and odd cars, and instead of yielding to the pressure of civilians I am inclined to be more rigid. I will have down on me all the Christian charities who are perambulating our camps, more to satisfy their curiosity than to minister to the wants of the poor soldier. My universal answer is that 200 pounds of powder or oats is more valuable to us than that weight of bottled piety. As to sanitary goods, they can come here
where they can be distributed as other stores, according to the known wants of the troops. I want you to back me in this, as I know the President and Secretary of War, yielding to ex parte clamor, will fail to see my reasons, nor will I explain them till asked for; you might do so. I must accumulate to the front at once as large a surplus as the capacity of the road will accomplish.

Yours, truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI

In the Field, Chattanooga, April 30, 1864.

General Allen,
Chief Quartermaster, Louisville.

At last, after I have started to open a desperate campaign, the Secretary of War denies me the service of a chief quartermaster. Well, I must do the best I can with you at Louisville, Donaldson at Nashville, and Easton here. The confusion in the wagons of Memphis illustrates how important it is I should have a chief near me. One division of white troops will remain at Vicksburg, one division at Memphis; all others will come to this quarter. All wagons, mules and horses should take the same general course. Wagon, mules and horses can best reach us here via Clifton and the Tennessee River, as long as the two divisions rendezvousing at Cairo are coming that way as escort.

All the furloughs are out, and these troops should now be all en route. After they have come the way will be safest from Louisville to Nashville, etc. Events won't wait for me to be all ready, but I must act when others are ready.

W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General.
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI

In the Field, Chattanooga, May 3, 1864.

General M. C. Meigs,
Washington, D. C.

General: I received yours of April 26 and agree with you that the chief quartermaster of the army, if they want to control its economy, should be with the main armies in the field, and not at Louisville, Chicago and Washington. I think Secretary Stanton has made a mistake in denying me the services of General Allen. By a general supervision of the whole department he could save more money to the Treasury than by scrutinizing 1,000,000 separate vouchers of purchase and expenditure. Also by providing means of transportation at the very time and in the manner demanded by events which cannot always be foreseen, a quartermaster can assist in achieving success, and, being at headquarters, he could be consulted and could act understandingly instead of receiving short categorical orders by the telegraph, which is almost as mischievous as useful. You often feel disposed to find fault with commanders of troops for not consulting the experienced quartermaster. I want to do so, but the chief quartermaster is at Louisville, another at Nashville, another here, all under my orders, but each so circumscribed by conditions that I cannot disturb them. I know this is wrong, and instead of commanding an army thus a general but drifts with its fate.

As to tents: You will need all kinds, and, as in clothing, must bend a little to fashion. The Sibley is the best when transportation is easy, wind high, and wood scarce, as on the prairie. The common wedge is the best when no boards can be ripped off our neighbors’ houses and fences with which to make sidings to the bivouacs, and when officers study to have handsome camps, which all general officers will and should encourage. The tente d‘abris is of course good for a roof as long as the men can take boards off the fences and houses of the people, or can split out “shakes”, but for men to use these tents for any time would be wrong, because it brings their persons too near the ground. I prefer no tent at all for
marching troops and the common A tent without poles for a camp of several days, weeks, or months, but repeat that in tents there is a fashion almost as despotic as in dress.

I write hastily from the same house in which General Grant was, but I go to the front, Ringgold, to-morrow or next day and will dispense with tent. My entire headquarters transportation is one wagon for myself, aides, officers, clerks and orderlies. I think that is as low down as we can get until we get flat broke, and thenceforward things will begin to mend. Soldiering as we have been doing for the past two years, with such trains and impediments, has been a farce, and nothing but absolute poverty will cure it.* I will be glad to hear Uncle Sam say "we cannot afford this and that—you must gather your own grub and wagons, and bivouac and fight, not for pay, but for self-existence." I think I see that period not far distant. I assure you I will second any effort you will make looking to economy, and first to that end have your chiefs at the very points where they can see the causes and prevent waste. Old men as auditors can control the papers to the rear, but the causes are here. I would like Mr. Stanton to know this, my opinion.

I am, with great respect, your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN,
Major General, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
Nashville, Tenn., April 6, 1864.

General J. P. Taylor,
Commissary-General,
Washington, D. C.

General:

I ought to have near me an officer of your department clothed with power co-extensive with my

*And yet the authorized transportation at that time was much less than at present. The trains of an American division to-day occupy two-thirds as much road space as the troops.
own, who could converse with me freely, learn my plans, the strength of my various columns, routes of march, nature of supplies, and everything, and who could direct the harmonious working of the whole machine. Now I have to deal with four distinct commissaries, with no common recognized head. Colonel Kilburn would be perfectly satisfactory to me, or indeed any officer of experience you may name. I ask the detail of such an officer to be made and to emanate from the highest authority, that his acts would be final.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

NASHVILLE, TENN., April 15, 1864—12 m.

General J. P. Taylor,
Commissary-General.

No commissary has yet reported to me. Colonel Beckwith is not here. I must have by May 1 near Chattanooga a large amount of beef-cattle on the hoof, and each commissary is making separate contracts utterly useless. We cannot supply transportation for cattle. They must travel by land, and I may be forced to seize breeding cattle in Tennessee to supply meat, for we can't wait our movement for such matters of economy.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

That General Sherman was right in his argument for representatives of the several Staff Departments on his own immediate staff it is believed all will agree. Should there, however, be any doubt the following correspondence of a general commanding an army of 100,000 men should be convincing.

General Sherman was indeed his own chief quartermaster and chief commissary. We find him corresponding at one time with the quartermaster at St. Louis and Louisville, then with the quartermaster at Nashville and the same as regards the several commissaries.
Some of this correspondence has already been inserted, others will now be given:

CINCINNATI, April 16, 1864,

General W. T. Sherman:
I learn that 8,000 cattle, large size, were bought on hoof at Nashville about 10th instant. I think they will be enough for number of men mentioned. I leave here to-morrow to join you.

C. L. KILBURN,
Lieut-Colonel and Assistant Comm’y General.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
Nashville, Tenn., April 17, 1864.

Colonel Kilburn,
Commissary of Subsistence,
Cincinnati, Ohio.
I want on the Tennessee River, at or near Bridgeport, beef cattle on the hoof to be driven along with the army about May 1, enough for a month’s supply for 75,000 men. Inquire what has been done to that end, and order what is necessary in my name. I wish you to come down.

W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General.

SAINT LOUIS, April 18, 1864.

Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman:
Will the 3,000 head of cattle you require at Cairo be wanted to start with the expedition? The number is so large I fear I shall have to pay a very high price if I purchase at once. They can be procured, but at not less than 7 cents gross, delivered here. If necessary to have them at once, I will furnish them.

T. J. HAINES,
Colonel and Commissary of Subsistence.
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
Nashville, Tenn., April 18, 1864.

Colonel Haines,
Chief Commissary,
Saint Louis.

The price is nothing. I want the Army of the Tennessee to have beef cattle on the hoof at or near Huntsville by May 1. The easiest way is to send them up to Clifton, on the Tennessee, and drive across. They should come up the Tennessee at the same time with the troops from Cairo.

W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General.

LOUISVILLE, April 18, 1864.

General W. T. Sherman:

Telegraphed you on the 16th, directed to Moscow. Am using prompt, and I hope successful, means to get the cattle to Bridgeport by the first proximo. I do not intend the commissary department shall be behind in furnishing your supplies. The contractor is here. I am urging him to be up to time. Have seen General Allen. Have his promise that the contractor has cars from Chicago and here for his cattle. Have ordered Major Symonds to buy at once cattle and ship by boat or drive. Have ordered Major Du Barry to buy at once and ship by boat. Have ordered the 1200 cattle which we had in reserve at Danville, Ky., to be driven at once to Nashville.

C. L. KILBURN,
Lieutenant-Colonel.

Military Railroads

It will be seen that advantage was taken of the movement of troops to send beef cattle, also mules, horses and wagons up the Tennessee to Clifton and thence overland to Decatur. Clifton, it may be mentioned, was at the head of Navigation on the Tennessee. This was done to relieve to some extent the pressure on the railroads. As it was the railroads
which played such an important part in the Atlanta Campaign and in fact made it possible, extracts from
the report of the General Manager and other officers showing how the military railroads of the Military
Division of the Mississippi were organized and operated will now be considered. In order to understand
the system in use in 1864, it is considered desirable to quote, first of all, the following order issued in
1862:

WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington City, D. C., February 11, 1862.

Ordered, That D. C. McCallum be, and he is hereby appointed military director and superintendent of railroads in the United States, with authority to enter upon, take possession of, hold, and use all railroads, engines, cars, locomotives, equipments, appendages, appurtenances that may be required for the transport of troops, arms, ammunition, and military supplies of the United States, and to do and perform all acts and things that may be necessary and proper to be done for the safe and speedy transport aforesaid.

By order of the President, Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States:

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

The effect of this order was the organization of a division of Military Railroads in the War Department and which, so far as I can ascertain, was subject to the orders of the Quartermaster General of the Army, altho from the above order it does not appear that there was any connection between the two.

However, from later orders and correspondence my assumption would appear to be correct. It was the Quartermaster Department that furnished all the supplies for the construction and operation of the railroads and made all the disbursements of moneys for their maintenance. All employees were carried
and paid on the rolls of the Quartermaster Department.

In obedience to orders from the War Department, dated December 19, 1863, Colonel McCallum proceeded to Chattanooga, Tennessee and reported to Brigadier General M. C. Meigs, Quartermaster General, U. S. Army. He assisted in the reconstruction of the railroads under military control in the Military Division of the Mississippi and later submitted a report to the Secretary of War on their condition. The result of this report was the issue of the following order:

(General Orders No. 3)

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI

Nashville, Tenn., February 4, 1864.

By authority of the Secretary of War, Colonel D. C. McCallum, additional aide-de-camp, United States Army, is hereby appointed general manager of all railways in possession of the government, or that may from time to time be taken possession of by military authority in the Departments of the Cumberland, the Ohio, the Tennessee, and of Arkansas, with all the powers and authorities conferred and duties imposed upon and vested in Jno. B. Anderson, as general manager of said railways, by Special Orders of the Secretary of War, of date War Department, Louisville, Kentucky, October 19, 1863, (as modified by paragraph 4, General Orders No. 13, from these headquarters) and will at once enter upon the duties of general manager of railways aforesaid.

Jno. B. Anderson is hereby relieved from duty as general manager of said railways and from all connection with the same, and will turn over to the said Colonel McCallum all property, moneys, contracts and papers of every kind and description belonging to government, or in anywise appertaining to or concerning said railways.

By order of Major General U. S. Grant:

T. S. BOWERS,
Assistant Adjutant General.
In order to show how Colonel McCallum carried out this order, extracts from the report made by him after the close of the campaign will here be inserted.

Upon assuming the duties thus imposed, I found most inadequate means to accomplish the purposes for which the railroads had been opened. The main army was at Chattanooga and in its vicinity, and all the supplies for men and food for its animals were received from Nashville, one hundred and fifty-one miles distant, over the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad. This road was necessarily the main line of supply during the subsequent campaigns from Chattanooga towards Atlanta, and from Knoxville towards southwestern Virginia, and was at this time in the worst condition. The track was laid originally on an unballasted, mud road-bed, in a very imperfect manner, with a light V rail, on wooden stringers which were badly decayed and caused almost daily accidents by spreading apart and letting the engine and cars drop between them. The total length of road in use was as follows:

- Nashville to Chattanooga: 151 miles
- Nashville (south) to Dark’s Mill: 39 miles
- Stevenson to Huntsville: 60 miles
- Chattanooga to Charleston: 42 miles

Total: 292 miles

Upon examination it was found there was on the above roads the following rolling stock:

- United States military railroad locomotives that could be made available: 47
- Locomotives borrowed from Louisville and Nashville railroad: 3

Total: 50

- Disabled and in shop for repairs: 11
- Total number of locomotives fit for service: 39

United States military railroad freight cars: 437
Cars borrowed from Louisville and Nashville railroad, about: 100

Total: 537

- Number disabled: 137
- Number of freight cars in running order: 400
My attention was first directed to the most efficient organization of the men employed. Two distinct departments were projected: the "transportation department," embracing the operation and maintenance of all the lines in use, and the "construction corps," for the reconstruction of the railroads which might fall into our hands as the army advanced.

The following orders and instructions were issued to the principal officers in charge of these respective organizations:

(General Orders No. 1.)

OFFICE OF GENERAL MANAGER MILITARY RAILROADS, U. S.
Nashville, February 10, 1864.

A. Anderson is hereby appointed general superintendent of transportation and maintenance of roads in use, and W. W. Wright, chief engineer of construction, in the military division of the Mississippi. They will be respected accordingly.

D. C. McCALLUM,

Approved:
U. S. GRANT,
Major-General.

OFFICE OF GENERAL MANAGER MILITARY RAILROADS, U. S.
Nashville, Tenn., February 11, 1864.

Sir: You are hereby appointed general superintendent of transportation on United States military railroads in the military division of the Mississippi. Your duties will be confined to the management of transportation on all railroads in use in this division together with all necessary repairs to the same. You will have, with the approval of the general manager, full authority to engage the service of all persons for whose acts you are held responsible, and will have full power to dismiss any subordinate when in your judgment the interest of the service will be promoted thereby. You will, also, with the approval of the general manager, have authority to establish rates of compensation of all persons serving under you. You will at an early day present to the general
manager, for his approval, a plan of the organization of your department. You will have authority to make requisitions for supplies upon the assistant quartermaster detailed to service on military railroads in the military division of the Mississippi. You have power to make requisitions for men and materials, or both, upon the chief engineer in charge of construction in this division, when in your opinion the emergency calls for such assistance.

As the duties of the general manager will occasionally cause his absence from this military division, you will at such times, and in order to insure prompt action, obey any order emanating from the general-in-chief of this military division, or the generals in command at the departments of the Cumberland, the Ohio, and the Tennessee, in all matters appertaining to the branch of duties in your charge.

D. C. McCallum,
Colonel United States Army, Military Director and General Manager U. S. Railroads.
A. Anderson, Esq.

Office of General Manager Military Railroads, U. S.
Nashville, Tenn., February 11, 1864.
Sir: You are hereby appointed chief engineer of United States military railroads in the military division of the Mississippi.

Your duties will be confined more especially to the reconstruction and opening of new lines of railroad. For this purpose you will have the entire charge of the construction corps. You will have authority, with the approval of the general manager, to engage all persons for whose acts you are held responsible, and will have full power to dismiss any person employed under you, when in your judgment the interest of the service will be promoted thereby. You will, with the approval of the general manager, have power to establish rates of compensation of your subordinates, and will at an early day report to the general manager for his approval a plan of organization of all the forces in your charge. You will have authority to make requisitions for supplies,
tools, etc., upon the assistant quartermaster detailed for special duty in the military division of the Mississippi, and located at Nashville.

It will also be your duty to honor requisitions made upon you for men and materials by the general superintendent of United States military railroads in the military division of the Mississippi, for the purpose of repairs of lines in use; but you will in no case withdraw your forces for said repairs without the consent and approval of the general in command of the department where your forces may be located, or the general-in-chief of this military division.

In order to insure prompt action, you will, in the absence of the general manager, obey the orders of the general-in-chief of this military division, of the generals in command of the departments of the Cumberland, the Ohio, and the Tennessee.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. C. McCALLUM,
Colonel United States Army, Military Director and General Manager U. S. Railroads.

W. W. Wright, Esq.

The transportation department embraced the following divisions or sub-departments:

First. Conducting transportation, or managing the movements of trains,

Second. Maintenance of roads and structures, or keeping the roadway, bridges, buildings, and other structures in repair, building new structures, rebuilding old ones when and where necessary.

Third. Maintenance of rolling stock, keeping in order the locomotives and cars, and managing the shop where such work was done.

For conducting transportation, "each principal line was operated by a superintendent of transportation," who was held responsible for the movement of all trains and engines over it.

Subordinate to the superintendent were one or more "masters of transportation," according to distance operated, who were constantly moving over the road to see that the employees attended properly to their duties while out with their trains.
At principal stations where locomotives were changed, or kept in reserve, an "engine dispatcher" was stationed to see that the locomotives were in good order for service, that they were properly repaired and cleaned when at the station; to supervise and control the engineers and firemen, and to assign the requisite crews to engines.

Maintenance of roads and structures for each line was in charge of a superintendent of repairs, with the necessary supervisors, road-masters, foremen, etc.

Maintenance of rolling stock was in charge of the master machinist, who managed repairs of locomotives, and the master of car repairs, under whose charge all repairs to cars were made.

The above officers were independent of each other, and reported directly to the general superintendent.

The maximum force employed at any one time in the transportation department of the military division of the Mississippi was about twelve thousand men.

The following is the organization in detail:

**General Superintendent’s Office:**—General Superintendent, assistant general superintendent, chief clerk.

**Officers reporting to general superintendents:**—Superintendent N. and C., N. and N. W., and N., and C. lines, superintendent N., D., and S. line, superintendent C. and A., and C. and K. lines; superintendent K. and B. line; engineer and superintendent Mem. and Chr., Miss. Cen., Mobile and O., Memphis and Little Rock lines; agent Louisville City line; chief master of transportation; general agent; engineers of maintenance and repairs; general machinist; master carpenter; superintendent of car repairs; general engine dispatcher; general train dispatcher; general freight agent; general fuel agent; general ticket agent; general car agent; general storekeeper; general lumber and timber inspector; surgeon in charge.

**Officers reporting to each superintendent:**—Master of transportation; train dispatchers; engine dispatchers; superintendent of road repairs; superin-
tendent of repairs, bridges and buildings; station agents; freight agents; fuel agents; car agents.

**Officers reporting to general machinists:**—Master machinist, Nashville shops; master machinist, Huntsville shops; foreman car repairs, Chattanooga shops; master machinist, Knoxville shops; master machinists, Memphis shops.

**Officers reporting to superintendent car repairs:**—Master car repairs, Nashville shops; master car repairs, Chattanooga shops; master car repairs, Knoxville shops; foreman car repairs, Johnsonville shops; foreman car repairs, Clarksville shops; foreman car repairs, Huntsville shops; foreman car repairs, Stevenson shops; foreman car repairs, Atlanta shops; foreman car repairs, Memphis shops; foreman car repairs, Little Rock shops.

**Officers reporting to general agent:** — Station agents; conductors.

**Officers reporting to engineer of repairs:** Assistants or division engineers; supervisors; road-masters; foreman; sub-foremen; tie inspectors.

The construction corps of the military division of the Mississippi was organized in six divisions, under the general charge of the chief engineer, and at its maximum strength numbered nearly six thousand men.

To give the corps entire mobility, enable it to move independently and perform work at the same time at widely different points, each division was made a complete whole in itself, and equipped with tools, camp equipage, and field transportation, in order that the whole or any part of the same might be moved at once in any direction where ordered, and by any mode of conveyance, by rail, with teams and wagons, or on foot.

The number of divisions was increased or diminished to suit the requirements of military movements.

The following is the organization of one division of the construction corps, United States military railroads, as it existed in the military division of the Mississippi.

Each division was under the command of a division engineer, and was divided into sub-divisions or sections.
Each sub-division was under the immediate command of a supervisor.

The two largest and most important sub-divisions in a division were the track-layers and bridge-builders. A sub-division was composed of gangs, each under a foreman. Gangs were sub-divided into squads, each under a sub-foreman.

A division completely organized was composed of the following named officers and number of men:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>No. of Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Division engineer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant engineer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rodman</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Messengers</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Subdivision No. 1

Supervisor of bridge and carpenter work .................................................. 1
Clerk and time-keeper ................................................................. 1
Commissary ................................................................. 1
Quartermaster ............................................................. 1
Surgeon ................................................................. 1
Hospital steward ......................................................... 1
Foremen (one for each 50 men) ................................. 6
Sub-foremen (one for each 10 men) .................. 30
Mechanics and laborers ........................................ 300
Blacksmith and helper ........................................ 2
Cooks ................................................................. 12

Subdivision No. 2

Supervisor of track ......................................................... 1
Clerk and time-keeper ..................................................... 1
Commissary ............................................................. 1
Quartermaster ............................................................. 1
Surgeon ................................................................. 1
Hospital Steward ......................................................... 1
Foremen (one for each 50 men) ................................. 6
Sub-foremen (one for each 10 men) .................. 30
Mechanics and laborers ........................................ 300
Blacksmith and helper ........................................ 2
Cooks ................................................................. 12
Subdivision No. 3
Supervisor of water stations ........ 1
Foremen ........ 1
Mechanics and laborers ........ 12
Cook ................ 1

Subdivision No. 4
Supervisor of masonry ........ 1
Foremen ........ 1
Masons and helpers ........ 10
Cook ................ 1

Subdivision No. 5
Foreman of ox brigade ........ 1
Ox drivers ........ 18
Cook ................ 1

Train Crew
Conductors ........ 2
Brakemen ........ 4
Locomotive Engineers ........ 2
Firemen ........ 2
Cook ................ 1

Grand total ........ 777

The commissary had charge of drawing, caring for, and issuing rations.
The Quartermaster had charge of issuing tools, camp equipage, etc.
Each foreman was responsible for the tools and other government property issued to his gang.
Each supervisor reported the time made by the men in his subdivision, through his division Engineer, to the chief time-keeper, who was stationed at the headquarters of the chief engineer.
The surgeons were appointed by the chief engineer, and were paid out of a private fund voluntarily contributed by the men for hospital purposes.
Sub-foremen were appointed by the foremen, subject to the approval of the division engineer. Foremen were appointed by the division engineer, subject to the approval of the chief engineer.
Division and assistant engineers were appointed by the chief engineer, subject to the approval of the general manager.

After completing the organization of the working forces, my attention was directed to providing an adequate supply of locomotives and cars, with the necessary shops, tools, and materials to keep them in working order.

In my report of January 19, 1864, I had estimated the rolling stock necessary for the business anticipated on the lines that would probably be operated from Nashville, at two hundred locomotives and three thousand cars, while only forty-seven available locomotives and four hundred and thirty-seven cars were on hand. From the imperative necessity of providing the additional equipment at the earliest possible time, the following order was given by the honorable Secretary of War to the locomotive manufacturers of the country:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, March 23, 1864.

Gentleman:—Colonel Daniel C. McCallum, general manager of government railways in the departments of the Cumberland, of the Ohio, and of the Tennessee, has been authorized by this department to procure locomotives without delay for the railways under his charge.

In order to meet the wants of the military departments of the government, you will deliver to his order such engines as he may direct, whether building under orders for other parties or otherwise; the government being accountable to you for the same.

The urgent necessity of the government for the immediate supply of our armies operating in Tennessee, renders the engines indispensable for the equipment of the lines of communication, and, it is hoped that this necessity will be recognized by you as a military necessity, paramount to all other considerations.

By order of the President:

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

It is but proper to state that the requisitions of this order were met by all in a spirit of zealous pat-
riotism. The manufacturers at once placed all their force at work upon the engines and cars ordered, which were completed and delivered in an unprecedented short time.

Notwithstanding the large additions made to the rolling stock in February, March and April, it was still inadequate to supply the wants of the service, and it was found necessary to use extraordinary measures to increase it.

The gauge of the Tennessee railroads being five feet, and only the roads in Kentucky having a corresponding gauge, they were the only source from which rolling stock could be obtained, and their engines and cars were temporarily impressed into the government service and sent south to Nashville.

The following number of engines and cars were thus obtained and used through May and during part of April and June:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engines</th>
<th>Cars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Louisville &amp; Nashville Railroad</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisville &amp; Lexington Railroad</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky Central Railroad</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>21</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The fifteen cars belonging to the Louisville & Lexington railroad and the sixty cars of the Kentucky Central railroad were subsequently purchased by the government.

To maintain the locomotives and cars in good working order, extensive machine and car shops were built at Nashville and Chattanooga.

The shops were supplied with machinery partly seized or purchased in the country, and partly obtained from northern manufacturers.

The shops at Nashville, particularly, were on a large scale, as at times one hundred engines and more than one thousand cars were there at once, it being the main terminal station of five hundred miles of road, running from it east, south and west. Extensive storehouses also were built at Nashville and Chattanooga, and kept supplied with all necessary materials to rebuild and repair track, bridges, buildings, engines or cars, to any reasonable extent.

The general intention was to make these two cities the great centers toward which all operations
would converge, where supplies of all kinds could be obtained in case the roads were cut in their rear; where repairs of any kind or to any extent could be made; and in case communication was destroyed between them, operations could be conducted from either with facility in any direction.

The Nashville & Chattanooga railroad, 151 miles, was the great main line over which passed all the supplies for the armies of the Cumberland, the Ohio, and the Tennessee, through the campaigns which terminated with the occupation of Atlanta. Over this single line of railroad the provisions, clothing and camp equipage for the men, forage for animals, arms, ammunition, and ordnance stores, re-enforcements, and all the varied miscellaneous supplies required for a great army engaged in an active campaign, were sent to the front; by it were returned the sick, wounded, disabled, and discharged soldiers, refugees and freedmen, captured prisoners, and materials deemed advisable to send to the rear.

About 115 miles of track were relaid with new iron, cross-ties, and ballast from February, 1864, to the close of the war. Sidings were put in at intervals to be not more than eight miles apart, each capable of holding five to eight long freight trains; and telegraph stations were established at most of them. In all, nineteen miles of new sidings were added to this road and forty-five new water tanks were erected.

During the spring and summer of 1864 a few occasional guerilla raids were made upon it, but they caused little damage to property or detention to transportation. About September 1, 1864, the rebel general Wheeler destroyed seven miles of road between Nashville and Murfreesboro. In December, General Hood destroyed seven and three-fourths miles of track and five hundred and thirty feet of bridges between the same stations. In both cases the road was promptly repaired and trains were running in a few days.

The next railroad in importance for military purposes was the Western & Atlantic, from Chattanooga to Atlanta, 136 miles. It was open to Ringgold, Georgia, 21 miles from Chattanooga, in March, 1864. Early in May the work of reconstruction was com-
menced south of Ringgold, and kept pace with the movements of Sherman's army. The line was opened through to Atlanta in August, 1864, immediately after the evacuation of the town by the rebel army. In the reconstruction of this road 22½ miles of track and 4,081 lineal feet of bridges were rebuilt. The most important single structure was Chattahoochie bridge, 780 feet long and 92 feet high, which was completed by the construction corps in four and a half days. While occupied as a military road this was more infested by guerillas than any other during the war. Every device possible to apply was used to throw trains from the track, and, though occasionally successful, the preparations to guard against such attempts were so complete that few of them caused loss of life or more than a few hours detention.

Early in October, 1864, General Hood passed around General Sherman's army, and fell upon the railroad at several points in its rear. He destroyed 35½ miles of track and 455 lineal feet of bridges, but in thirteen days after he left it was repaired and trains were running over its entire length.

Thirty-five miles of track and 230 feet of bridges in one stretch, between Tunnel Hill and Resaca were reconstructed in seven and a half days. This was accomplished by working from each end of the break and at the same time working both ways from Dalton, which was reached by trains with material by way of Cleveland after relaying one and a half miles of track.

When General Sherman commenced his march to Savannah, in November, the road between Atlanta and Dalton, 100 miles, was abandoned, the track from Atlanta to Etowah River, 46 miles, was torn up and destroyed, and from Resaca to Dalton, 16 miles, the rails were taken up and carried to Chattanooga.

By order of Major General Thomas the road from Dalton to Atlanta was reconstructed, and between May 10 and July 4, 1865, sixty-six miles of track were laid, 36 miles repaired, and 3,553 lineal feet of bridges rebuilt.

* * *

**GENERAL REMARKS**

With few exceptions, the operations of military
railroads have been conducted under orders issued by the Secretary of War, or by army commandants in or out of the field.

It was made the duty of the director and general manager to arrange the military railroad organization upon a basis sufficiently comprehensive to permit the extension of the system indefinitely, to perfect the modus operandi for working the various lines, to determine as to the number of men to be employed in the several departments, and the compensation to be paid therefor, the amount and kind of machinery to be purchased, and the direction as to the distribution of the same.

The following important order of the Secretary of War, the wisdom of which has been so abundantly vindicated by experience, is here inserted as defining in part the position of the military railroad organization, which seems not to have been clearly understood by many in and out of the service:

(Special Order No. 337.)

WAR DEPARTMENT
Adjutant General's Office

Special Orders No. 337. Washington, November 10, 1862.

(EXTRACT)

Commanding officers of troops along the United States military railroads will give all facilities to the officers of the roads and the quartermasters for unloading cars so as to prevent any delay. On arrival at depots, whether in the day or night, the cars will be instantly unloaded; and working parties will always be in readiness for that duty, and sufficient to unload the whole train at once.

Commanding officers will be charged with guarding the tracks, sidings, wood, water-tanks, etc., within their several commands, and will be held responsible for the result.

Any military officer who shall neglect his duty in this respect will be reported by the quartermasters and officers of the railroad, and his name will be
stricken from the rolls of the army. Depots will be established at suitable points, under the direction of the commanding general, and properly guarded. No officer, whatever may be his rank, will interfere with the running of the cars as directed by the superintendent of the road. Anyone who so interferes will be dismissed from the service for disobedience of orders.

By order of the Secretary of War:

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant General.

The above order was given in consequence of several attempts having been made to operate railroads by army or department commanders, which had, without an exception, proved signal failures, disorganizing in tendency, and destructive of all discipline. The great benefit resulting from this order was more especially exhibited during General Sherman's campaign from Chattanooga to Atlanta, and in this, my last report, I desire to put on record, for the benefit of those who may be called upon to conduct military railroad operations in the future, the following:

Having had a somewhat extensive railroad experience, both before and since the rebellion, I consider this order of the Secretary of War to have been the very foundation of success. Without it the whole railroad system, which has proved an important element in conducting military movements, would have been not only a costly but ludicrous failure. The fact should be understood that the management of railroads is just as much a distinct profession as is that of the art of war, and should be so regarded.

The difficulty of procuring a sufficient force of competent railroad men, both in the construction and transportation departments, was almost insurmountable. Owing to the peculiar nature of the service, and the rapid expansion of railroad system, the supply of railroad operatives in the country has always been limited; many had entered the army in various positions, thus diminishing the actual number in civil life, while the stimulus imparted by the war to
the business of northern railroads had greatly enhanced the value of the services of those who remained at their posts, thus rendering the home demand for skillful labor far in advance of the supply. When the large number of men necessary to equip these military lines were sought for, it was extremely difficult to induce those who were really valuable to leave secure positions and enter upon a new and untried field of action.

The difference between civil and military railroad service is marked and decided. Not only were the men continually exposed to great danger from the regular forces of the enemy, guerillas, scouting parties, &c., but, owing to the circumstances under which military railroads must be constructed and operated, what are considered the ordinary risks upon civil railroads are vastly increased on military lines. The hardships, exposure, and perils to which train-men especially were subjected during the movements incident to an active campaign, were much greater than that endured by any other class of civil employes of the government, equalled only by that of the soldier while engaged in a raid into the enemy's country. It was by no means unusual for men to be out with their trains, from five to ten days, without sleep, except what could be snatched upon their engines and cars while the same were standing to be loaded or unloaded, with but scanty food, or perhaps no food at all for days together, while continually occupied in a manner to keep every faculty strained to its utmost. Many incidents during the war, but more especially during the Atlanta campaign, exhibited a fortitude, endurance, and self devotion on the part of these men not exceeded in any branch of the service. All were thoroughly imbued with the fact that upon the success of the railroad operations in forwarding supplies to the front depended in great part the success of our armies; that, although defeat might be the result even if supplies were abundantly furnished, it was evident there could be no advance without; and I hazard nothing in saying, that should failure have taken place, either in keeping the lines in repair or in operating them, General Sherman's campaign, instead of proving, as
it did, a great success, would have resulted in dis-
aster and disaster, and the greater the army to supply;
the more precarious its position. Since the end of
the rebellion I have been informed by railroad officers
who were in the service of the enemy during the
war, that they were less surprised at the success
of General Sherman, in a military point of view, than
they were at the rapidity with which railroad breaks
were repaired, and the regularity with which trains
were moved to the front; and it was only when the
method of operating was fully explained that it
could be comprehended.

In the beginning of the war military roads were
experimental and although some light as to their
management had been gleaned by the operations of
1862 and 1863, yet so little progress had been made
that the attempt to supply the army of General Sher-
man in the field, construct and reconstruct the rail-
road in its rear, and keep pace with its march, was
regarded by those who had the largest experience,
and who had become most familiar with the subject,
as the greatest experiment of all. The attempt to
furnish an army of one hundred thousand (100,000)
men and sixty thousand (60,000) animals with sup-
plies from a base three hundred and sixty (360) miles
distant by one line of single-track railroad, located
almost the entire distance through the country of an
active and most vindictive enemy, is without prece-
dent in the history of warfare, and, to make it suc-
cessful, required an enormous outlay for labor and a
vast consumption of material, together with all the
foresight, energy, patience, and watchfulness of
which men are capable.

This line, from the fact of its great length, was
imperfectly guarded, as troops could not be spared
from the front for that purpose. This rendered the
railroad service one of great risk and hazard, and at
times it was only by the force of military authority
that men could be held to serve. As an item show-
ing the real danger attending military railroad oper-
ations, it may be stated that during the last six
months of the fiscal year ending June 30, 1865, the
wrecking train picked up and carried to Nashville
sixteen (16) wrecked locomotives and two hundred
and ninety-four (294) car loads of car wheels, bridge iron, &c. These wrecks were caused by guerillas and rebel raids.

The Chattanooga & Atlanta, or Western & Atlantic Railroad, extends from Chattanooga to Atlanta, one hundred and thirty-eight miles, with a branch from Kingston to Rome seventeen miles long. The reconstruction and maintenance of this line was, in many respects, the most difficult of any military railroad operations during the war. By it the Confederate army; under General Johnston, made its retreat from Buzzard's Roost to Atlanta, and in falling back from one strong position to another, it did such damage to the road as was supposed would delay or prevent Sherman's pursuit; but in this it was unsuccessful. However great the damage done, it was so speedily repaired that General Sherman soon ceased to fear any delay from this cause, and made his advance movements with perfect confidence that the railroad in his rear would be "all right."

Being, from the nature of the case, entirely ignorant of the obstacles to be encountered at each advance, the construction force was at all times prepared for an emergency, either to build bridges of formidable dimensions, or lay miles of track, or, perhaps, push back to some point on the line and repair damages done by guerillas or raiding parties. These attacks on the line to the rear were of such frequent occurrence, and often of so serious a character, that, to insure speedy repairs, it became necessary to station detachments of the construction corps at various points along the road, and also to collect supplies of construction materials, such as iron rails, chairs, spikes, cross-ties, and bridge timber at points where they would be comparatively safe and easily obtained when required. These precautionary measures proved to be of the utmost importance in keeping the road open.

The detachments stationed along the line were composed of bridge-builders and track-layers, with an ample supply of tools for all kinds of work. Each detachment was under the command of a competent engineer or supervisor, who had orders to move in either direction, within certain limits, as soon as a
break occurred, and make the necessary repairs without delay, working day and night when necessary. Under this arrangement small breaks were repaired at once at any point on the line, even when the telegraph wires were cut, and special orders could not be communicated to the working parties.

When "big breaks" occurred, one or more divisions of the construction corps were moved as rapidly as possible thereto, either from Chattanooga or the front. Construction trains, loaded with the requisite tools and materials, were kept ready at each end of the road to move at a moment's notice.

Guerillas and raiding parties were more or less successful in destroying portions of the track during the whole time we held this line, but the crowning effort was made by the enemy in October, 1864, when Hood, getting to Sherman's rear, threw his whole army on the road, first at Big Shanty, and afterwards north of Resaca, and destroyed, in the aggregate, 35½ miles of track and 455 lineal feet of bridges, killing and capturing a large number of our men.

Fortunately, however, the detachments of the construction corps which escaped were so distributed that, even before Hood had left the road, two strong working parties were at work, one on each end of the break at Big Shanty, and this gap of ten miles was closed and the force ready to move to the great break of 25 miles in length north of Resaca, as soon as the enemy had left it. The destruction by Hood's army of our depot of supplies compelled us to cut nearly all the cross ties required to relay this track, and to send to a distance for rails. The cross-ties were cut near the line of the road, and many of them carried by hand to the track, as the teams to be furnished for hauling them did not get to the work until it was nearly completed. The rails used on the southern end of the break had to be taken up and brought from the railroads south of Atlanta, and those for the northern end were mostly brought from Nashville, nearly 200 miles distant.

Notwithstanding all the disadvantages under which the labor was performed, this 25 miles of track was laid and the trains were running over it in 7½ days from the time the work commenced.
The economy so commendable and essential upon civil railroads was compelled to give way to the lavish expenditure of war, and the question to be answered was not, "How much will it cost?" but rather "Can it be done at all at any cost?"

During February, 1862, I received the following important verbal order from the Secretary of War. "I shall expect you to have on hand at all times the necessary men and materials to enable you to comply promptly with any order given; nor must there be any failure."

The military railroad organization was designed to be a great construction and transportation machine for carrying out the objects of the commanding generals, so far as it was adapted to the purpose, and it was managed solely with a view to efficiency in that direction. It was the duty of the quartermaster's department to load all material upon the cars, to direct where such material should be taken, and to whom delivered. It then became the province of the railroad department to comply with said order in the shortest practicable time, and to perfect such arrangements as would enable it to keep the lines in repair under any and all circumstances.

As to the duties of the Chief Quartermaster on duty with the Military Division of the Mississippi, I will quote extracts from the report of that officer, Captain F. J. Crilly, A. Q. M., U. S. A.

It may not be out of place here to state what are the duties of the quartermaster on duty with military railroads. The organization consists of one chief quartermaster stationed at Chattanooga, Tennessee, and one assistant quartermaster stationed at Memphis. Captain S. R. Hamill, assistant quartermaster, is stationed at Nashville and is responsible for all the property on the Nashville & Chattanooga, Nashville & Northwestern, Nashville & Alabama; total number of miles, four hundred and twenty-nine. He has also charge of the general supply store at Nashville, and of the lumber yard, property, saw mills, and means of transportation of the quartermaster's department.
The rolls of the roads above mentioned are made out and certified to by the general superintendent of military railroads, and after being audited and approved by the general manager or chief engineer, in accordance with orders of the War Department, are paid by the chief quartermaster at Nashville.

Captain W. R. Hopkins, assistant quartermaster, is stationed at Chattanooga, Tennessee, and is responsible for all the property on the Chattanooga & Knoxville, Chattanooga & Atlanta, and East Tennessee & Virginia Railroads; total number of miles, three hundred and seventy-eight. Chattanooga being so remote from the auditor's office, and it being impossible for the auditor to visit there monthly, the rolls are made out and certified to by Captain Hopkins; otherwise, no vouchers could be issued to discharged employes unless the general manager or chief superintendent was present.

Stores are purchased and supplied by the quartermaster on requisition of the general superintendent and chief engineer of the roads.

The question of property responsibility has always been the most difficult matter to arrange, owing to the peculiar organization of the military railroad service. In this military division it is organized under the direction of a general superintendent, who has charge of everything relative to transportation and repairs, and a chief engineer in charge of construction. Each was independent of the other, and the quartermaster independent of both, except so far as filling requisitions for supplies and paying the employes.

The mingling of civil and military officials, without any precedent or regulation to govern anomalous cases that constantly arise, would naturally produce collisions of authority, unless all parties worked with the proper spirit, and yielded questions of rank and precedence to the more important one of emergencies of service. Fortunately this was the case except in one instance, when the bad temper of one official produced so much bad feeling and annoyance that his resignation was promptly accepted by the general manager. It will be seen therefore, that the property, although on the returns of the quartermasters,
is all in the hands of officers of the railroad service, who are no ways responsible to him. During the period that Mr. E. L. Wentz was superintendent he completely ignored the authority of the quartermaster, and prohibited any reports being made of the loss or destruction of property. The consequence was that the officer responsible, Captain G. H. Clemens, assistant quartermaster, on being ordered to be relieved, could not find a tithe of the property his papers called for, and was so involved that a board of survey is now in session, convened by order of Major General Thomas, to investigate the cause of his large deficiency, and fix the responsibility.

A system of reports is now instituted by which the quartermaster is kept advised of the condition of property, and affidavits are furnished for all lost or destroyed, which I believe will effect a more prompt rendition of returns than could be previously obtained.

The duty of placing the supplies within reach of the army is performed by the service of the Line of Communications which transports supplies by rail; water or wagon transportation, or a combination of these, from the base to the front.

General Sherman, however, did not have any regularly organized service of the Line of Communications as that term is understood at the present time. There was no General of Communications in supreme command who was responsible to General Sherman for the forwarding of supplies and for the guarding and maintenance of the Communications. General Sherman seems to have superintended this work himself.

**Transportation with the Troops**

The transportation to accompany the troops in the field was cut down to the requirements of absolute necessity. General Sherman desired to make his
army as mobile as possible and as one of the means to this end he limited the transportation and impedimenta to the absolute needs of the troops. The instructions he issued on this subject as well as the orders issued by some of his subordinate commanders, are interesting and follow:

**HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI**
Nashville, Tenn., April 13, 1864.

**General Orders**

No. 7.

I. When troops serving in this military division are transferred from one post to another, or from one department to another department, the orders will embrace the transportation for all the wagons, mules, horses, tents, clothing, and camp equipage properly pertaining to such troops.

II. When troops are ordered to march for action or to be in condition for action, all incumbrances must be left in store at the most safe and convenient point. Mounted officers (general, regimental, or cavalry) will be expected to carry on their own or led horses the necessary bedding and changes of clothing, with forage and provisions for themselves for three days, which must last five days. Infantry officers and soldiers must carry on their persons or on led horses or mules the same; to which end will be allowed to each company, when practicable, one led horse or pack mule. Artillery can carry the same on their caissons, so that all troops must be in readiness for motion without wagons for a five days’ operation.

III. For longer periods of service, the generals in command of armies, divisions or brigades will indicate in orders beforehand the number of wagons to each headquarters and subdivision of command. In no event will tents be carried, or chests, or boxes, or trunks. Wagons must be reserved for ammunition proper, for cooking utensils, for provisions consisting exclusively of bread or flour, salt, sugar, coffee, and bacon or pork, in the proportion of thirty days’ sugar and coffee, double of salt, twenty days’ of bread or
flour, and six of pork or bacon. The meat ration must be gathered in the country or driven on the hoof. Officers must be restricted to the same food as soldiers, and the general commanding knows that our soldiers will submit to any deprivation, provided life and health can be sustained and they are satisfied of the necessity.

IV. One or two ambulances and one wagon should follow each regiment. All other wheeled vehicles should be made up into trains of convenient size, always under command of some quartermaster with a proper escort; and minute instructions should be imparted to the officers in charge of trains as to keeping closed up, doubling up on the roads when they are wide enough, or parking in side fields when there is any cause of delay ahead, so that the long periods of standing in a road, which fatigue the troops so much, may be avoided.

These orders are preliminary.

BY order of Major-General W. T. Sherman:

R. M. SAWYER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT AND ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE
Huntsville, Ala., April 18, 1864.

Major General John A. Logan,
Commanding Fifteenth Army Corps.

General:
The following instructions relative to transportation for the army in the field will at once be communicated to your command:

First. Each regiment*, battery or detachment will be allowed two wagons and no more; one for the cooking utensils of the men, the other for the baggage and mess of the officers.

Second. Each brigade headquarters will be allowed two wagons and no more.

Third. Each division headquarters will be allowed three wagons and no more.

*In considering these figures it must be remembered that the veteran regiments of 1864 numbered as a rule only a few hundred men.
Fourth. The remaining teams of the command will be organized into an ordnance and supply train—the ordnance train under the direct supervision of the ordnance officer of the division, who will be assisted by a competent quartermaster detailed for that purpose; the supply train of the division under the immediate control of the division quartermaster, assisted by the quartermaster of the command, who must not lose sight of their teams. Quartermasters must be present to superintend the moving of their trains in the morning, and will see them parked for the night. This must not be left for the wagon masters.

Fifth. Not a tent will be taken with the army, and officers will govern themselves accordingly.

All surplus baggage must be thrown out and disposed of at once, and the army placed in a condition to move.

By Order of Major General McPherson:

Wm. T. Clark,
Assistant Adjutant General.

(Same to Hurlbut, Dodge, Leggett and Crocker.)

In a letter from the Quartermaster General, U. S. Army, to General Sherman, on April 20, 1864, concerning the question of transportation he stated that General Grant allowed 600 wagons and 180 ambulances to a marching column of 32,000 men.

They were distributed as follows:

- for ammunition, 5 to 1000 men
- for baggage; 3 to 1000 men*

The remainder, 320 wagons, were used for provisions and forage. It may be added that these wagons were capable of hauling a net load of 3000 pounds and were of the army type drawn by six mules.

* These figures afford a good basis for comparison with the proportion of baggage wagons authorized by the service regulations of modern armies. The invariable tendency in time of peace is to increase the amount of impedimenta with the troops; the longer the interval between wars the greater the increase in the amount of authorized baggage. As a rule only by war itself is the proportion cut down again to the requirements of absolute necessity.
The organization of the ordnance train of the Army of the Ohio as well as the amount of small arms and artillery ammunition carried is shown from the following circular:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO
Office Chief of Artillery and Ordnance
Knoxville, April 26, 1864.

(Circular)

In organizing the ordnance trains for the army in the field, as directed by Major-General Schofield, commanding department, the following general rules will be observed:

First. The corps ordnance train will carry 100 rounds per piece of ammunition for all small-arms and a supply of artillery ammunition equal to that carried in the ammunition chests of all the batteries.

Second. Each division ordnance train will carry sixty rounds per piece of ammunition for all small-arms in its division, and it will habitually march immediately in rear of the division baggage train. The division ordnance officers will be responsible for the ammunition carried in the division ordnance train, and will issue direct to regiments.

Third. No other stores, baggage, or articles of any kind, excepting forage for mules and drivers' necessary baggage, will be allowed in any of the wagons composing the ordnance train.

Fourth. On the march the wagons composing the ordnance trains will not be allowed to scatter or to be separated by allowing other wagons to get between them, and in camp, when practicable, will be parked in a body and separated from other trains.

Fifth. It will be the duty of each division officer to know the particular kind and caliber of ammunition in each wagon of his train, so that there may be no delay when called upon to issue.

In pursuance of these instructions you will immediately ascertain the quantity of ammunition required in your respective divisions to supply each man with 100 rounds (40 rounds in cartridge-boxes
and 60 in wagons), and will at once make requisition for the quantity deficient.*

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. W. SCHOFIELD,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Chief of Artillery and Ordnance.

Judging from the preceding orders it would appear that the supply trains with Sherman's army were distributed in close accordance with the generally accepted principles of today. Although the corps organization was then in existence in our service, still the greater portion of the supplies were carried in the supply trains of the various divisions. Each of these trains was under the direct supervision of the Division Quartermaster but, as occasions were rare when a corps could be assigned more than one road, the division trains of each corps were generally combined into one column and followed the troops of the corps at a suitable distance. The order of march of the divisional supply columns corresponded, as a rule, to the order of march of the troops. The corps ordnance train ordinarily marched with the consolidated supply trains. Had each corps ordnance train been split up and part attached to each division supply train, the latter would have closely corres-

* It will be noted that 200 rounds S.A.A. were provided per man. With modern rifles this would be insufficient. The distribution of the S.A.A. carried by the Army of the Ohio as compared with the distribution of a modern American division is as follows:

Army of the Ohio.
40 rounds carried by soldier.
60 rounds carried in division ordnance train
100 rounds carried in corps ordnance train.
200 Total.

A Modern United States Division
90 rounds carried by soldier.
120 rounds carried in combat trains.
120 rounds carried in division ammunition train.
330 Total
ponded to our present (divisional) ammunition and supply columns.

The regimental wagons seem to have carried only baggage and cooking utensils. They apparently marched immediately in rear of their respective regiments. It is believed that the modern system of having only combat trains habitually is a preferable method.

It was General Sherman's intention to have at all times 20 days rations and forage (green) with the troops, it was, however, generally the case that only 8 or 10 days rations could be kept on hand. Of these rations 3 seem to have been habitually carried by the men in their haversacks, the remainder being in the supply trains.

The operations of the campaign from a supply standpoint will next be considered in order to show how, as the campaign progressed, the supply trains moved, how they were refilled, and how the line of communications was extended and the depots established.

Opening of Campaign

Prior to the opening of the campaign the Army of the Tennessee (McPherson) was at Huntsville, Alabama, the Army of the Ohio (Schofield) was at Knoxville, Tennessee, while the Army of the Cumberland was disposed as follows:

4th Corps (Howard).
Hdq's, Cleveland, Tenn.
1st Div. (Stanley), Blue Springs (5 miles west of Cleveland).
2d Div. (Newton), Cleveland.

* Our present F.S.R. prescribe that under normal conditions each man will carry 1 (or 2) haversack rations and 1 emergency ration. Two more haversack rations are carried in the field train and three more in the supply columns. This distribution is in accordance with practice of most modern armies.
3d Div. (Wood), McDonald’s Station.
Croft’s Brigade, 1st Div., Ooltewah, Tenn.

14th Corps (Palmer).
Hdqs. Chattanooga, Tenn.
1st Div. (Johnson), Graysville, Ga.
2d Div. (Dans), near Ringgold, Ga.
3d Div. (Baird), Ringgold, Ga.

The 20th Corps (Hooker) was in the vicinity of Chattanooga.

The campaign was to open with the concentration of the three Federal armies in front of Chattanooga preparatory to moving against the enemy in the vicinity of Dalton. This concentration was to be covered by the 4th and 14th Corps which were nearest to the Confederate army. Meanwhile the Army of the Tennessee was to be brought up to Rossville and the Army of the Ohio to Cleveland.

Fourth Corps, May 3—4

We will first follow (from a supply view point) the movements of the 4th Corps which, in accordance with the general concentration scheme, was ordered forward to Catoosa Springs. The orders of the corps commander for May 3d and 4th follow:

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY CORPS
Cleveland, Tenn., May 2, 1864.

General Stanley:

In obedience to instructions just received from department headquarters, dated May 1, this corps will march to Catoosa Springs upon the arrival at this place of Major General Schofield’s command. Major General Stanley will, with his troops now at Blue Springs, march via Red Clay, pursuing the most direct route and carefully watching and covering his left flank. General Newton will do the same, following General Stanley. General Cruft’s brigade, of the First Division, will follow General Wood, communicating with him as to the point of joining his column. The ambulances will follow their respective divisions. The trains will follow General Wood’s
column, General Wood’s leading, then General Stanley’s, then General Newton’s. Unless otherwise directed, the first park will be somewhere to the east and in the vicinity of Parker’s Gap. Major General Stanley will leave two regiments of Cruft’s brigade at Ooltewah—the two having the least time to serve—with instructions to guard Julian’s and McDaniel’s Gaps. General Wood will send the two regiments of his command having the least time to serve to Cleveland as a guard to the depot, the senior officer to be the commandant of the post. Division commanders will guard their respective trains by at least one regiment each. The cavalry under General McCook has had instructions to move in such a manner as to cover the left flank of this corps. Division commanders will provide themselves with suitable, intelligent guides. The hour of march will be indicated hereafter.

By order of Major General Howard:

J. S. FULLERTON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

(Copies to Generals Newton and Wood.)

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY CORPS
May 2, 1864—8 p.m.

Major General Stanley,
Commanding First Division,
Fourth Army Corps.

Move at 12 m. tomorrow. Concentrate your train at some point on old Alabama road in the rear of General Wood’s train. Halt your main body at Red Clay, and send me word at the crossing of the Alabama and Julian’s Gap road of your arrival. Have Cruft march to Wood’s position tomorrow.

O. O. HOWARD,
Major General.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY CORPS
Cleveland, Tenn., May 2, 1864.

General Wood,
Commanding Third Division,
McDonald’s Station.

You will move tomorrow at 12 m., and encamp
tomorrow night near the point where the road from Julian's Gap to Red Clay crosses the old Alabama road. Stanley and Newton will be near Red Clay tomorrow night. My headquarters will be with you. Concentrate your train, not far in your rear, ready for the next day's march.

O. O. HOWARD,
Major General

CLEVELAND, TENN.,
May 2, 1864

Brig. Gen. E. M. McCook, Commanding Cavalry Division.

General:

Unless specific instructions should be communicated from headquarters Army of the Cumberland, you will move in obedience to instructions of the commanding general of May 1, instant, in such manner as to cover my left flank during my march from Cleveland to Catoosa Springs. You will leave camp at 10:30 a.m. tomorrow, and pass and cover Stanley's camp, which will be at Red Clay tomorrow night. Please consult with him, and communicate to him your dispositions. Your trains can follow mine along the old Alabama road, being covered by General Schofield's advance toward Varnell's Station, giving them such guard as you deem necessary. My headquarters will be with General Wood's division tomorrow night, near crossing of Julian's Gap and Red Clay road with old Alabama road.

Respectfully,

O. O. HOWARD,
Major General

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY CORPS
Near Marsh's House, May 3, 1864—5-15 p.m.

Major General Stanley, Commanding First Division.

Encamp here; Cruft in advance. He will lead tomorrow, starting at 5 a.m., via Switzer's, Brannan's, and Salem Church. Your train will encamp not far from Blackburn's, General Newton's just this side of the Widow Tucker's. The trains will all fol-
low General Wood tomorrow. Start your head of
column at 5 a.m. tomorrow, yourself and General
Newton pursuing the same order of march as today.
Communicate with General McCook so as to satisfy
yourself with regard to his position. His train had
better follow ours so as to reach him as soon as pos-
sible after our arrival at Catoosa Springs; however,
he will know best about that. Please allow General
Newton to read this.

By order of Major General Howard:

J. S. FULLERTON,
Assistant Adjutant-General:

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY CORPS

Marsh's House, May 3, 1864—6 p.m.

Brigadier General Wood,
Commanding Third Division.

The general commanding directs that you march
at 5.30 a.m. tomorrow, following General Cruft.
General Cruft’s train will follow your troops imme-
diately and your train will follow his. The general
wishes you to have your inspector examine the entire
train while en route tomorrow with a view to surplus
baggage, etc.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. S. FULLERTON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

In accordance with the foregoing orders, the
Fourth Corps moved in two columns on Catoosa
Springs. The left column, composed of the 1st Divi-
sion (Blue Springs) and 2d Division (Cleveland), took
the road via Red Clay and Ellige’s Mill; the right
column, composed of the 3d Division (McDonald’s
Station) and 1st Brigade, 1st Division (Ooltewah),
took the old Alabama road via Blackburn, Sigler and
Salem Church. The trains of the corps were concen-
trated and moved in rear of the right column via the
old Alabama road. They were arranged in the order
of march of the divisions—3d, Cruft’s Brigade, 1st
and 2d Divisions.
The movement of the 4th Corps on Catoosa Springs began at 12 noon, May 3. That night it camped as follows:

- **Left column, main body Red Clay.**
- **Right column, Cruft in advance, probably near New Prospect Church.**
- Trains in vicinity of Blackburn.

The route followed by Cruft was via McDaniel's (McDonald's) Gap. This would account for this brigade being in advance instead of in rear of the 3rd Division as originally ordered, for it had a shorter line of march from Ooltewah than did the 3rd Division from McDonald's Station. As Cruft's Brigade was to take the lead in the march of the right column on May 4th, it is natural that the position of his train in the column should also change and that his train should follow immediately after the troops (3d Division).

The march was recommenced at 5 a.m. on May 4th, along the routes already mentioned. From the orders given it will be seen that there was some uneasiness as to the left flank of the corps and it was therefore natural to take the precaution of having all the trains follow the right column, away from the threatened flank. The position of the trains was influenced more by fear of cavalry than by expectation of any general movement of the enemy, for we see on the 4th the trains following immediately in rear of the right column.

The right column reached Catoosa Springs at 9 a.m. May 4th, while the 1st Division arrived there at 10:30 a.m. The 2d Division camped near Burke's Mill. The train was parked at Salem Church, about 3 miles north of Catoosa Springs. The train of General McCook's Cavalry Division, which was covering the movement, also joined the train of the Fourth Corps during the 4th and followed it to Salem Church.
This march to Catoosa Springs brought the Fourth Corps into position close to the camp of the Fourteenth Corps at Ringgold. These two corps were to hold these positions while the rest of Sherman’s army closed up. On this date (May 4th) the Army of the Ohio advanced from Cleveland, the Army of the Tennessee was near Rossville and the Twentieth Corps was near Lee & Gordon’s Mills.

Movement Against Tunnel Hill

On the evening of the 5th the positions of the Federal troops were as follows:

- Army of the Ohio—Red Clay.
- Army of Cumberland.
- Army of Tennessee—Gordon’s Mills.

The railroad had been repaired to Ringgold since March 20th. During this time Ringgold had been occupied by part of the 14th Corps. It became an advance depot during these preliminary movements of the campaign.

The first move was to dislodge the enemy from Tunnel Hill. The dispositions were as follows:

- Army of Ohio via Ellige’s Mill to Dr. Lee’s, covering left flank of 4th Corps.
- 4th Corps to Tunnel Hill via Dr. Lee’s.
- 14th Corps directly on Tunnel Hill.
- 20th Corps thru Nickajack Gap on Trickum.
- Army of the Tennessee to Snake Creek Gap via Villanow.

This will give a general idea of the contemplated move. Before continuing the dispositions made by the 4th Corps, its position as well as that of the Army of the Ohio in relation to the remainder of the army is to be noted.

It will be seen that they were separated from
the remainder of the army by a ridge called Taylor Ridge south of Ringgold while north of this place it was called White Oak Ridge. In the vicinity of Catoosa Springs this ridge could only be crossed at two places—Catoosa Station and V. C. Parker’s Gap. The former pass was of course to be taken by the 14th Corps in its advance on Tunnel Hill.

The preparations made by the 4th Corps will now be considered.

The corps commander issued the following order:

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY CORPS
Catoosa Springs, May 5, 1864.

General Stanley,
Commanding First Division.

General:

Major General Thomas requests that when we move from this place toward the enemy that it be done with the least possible number of wagons. To carry out this request there will be allowed one wagon each to corps, division, and brigade headquarters. A small supply train, sufficient forage and rations, ammunition train, and the wagons with tools, will constitute the train for the march. The rest of the wagon train will move to Ringgold, via Parker’s Gap, filled with rations and forage at that place, and be ready for further orders. This is preparatory for marching orders, which will probably come tomorrow morning.

Division commanders will please report as soon as possible the exact number of wagons that will go forward in their trains, in compliance with the above instructions. Lieutenant Colonel Hayes, chief quartermaster Fourth Corps, will direct the organization and movement of the trains to be made up as above mentioned. The two regiments of the First and Second Divisions, now with the general supply train at Salem Church, will come to the front as a guard for the train which is to move with the troops. Brigadier General Wood, commanding Third Division, will furnish a regiment to guard that part of the general supply train which is to move to Ring-
gold via Parker's Gap. This regiment will stop at said gap, where it will remain as a guard until further orders.

By order of Major General Howard:

J. S. FULLERTON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

P.S.—The design is to carry, in different ways, five days' supplies.

(Same to Newton, Wood and McCook.)

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY CORPS
Catoosa Springs, Ga., May 6, 1864.

Major General D. S. Stanley,
Commanding First Division,
Fourth Army Corps.

General:
This corps will move to Tunnel Hill tomorrow. Your division will lead, moving via the Alabama or old Federal road and the first road to the right after passing Ben Clark's house. The Third Division, General Wood commanding, will move to Doctor Lee's via Burke's Mill. General McCook's cavalry, moving in conjunction with General Newton, will also move to Doctor Lee's. The general commanding wishes first to ascertain whether the enemy occupies the Tunnel Hill range in force. If not, the hill must be taken possession of, your division forming a junction with Palmer's corps, which has been ordered to move directly on the tunnel. General Wood's division will form immediately upon your left, and General Newton's will be massed in reserve opposite the left as a strong cover to our left flank, waiting the arrival of Major General Schofield, whose right is to rest at Doctor Lee's house. Should the enemy be found in force it will be necessary to take the ridge at the most accessible points and then change front toward the tunnel. Your division will draw out at 4:30 a.m. and Newton's at 4:30 a.m., and General Wood's at 5 a.m. The wagon train that goes forward with the troops will leave Salem Church at 5 a.m., passing Catoosa Springs to the Alabama road, then turning to the left it will go into
park at some point that will be indicated by a staff officer.

By order of Major General Howard:

J. S. FULLERTON,
Lieut. Col. and Assistant Adjt. Gen.

(Copies to Generals Newton and Wood.)

General Sherman was more or less in the dark as to what would be the result of this first move on the enemy at Tunnel Hill. How strongly Tunnel Hill was held was unknown to him; further Taylor's Ridge divided his army. His following instructions to General Thomas (Army of the Cumberland) are therefore well taken:

"Trains likely to embarrass our movements should not be taken east of Taylor's Ridge till we have observed the effect of these first movements."

Sending to Ringgold the trains which were not to accompany the troops accomplished two objects: First, it placed them west of Taylor's Ridge where they were comparatively safe with Parker's Gap held by its guard of one regiment. Second, it gave an opportunity for replenishing the supplies which had been consumed since leaving Cleveland and also those which the troops had taken with them in the movement.

When the 4th Corps advanced on Tunnel Hill, the small train which accompanied it advanced from Salem Church to Catoosa Springs and parked in the vicinity of Lowe. In this position it was about 4 miles from Tunnel Hill and on the main road to Ringgold where, if the corps were repulsed, the train could quickly take refuge and be on the west side of Taylor's Ridge. It should also be noted that the 2d Division, in reserve, was near Dr. Lee's while the Army of the Ohio was moving on this point from Red Clay.
Tunnel Hill was occupied by Howard at 11 a. m., May 7th, with little or no resistance.

* * * * * *

Army of the Ohio

The movements of the Army of the Ohio from the time it left Cleveland, Tenn., on May 4th, until it reached Dr. Lee's on the morning of the 7th, will now be considered. General Schofield had to leave Cleveland with his trains incomplete on account of lack of wagons which, however, he expected to join him in a few days.

It is probable that the army upon its arrival at Red Clay on the evening of the 4th of May was only accompanied by its regimental wagons carrying three days' rations, while the men in their haversacks carried four days' rations.

It was expected that for the present, and until the supply column could rejoin, the East Tennessee & Georgia railroad which ran south from Cleveland and along which the Army of the Ohio was to operate would transport the supplies from Cleveland, where a temporary depot was established, but the railroad had been more seriously interrupted than had been expected. This, however, did not hinder the movements of the Army for the railroad was repaired in time to prevent its causing any delay to the operations.

By the time, May 7th, that the movement on Tunnel Hill was to commence, it is probable that the Army of the Ohio (which had remained at Red Clay since its arrival there on the 4th, had been joined by its supply and ammunition columns and was thoroly equipped to enter upon the campaign.

In General Sherman's order for the movement of the Army of the Ohio to Dr. Lee's on the 7th, he
notified General Schofield that, while repairs on the railroad to Cleveland would continue, Ringgold would be his point of supply. This illustrates in a small way a change in the line of communications.

As General Schofield’s order for the march is rather long, only extracts of it will be given:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO
Camp near Red Clay, Ga., May 6, 1864.
Special Field Orders
No. 1.

The command will march at 5 a.m. tomorrow, in the following order: Third, Second and First Division, train of the entire corps, and rear guard, to consist of one regiment from the First Division. The column will march on the main road to Catoosa Springs, leaving the railroad near General Cox’s present headquarters, passing by Thatcher’s and Ellige’s Mill, thence to Doctor Lee’s on the main road from Varnell’s Station to Ringgold. The train will continue on the Catoosa Springs road from Ellige’s Mill to Burke’s Mill, and will park in the most secure and convenient place in the vicinity. The rear guard on arriving at Ellige’s Mill will take position on the road leading from that road toward the east, in the gap of the hills immediately to the east of the line of march of the main column, and occupy that position till further orders.

The ordnance train will move in advance of all supply and baggage trains. The engineer train will move with the ordnance train. The trains, i.e., the ordnance and engineer trains, will halt in the vicinity of Ellige’s Mill, and will remain there in park, under the immediate protection of the rear guard until further orders. The general train will move to Burke’s Mill as before directed. The commander of each division will send the customary guard with the train of his own division. Officers and men must carry on their persons or private horses four days’ rations. The artillery will carry two days’ forage on the caissons. Ambulances will accompany their proper commands. All other vehicles will move with the general train. In the absence of the chief
quartermaster of the corps, Captain Stewart, chief quartermaster Third Division, will have general superintendence of all the trains. The train guards, while the trains are together, will be under the command of the senior officer present. One regiment of infantry from the Third Division and two squadrons of cavalry from Colonel (Dorr's) brigade will remain until further orders at this place, to protect the workmen engaged in rebuilding the railroad and to cover the movement of supplies to the front. The commanding officer of the squadrons of cavalry will report to the commander of the infantry regiment for duty.

By order of Major General Schofield:

J. A. CAMPBELL,
Major and Assistant Adjutant-General.

The location at Burke's Mill of the park of the general train of the Army of the Ohio is to be noted. It was in a good position to move, if necessity demanded, through Parker's Gap, distant about 7 miles, while at the same time it was not too far from the army. Further, it was held near a stream, an important consideration in the parking of a large train. The disposition of the rear guard, covering the road leading east from Ellige's Mill, was a wise precaution against any move of the enemy's cavalry around the left flank, while at the same time the train guard of each division attended to the immediate protection and police of the train.

The engineer and ordnance trains were parked near Ellige's Mill. Here they were on the main road to the front and the natural line of withdrawal to the rear. They were also under the immediate protection of the rear guard which as already noted, covered the road to the east from that point. Their position at Ellige's Mill was convenient to the army, for they were on the main road and only 2½ miles from Dr. Lee's.

As soon as Tunnel Hill was captured the repair
of the railroad to that point was expedited and daily supplies were sent forward from the advance depot at Ringgold to Tunnel Hill, and issued direct from the cars.

The operations on the 8th, 9th and 10th toward Buzzard's Roost developed the strength of the enemy in this direction. They also gave the Army of the Tennessee time to reach Snake Creek Gap.

Supply Arrangements, May 10—12

On the 10th General Sherman decided to leave the 4th Corps with Stoneman's and McCook's cavalry in front of Buzzard's Roost Gap while with the remainder of his three armies he moved to McPherson's support at Snake Creek Gap with the idea of throwing himself on the enemy's flank and rear at Resaca. This move was attended with some risk as the enemy might attack the 4th Corps and threaten Sherman's line of communications. General Thomas' instructions to General Howard regarding supply during this movement were as follows: "You will, therefore, at once proceed to make the necessary preparation, stripping your command light, sending all spare wagons to Ringgold. In case the enemy should detect the diminution of force and attack you, you will gradually fall back in the direction of Ringgold, but defend that point at all costs. The chief engineer of the railroad will be ordered to keep a locomotive and construction train here, prepared, if this retrograde movement becomes necessary, to take up at intervals rails, so as to make a repair train necessary to replace them; this that the enemy may not use the railroad to facilitate his movement in pursuit".

In obedience to the above order the following allowance of transportation to each division of the 4th Corps was made:
"To division headquarters one wagon for baggage, and such forage as can be carried. To brigade headquarters each one wagon for baggage and such forage as can be carried. All wagons allowed by this order, together with the entire ammunition train, will be parked, but not unhitched or unharnessed, in the open field on the western slope of Tunnel Hill, in the camp formerly occupied by Colonel Harker before the movement on Rocky Face Ridge. The remainder of the train with the exception of sufficient to haul one day’s supplies of subsistence and forage, will for the present be sent to Ringgold.

In the movement on Snake Creek Gap the remainder of the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of the Ohio took the Mill Creek road, their trains moving on the road further west and via Villanow: Rations for 10 days were carried, as few wagons as possible being used and the remainder sent to Ringgold.

The Army of the Tennessee

The Army of the Tennessee was the right wing of Sherman’s Army. It concentrated at Rossville preliminary to the opening of the campaign. Its first move was on Snake Creek Gap via Villanow. It reached the western end of the gap on May 8. The movement through the gap and against the enemy’s flank and line of communications at Resaca, and which was unsuccessful, was made on the 9th. “All wagons and baggage were left behind, except ambulances and ammunition wagons enough to make 60 rounds per man in addition to what they had in cartridge-boxes”. The men carried three days rations in their haversacks.

The wagons left behind were parked near the western entrance of the gap, and a brigade of infan-
try from each division and one battery left as guard.*

During the move of the Army of the Tennessee from Chattanooga to Snake Creek Gap it drew its supplies direct from Chattanooga. The method of supply will best be understood from the following correspondence:

CHIEF QUARTERMASTER’S OFFICE
Department of the Tennessee
Chattanooga, Tenn., May 6, 1864.

Lieutenant-Colonel W. T. Clark,
Chief of Staff, Hdqrs. Dept. & Army of the Tenn.

Colonel: I have the honor to make the following statement of supplies in the Army of the Tennessee:

Each regiment of the Fifteenth Corps has three wagons: one for officers, one for the companies, and one for the medical department; each brigade headquarters two wagons; each division headquarters three wagons. The remainder of the wagons are organized into supply trains and kept in camp at Chattanooga, when not hauling supplies to the corps. Some of the trains have not yet arrived at Chattanooga. Each division is supplied with fifty wagon-loads of ammunition. The Second and Fourth Divisions are supplied with ten days’ rations from May 6; the First Division with five days’ rations from May 6. Twenty-five wagon-loads of forage have been sent to the Fourth Division, and twenty-three wagon-loads of forage have been sent to the Second Division. (on May 6). The First Division train will be in tonight, May 6, for forage. Left wing, Sixteenth Corps, is supplied as follows: Two wagons for each regiment; the remainder en route to Chattanooga, and organized as in Fifteenth Corps. Up to this time wagons have been furnished to Sixteenth Corps by the Fifteenth, and twenty wagons are now waiting here to load for that corps: forty more will be furnished tomorrow. The divisions have four days’ rations from May 6. Forty wagon-loads of ammunition were sent to General Dodge’s command May 6, and twenty wagon loads of forage. There

* Although the brigades were small, still this train guard seems to have been unnecessarily strong.
are wagons enough here to keep up the supplies, and
the remainder are arriving daily. General Dodge's
trains are expected to be in by tomorrow night.
I am, very respectfully; your obedient servant,
J. D. BINGHAM,
Lieut. Col. and Chief Quartermaster,
Army of the Tennessee.

From Chattanooga to the western entrance of
Snake Creek Gap is about 35 miles. The trains appear to have been sent through direct to their destination.
From the correspondence between Generals' Sherman and McPherson it is probable that the latter's army was supplied from Ringgold after it arrived at Snake Creek Gap.
The concentration of the Army of the Cumberland (except the 4th Corps, etc.) and the Army of the Ohio at Snake Creek Gap was completed by the 12th and on the 13th the general attack on Resaca began. The men carried rations for three days in their haversacks, leaving their knapsacks with the trains. All trains were brought through the gap and parked near its eastern entrance. The only trains that accompanied the troops were the ammunition and ambulance trains with wagons enough to carry 3 days' forage (grain).

Dalton and Resaca
The enemy evacuated Dalton at 9:00 P.M., May 12th, and fell back on Resaca. The 4th Corps, following the enemy, entered Dalton at 9:00 A.M. on the 13th, and continued the march south to Resaca.
The following order is self-explanatory:
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
Special Field Orders In the Field of Resaca, Ga.,
No. 7. May 15, 1864.
I. Dalton is announced as the present depot of
supplies, but the railroad superintendent may bring forward trains of cars with ammunition or special articles up to the very rear of the army. The wagon trains will be brought out of Snake Creek Gap and that route abandoned. Wagon trains will take post under the direction of the proper staff officers and guards to the rear of their respective armies.

II. Commanders of armies will aim to keep on hand ten days' supply of meat and bread, and as much forage as they can, keeping their mules in as good condition as possible, looking for the probability of a long march.

By order of Major General W. T. Sherman:

L. M. DAYTON,
Aide-de-camp.

The operations at Resaca will be passed over. Johnston withdrew from that place during the night of the 15th of May, retiring on Calhoun. Sherman entered the town on the morning of the 16th and began at once the work of repairing bridges and putting his columns across the Oostenaula river.

The Army of the Tennessee crossed at Lay's Ferry, 4th and 14th Corps (Cumberland) and Army of the Ohio crossed at Fite's Ferry.

The Advance from Resaca

The order of General McPherson for the advance of the Army of the Tennessee follows:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT AND ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE

Special Field Orders Near Resaca, Ga.
No. 11. May 16, 1864.

I. The army will be immediately put in motion on the road to Rome, Ga., crossing at Lay's Ferry, Brigadier General Dodge having the advance. Major General John A. Logan, commanding Fifteenth Corps, will follow promptly, and every precaution will be used to prevent delay.

II. The command will be supplied with three-
days' rations in haversacks. Cartridge boxes and ammunition chests will be refilled from the supply train.

III. Brigadier General Dodge will instruct his quartermaster to turn over without delay to Lieutenant Colonel J. Condit Smith, chief quartermaster, Fifteenth Corps, the teams temporarily loaned for the use of the Sixteenth Corps. The teams can be halted at Lay's Ferry and sent back from that point if practicable.

IV. Major General John A. Logan, commanding Fifteenth Corps, will cause to be detailed from his command a competent officer to act as commissary for the hospitals of this command at Resaca. He will report for instructions to Lieutenant Colonel Morton, chief commissary of subsistence Fifteenth Corps, who will see that a sufficient number of beef cattle are turned over to the officer detailed as herein provided for the use of the hospitals.

V. The following orders and instructions are issued for the information and guidance of corps and division commanders:

1. All the wounded of this army will be collected together in hospitals as near as practicable to the town of Resaca. There they will remain until transportation to the north can be provided for them by cars, which will be done in a few days. A commissary has been appointed for the hospitals with instructions to furnish fresh beef and other necessary commissary stores.

2. Resaca having been designated as the present depot of supplies, all empty trains will be sent to that point, loaded as fast as possible, and sent forward on the route taken by the Army of the Tennessee.

3. To secure a sufficient supply of ordnance stores at all times, division commanders will appoint an assistant ordnance officer of their respective divisions, whose duties it shall be to take charge of the division ordnance train going to the rear to procure the necessary amount of ordnance and get it forward to the command without any delay.

VI. Major General John A. Logan, commanding Fifteenth Army Corps, will have the advance to-
morrow, and will move his command at 7 o'clock on the Rome Road. General Logan will move forward cautiously, feeling out well to the right and left, endeavoring to communicate on his left with the column of General Thomas.

VII. The cavalry division, with the exception of one regiment to be employed as advance guard and flankers, will follow the Fifteenth Corps.

VIII. Brigadier General G. M. Dodge, commanding Left Wing, Sixteenth Army Corps, will follow the cavalry division.

By order of Major General James B. McPherson:

W. T. CLARK.
Assistant Adjutant General.

The following points are to be especially noted in the above order:

1. The establishment at Resaca of the advanced depot for the army. The railroad had been repaired to that point by 6 p. m. on the 16th, when cars entered with one day's forage for the entire army.

2. The evacuation of the wounded and the appointment of a commissary for the hospitals at Resaca. There was some delay in crossing the river at Resaca. This was due to the lack of bridges. Troops were also delayed by a congestion of the trains. A strong garrison was left at Resaca, the other garrisons in rear being at Dalton and Tunnel Hill.

The 4th and 14th Corps advanced in the above order along the main road south through Calhoun, Adairsville to Kingston. The trains of each corps followed immediately in its rear until near Kingston where the trains of the 4th Corps upon approaching that place followed in rear of the 14th Corps. The 20th Corps moved on a road further to the east of the road taken by the 4th and 14th Corps and was

*This placing of the bulk of the cavalry in the center of a column of other troops seems inexplicable.
followed by its train. From Adairsville it marched on Cassville. The Army of the Ohio advanced on Cassville via Marsteller's Mill and was followed by its train.

The Army of the Tennessee reached Kingston via Maguire and Woodland. The advance from Woodland was made with the expectation of a battle at Kingston. The trains, with the exception of five wagons with ammunition which followed each brigade, were left at Woodland under escort.

Kingston and Cassville were entered without resistance on May 19th.

Kingston to Dallas

The army was now given a rest to replenish supplies and fit up. Supplies were immediately brought forward from Resaca and the task of preparing for a turning movement via Dallas was begun. The first cars with supplies reached Kingston on the 20th.

The order preparatory for this movement follows:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
In the Field, Kingston, Ga., May 20, 1864.
Special Field Orders

No. 9.
I. Major General Thomas will group his army in and around Cassville, Major General Schofield his at or near Pettit's Creek or along Nancy's Creek, and Major General McPherson his at Kingston and the fords and bridges across the Etowah in that vicinity.

II. Each army commander will use his cavalry and staff officers freely in the next two days in collecting information, making maps, etc., and in preparing for the next grand move, full details of which will in due season be made known.

III. The cars now run to our very camps. Each army commander will send to the rear all wounded and sick, as also all worthless men and idlers that have turned up on this march. He will then make
provisions to subsist his command independent of the railroad for twenty days.*

IV. The whole army must be ready to march by May 23, stripped for battle, but equipped and provided for twenty days. At the same time the wagon trains should rather be diminished than increased, as we can safely rely on getting much meat, and forage, and vegetables, in the country to which we propose to go.

V. The ration will be for troops, one pound of bread, flour or meal, beef on the hoof, two day's allowance of bacon per week, and sugar, coffee, and salt; four pounds of grain will be allowed each animal and no more. All else must be gathered in the country. Brigade quartermasters and commissaries will be instructed to forage and graze, but indiscriminate plunder must not be allowed.

By order of Major General W. T. Sherman:

L. M. DAYTON,
Aide-de-camp.

The movement started on the 23d, the order for which is inserted:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
In the Field, Kingston, Ga., May 22, 1864.
Special Field Orders
No. 11.

I. General McPherson will cause the 17th Army Corps, Major General Blair commanding, to march from Decatur to Rome and Kingston, and will garrison Rome with a force of about 2,000 men until further orders. General Thomas will garrison Kingston with a small force, say 1,000 men, well covered by earthworks or stone buildings. Resaca will be held strong, and will be the depot of supplies until further notice. Such stores and provisions will be kept forward at Kingston and Rome as can be moved by the wagons of the troops present and no more.

II. The several armies will move punctually to-

As a matter of fact the army was on about three-fourths rations of subsistence and one-half rations of grain for the 16 days following the beginning of this movement. (Report Chf. Q. M., page 696—Serial No. 109, R. R.)
morrow morning, provided, as heretofore ordered, by separate roads, aiming to reach the positions hereinafter assigned them in the course of the third day, and in the meantime each wing communicating freely with the center by cross-roads.

The Army of the Cumberland will move on Dallas by Euharlee and Stilesborough, the division of General Jeff C. Davis, now at Rome, marching direct for Dallas by Van Wert.

The Army of the Ohio will move for position on the left, via Richland Creek and Burnt Hickory or Huntsville. The Army of the Tennessee will move, via Van Wert, to a position on the right at or near the head of Pumpkin Vine Creek, south of Dallas.

III. Marietta is the objective point, and the enemy is supposed to be in force at Allatoona, but with cavalry all along the line of the Etowah. Henceforth great caution must be exercised to cover and protect trains.

* * * * *

By order of Major General W. T. Sherman:

L. M. DAYTON,
Aide-de-camp.

From the above it is seen that upon reaching Kingston the advance depot was not pushed forward from Resaca to that point but remained at the latter place, only sufficient supplies being sent to Kingston and Cassville to supply the army for the approaching movement. It was a wise precaution for General Sherman to leave his advance depot at Resaca, for he was about to uncover his line of communications. Resaca being farther to the rear was less likely to be attacked while at the same time if it should be attacked it could put up a very stubborn defense with the Oostanaula river on the south, and the aid of the strong fortifications which the Confederates had constructed for their defense of the place. A large amount of supplies was usually collected at Resaca — for the road between Dalton and Resaca was later
interrupted almost daily for a period of 20 days during which time the main source of supplies was Resaca alone.

No stand had been made by the Confederates at Kingston and naturally no fortifications had been prepared by them at that point. It would therefore have taken some time and a number of men to have properly prepared it for defense.

The wisdom of keeping the advance depot at Resaca is best shown by the quickness with which General Wheeler with his cavalry made his swoop down on Cassville and toward Kingston as soon as General Sherman had put his army on the march south of the Etowah. He succeeded in capturing and destroying some wagons belonging to the Army of the Ohio which had been delayed at Cassville in refilling and were left behind when the army moved.

From Special Field Orders Nos. 9 and 11, Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, it will be remembered that the Army of the Cumberland was to concentrate in and around Cassville. Its first objective was Dallas, which it was to reach via Euharlee and Stilesborough.

The first day's march (23d) took it to the vicinity of Euharlee Mills, the 20th Corps crossing the Etowah at Milame's bridge and 4th Corps crossing at Gillem's bridge. The 20th Corps started at 4 a.m., being followed at 8 a.m. by the 4th Corps.

The 14th Corps marched at 8 a.m., crossing the Etowah at Island Ford.

The movement was covered by the 1st Division Cavalry, which marched at 4 a.m. and crossed the Etowah at Island Ford.

The march order of the 20th Corps in this movement is inserted as it gives a very clear idea of the order of march of the corps on this day:
ORDERS:

The corps will march at 4 a.m. tomorrow in the following order, to wit: The First Division, Third Division, and Second Division. Commanders are enjoined to have all their troops well closed, and, when practicable, have their commanders march abreast of them. The forest and the cleared fields of the district through which our march lays generally admit of this mode of marching. Whenever halts are made for rest the trains will be habitually parked, and if for encamping they will at once be thrown into park, leaving the road open for the divisions which follow. By a careful adherence to this practice we will be able to make our marches comparatively secure, quick, and satisfactory. In the march of tomorrow it is intended that the supply trains march in rear of the column under charge of the chief quartermaster of the corps. The ammunition and all other trains follow their respective divisions.

By order of Major General Hooker:

H. H. PERKINS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

From it we see that the division supply trains assembled under charge of the corps quartermaster marched in rear of the corps while the ammunition and regimental trains of each division followed immediately in rear of its division. It also brings out the method adopted to shorten the length of the column by marching in line of brigades in column of fours where practicable.

The Army of the Cumberland continued the march on the 24th, May, in order of 20th, 4th and 14th Corps. The 20th camping at Burnt Hickory, with the 4th and 14th Corps echeloned in the road in rear.

On the 25th the advance on Dallas was continued, the 20th Corps moving by three roads, a division on
each, while the 4th and 14th Corps moved by a road farther to the right of the 20th Corps.

Upon reaching the vicinity of Owen's Mill, General Hooker (20th Corps) being convinced that the stronger force of the enemy was in the direction of New Hope Church, changed the direction of march of this corps on that point. The enemy was soon encountered. General Sherman ordered General Hooker to attack and develop the enemy in his front. The action which resulted is known as that of New Hope Church.

On the morning of the 26th, May, the Army of the Cumberland was in position as follows: The 20th Corps (Hooker) deployed in front of New Hope Church with the 4th Corps (Howard) on its left.

Of the 14th Corps, the 1st Division was brought up in reserve, while the 3d Division was left to guard the supply trains which were parked on Pumpkin Vine Creek at the Burnt Hickory crossing (see route 3d Div. 20th Corps). The trains of the Army of the Cumberland remained in the above position during the subsequent operations of Sherman's Army which had for their object the extending of the line to the left.

The movements of the Army of the Tennessee will next be considered. It concentrated preparatory to the movement at Kingston. Its orders were to move on Dallas via Van Wert. In the march on the 23d the 15th Corps was in advance and crossed the Etowah at Wooley's Bridge.

The march order of the commander of the 16th Corps is here given:

HEADQUARTERS LEFT WING, 16TH ARMY CORPS
Special Field Orders, Near Kingston, Ga.,
No. 7. May 22, 1864.

VI. The order of march for 23d instant will be as follows:
First. Second Division following the Fifteenth Army Corps (whose advance moves at 6 a.m.), with one ammunition wagon to each regiment and battery following the division.

Second. Fourth Division, with one ammunition wagon to each regiment and battery following the division.

Fourth. Brigadier General J. C. Veatch will guard the trains with one brigade, a portion of which will be distributed through the trains, the balance in rear. Great care will be taken to keep trains closed up and vigilantly guarded, and at all long halts teams will mass in open fields under cover of the column.

Fifth. Two companies of the Ninth Illinois will take the advance; the other companies will report to Lieutenant Colonel G. L. Godfrey, First Alabama Cavalry Volunteers, who will protect the flanks of the trains and watch closely our right flank.

By order of Brigadier-General G. M. Dodge:

J. W. BARNES,
Assistant Adjutant General.

In the march order of the 16th Army Corps for May 25th, are given instructions for the replenishment of the rations carried by the men. It follows:

"Seventh. The commissaries of the respective divisions will select from their supply trains wagons containing three days' rations for the troops, which will move immediately in the rear of ordnance trains accompanying each division. These rations will be issued to the command at the first opportunity during the day or night."

It is to be understood that generally in this corps all trains except the ambulance and ordnance trains were assembled and marched in the rear of the corps. The latter followed immediately in rear of their respective divisions.

On the evening of the 25th General McPherson's advance (15th Corps) had reached the vicinity of
Pumpkin Vine Church (probably near Taylor's Mill at the Pumpkin Vine Creek crossing of the Van Wert—Dallas road.) As it was expected to meet the enemy in force in front of Dallas on the following morning, the following preparations were made. The 16th Corps was brought up on the right of the 15th, so that the two corps might advance side by side on Dallas. The trains of the two corps except the ammunition wagons and ambulances were parked on the west side of Pumpkin Vine Creek as compactly as possible and left under a small guard. It is to be noted that Dallas is not over three miles from Pumpkin Vine Creek. Bringing the trains across the creek before the outcome of the present situation was known would therefore have been extremely unwise.

Dallas was entered with but slight resistance about 2 p. m. on the 26th of May, and the Army of the Tennessee took up a position to the west and south of the town at about a distance of one mile. It remained in this position until June 1st.

The supply trains which had been parked west of Pumpkin Vine Creek on the 26th during the advance on Dallas were brought across the creek on the 27th. After supplies sufficient for three days had been issued to the men these trains, together with with one-third the ordnance train, proceeded to the vicinity of the train park of the Army of the Cumberland at the Burnt Hickory crossing of Pumpkin Vine Creek. As to whether the trains parked at the point above mentioned the correspondence is not clear, for in General Sherman's order of May 28th for the extension to the left he directed that the supply trains of the Army of the Tennessee be parked at the bridge near Owen's Mill. The Army of the Tennessee was to take Hooker's place near New Hope Church in this movement. It was unable to do so and remained near Dallas until the 31st of May as already mention-
ed. It seems more probable, however, from the following order that the trains of the three armies were parked at the point before mentioned—the Burnt Hickory crossing of Pumpkin Vine Creek:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
In the Field, near Dallas, May 29, 1864.

Major Generals McPherson and Schofield:

I am directed by the general commanding to inform you that on Tuesday next General Thomas will send to Kingston a train of empty wagons, under escort of one brigade, for the purpose of bringing forward supplies. General Sherman desires you likewise to make up a train and send it at the same time; one regiment will be sufficient guard. Send back in these wagons all your sick and wounded proper to go to the rear, and have your commissary and quartermaster notify the chief commissary and quartermaster of the army the proper proportion of supplies needed, in order that they may be brought forward to Kingston by railroad. Instruct the officer in charge of your train to avail himself of the movements of General Blair* to return to your command under cover.

I am, with respect, yours, truly,
L. M. DAYTON,
Aide-de-Camp.

June 1st to 5th

The movement of the Army of the Ohio will now be brought up to date.

It concentrated in the vicinity of Pettit’s and Nancy’s Creeks, and crossed the Etowah near Etowah Cliffs on the morning of the 24th.

Due to a misunderstanding supplies were late in being sent forward to General Schofield and consequently when he took up the advance on the 23d, part of his supply trains remained unfilled. These

*General Blair was the commander of the 17th Army Corps (Army of the Tennessee), which was en route to join Sherman.
were left behind at Cass Station to be filled and then follow the army. General Stoneman’s Cavalry Corps was left as guard for the trains until they had crossed to the south bank of the Etowah. His orders were to cover the roads from the east of Cass Station as well as all the roads from the east to Etowah Cliffs. Two regiments of infantry were left for the immediate guarding of the trains.

These dispositions, however, did not prevent General Wheeler, who had been sent on reconnaissance with a strong force of Confederate cavalry, from eluding General Stoneman and burning a wagon train on the Road from Cass Station to Kingston.

The Army of the Ohio reached the vicinity of Burnt Hickory on the afternoon of the 25th where it rested until 5 p. m. Upon hearing that Hooker’s advance guard had encountered the enemy it moved forward, with the exception of Hovey’s Division left as guard for the trains, via Burnt Hickory to Owen’s Mill. It was greatly delayed on account of Hooker’s trains blocking the road.

By 5:30 a. m. May 26th, the head of the column had reached Owen’s Mill. General Sherman directed it to take position on the left of the 4th Corps in the vicinity of Brown’s Mill. At 11:30 a. m., May 26th, it was in the position above indicated.

The train of the Army of the Ohio was parked near that of the Army of the Cumberland.

On the 31st, May, the positions of the armies were as follows:

The Army of the Tennessee in front of Dallas.
The Army of the Cumberland in front of New Hope Church,
The Army of the Ohio on the left of the Army of the Cumberland.

On the 1st of June the Federal army shifted bodily to the left, bringing McPherson in front of
New Hope Church (Thomas’ former position). The Union cavalry seized Allatoona. Apparently the trains of the three Federal armies did not change position although it seems that a corresponding movement of the trains would have been advisable, especially as regards McPherson’s trains. That this necessity was recognized even though the orders were not issued until rather late, is apparent from the following order of McPherson:

Near New Hope Church, June 1, 1864.
Brigadier-General Veatch,
Commanding Division.

On relieving General Garrard, commanding cavalry, from duty of guarding the trains, you will proceed to make a thorough examination down Pumpkin Vine Creek to see if a better and more secure place can be found in which to park them. Since our recent movements (they are) too near our flank, and should be carried around more nearly opposite the center of our line. From the map which I enclose herewith I should say along Raper’s Creek, on this side of Pumpkin Vine, would be the best place for the present. It may be necessary to open roads and construct bridges, but you can have it done, and you may succeed in finding some fresh fields for pasture. See Lieutenant-Colonel J. Condit Smith, chief quartermaster. He will give you all the assistance in his power. A good road should be opened from the new position of the corral to the present camp.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JAS. B. McPHERSON,
Major-General, Commanding.

The sending of the Federal cavalry to Allatoona and the consequent exposure of General Sherman’s right flank led to some concern for the safety of those trains of McPherson’s army that had been sent back to Kingston to refill. This is evident from the following report:
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
In the Field, near Dallas, June 3, 1864.
Major-General Thorne,
Commanding Army of the Cumberland.

General: General McPherson reports his trains back all safe from Kingston. I suppose yours also are back or about Burnt Hickory, in which case the wagon escort is near enough to be counted present. If so, I wish you to send a brigade of infantry, section of artillery, and such dismounted cavalry as Colonel McCook can spare, up on the Allatoona road to the forks of the Acworth road; and along it to Allatoona Creek, where there is reported a good bridge and ford, to guard and hold that point. I want also a line of couriers to Allatoona, which for the present had better be by Burnt Hickory. Keep your prisoners busy on roads to Allatoona and Burnt Hickory.

Yours, truly,
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

As showing the need for this general movement to the left and for the possession of Allatoona Pass and the railroad to Acworth, the following orders are of interest:

ALLATOONA, GA., June 3, 1864.
(Received Kingston, Ga., 4th.)

Lieutenant R. H. Humphrey,
Acting Quartermaster, Cavalry Command:

General Sherman directs that forage for the horses and rations for the men (2000 of each) belonging to this command be sent by rail, if possible, or if not by rail by teams at once, to Etowah bridge; also that the railroad be completed up to this point at once, and the same with the telegraph. You will advise Colonel Wright, or the superintendent of the military road, and the superintendent of the U. S. military telegraph, and the officer in charge of the railroad transportation of the wishes of General Sherman, and say to them that I am directed by him to notify them of his wishes. My men and horses are entirely without anything to eat. The railroad and
telegraph wire are both complete as far as Acworth, except the Etowah railroad bridge, and the country in our rear is entirely clear of the enemy. General Sherman directs that every effort shall be made to complete the railroad up to this point at the very earliest possible period.

GEORGE STONEMAN,
Major-General.

P.S. —Send dispatch in my name to Colonel Wright and get a telegraph operator to come here at once.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
In the Field, June 4, 1864—9:30 P.M.
Major-General Thomas,
Commanding Army of the Cumberland.

General: Lieutenant Tucker, of your headquar-
ters guard, just from Kingston, comes to me to know about the train now loaded at Kingston ready to start. I think the train can safely come to you via Euharlee, Stilesborough, Allatoona, and down the road till it meets you at some point on the road from Allatoona to Marietta, and you may instruct it to take that route. It need not even cross the Etowah at the Free Bridge, but come via the railroad bridge, provided you have a bridge of boats to send there. I regard the road hence to Allatoona safe now and thence to Kingston, the only difficulty being at the Etowah River. I think that two of Garrard’s regi-
ments could patrol the country south of the Etowah, and he should remain in Allatoona Pass until McPherson gets in front, which I expect the day after to-
morrow. These rains will make the country very soft, but will affect the main roads less than the smaller side roads. Therefore, your large trains would do better to come around by Allatoona. Colonel Wright should be at work on that railroad bridge. This rain will also delay Blair, though I have two staff officers at Rome to urge him forward. I am not certain that he is even yet in Rome. He was not yesterday. I am certain that we should move our entire army over to the railroad about Acworth and Andersonville at once, for Joe Johnston is shrewd
enough to see that we have begun such a movement, and will prepare the way.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

On June 5th and 6th McPherson's and Thomas' armies moved in the order named from right to left, passing in rear of Schofield and taking up position across the railroad near Acworth.

General Sherman's order for the movement follows:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
In the Field, on Little Allatoona Creek, June 4, 1864.
Special Field Orders
No. 18.

I. To-morrow, June 5, unless the enemy display more force and activity than now, Major-General McPherson will send his wagons to Burnt Church on the Allatoona road, by a road to the rear of Major-General Thomas' road, and move with his command by both roads to a point north of and near Burnt Church, ready the next day to move to Acworth, leaving his wagons behind Allatoona Creek.

II. Major-General Thomas will refuse his right behind the creek on which Brow's Mill is located, and will prepare to move across Allatoona Creek to a point on the railroad in front of Acworth, say Big Shanty.

III. Major-General Schofield will strengthen his position and so dispose his wagons as to follow Major-General Thomas, and with his troops cover his movements and occupy the point on Allatoona Creek north and east of his present position.

IV. Allatoona will be the point of supply as soon as the railroad bridge can be completed; and, in the meantime, all trains and detachments at Kingston or Burnt Hickory will be directed to Allatoona, to which end Major-General Thomas will send his pontoons
there, to be laid down until the pier and railroad can be rebuilt.

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman:

L. M. DAYTON,
Aide-de-Camp.

General McPherson's order for the movement is as follows:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT AND ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE
Near New Hope Church, June 5, 1864.

Special Field Orders

No. 30.

I. In accordance with instructions from Major-General Sherman, the following movements will take place today, march to commence as soon as practicable.

1. Major-General Logan, commanding Fifteenth Army Corps, will move to the vicinity of Burnt Church, and one division, if possible, without wagons or artillery, will be pushed forward to the bridge across Allatoona Creek, near Acworth, where Major-General Thomas has a brigade. Two divisions of the Fifteenth Army Corps will march by the main road which runs substantially parallel to the enemy's line; the other division will march by a road which runs in rear, guarded by Captain C. B. Reese.

2. Brigadier-General Dodge, commanding Left Wing, Sixteenth Army Corps, will move his command to vicinity of Burnt Church, Brigadier-General Sweeney's division, and Brigadier-General Fuller's brigade, of Veatch's division, following the rear road taken by one division of the Fifteenth Army Corps. The other brigade of General Veatch's division will follow the road taken by the wagon train and act as a rear guard.

3. The trains will be pushed ahead as fast as possible to Burnt Church, under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel J. Condit Smith, chief quartermaster, and all the sick and wounded will be moved to same point under general supervision of Surgeon Moore, Medical Director.
4. Headquarters will be tonight in the vicinity of Burnt Church.

III. The command will move to Acworth tomorrow, Major-General Logan, commanding Fifteenth Army Corps, having the advance, marching at 6:00 A.M. Brigadier-General Dodge will follow, keeping one brigade in rear of the trains as guard.

By order of Major-General James B. McPherson:
WM. T. CLARK,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

General Thomas' order is as follows:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND
Brown's Mill Creek, Ga., June 5, 1864.

Order of march for June 6, 1864:

I. The Twentieth Army Corps will move at daybreak across Mason's Bridge, over the Allatoona Creek, and take up a position on the ridges in the angle between the road to Big Shanty and the one leading south, to the east of Lost Mountain, right resting on Allatoona Creek.

II. The Fourteenth Army Corps will follow the Twentieth, and take up a position across the Sandtown and Marietta road and the road leading from Maloney's and Moore's Station.

III. The Fourth Corps will follow the Fourteenth, turn to the left after crossing Mason's Bridge upon the road leading to Acworth, distant four miles, and take up a position holding that road and the Sandtown and Marietta road.

IV. The First Cavalry Division will remain in its present position, whence Colonel McCook will send out pickets upon the roads converging upon the front of the army.

V. The roads will be left for the artillery and wagons, the troops marching through the fields parallel to the road. The wagons will follow the troops in order of corps, and park in rear of them.

VI. Department headquarters will be somewhere in the vicinity of Maloney's. The large train
sent to Kingston left that place today for Acworth via Euharlee and Stilesborough.

By command of Major General Thomas:

WM. D. WHIPPLE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Allatoona the New Advance Depot

By June 6th the armies were in their positions from right to left as follows: Schofield, Thomas, McPherson. Johnson had also shifted his lines to the east and was now holding the line Lost Mountain—Brush Mountain, confronting General Sherman.

That night General Sherman reported from Acworth:

"We have turned Allatoona Pass and reached the railroad at this point seven miles east of Allatoona Pass, and have full possession of all roads seven miles farther east to within six miles of Marietta."

His orders with reference to his change of the line of communications back to the railroad are as follows:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
In the Field, Acworth, Ga., June 6, 1864.

Special Field Orders

No. 20.

Major General Blair's command is at Kingston and a good pontoon bridge is laid over Etowah River at the railroad crossing. The general commanding believes the enemy has gone across Chattahoochee River, though all must be prepared for battle at or near Kenesaw Mountain. The following dispositions will be completed and the army ready to move on lines to be hereafter designated by Thursday morning, June 9, at 6 a.m.:

I. Major General Thomas will continue to provide a garrison at Kingston, which, however, will cease to be a depot, but all stores will hereafter be kept as near Allatoona as possible until the railroad
bridge is done, when Allatoona will be the main depot, Resaca being discontinued. The two road bridges across the Etowah, near Kingston, will be stripped of their planking and be guarded by cavalry. The fords of the Etowah will also be patrolled by cavalry, and Major General Thomas will keep a small cavalry force at some convenient point to patrol the country south of the Etowah.

II. Major General McPherson will cause one regiment to guard the railroad bridge now under construction near Allatoona, and the balance of a brigade to hold the mountain pass of Allatoona. Two or more good strong earth redoubts will be located at the eastern extremity of this pass, and must be constructed by the troops; but the commanding officers at Kingston, at the railroad bridge, and at Allatoona will arrest and put to work on these redoubts all soldiers loafing about pretending to seek their regiments and all skulkers or men sent by corps commanders or provost-marshal's to work as a penalty. Captain Poe, chief engineer, will lay out the traces of these works and give instructions as to details.

III. On Thursday morning at daylight Major General Stoneman will be on the right, reporting with all his effective cavalry to Major General Schofield, and General Garrard will be on the left, reporting with all his effective force to Major General McPherson. The utmost care must be taken to graze all horses and mules at every chance. The growing wheat, oats, and rye, if used in moderation and frequently, will not injure a mule or horse.

IV. The whole army must be ready to move at daylight Thursday, supplied for ten days, all empty and surplus wagons to be sent back to the neighborhood of Cartersville and Etowah bridge.

By order of Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman:

L. M. DAYTON,
Aide-de-camp.

Supply Arrangements, June 7-27

He elsewhere expresses his intention of having established "a place of issue" at Acworth as soon as
the railroad through Allatoona was in operation. Allatoona was, however, to be his main advanced depot, and was to be "strongly fortified".

Between June 7th and 12th the Federals gradually forced the Confederates back toward the main position on Kenesaw Mountain. On the 12th General Sherman issued the following order, which tends to show that the railroad to Acworth and Big Shanty was now open and that both stations were being used for the issue of supplies:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
In the Field, Big Shanty, June 12, 1864.

Special Field Orders  
No. 24

I. During the temporary stay of the army at or near its present locality, the Army of the Tennessee will draw their supplies from the Big Shanty depot; the Army of the Cumberland from Acworth, and the Army of the Ohio from Allatoona.

II. The ration prescribed for men and horses in Special Field Orders, No. 9, was designed for troops operating at a distance from railroad, with the use of wagons or pack animals only. When the army is on a railroad, or near it, the chief commissary and quartermaster may increase the allowance according to the capacity of the railroad for supply.

By order of Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman:

L. M. DAYTON,
Aide-de-camp.

From then on until the battle of Kenesaw Mountain on June 27th, the relative positions of the Federal armies remained unchanged although the right (Schofield) was gradually extended and pushed forward till the entire Union army was facing more nearly east with its center (Thomas) opposite and almost directly west of Kenesaw Mountain. During this period it seems probable that McPherson continued to draw his supplies from Big Shanty and
Thomas from Acworth. It seems probable that as Schofield pushed forward, his line of supply was shifted to Acworth instead of continuing back by road to Allatoona as originally directed in Sherman's orders of June 12th. Later on, Big Shanty became the point of issue for all the armies.

As showing the state of affairs generally up to this period, the following letter of General Sherman is particularly interesting:

In the Field, June 18, 1864.

(General U. S. Grant)

Dear General: I have no doubt you want me to write you occasionally letters not purely official, but which will admit of a little more latitude than such documents possess. I have daily sent to Halleck telegraphs which I asked him to report to you, and which he says he has done. You, therefore, know where we are and what we have done. If our movement has been slower than you calculated I can explain the reason, though I know you believe me too earnest and impatient to be behind time. My first movement against Johnston was really fine, and now I believe I would have disposed of him at one blow if McPherson had crushed Resaca, as he might have done, for then it was garrisoned only by a small brigade, but Me. was a little over cautious lest Johnston, still at Dalton, might move against him alone; but the truth was I got all of McPherson's army, 23,000, eighteen miles to Johnston's rear before he knew they had left Huntsville. With that single exception McPherson has done very well. Schofield also does as well as I could ask with his small force. Our cavalry is dwindling away. We cannot get full forage and have to graze, so that the cavalry is always unable to attempt anything. Garrard is over-cautious and I think Stoneman is lazy. The former has 4,500 and the latter about 2,500. Each has had fine chances of cutting in but were easily checked by the appearance of an enemy. My chief source of trouble is with the Army of the Cumberland, which is dreadfully slow. A fresh furrow in a plowed field
will stop the whole column, and all begin to intrench. I have again and again tried to impress on Thomas that we must assail and not defend; we are the offensive, and yet it seems the whole Army of the Cumberland is so habituated to be on the defensive that, from its commander down to the lowest private, I cannot get it out of their heads. I came out without tents and ordered all to do likewise, yet Thomas has a headquarters camp on the style of Halleck at Corinth; every aide and orderly with a wall-tent, and a baggage train big enough for a division. He promised to send it all back, but the truth is everybody there is allowed to do as he pleases, and they still think and act as though the railroad and all its facilities were their's. This slowness has cost me the loss of two splendid opportunities which never recur in war. At Dallas there was a delay of four hours to get ready to advance, when we first met Johnston's head of column, and that four hours enabled him to throw up works to cover the head of his column, and he extended the works about as fast as we deployed. Also here I broke one of his lines, and had we followed it up as I ordered at daylight, there was nothing between us and the railroad back of Marietta. I ordered Thomas to move at daylight, and when I got to the point at 9:30, I found Stanley and Wood quarreling which should not lead. I'm afraid I swore, and said what I should not, but I got them started, but instead of reaching the Atlanta road back of Marietta, which is Johnston's center, we only got to a creek to the south of it by night, and now a heavy rain stops us and gives time to fortify a new line. Still I have all the high and commanding ground, but the one peak near Marietta, which I can turn. We have had an immense quantity of rain, from June 2 to 14, and now it is raining as though it had no intention ever to stop. The enemy's cavalry sweeps all around us, and is now to my rear somewhere. The wires are broken very often, but I have strong guards along the road which make prompt repairs. Thus far our supplies of food have been good, and forage moderate, and we have found growing wheat, rye, oats, &c. You may go on with the full assurance that I will continue to press Johnston as fast as
I can overcome the natural obstacles and inspire motion into a large, ponderous, and slow (by habit) army. Of course it cannot keep up with my thoughts and wishes, but no impulse can be given it that I will not guide.

As ever, your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN.

On June 20th General Sherman became somewhat worried about his communications to the rear. At any rate on that date he issued the following order:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
In the Field, June 20, 1864.

Major General Thomas,
Commanding Army of the Cumberland.

General:

It is manifest the enemy is maneuvering on our communications and is reaching as far back as Dalton and Cleveland. I have ordered General McPherson to call up the division of John E. Smith from Huntsville to take post at Kingston. That will give Steedman three good strong detachments along the Etowah, at Rome, Kingston, and Allatoona. I have also instructed him to send to Rome a regiment of Alabama cavalry that is hanging round here of no use, with orders to scout across the Tennessee at Guntersville, toward Gadsden, etc. Now as soon as these changes can be made, and they will be initiated at once, you had better give Lowe all the cavalry now back of the Etowah and keep him off along the Tennessee road from Cartersville, Spring Place, etc., with orders at his discretion to venture out to Ellijay, Dahlonega (sic), etc. General Steedman was here last night and has returned. He needs train guards, and I have also ordered you to supply him 1,000 men, which is the equivalent of the present garrison of Kingston, which will be relieved by John E. Smith's division as soon as it can come from Huntsville.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN,
Major General, Commanding.
To show how General Sherman took full advantage of his railroad communications in order to rest his transport animals the following extract of an order issued on June 20th is quoted:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
In the Field, Big Shanty, Ga., June 20, 1864.
Special Field Orders, No. 27.

III. There is abundance of fine forage and grass in the valley of the Etowah and Oostenaula, and army commanders will collect all the stock, horses, mules, etc., that are useless in this army and a tax on its forage, and send them to one or other of the detachments guarding the railroad. No forage should be issued to horses at the front, unless they are good artillery and cavalry horses, or the horses of officers whose duties require them to be mounted. The special attention of quartermasters and inspectors general is called to this subject.

By order of Major General W. T. Sherman:

L. M. DAYTON,
Aide-de-Camp.

To show what great attention General Sherman paid to questions of supply, the following order, issued the day before the assault on Kenesaw Mountain when most generals would be thinking of little but the contemplated attack, is quoted:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
In the Field, near Kenesaw Mountain, Ga., June 26, '64.
Special Field Orders, No. 29.

I. The question of supplies to an army of this size is one of the greatest possible importance, and calls for a most rigid economy. By comparing issues by the commissary department and the reports of army commanders of effective strength for duty, which embraces officers as well as men, it is found
that a quantity of provisions is issued daily equal from 50 to 75 per cent. over the effective strength. This proportion is entirely too large in our present situation, and either the quantity must be reduced or the number of non-effectives be brought within reasonable limits by sending servants and others to the rear. Twenty-five per cent. is deemed a large and reasonable limit, and the chief commissary of the army in the field, as well as of all the garrisons and detachments dependent on the railroads south of Nashville, will see that issues are limited to that figure. The chief commissaries will be furnished with field reports from superior headquarters, and will call the attention of the proper commanding officers when requisitions exceed the number of men and officers for duty with 25 per cent. added.

II. When, from interruption to the railroads or any other cause, supplies cannot be had equal to this standard, the commissaries will make issues as near as possible for each ten days in advance, and must scale their issues so that all parts of the army receive a fair proportion of each article. When deficiencies occur in the bread or small rations, the commissary may increase the allowance of fresh beef, if on hand and the commanding general will approve the abstract of issues made in compliance with the order of substitution.

III. The effective strength of a brigade, division, corps, or army will be construed to mean officers and men present for duty, sick in quarters, extra duty men that are armed, and “in arrest or confinement.” Sick in hospital, unless there be a prospect of early recovery, should be sent to a post in the rear.

IV. Unarmed cooks, teamsters, pioneers, and laborers are the only proper non-effectives with the army. All other persons dependent on our supplies are useless mouths which we cannot afford to feed, and should be sent north of Nashville. Twenty-five per cent. is the maximum allowance for this class of non-effective but useful laborers specified, and even these should be armed; the teamsters especially should have muskets in strong loops to their wagons within easy reach, and cooks also might be armed.
All details for actual duty will be made on the basis of "effective strength," and if, on inspection, it be found any commanding officer reports an "effective strength" greater than he can immediately parade for battle, his report, return, or requisition for stores and provisions will be deemed a false report under the Articles of War.

By order of Major General Sherman:

L. M. DAYTON,
Aide-de-Camp.

The following order issued by General Steedman at Chattanooga on June 28th, illustrates in some measure the difficulties attendant upon getting supplies to the front and the necessity of guarding well the line of communications:

**HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE ETOWAH**

Chattanooga, Tenn., June 28, 1864.

General Orders}
No. 2.

I. The frequent depredations committed upon the communications between Bridgeport and the army in front as well as the barbarities practiced by placing torpedoes under the track to blow up trains containing sick and wounded soldiers and citizens demand the adoption of the most stringent measures to suppress these crimes and atrocities. To this end all citizens except Government employees found within three miles of the railroad from Bridgeport to the Federal army in Georgia, outside of the picket line of any post or station or troops after the 7th day of July, 1864, will be arrested and forwarded to these headquarters to be tried before a military commission as spies "found lurking" within the lines of the armies of the United States. All officers commanding troops within the district are charged with the execution of this order. Exceptions to this order will be made only by the general commanding the district or by superior authority upon the most conclusive evidence that the party applying to be excepted is of undoubted loyalty, and that it is for the interest of the Federal arms that the exception be made.
II. Commanding officers of posts and stations on the line of road mentioned in the foregoing paragraph will keep constant patrols on the road between their respective stations, who will carefully examine the track and all the bridges and culverts, and if any part of the road be found dangerous for the passing of trains they will signal and stop approaching trains and report the condition of the track to the person in charge of such train. Daily patrols will also be made over the territory from which citizens are excluded by the foregoing paragraph. Guards stationed at bridges will inspect them after the passage of each train, and see that all fire that may be dropped from the engine is extinguished, and that the track and bridge are unimpaired by the passing train. In like manner all tunnels will be inspected by the guards stationed to protect them.

III. When all trains, either railroad or wagon, or any battery, herd of cattle, mules, or horses arrive at any station, (if the commanding officer at that station) shall deem the guard accompanying such property insufficient for its protection he shall add to such guard a force sufficient, in his opinion, to protect it to the next station, where it will be relieved, if necessary, by a detail made in accordance with this paragraph, in each case reporting by telegraph to these headquarters the strength of such additional guard.

By command of Major General Steedman:

S. B. MOE,
Captain and Assistant Adjutant General.

The effective strength of Sherman’s transportation at this time was about 28,300 horses, 32,600 mules, 5,180 wagons and 860 ambulances. His troops numbered about 100,000.

Resaca continued to be the main depot on the line of communications until Allatoona was made secure. After that time Resaca became of comparatively little importance as a supply depot, while great efforts were made to accumulate a large and well guarded stock of supplies at Allatoona.
Supply Arrangements, June 28—July 3

Omitting any discussion of the unsuccessful battle of Kenesaw Mountain on June 27, we find that between June 28th and July 3d, "Thomas in the center, extended his line a little to the right; McPherson moved his army in rear of Thomas and formed it on his right; Schofield, with the right wing, moved down the Sandtown road and intrenched a line to the south of the Confederate position; Stoneman's cavalry reached the Chattahoochee near Sandtown. Johnston withdrew to a strong position at Smyrna, resting his flanks on Nickajack and Rotten-wood creeks." (Steele).

All ammunition trains were filled for this movement from the advance ordnance depot at Big Shanty. In connection herewith the indorsement on the following message is of interest and shows that its writer recognized the fact that, during the contemplated turning movement, the advance ordnance depot should preferably be at the main advance supply depot, and not at some less strongly guarded point in rear.

THOMAS' HEADQUARTERS, June 30, 1864.

Captain L. M. Dayton:

The ordnance depot at Big Shanty will be moved to the rear day after tomorrow, after all the trains are filled up. Where shall it be, Cartersville or Kingston? The former is preferable, if there are troops enough there to protect the property. Allatoona would not answer at all.

T. G. BAYLOR,
Captain, Chief of Ordnance.

(Indorsement)

Neither place will do. Allatoona or Resaca.

By direction of General Sherman.

The greater part of this general movement of Sherman’s armies to the right and south was based on the following:
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI

In the Field, near Kenesaw Mountain, Ga., July 1, 1864.

Special Field Orders

No. 31.

The object of the contemplated movement is to deprive the enemy of the great advantage he has in Kenesaw as a valuable watchtower from which to observe our every movement; to force him to come out of his intrenchments or move farther south. To obtain which end:

I. All army commanders will fill up their wagons at Big Shanty depot to the utmost capacity with provisions, ammunition, and forage. The chief quartermaster and commissary will give all necessary orders to clean out the depots in front of Allatoona, and so instruct that the locomotives and cars will come forward of Allatoona with great caution, and only when ordered by the chief quartermaster.

II. Major-General Thomas will hold the ground below Kenesaw as far as Olley’s Creek near Mount Zion, Major-General Schofield that from Olley’s Creek to the Nickajack, and General McPherson will move his train and troops rapidly in a single march and as little observed from Kenesaw as possible to the Sandtown road, and down it to the extreme right with one corps near the Widow Mitchell’s, another near Ruff’s Mills, on the Nickajack, and the third in reserve near the forks of the road.

III. General Garrard’s cavalry will cover the roads out of Marietta which pass north of Kenesaw and General Stoneman’s cavalry will occupy Sweet Water Old Town, coincident with the movement of McPherson. In case the enemy press Garrard back by superior and overwhelming forces he will send one of his brigades to the flank of General Thomas and with the others fall back gradually toward Allatoona, disputing every foot of the ground.

IV. Major-General McPherson will threaten the Chattahoochee River and also the rail road, and General Thomas will press the enemy close and at the very earliest possible moment break his lines and reach the railroad below Marietta. All movements
must be vigorous and rapid, as the time allowed is limited by the supplies in our wagons.

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman:
L. M. DAYTON,
Aide-de-Camp.

That General Sherman still had to act as his own chief commissary is shown by the following correspondence:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO
In the Field, July 2, 1864—9:00 P.M.
Major-General Sherman:
My command is supplied with bread for only three days. The others, I am told, have ten days supply. I have had trains waiting at the depot continually for the last six days. I will order back my empty trains early in the morning and do the best I can.

J. M. SCHOFIELD,
Major-General.

July 2, 1864.

General Schofield:
Don't order back your empty wagons, but have them loaded with bran, rice, hominy, sugar and coffee, and salt, and I will see, if the commissaries have slighted you in distribution of bread rations, that it be made good. I also think it will be safe for your wagons to remain at Big Shanty throughout tomorrow, as General Garrard's cavalry (Thomas' left) rear McPherson's column; will cover the place all day. At all events, your teams will have plenty notice in case of danger. Can soon gain the cover of Thomas' troops, which remain in position. The enemy evidently detected our movement, and therefore we must act quick. Johnston will either attack in the morning or draw his extreme right "back" to the Chattahoochee. I want his movements watched close to-night and early in the morning, and could form better opinion if I could hear from Stoneman. Do you know whether McCook is with Stoneman? McCook has artillery; Stoneman, none.

W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General.
Marietta to Atlanta

On July 4th Johnston withdrew to his intrenchments on the west side of the Chattahoochee covering the railroad bridge. In the meantime Thomas had pressed on southward through Marietta and McPherson had passed in rear of Schofield and down the Sandtown road to the Chattahoochee. Schofield then marched to the mouth of Soap Creek, north of Thomas' position and by the 9th had made a lodgment on the east bank of the Chattahoochee. On this day (July 9th) Johnston withdrew east of the river and McPherson was marching northward in rear of both Thomas and Schofield to the crossing already secured at Roswell by Garrard's cavalry.

During these various marches by the flank, each army was accompanied by its trains and apparently were supplied mainly by them. A new advanced depot was, however, early established at Marietta, and arrangements made by which supplies could be shipped right up to the rear of Thomas' army, as will be seen by the following order:

**HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI**

In the Field, near Chattahoochee River, July 10, 1864.

Special Field Orders

No. 32.

I. The division of General John E. Smith will occupy the Allatoona Pass, with a detachment at Kingston and Cartersville, and the brigade now at the Allatoona Pass will occupy Kenesaw Mountain and Big Shanty. The district of the Etowah will be extended to embrace the Kenesaw Mountain.

II. Each of the three armies will have one regiment at Marietta, of the average strength of 330 men for duty, to unload cars; the commanding officers to report for orders to the chief commissary, Colonel Beckwith, Marietta will be the grand depot, but the chief quartermaster may arrange to deliver...
stores in bulk at Ruff's or Vining's Stations, according to the facilities of the railroad.

III. Commissaries and quartermasters must keep ten days' supplies on hand at all times, without special orders to that effect, and the army must be ready for quick, prompt movement, as our future plans depend on the enemy.

By order of Major General W. T. Sherman:

L. M. DAYTON,
Aide-de-Camp.

For some days after a foothold was gained east of the Chattahoochee, stringent orders kept the supply trains "habituall on the west bank of the river." They were allowed to "cross the river to make issues" but directed to "return without unnecessary delay."

By July 18th Sherman's "army was all across the Chattahoochee with wagons full, carrying about ten days' supplies. In the hard fought battles that followed, the Federals repulsed the assaults of the Confederates at Peach Tree Creek, about Decatur and west of Atlanta.

To quote from the Chief Quartermaster of Sherman's Army: "Up to August 5 whatever stores were immediately wanted by the army were unloaded at the Chattahoochee River (the remainder being left at Marietta), at the point where the railroad bridge had stood before it was burned. Two wagon bridges had been built over the river by our troops and a pontoon bridge captured from the enemy. August 5 the railroad bridge was completed by the construction corps, and supplies were brought over the river and unloaded on the bank south of it. At that date we had twenty days' subsistence and twelve days' grain up with the army and the men were well clothed." (Report of General Easton, C. Q. M. page 698, R. R. Serial No. 109).

From this time on to the evacuation of Atlanta by
Hood on September 1st, there was no particular difficulty encountered in keeping Sherman's army well supplied in every way.